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This thesis proposes a realist analysis of the contemporary concept of popular 
sovereignty in its ability to make sense of the EU’s legitimacy. Drawing upon 
Bernard Williams’ political thought, a conception of legitimacy should make 
sense of hierarchical rule as a desirable civic order from within its own 
historical circumstances at the normative level. In addition, it should offer 
realistic guidance to political agents, meaning that its political fictions must 
therefore acquire a certain degree of practical resonance in order to act as 
heuristic tools. The modern concept of popular sovereignty sets appropriate 
criteria of legitimacy based upon the bonds created between citizens. Through 
a genealogical inquiry, I reconstruct conceptions of popular sovereignty which 
underpin defences of the EU’s output, democratic, and identitarian legitimacy 
from canonical arguments. These justifications of the state consider the 
people as beneficiaries of security and economic prosperity, as a self-
governing demos, and as a cultural nation, respectively. I propose a realist 
vindication of this multi-faceted conception of popular sovereignty at the 
normative level, because these different conceptions complement one 
another in making sense of the sovereign state’s legitimacy. The thesis then 
discusses how the political fictions of the people could simultaneously make 
sense within the European polity. In short, the citizens of Europe’s polities 
have become part of the normative systems which create judicial-economic, 
civic-democratic, and socio-cultural relationships within the territorial borders 
of the European states. In addition, the centralisation of decision-making 
power and implementation resources has given plausibility to the political 
fiction of sovereignty. European integration has, however, resulted in a 
reconfiguration of these normative systems and restructuring of power into a 
two-tier political order. In this novel context, a realist vindication of the 
contemporary conception of popular sovereignty is no longer possible. The 
thesis concludes by suggesting that a demoicratic reconceptualisation of 
popular sovereignty offers a constructive way to make sense of the EU’s 
legitimacy. 
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Chapter 1: A Realist Inquiry into Popular Sovereignty 
in Europe 
 
The European Union notoriously lacks a single European “people” able to 
close the “democratic deficit” between citizens and institutions. 
Margaret Canovan, The People, 354 
 
A genealogy is a narrative that tries to explain a cultural phenomenon by 
describing a way in which it came about, or could have come about, or might 
be imagined to have come about … After a certain point, or rather, various 
different points, we must turn to real genealogy - to cultural contingencies and 
to history.    
Bernard Williams, Truth & Truthfulness, 20; 39 
 
I - Introduction 
The EU’s alleged democratic deficit remains a topical issue in political, public, 
and academic debates. This thesis proposes a realist analysis of the 
contemporary concept of popular sovereignty in its ability to make sense of 
the EU’s legitimacy. Drawing upon Bernard Williams’ political thought, a 
conception of legitimacy should make sense of hierarchical rule as a desirable 
civic order from within its own historical circumstances at the normative level. 
In addition, it should offer realistic guidance to political agents, meaning that 
its political fictions must therefore acquire a certain degree of practical 
resonance in order to act as heuristic tools. The modern concept of popular 
sovereignty sets appropriate criteria of legitimacy based upon the bonds 
created between citizens. Through a genealogical inquiry, I reconstruct 
conceptions of popular sovereignty which underpin defences of the EU’s 
output, democratic, and identitarian legitimacy from canonical arguments. 
These justifications of the state consider the people as beneficiaries of 
security and economic prosperity, as a self-governing demos, and as a 
cultural nation, respectively. I propose a realist vindication of this multi-faceted 
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conception of popular sovereignty at the normative level, because these 
different conceptions complement one another in making sense of the 
sovereign state’s legitimacy. The thesis then discusses how the political 
fictions of the people could simultaneously make sense within the European 
polity. In short, the citizens of Europe’s polities have become part of the 
normative systems which create judicial-economic, civic-democratic, and 
socio-cultural relationships within the territorial borders of the European 
states. In addition, the centralisation of decision-making power and 
implementation resources has given plausibility to the political fiction of 
sovereignty. European integration has, however, resulted in a reconfiguration 
of these normative systems and restructuring of power into a two-tier political 
order. In this novel context, a realist vindication of the contemporary 
conception of popular sovereignty is no longer possible. The thesis concludes 
by suggesting that a demoicratic reconceptualisation of popular sovereignty 
offers a constructive way to make sense of the EU’s legitimacy. 
This introductory chapter unfolds as follows: I commence (section II) by 
arguing that the debate on the EU’s democratic deficit is fruitfully understood 
as one on the politically relevant relationship between EU citizens. From this 
perspective, popular sovereignty remains the central concept through which to 
make sense of the EU’s legitimacy. The next section (section III) introduces 
Bernard Williams’ political thought in the context of the (re)emergence of 
realism in normative political theory. Contemporary realists emphasise, firstly, 
the autonomy of politics as a distinct sphere of human endeavour and, 
secondly, the importance of actual politics for theory development. Williams 
connects these tenets in a distinct way in his realist theory of legitimacy in 
which political authority should make sense within its own historical 
circumstances. The subsequent section (section IV) explicates the argument 
and its contribution to the literature. This thesis appraises the normative 
commitment to popular sovereignty in making sense of the EU’s legitimacy 
through a realist lens. I propose that a realist inquiry informed by Williams’ 
thought offers a contribution to the existing debate(s). His perspective offers, 
firstly, a sophisticated understanding of the contemporary conception of 
popular sovereignty which governs debates on the EU’s democratic deficit. 
Secondly, this historicist approach clarifies its normative use in making sense 
Chapter 1: A Realist Inquiry into Popular Sovereignty in Europe 
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of the sovereign state, and why this conception no longer remains vindicated 
in making sense of legitimacy within contemporary Europe. Finally, I propose 
that a demoicratic conception of popular sovereignty could make sense of 
democratic legitimacy of the EU. After clarifying this contribution (section V), I 
introduce my genealogical method and the rationale behind its application. In 
short, I will inquire into the conceptualisation and institutionalisation of popular 
sovereignty in the European polity, before and after European integration, in 
the search for a realist appraisal of this political norm. The final section 
(section VI) illustrates how the overall argument unfolds in the rest of the 
thesis. 
 
II - The EU ‘democratic deficit’ as a question of popular sovereignty 
The twentieth century project of European integration could for a long time 
rely upon so-called permissive consensus. This most recent attempt at 
European integration stands out from its predecessors in virtue of its peaceful 
and voluntary nature. Europe’s sovereign states have progressively integrated 
into the Union through the acceptance of supranational laws and bureaucratic 
procedures (Zielonka 2008: 139). The peaceful emergence of a set of political 
institutions designed to pursue common objectives has been described as an 
unprecedented political achievement (Moravcsik 1998: 501). Lindberg and 
Scheingold (1970) coined the term permissive consensus to describe popular 
support for this rather elitist project. This support was based upon the 
prospect of beneficial outputs, such as peace and prosperity, in the aftermath 
of the Second World War. This consensus, however, seems to have 
deteriorated since the early 1990s.1 As Donald Puchala observes, 
“supranational decisions penetrate national societies and affect Europeans’ 
lives every day” (1999: 329). In this context, by raising fundamental questions 
about the future of European integration, the Maastricht treaty forced the 
democratic legitimacy of the European polity and its regime on the political, 
public, and academic agenda (Bellamy and Castiglione 2003: 7-8; Dobson 
2006: 511). This treaty was arguably a ‘precipitating factor’ for broader 
intellectual openness to critical evaluations of norms at the end of the Cold 
War (Dobson 2006: 513; see also Lacroix and Nicolaïdis 2010a: 10). Either 
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way, permissive consensus lost its legitimating force. The social sciences’ 
large register of tested legitimation strategies and taxonomies have been 
drawn upon to suggest solutions in theory (e.g. Beetham and Lord 1998; 
Føllesdal 2006) and in practice (e.g. Eriksen and Fossum 2004; Middelaar 
2009). These attempts to make sense of the EU’s legitimacy have, however, 
been to little avail and the debate persists. The current lack of popular 
acceptance of the EU’s authority has been described as a constraining 
dissensus (Hooghe and Marks 2009) and even as a crisis of democratic 
legitimacy (Marks 2012: 17).  
In academia, the theorem of the democratic deficit gave rise to an 
increasing number of normative reflections on European integration (Friese 
and Wagner 2002: 342): the so-called normative turn in EU studies (Bellamy 
and Castiglione 2003: 8).2 The broadly shared analysis behind the EU’s 
democratic deficit is that European institutions gained a degree of formal and 
informal autonomous decision-making powers without meeting the necessary 
criteria of legitimacy (e.g. Beetham and Lord 1998; Lord 2011). As we will 
see, however, theorists disagree about the criteria to be met. The normative 
debate on this real world problem reflects the lack of a shared evaluative 
framework for making sense of the EU’s legitimacy. A precondition for a 
stable political order is broad consensus between rulers and ruled on the 
appropriate criteria of legitimacy for a political order. One challenge facing the 
EU is the creation of a coherent understanding of the institutional realities of 
European governance (e.g. Schmidt 2004; Schmitter 2000; Zielonka 2006). 
This debate continues to grapple with Wallace’s famous analysis of the 
European Community as ‘less than a federation, more than a regime’ 
(Wallace 1983). Furthermore, in addition to its institutional complexity (Friese 
and Wagner 2002: 342; Zielonka 2007: 190), many uncertainties and 
disagreements continue to exist about the desirable institutional form of 
democratic politics in Europe (Eriksen and Fossum 2004: 435). This 
observation places the current reality in a temporal perspective in which 
legitimacy would materialise once an institutional aim has been achieved (see 
however Sternberg 2013; Weiler 2012). European political integration is 
arguably best understood as a transformation into a novel democratic polity 
(e.g. Bohman 2004; Friese and Wagner 2002: 353). The normative question 
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remains as to how to organize democratic rule within this elusive, but 
nonetheless emerging European polity (Lavdas and Chryssochoou 2011: 45-
47). 
Appropriate criteria of legitimacy for the Union have been sought in 
both classic statist models and novel sui generis models. Andrew Moravcsik, 
for example, argues in favour of the re-establishment of an intergovernmental 
regime (Moravcsik 2002), whilst others argue that the EU should become a 
federal democratic state (e.g. Bickerton 2011; Morgan 2005a). The former 
rejects the desirability of any move toward a post-national democratic order. 
The federalists, by contrast, interpret the current state of affairs as a phase 
toward the creation of a European federal state. They believe that a federal 
state is a desirable telos for the European project. This disagreement is 
primarily about the rightful place of sovereignty within the European polity 
(e.g. Bellamy and Castiglione 1997; Bowman 2006; Pélabay, Lacroix et al. 
2010). These approaches have, however, been deemed too statist and 
lacking sensitivity to the peculiarities of the emerging European polity (e.g. 
Friese and Wagner 2002; MacCormick 1997). A second strand of EU scholars 
argues that the sui generis character of the emerging European polity has to 
be taken seriously since the European polity has transformed from its statist 
form toward a unique type of polity (e.g. Bohman 2005; Cheneval and 
Schimmelfennig 2013; Dahl 1989; Nicolaïdis 2013). These theorists’ analyses 
focus on the social substrate of existing relations between citizens of the 
European polity (Friese and Wagner 2002: 343). The assumption is that the 
relationships between European citizens are not akin to the set of social, 
economic, and cultural relations within Europe’s national polities (Bellamy 
2013: 502). This analysis does not mean that democratic legitimacy is 
unattainable. Some argue that EU-citizens share an interest in the outcomes 
of European governance. Output legitimacy is therefore an appropriate 
criterion of legitimacy due to citizens’ interdependence upon one another for 
attaining economic prosperity (e.g. Majone 1996; Scharpf 1999). Others, by 
contrast, argue that democratic institutions fit in with EU citizens’ common 
commitment to democratic values, a European regime should, consequently, 
be democratic. Unlike Moravcsik and other intergovernmentalists, they argue 
that these democratic institutions do not require a European nation (e.g. 
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Bohman 2004; Habermas 2001). These theorists thus offer alternative political 
theories on appropriate criteria of legitimacy for the EU. The examples 
illustrate how contextual approaches disagree about relevant relationships 
between EU citizens, resulting in proposals which make sense of the EU’s 
legitimacy through different criteria.  
The concept of popular sovereignty grounds these theorisations of the 
legitimacy of the EU -- implicitly or explicitly -- because relationships between 
citizens inform the appropriate criteria of legitimacy. These relationships 
transform the denizens within Europe’s polity into a ‘people’, which constitutes 
the normative underpinning of a legitimate democratic European polity. In this 
context, popular sovereignty describes a normative logic of legitimacy in 
which an account of the people is essential in delineating appropriate criteria 
for evaluating the legitimacy of a political order. The appropriate criteria of 
legitimacy, therefore, can include outcomes, procedures, or other norms. An 
opposing group of theorists reject the need for an account of the people to 
make sense of the EU’s legitimacy. The people is not a conceptual necessity 
for legitimate democratic rule (e.g. Balibar 2004a; Bohman 2004: 320-321). 
The majority of statist solutions and sui generis theories, however, do rely 
upon communalities, or lack thereof, between citizens to make sense of the 
EU’s legitimacy. Richard Bellamy argues, for instance, that the scope of 
democratically legitimate rule is limited by the existing relationships between 
citizens which define them as a people (Bellamy 2013; see also White 2011), 
a claim which echoes broader political and public debates (Sternberg 2013). 
As this section has shown however, the appropriate conceptualisation of the 
people remains contested in Europe’s novel political landscape. I will argue 
that the broader commitment to statist conceptions of popular sovereignty 
contributes to the continued contestation of the EU’s legitimacy. Bernard 
Williams’ philosophy frames my realist inquiry into and appraisal of popular 
sovereignty in contemporary Europe, I will therefore introduce his political 
thought next.  
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III - Bernard Williams and Realism in Normative Political Theory 
Bernard Williams’ political thought has been an important catalyst for the 
current (re)emergence of realism in normative political philosophy. These 
realists have been characterised as ‘at first glance a ragtag band’ (Galston 
2010: 385) consisting of a variety of thinkers, such as ‘(low) liberals, left-
Nietzscheans, Machiavellians, and agnostic left-wing Schmittians’ (North 
2010: 381).3 Two tenets distinguish these political realists from other 
philosopher and theorists: (i) the autonomy of ‘the political’ as a space of 
conflict and power, and (ii) the importance of non-ideal circumstances of (real) 
politics for political theory (Baderin 2014; Mantena 2012: 455).4 These two 
central tenets of political realism clarify the assumptions and distinctiveness of 
Williams’ realist political thought. This brief introduction positions this thesis’ 
philosophical approach within the realist movement in normative political 
theory. Williams’ realist theory of legitimacy connects the two realist tenets in 
a distinct manner. In contrast to other normative approaches, Williams’ 
political realism offers a particularly fruitful approach for appraising our 
conceptions of popular sovereignty, in virtue of its function in making sense of 
the EU’s legitimacy. I will contrast political realism to other approaches to 
clarify Williams’ distinctiveness. 
The realist autonomy claim holds that political theory should treat 
politics as an autonomous sphere of human endeavour. This approach has 
historically been construed in opposition to both consequentialist moralist 
theories (driven by assessments of certain institutions’ ability to instantiate 
moral values) and neo-Kantian theories (driven by moral constraints on 
political action, often expressed in the form of a right to justification). Realists 
associate so-called political moralism, or ‘high liberalism’, with the work of the 
early John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, and Jürgen Habermas (e.g. Galston 2010; 
North 2010; Stears 2007). Their critique is not strictly about its normative 
desirability, but rather that these philosophies are not about the human 
endeavour of politics. To illustrate the logic of this argument, Michael 
Oakeshott argued that political theorization should draw out the conceptual 
framework of a particular thea – empirical phenomenon – without reducing it 
beyond recognition. The thea under investigation sets limits to the act of 
theorization (Oakeshott 2004). On the realist account, ‘the political’ should be 
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the thea under investigation in political theory. Realists claim that political 
moralists reduce politics to questions about morality or law rather than 
focusing on real practice of politics (Galston 2010: 386; Philp 2008: 394). A 
realist inquiry, by contrast, starts with an interpretive analysis of the thea of 
politics in order to set boundaries to their normative projects. 
This brings us to the two most fundamental features of the political, as 
defined by realists. According to them, the defining features of the so-called 
‘circumstances of politics’ (e.g. Elkin 2001: 1941; Williams 2005: 77-78) are 
coercion and conflict. Inevitable disagreement is a fact in every polity. 
Coercive structures constitute a ‘functional response’ to deal with it (Stears 
2007: 545). These coercive structures prevent civil war thereby creating a 
stable political order able to solve, or more likely alleviate, internal conflicts, 
and possibly even achieve common projects. This realist interpretation of ‘the 
political’ excludes two states of affairs as apolitical. On the one hand, this 
precludes civil war and anarchy, but also peaceful social relations, because 
they lack the coercive structures characteristic of the thea of politics. On the 
other hand, the suppression of all conflict through coercion within the polity 
also constitutes an apolitical state of affairs. In such a state of raw 
domination,5 rulers use coercion in violent and manipulative ways to enforce 
and even ‘legitimate’ their power. Rulers and ruled no longer form a political 
order. Instead, this situation has digressed into a civil war pitting rulers against 
ruled; politics becomes the problem it should alleviate. This dismissal of 
domination as apolitical alludes to an inherent normativity within the realist 
understanding of ‘the political’.6 The acceptable organisation of coercive 
power in political circumstances of unavoidable conflict becomes a central 
topic in normative realist theory; the question of legitimacy (Rossi and Sleat 
2014: 692-694). 
The second tenet of political realism is the claim that many theories 
have become too detached from real politics. This so-called detachment 
critique, in a nutshell, holds that Anglo-Saxon political philosophy often 
digresses into utopian daydreaming without any relevance to real politics (e.g. 
Hall Forthcoming: 2-4). This critique features prominently in the corollary 
debate on ideal and non-ideal theory (e.g. Erman and Möller 2013; Mills 2005; 
Philp 2008; Robeyns 2008; Schmidtz 2011; Simmons 2010; Stemplowska 
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2008; Valentini 2009; Ypi 2010). In classic Rawlsian terms, non-ideal theory 
should address the question of how to achieve ideal principles of justice 
without the assumption of full-compliance. The use of idealisations, false 
assumptions, and a lack of real world relevance have also been deemed 
useful to distinguish ideal theories from non-ideal ones (e.g. Stemplowska 
2008; Swift 2008; Valentini 2009). These differentiations are informed by 
several distinct, but interrelated criticisms of ideal theory (see Schmidtz 2011). 
Many contributors agree that there is a place for both. Some argue that ideal 
principles are a prerequisite for thinking about normative non-ideal theory 
(e.g. Stemplowska 2008; Valentini 2009; Ypi 2010).7 Political realists, 
however, are sceptical whether political theory can derive norms from outside 
the real practice of politics. 
Broadly accepted facts about human experience and historical context 
are constitutive for realist theorisations of politics. Realist political theory 
adheres to ‘the canons of logic’ and ‘rest[s] on [the] laws of nature’ (Galston 
2010: 403). Classic examples of realist assumptions about human psychology 
include Machiavelli’s argument about fear being a more stable assumption for 
rule than love and Madison’s assumption of self-interest in his institutional 
design of the modern commercial republic. Human psychology affects political 
practices, these pragmatic considerations should therefore be taken seriously 
in political theory (Williams 2005: 72-73). The realists are not necessarily 
advocating the status quo, because political beliefs and practices change. The 
imaginative act of a ruler can undo previously accepted conventions (Geuss 
2008), which implies that radical breaks are both possible and unpredictable 
(Wright 2007: 32).8 Friese and Wagner (2002) observe that many theorists in 
the  debate on the EU’s legitimacy do not explicitly address the relationship 
between ‘social context’ and ‘political form’. Those ascribing to the no-demos 
thesis, for example, have been prone to emphasise constraints (Friese and 
Wagner 2002: 344). The political form, however, is part of the institutional 
context. The constitutional order, for instance, can shape its citizens (e.g. 
Elkin 2001). Taking seriously the impact of new circumstances should prevent 
political realism becoming a deterministic defence of the status quo. Matt 
Sleat rejects mere status quo apologists (Sleat 2014) and even invokes, 
together with Enzo Rossi, the Althusserian adagium, “Be Realistic. Demand 
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the impossible” (Rossi and Sleat 2014). Despite being unable to predict the 
future, social scientific reflections can draw attention to particularly resilient 
features of social reality (Robeyns 2008: 350; Wright 2007: 32).9 Realists 
argue that political theories should remain sensitive to the specific 
circumstances in which political concepts have to govern political behaviour 
(Sangiovanni 2008). In principle, the concepts should be able to guide political 
practices (Hall Forthcoming). Therefore, as Zofia Stemplowska argues, a non-
ideal theory should address “the circumstances that we are currently facing, 
or are likely to face in the not too distant future” (Stemplowska 2008: 342). In 
a similar vein, a realist interpretation of possible change avoids social 
determinism and retains the normative potential of political realism (Valentini 
2009: 340-342). It is important to recognise, however, that this fact-sensitivity 
to the circumstances of (real) politics is an important, yet oft misunderstood 
tenet in Williams’ political thought.  
Contemporary realism in normative political theory is ‘fact-sensitive’ for 
a specific reason; political realists argue that normative theory should draw its 
norms from the practice of politics. Political realists consequently engage in 
normative political theory from a practice-sensitive perspective.10 They argue 
that other normative concerns are equally if not more relevant to political 
theory than morality (Jubb and Rossi Forthcoming - 2015). In a Machiavellian 
vein, some argue that morality is not applicable to political theory (Rossi and 
Sleat 2014: 691). Either way, the relevant normative considerations should be 
drawn from actual political practices. A philosophical question presents itself: 
why draw norms from political practice? A deeper implicit ontological 
consideration informs Bernard Williams’ realist commitments. Williams argued 
that this is necessary because our identities and our normative commitments 
are products of history (Williams 2000: 490-491). An individual’s conceptual 
understanding of the world is not a static given. Rather norms evolve over 
time, making the elaboration of a final answer impossible (Schmidtz 2011: 
783-790). Philosophy, therefore, has to commence in medius rebus from a 
particular historical understanding of normative concepts (see also Horton 
1992). In the case of political theory, the meaning of normative concepts 
should be drawn from political practices. To borrow Sangiovanni’s use of 
concept and conception (Sangiovanni 2008; 2013), theorists can posit an 
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abstracted account of a concept, such as justice. This concept relies upon the 
particular conceptions used in practices. The concept’s conceptual structure 
captures ‘family resemblances’ between actual historical instantiations: 
conceptions (see also Coicaud 2002). This ontological understanding of 
normative commitments informs Williams’ argument that real political 
practices should be taken seriously in normative political theory (Williams 
2000). Edward Hall persuasively argues that Williams’ realist thought resists 
categorisation into the ideal/non-ideal and fact-sensitive/fact-insensitive 
distinctions (Hall Forthcoming). Williams engages in ideal theory, but relevant 
norms are drawn from political practices within their historical circumstances. 
Yet these norms, in turn guide, should be able to guide political practice or 
they would make no sense to human beings as political conceptions.  
It is from this realist political philosophy that Bernard Williams 
developed his theory of legitimacy. I shall briefly introduce Williams’ theory of 
legitimacy to be able to better clarify my argument and its contribution to the 
literature. In this influential theory (e.g. Bavister-Gould 2011; Hall 2015; Sleat 
2010), Williams argues that modern politics faces the challenge of creating a 
civic order within a situation of conflict (Williams 2005: 1-17). Coercive 
hierarchical structures are necessary to create stability and avoid 
degeneration into civil war. These structures, however, can also become a 
threat to the civil order if the rulers use their power to dominate the ruled. In 
effect, the solution becomes part of the problem. Williams makes the point 
that rulers should offer legitimation stories to the disenfranchised to justify 
their authority (Williams 2005: 3-9).11 If sufficient number of citizens accepts 
these stories then the regime is legitimate. Legitimation stories, however, are 
more than mere justificatory devices on Williams’ account. He argues that 
citizens require legitimation stories to ‘make sense’ of their political reality. 
These hermeneutical tools turn the political order into a structure intelligible by 
citizens, thereby enabling them to evaluate its legitimacy. Williams’ account of 
legitimation stories implies that our conceptions of legitimacy emerge out of 
particular historical circumstances. These circumstances shape concepts into 
particular conceptions, because human beings have to contextualise these 
‘thin universal concepts’ to make sense of their specific political life-world.  
One consequence is that legitimation stories make sense ‘to us around here’. 
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‘Us around here’ implies that political concepts are particular to a set of 
individuals rather than the whole of humanity (Williams 2000: 483-484). This 
constituency does not have to be nationally or territorially bound, but rather it 
shares a cultural background in the anthropological sense. On Williams’ 
account of realist theory, political theorists should reconstruct political 
conceptions from the legitimation stories used when making sense of a 
particular order’s legitimacy (Hall 2014; Forthcoming). From this account of 
legitimacy, Williams proposes a genealogical method to appraise the 
normative function of our political conceptions (e.g. Williams 2004). In line 
with Edward Hall (Hall Forthcoming), I argue that this realist approach sets 
two criteria for the appraisal of political concepts; a normative vindication in 
virtue of offering a desirable answer to the first political question of 
establishing order, and second an appraisal of its plausibility in guiding 
political practise. This realist method, which I shall present later on, remains 
unexplored in the debate on the EU’s legitimacy. It can however, so I hope my 
thesis will convincingly show, offer a valuable contribution to the normative 
theoretical debates on the EU’s democratic deficit. The method enables a 
reconstruction of the dominant conceptions of popular sovereignty and allows 
their appraisal as functional tools for making sense of contemporary Europe’s 
political order. 
 
IV - The argument and its contribution to the literature 
The central claim of the thesis is that a continued normative commitment to 
popular sovereignty, when making sense of the EU’s legitimacy, cannot 
remain vindicated from a realist perspective. I argue that the continued 
normative commitment to contemporary conceptions of popular sovereignty 
undermines attempts to make sense of the democratic legitimacy of Europe’s 
contemporary political order(s). This political theoretical inquiry concludes with 
a proposal for a demoicratic conception of popular sovereignty. These 
conclusions derive from an extensive genealogical enterprise. I commence 
with a reconstruction of our contemporary conceptions of popular sovereignty 
from canonical arguments on the sovereign state’s legitimacy. These 
technocratic, democratic, and identitarian conceptions of popular sovereignty 
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clearly resonate with the three dominant criteria in the debate on the EU’s 
legitimacy – output, democracy and identity respectively. Each of the three 
conceptions relies on a distinct understanding of ‘the people’ with its implicit 
normative principle and conceptual border. The people are posited as 
beneficiaries of security and prosperity, as demos, and as nation. After this 
conceptual reconstruction of popular sovereignty, I firstly argue that the 
conceptions of popular sovereignty can be vindicated at the normative level 
and, secondly, that they could function as heuristic tools in Europe’s statist 
pre-integration polity. This multi-faceted conception of popular sovereignty is 
vindicated due to its ability to make sense of the sovereign state’s legitimacy 
within modernity’s enlarged polities. And further despite countries’ distinct 
trajectories, Europe’s territorial states offered boundaries for normative 
systems to institutionalise groups of people as beneficiaries, demos, and 
nation within their borders. The fictions of the people and sovereignty gained 
practical resonance within these circumstances. In the aftermath of the 
Second World War, however, the modern project of integration has 
significantly transformed the circumstances within which popular sovereignty 
has to function to make sense of the political legitimacy. Focussing on 
contemporary Europe, the boundaries between the normative systems which 
institutionalised national peoples as beneficiaries and demoi opened up in 
parallel with the creation of second tier of authoritative decision-making: the 
EU. Yet national public spheres still ground democratic will-formation 
processes and national identities in national polities. A multi-faceted 
conception of popular sovereignty is, so I conclude, ill-suited to making sense 
of contemporary political practices of rule. These conceptions are unable to 
make sense of Europe’s two-tier political order in circumstances of deep 
diversity. National peoples remain primarily bound by nationally organized 
systems, yet are nonetheless drawn into transnational relations as collectives. 
On the basis of this interpretation of the institutional bonds of collectivity, I 
suggest that a demoicratic conception of popular sovereignty could provide a 
fruitful avenue through which to overcome Europe’s democratic deficit. While 
this reconceptualisation constitutes a significant departure from the 
contemporary conceptual structure of popular sovereignty, it could realistically 
guide citizens in making sense of the EU’s legitimacy.  
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The guiding normative question is whether our contemporary 
conception of popular sovereignty can remain vindicated in the context of 
European integration. My thesis offers, through a genealogical method, a 
realist assessment of contemporary conceptions of popular sovereignty in 
their capacity to make sense of the contemporary European political order. 
This method reflects Williams’ historicist underpinnings in normative political 
theory. To clarify, I shall expand upon the aforementioned historical nature of 
our normative conceptions. As alluded to above, Williams argues that 
autonomous historical processes shape individuals’ understanding of the 
social world. Humans find themselves socialised in a specific context with 
their own specific meanings (e.g. Bevir 1996; Williams 2005; Wright 2010: 
22). This cultural-historical formation of meanings creates what Edward Hall 
has called the ‘realist constraint’ on political theory (Hall Forthcoming).12 
Political theory has to be sensitive to historical circumstances when 
reconstructing and appraising conceptual structures (Williams 2005: 75-78).13 
Edward Hall clarifies that this realist constraint is misconstrued as mere fact-
sensitivity. Instead, historical sensitivity reflects intellectual seriousness 
because concepts gain their determinate meaning in real (historical) practices. 
Therefore, unlike Dworkin, Williams does not propose to replace normative 
theory with history (Hall Forthcoming: 7-8).  A conception, however, is not 
vindicated simply because it was useful in the past. This is a conservative 
tendency found among certain strands of cultural conventionalists 
(Sangiovanni 2008: 144-146). Instead, the lesson to take from Wittgenstein’s 
anti-foundationalism, as Williams argued, is that parts of our social world can 
be critically condemned from positions within the cultural background 
(Williams 2005: 29-39).14 Realism thus maintains its critical potential. The fact 
that normative concepts are the product of contingent historical processes 
vindicates human beings as authorities to reject or accept norms upon 
reflection (e.g. Williams 2000; Williams 2004: 40). William’s political thought 
informs this thesis’ normative theoretical question; namely, whether the 
contemporary conception of popular sovereignty remains vindicated in 
contemporary Europe. 
This historicist account of our normative concepts informs a 
genealogical enterprise which might, to some, come across as rather 
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extensive for a thesis addressing a contemporary political challenge. To justify 
and clarify why this thesis reflects upon the ideas of popular sovereignty in 
relation to the formation of the modern state in four of its eight chapters 
(chapters 3 through 6), I turn to Williams’ realist criteria for the appraisal of our 
normative commitments. The objective of philosophy, according to Williams, 
has been summarised as follows: “we must reflect on where our commitments 
come from, how (if at all) we can make sense of them, and whether or not we 
should continue to use them in our first-order disagreements” (Hall 2014: 567-
568).15 This thesis’ genealogical enterprise aims firstly to reconstruct the 
conceptions of popular sovereignty used to make sense of the state’s 
legitimacy because, as Williams argues, a political concept is a ‘contingent 
historical deposit’ of ‘various conceptions and understandings’ (Williams 2005: 
75).16 My aim is to reconstruct those conceptions relevant to the current 
debate on the EU’s legitimacy; I therefore take the current debate as the point 
of departure. Leaving aside Europe’s diversity for now, normative 
commitments to our current conception of popular sovereignty have been 
shaped by the past. In the case of the popular sovereignty, they were used to 
make sense of the state, hence I turn to the concept’s statist past first. I hope 
that readers will bear with me on this genealogical enterprise. The more 
sophisticated understanding of how we make sense of the state’s legitimacy 
in relation to popular sovereignty is essential to appreciating the EU’s 
democratic deficit. The conceptual reconstruction focuses on ‘the people’ as 
the normative heart of popular sovereignty, a move vital to the subsequent 
institutional assessment of why these distinct statist conceptions of popular 
sovereignty contribute to the EU’s democratic deficit. This assessment reflects 
on the institutional political realities in which conceptions of popular 
sovereignty emerged in the European polity. The central claim is that three 
conceptions of popular sovereignty could make sense in Europe’s statist 
polity, when relationships between populations were contained within the 
territorial borders of Europe’s sovereign states. European integration, 
however, has significantly transformed the institutional landscape. These 
conceptions of popular sovereignty can no longer remain vindicated in their 
current constellation. The extensive genealogical enterprise is vital to laying 
the groundwork required to systematically reach this conclusion.  
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This thesis, however, also transcends Williams’ philosophical agenda 
because it also suggests a conception of popular sovereignty for novel 
European legitimation stories. The negative conclusion that contemporary 
statist conceptions of popular sovereignty cannot make sense of democratic 
legitimacy within the European polity is, arguably, somewhat unsatisfactory. 
More importantly, institutional analysis of the Union opens up some avenues 
for critical reflection. In line with Williams’ contemporary followers (e.g. 
Sangiovanni 2013), I propose my own conception of popular sovereignty 
based upon a realist interpretation of Europe’s institutional bonds of 
collectivity. Drawing upon my conceptual framework (chapter 2), I will use the 
final chapter to suggest a significant reconceptualisation of popular 
sovereignty, which once more makes sense of legitimacy within Europe’s 
polity. I propose that my institutional analysis (chapter 7) resonates strongly 
with the literature on a European demoicracy; the normative position that the 
Union should be understood as novel transnational or multilateral democratic 
order in which multiple peoples legitimate the overarching democratic regime 
(e.g. Bellamy 2013; Cheneval and Schimmelfennig 2013; Nicolaïdis 2013). 
Using Andrea Sangiovanni’s practice-dependent approach to concept 
development, I will offer a realist account of the institutional relationships, or 
‘bonds of collectivity’, existing within contemporary Europe. This interpretive 
analysis informs a demoicratic conception of popular sovereignty able to 
make sense of the legitimacy of Europe’s two-tier political order within 
circumstances of deep diversity. Finally, I will sketch how this conception 
could make sense of the legitimacy of the EU-institutions, developing my 
position through both constructive and critical arguments. Most importantly, 
the outcome of this analysis draws hopeful conclusions regarding a 
prospective legitimate democratic European polity. This thesis primarily offers 
a realist analysis of the role of popular sovereignty in the contemporary 
debate on the EU’s democratic deficit. It nonetheless attempts to offer a 
constructive contribution to this debate by proposing a demoicratic 
reconceptualization of popular sovereignty.  
The thesis contributes to the political theoretical literature on the EU’s 
democratic deficit, which has accurately been described as ‘crowded territory’ 
(Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2007).17 It can fruitfully be located within this 
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body in relation to its three distinct characteristics: its realist method, its focus 
on popular sovereignty, and its proposal for demoicratic popular sovereignty. 
The realist method is often misunderstood due to the many connotations 
carried by the term realism. This method is distinct from non-ideal 
approaches, because these approaches tend to start from an analysis of the 
institutional context to then formulate an appropriate normative principle to 
design political institutions. Williams’ realist method is, in the first instance, not 
about finding ideas that could align with institutional realities. It instead 
analyses the normative conception used in practices to make sense of the 
political order, because legitimacy cannot emerge if conception cannot guide 
practices. As a result, the normative question concerning political concepts, 
such as popular sovereignty, is whether our conceptions could act as heuristic 
devices which make sense of the legitimacy of a specific political order within 
its own historical circumstances. In line with this aim, this thesis primarily 
analyses the current conception(s) of normative concepts so as to appraise its 
functioning (or lack thereof) as a desirable heuristic device for making sense 
of the EU’s legitimacy. These other closely related non-ideal approaches are 
equally valid on their terms, but they are distinct from this realist approach, as 
are its outcomes.  
Aligning myself more with the non-ideal theorists in EU studies and 
neo-realists in normative political theory, I propose a new conception of 
popular sovereignty suited to Europe’s novel institutional context. To my 
knowledge, self-aware, Williams-inspired realists are almost completely 
absent from the literature on the EU. For my proposal, I draw upon the 
notable exception to this rule: Andrea Sangiovanni. He uses his practice-
dependent approach to concept development (2008) to offer a conception of 
solidarity suited to the EU (2013). Sangiovanni argues that politics should take 
precedence over morality, because a political order constitutes a precondition 
for legal, aesthetic, economic, and moral orders, to name a few. This logic 
informs his institutionalist approach to the analysis of relevant norms able to 
govern practices which are imminent in a regime’s design (Sangiovanni 
2008). He uses this approach to develop an appropriate conception of 
solidarity for the Union.18 In a similar vein, Williams theorises legitimacy for a 
non-state political regime of human rights (Williams 2005: 62-74). Whilst 
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drawing upon Sangiovanni, especially in the final chapter, my object of 
analysis is not solidarity (as a particular conception of justice), but popular 
sovereignty as a species of concept through which to make sense of political 
legitimacy (other than human rights). Of course, a particular conception of 
popular sovereignty might generate popular demands for justice, thus justice 
and legitimacy are not completely separate in theorising political norms. Still, 
my realist inquiry focuses on the normatively relevant relationships between 
European citizens in making sense of the EU’s legitimacy rather than 
theorising any duties of justice (or charity). Furthermore, Sangiovanni’s 
practice-based approach focuses on the regime’s constitutional documents in 
order to interpret appropriate conceptualisation of solidarity from the point and 
purpose of the (present) regime (Sangiovanni 2008; 2013). My inquiry 
reconstructs the contemporary conceptions of popular sovereignty from 
arguments predating European integration. This genealogical rather than 
purely institutional mode of theorising distinguishes my approach from 
Sangiovanni’s, if not necessarily in form at least in focus. That being said, 
Sangiovanni remains a source of inspiration, especially in the final chapter in 
which I explicitly use his method. The thesis uses this underexplored 
theoretical method to navigate an underappreciated topic: contemporary 
conceptions of popular sovereignty. 
The focus on popular sovereignty results in a substantive contribution 
to the normative theoretical literature on the EU’s democratic deficit. This topic 
has informed a wide array of reflections. The question of the appropriate 
institutional design has been particularly salient since the early 1990s. Many 
scholars of the Union have proposed (implicitly and explicitly) institutional 
models to guide the European integration process (e.g. Friese and Wagner 
2002; Horeth 1999). A democratic federal superstate, technocratic regulatory 
state, and intergovernmental regime are the prominent proposals for the 
Union associated with federalist, functionalist, liberal intergovernmental social 
science explanations of the integration process respectively (Schimmelfennig 
2004: 78). The focus on popular sovereignty shifts attention away from the 
institutions closely associated with the debates on the concept of sovereignty 
(e.g. Aalbers 2004; Avbelj 2014; Ham 2001). Some convincingly argue that 
European integration has been the official death sentence of sovereignty 
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(Bellamy and Castiglione 1997: 421). Yet one has to consider that de jure 
popular sovereignty is distinct from the more descriptive concept of de facto 
state sovereignty. Focussing on popular sovereignty, this thesis also 
contributes to the debates on constituent power in international political theory 
(Patberg 2013). In these debates the people rather than the institutionalisation 
of (sovereign) power forms the point of departure for philosophical reflections 
on legitimacy. From this perspective, the form of coercive structures should 
follow from an account of the authority of the people. In line with this 
‘trailblazing debate’ (Patberg 2013: 224), I inquire into popular sovereignty 
within one particular context: the European polity.  
Commitment to the normative payoff of a demoicratic conception of 
popular sovereignty locates this thesis in the literature on the EU as a 
demoicracy. This ideal has recently gained salience in the normative literature 
on the EU (e.g. Bellamy and Castiglione 2013; Besson 2006; Bohman 2005; 
Cheneval and Schimmelfennig 2013; Müller 2011; Nicolaïdis 2004; Weiler 
1999). The argument supporting it broadly conforms to a two-step structure 
(Beetz 2015: 38-40). The first step is that the European polity consists of 
European peoples rather than a unified European people with an overarching 
democratic regime. Unlike federalists and nationalists, this situation is 
evaluated as normatively desirable. Transnational spill-over effects, such as 
environmental pollution, require democratic transnational responses to avoid 
one demos effectively dominating another (e.g. Cheneval and 
Schimmelfennig 2013: 340; Nicolaïdis 2013: 358-360). A demoicratic 
European regime is more desirable than the recreation of a sovereign state 
because it mitigates some of the negative effects of fully sovereign peoples. 
Demoicrats draw attention to, for instance, the exclusionary nature of 
peoplehood (Cheneval and Schimmelfennig 2013). The second step in the 
argumentative structure is the advocacy of demoicratic institutions, 
procedures, and values to legitimate the Union. The EU is not a state, but it 
requires more than indirect intergovernmental democratic legitimacy 
(Cheneval and Schimmelfennig 2013: 338-340; Nicolaïdis 2013). Francis 
Cheneval and Frank Schimmelfennig delineate appropriate criteria of political 
legitimacy for the Union through a Rawlsian constructivist methodology 
(Cheneval and Schimmelfennig 2013), whilst other demoicrats  turn to the 
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republican value of non-domination to sketch appropriate criteria for a 
legitimate European order (e.g. Bellamy 2013; Nicolaïdis 2013). At the core of 
these demoicratic arguments lies the analysis that a political theory of EU 
legitimacy should take seriously the continued existence of national European 
peoples.  
This literature knows a similar divide to the broader political theoretical 
literature on the EU between model-application and sui generis non-ideal 
approaches. To avoid frontloading this thesis, I will present the general 
tendencies in the literature at this stage to align myself with non-ideal 
theorists. A more detailed treatment follows in chapter 8. My approach 
distinguishes itself from demoicratic philosophers who assume particular 
Rawlsian democratic procedural values as the only relevant norms, such as 
Francis Cheneval (2011) or Antoinette Scherz (2013), or similar deliberative 
democratic standards to offer a normative justification for a demoicratic Union, 
including James Bohman (2004) and Samantha Besson (2006). These 
accounts take a firm principle-first approach to theorising the EU’s legitimacy. 
Instead, my realist approach and conclusion aligns more closely with non-
ideal contributions to this debate. Theories, such as Kalypso Nicolaïdis’ 
immanent account of European demoicracy (e.g. Nicolaïdis 2003; Nicolaïdis 
2013; Nicolaïdis and Young 2014; Pélabay, Lacroix et al. 2010), Richard 
Bellamy and Dario Castiglione’s neo-republican argument (e.g. Bellamy 2013; 
Bellamy and Castiglione 1997; 2003; 2013), and more institutional accounts 
including Jürgen Neyer’s supranational deliberation (Neyer 2012; 2014), 
cumulate in proposals relying on more realistic accounts of Europe’s peoples, 
as more than mere statespeoples or purely democratic entities, pace 
Cheneval. The EU’s democratic legitimacy has to rely upon a transnationalist 
political theory which acknowledges distinct national democracies (Bellamy 
and Castiglione 2013; Nicolaïdis and Young 2014). My contribution to this 
demoicratic body of knowledge lies not only in my argument that the opening 
up of borders has not merely resulted in a democratic imperative to govern 
interdependencies, but also that the European governance regime has 
resulted in institutional transnational ties between national peoples. These 
institutionalized bonds offer a firm realist justification for a European 
demoicratic political order which, so I suggest, could rely upon a legitimation 
Chapter 1: A Realist Inquiry into Popular Sovereignty in Europe 
 30 
stories grounded in a demoicratic conception of popular sovereignty. The 
thesis thus contributes a realist justification and an alternative conception of 
popular sovereignty to the existing literature on the EU as a demoicracy. 
 
V - A realist genealogical inquiry into popular sovereignty  
A genealogical method was chosen to reconstruct contemporary conceptions 
of popular sovereignty, in anticipation of their appraisal as heuristic tools in 
Europe’s contemporary institutional landscape.19 Broadly speaking, 
genealogies are histories of the present. The genealogical method has 
become a prominent methodology in the human sciences.20 In political 
philosophy, David Hume’s account of the artificial virtue of justice is an early 
predecessor (Hoy 1986; Williams 2004: 21), though the method is more 
commonly associated with Friedrich Nietzsche (2007 [1887]) and Michel 
Foucault (1984).21 A distinction can be drawn between historical and imagined 
genealogies (Williams 2004: 20-21).22 Historians, such as Quentin Skinner 
(1998) and Mark Bevir (2006), undertake historical genealogies which balance 
the literal interpretive tendencies of hermeneutics with the sceptical ones of 
deconstructivism (Dienstag 2011: 44). The aim of these genealogies tends to 
be critical or ‘subversive’ (Shklar 1972), such as Stefan Elbe’s genealogy of 
the idea of Europe (2001). They reveal radical contingency thereby 
denaturalizing concepts taken for granted nowadays (Williams 2004: 20), for 
instance sovereignty (Bartels 1995).23 Imagined genealogies, on the other 
hand, are philosophical treaties. Bernard Williams uses this method (2004: 
20-22) to vindicate normative commitment to particular conceptions, or to 
condemn them (Hall 2014). On his account, a philosophical genealogy should 
provide a ‘potential explanation’, which is an explanation that is true if the 
assumptions were correct (Williams 2004: 31).24 Potential explanations offer 
plausible functional reasons for holding onto a political commitment (Williams 
2004: 31). But despite the fictional starting point, a philosophical project 
exclusively relying on thought experiments can wander off into the realm of 
‘science fiction’ (Williams 2004: 39). Williams therefore argues that a 
philosophical genealogy has to turn to historical and cultural observations to 
secure its realism (2004: 39). For example, one cannot rationally predict the 
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creation of a system of writing, however once it has occurred then we should 
theorise its impact on our conception of truth (Williams 2004). A philosophical 
genealogy must thus turn to human practices to remain sensitive to the facts 
which shape normative concepts (2004: 39). In this regard, as said above, 
Hall argues that the inclusion of historical arguments and circumstances is a 
mark of ‘intellectual seriousness’ on behalf of the political realist (Hall 
Forthcoming). A philosophical genealogy should reflect on whether our 
original commitments to concepts continue to perform a desirable role within 
present circumstances, thus being vindicated, or should instead be 
condemned. A philosophical genealogy should cumulate in value-judgements 
on our normative commitments.  
The genealogical tradition is also known for its sensitivity to power 
broadly construed. Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel Foucault have been 
particularly sensitive to the power of ideas. These thinkers propose critical 
reflections on ideas taken for granted. Nietzsche’s famous concept of ‘slave’ 
or ‘herd morality’ suggests that Christianity offers the weak with the power to 
discipline the strong (Nietzsche 2007 [1887]). Foucault’s writings were more 
explicitly political in this regard. With regards to legitimacy, Foucault describes 
governmentality, a notion which captures a self-disciplining ethos among 
modern citizens in the West (Foucault 2003 [1975-1976]). These theorists 
illustrate that normalised conceptual relations influence individuals’ behaviour; 
ideas therefore have political power. More specifically, Foucault’s analysis 
points toward the social construction of political power, which makes reflecting 
on political concepts particularly important. Friedrich Nietzsche’s legacy 
explicitly influences Williams’ philosophy (2000). Yet, as I will address in more 
detail later on (chapter 2), Williams argued that legitimation stories play an 
anthropological role making the political order intelligible as a structure. On his 
account, the creation of social and political power through semantic 
relationships is not necessarily undesirable. A commitment to particular 
conceptions can be deemed desirable due to their contribution to civic order, 
for instance. Williams’ interpretation of this Nietzschean legacy consequently 
enables a vindicatory account of normative concepts rather than a mere 
problematisation thereof. Genealogical reflections on political concepts can 
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thus result in either condemnation or vindication of particular conceptions in 
the present.  
The inclusion of actual historical circumstances, especially political 
institutions, is vital for a realist genealogy. The reason lies in the importance 
of Williams’ ‘realist constraint’. Conceptions should make sense in particular 
circumstances. Context matters when appraising a political conception’s 
continued relevance in making sense of the existing political order. 
Legitimation stories do not make sense of all politics everywhere, but they 
should make sense in particular institutional circumstances. The classic 
conception of privacy, for example, loses its former function in the realm of 
politics with the digital revolution, such as when criminals film their own 
crimes. Privacy does not disappear, but our understanding of it should change 
to deal with new contingent facts (Hall Forthcoming: 7-8). In a similar vein, 
legitimation stories of political regimes have to make sense of the actual 
institutional framework. To take an obvious example, legitimation stories 
prefaced on an absolute right or wrong, such as most fascist ideologies, make 
little sense of the democratic political institutions of the Union (hopefully). 
Political institutions matter in the vindication of a normative commitment to 
political concepts. This is the first reason for the inclusion of institutional 
circumstances in a realist genealogy. 
The second reason is that conceptions should be able to guide 
individuals’ behaviour within particular circumstances. Political institutions 
shape conceptions of legitimacy because human beings use these normative 
concepts to navigate through the political world. If they do not reject imperfect 
concepts, therefore, they will adapt them to fit the circumstances. As Charles 
Taylor argues:  
 
[F]or political actors, understanding a theory is being able to put it into 
practice in their world. They understand it through the practices that put it into 
effect. These have to make sense to them, the kind of sense the theory 
prescribes (Taylor 2004: 115). 
 
As an analogy, Immanuel Kant argued that theories depend upon 
schematized incorporation in practices to become historical realities (Taylor 
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2004: 115-116). The original meaning of democracy, for instance, was 
transformed into representative democracy to suit modern enlarged polities 
(e.g. Dunn 2005). The practical process of making sense is only sustainable if 
the legitimation story ‘fits’ the political institutions. Too large a gap between 
semantic relationships and institutional reality results in an inability to guide 
individuals. In this context, the concept of popular sovereignty relies upon 
fictions to make complex and at times inconsistent practices intelligible. The 
place of political fictions in the legitimation practice remains underexplored in 
Williams’ work, which is arguably due to his concern with truth in Western 
politics. Two core aspects of popular sovereignty -- the people and 
sovereignty -- have been deemed political fictions which rely on citizens’ 
acceptance whilst defying demonstration and/or overcoming a degree of 
dissonance. In this context, the willing suspension of disbelief by the ruled is 
another functional demand for conceptions to realistically guide political 
practices. Too abstract or otherwise ill-suited conceptions fail to function as 
heuristic devices for (real) politics. The conceptions have to find practical 
resonance to remain vindicated as heuristic tools. My appraisal of our 
conceptions of popular sovereignty therefore takes into account the changes 
within the political institutions in contemporary Europe.  
 
My genealogical enterprise combines a conceptual reconstruction of 
the contemporary conceptions of popular sovereignty with an analysis of the 
institutional circumstances in which they should function as sense-making 
devices. In combination with more practical research considerations, I have 
chosen to turn to canonical arguments for the conceptual reconstruction. The 
primary reason is that, as Williams argued, the object of analysis for the 
philosopher are the reasons used to make sense of our semantic relationship 
to the world (Williams 2000: 483). The use of well-known arguments is a 
proven method to reconstruct the meanings of political concepts on which 
there exist first-order disagreements (e.g. Horton 1992; Williams 2005: 78-79). 
The method is not only proven, but empirical evidence further justifies this 
choice since individuals apply paradigmatic arguments through analogies to 
other cases (Kratochwil 2006: 305-306). As Charles Taylor further explains: 
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How do we understand society? We have a theory. We read Rousseau, we 
read Locke, that’s very often part of the understanding, and societies differ in 
the degree to which there is theoretical foundation. Modern Western societies 
are much more theory-entrenched than others … (Bohmann and Montero 
2014: 4). 
 
On this account, these canonical arguments continue to shape our 
understanding of ourselves. For example, Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan might 
have been irrelevant in his time; as Williams argues, theories require some 
time to influence political practice (Williams 2005: 57-58). Furthermore, 
Hobbes’ intentions might have diverged from its reception. Yet the idea of 
individuals escaping a brutal state of nature through consent to a common 
sovereign for their mutual benefit remains an influential argument in Western 
political thought. Francis Cheneval, for instance, invokes Hobbes’ security 
argument to justify a multilateral political order in an age of globalisation 
(Cheneval 2007). The Hobbesian example might trigger concerns about the 
possibility of anachronism in the genealogy. The danger of anachronism 
derives from contemporary conceptions being a product of the reinterpretation 
and reuse of possibly outdated principles. It thus results from the human 
practice of sense-making rather than the choices of the genealogist.  In the 
sense-making process, an argument might be stripped of its original 
metaphysical properties, which are essential to the historical reconstruction of 
a theorist’s political thought. Locke’s contract theory, for instance, is 
embedded in a Christian worldview, which resonates with his reference to 
mankind rather than a particular people per se (e.g. Dunn 1968; Stanton 
2011). Yet, Locke’s arguments are still invoked in contemporary debates on 
capitalism (Somers 2008; Spies-Butcher, Paton et al. 2012b) and even 
European rule (Lord 2011). As Raymond Geuss argues, most contemporary 
liberals have engaged in similar practices in their appropriation of Kant’s 
political thought (Geuss 2002). From this perspective, a genealogical 
reconstruction might, at certain points, come across as anachronistic, 
however this characteristic is part of the contemporary conception rather than 
the result of its historical reconstruction. Moreover, upon critical reflection, the 
genealogist might condemn certain conceptions in their contemporary context 
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due to their unsustainable dissonance between it and political practice. Still, 
this thesis takes seriously the historical resonance of the conceptions used to 
make sense of the political world.  
By now it should hopefully become apparent that this genealogical 
research is a project in political theory and not an intellectual history (see also 
Castiglione 1993). The first part of the genealogy reconstructs the 
conceptions of popular sovereignty that inform the EU’s legitimacy debate 
from canonical arguments which legitimate the state upon the same criteria. 
The thesis is not primarily concerned with reconstructing authorial intentions - 
weak or strong - (Bevir 2002), entire theories of past philosophers, or even 
concepts in or out of their historical context.25 The aim is to reconstruct a 
contemporary conceptions from their intellectual tradition, which rejects any 
essentialist understanding of these concepts (Bevir 1999; Geuss 2002: 325-
326). Such reconstructions might include theorists that, in a historical light, 
might be too distinct. To illustrate, together with Hobbes, Locke’s property 
argument has become part of a tradition legitimating state rule in virtue of 
outputs. Of course, Hobbes did not construe subjects as citizens nor did he 
share Locke’s metaphysical Christianity per se. Versions of these canonical 
arguments nonetheless continue to be invoked in debates on the legitimacy of 
political orders (Simmons 1999). These arguments thus continue to resonate 
with contemporary conceptions of popular sovereignty. The danger of 
anachronism is a concern for intellectual historians rather than for this 
presentist genealogy of contemporary meaning. My genealogical enterprise 
uses arguments from a more narrow historical period - European state 
formation - compared to other genealogists, who for instance trace the idea of 
Europe back to Plato (Elbe 2003). Still, the use of secondary sources should 
guard against implausible reconstructions of canonical arguments. Raymond 
Geuss reflects on anachronism in conceptual reconstructions, concluding that 
the genealogy’s success should be appraised in virtue of achieving its overall 
aims (Geuss 2002: 322-326). Hopefully, the final argument convincingly 
achieves its aim: to develop a more sophisticated understanding of our 
contemporary conceptions of popular sovereignty.  
The conceptual chapters focus on reconstructing the principle bonds 
and boundary of the people in conceptions of popular sovereignty. The three 
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dominant criteria in the contemporary EU legitimacy debate -- output, 
democratic and identitarian legitimacy -- rely upon distinct conceptions of 
popular sovereignty, I shall argue. The justificatory logic shall guide the 
selection of arguments on the state’s legitimacy. From canonical arguments, I 
reconstruct distinct accounts of the people underlying these three 
contemporary conceptions of popular sovereignty. The canonical arguments 
exemplify attempts to justify these criteria as appropriate for the legitimacy of 
the modern sovereign state. In the process, they shape rather abstract criteria 
of legitimacy, as others have pointed out (e.g. Coicaud 2002; Hall 
Forthcoming; Williams 2004). As will become apparent, these arguments posit 
a bond between the ruled which prescribes a particular criterion of legitimacy 
as appropriate for the state. The genealogy focuses on the reconstruction of 
these conceptual bonds of collectivity. The reconstruction will also focus on 
the conceptual boundary between popular sovereigns that is the posited 
border between different peoples. The reason to focus on this fiction is that it 
remain the normative underpinnings of contemporary conceptions of popular 
sovereignty (Bickerton 2011; White 2010; 2011). These conceptions of 
popular sovereignty are subsequently placed in their institutional 
circumstances in order to appraise how they could make sense of the state as 
the authoritative modern political order. 
 
In chapters six and seven, I turn to the institutional analysis in which 
these conceptions attempt to make sense of the legitimacy of political order 
within Europe’s modern polity before integration and in the present day. 
Chapter six starts with the normative appraisal of popular sovereignty in its 
ability to make sense in modern circumstances. This analysis focuses on 
three key features of modern enlarged state polities: complexity, value 
pluralism, and closure. The three paradigmatic conceptions of popular 
sovereignty can complement one another in making sense of these features. I 
hopefully offer a convincing argument as to why individuals should become 
willing to suspend their disbelief and buy into stories of popular sovereignty. 
This realist vindication of the statist, multi-faceted conception of popular 
sovereignty sets the point of departure for a systematic appraisal of its 
heuristic function in making sense of the state’s legitimacy. The institutional 
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analysis assesses whether this conception could function in making sense of 
legitimacy in statist Europe, and then, present day Europe. Focussing on the 
essential political fictions of people and sovereignty, I argue that the statist 
conceptions made sense of a particular set of institutional circumstances, 
which have now been transformed through European integration. I use 
several historiographies to reconstruct Europe’s institutional landscape 
(Axtmann 2004; Bellamy 2004; Bobbitt 2002; Goldmann 2001; Hertz 1957: 
475-485; Tilly 1975). Stefano Bartolini’s Restructuring Europe has been a 
particularly fruitful source of historical evidence because his analysis focuses 
on the institutionalisation of relationships between individuals in European 
polities and the changes due to modern integration processes (Bartolini 
2005). Unlike Bartolini’s primarily empirical analysis however, I evaluate these 
institutional circumstances with an eye on the practical resonance of political 
fictions underpinning the multi-faceted conception of popular sovereignty, 
which is necessary for it to act as a heuristic tool for political agents. My 
analysis shows that the three distinct conceptions of popular sovereignty 
made plausible sense of legitimacy before European integration, however this 
process cumulated in significant changes in normative systems of 
peoplehood, and structures of power. The conceptions have lost the ability to 
fulfil their heuristic function in the contemporary European landscape. This 
institutional analysis thus reconstructs the important institutional features of 
this landscape before integration (chapter 6) and then offers an analysis of the 
current European landscape (chapter 7). As said, this institutional part of the 
analysis focuses on two central concepts present in each conception of 
popular sovereignty: the people and sovereignty.  
The first notion can be understood to have two interrelated, yet 
analytically distinct, practical dimensions.26 On the one hand, ‘the people’ is 
grounded in individuals’ sincere beliefs, which are informed by legitimation 
stories. A normative self-awareness of an individual’s communality with others 
in the polity is the product, to some extent, of these stories (Tilly 2005). A 
group might not exist before such a representative act (Glencross 2011: 350). 
In stories of popular sovereignty, the collective identity acts as the source of 
criteria of legitimacy for any political regime. An essential point is to recognize 
that the self-awareness of, for instance, economic interests can shape 
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individuals’ shared identity as with any self-clarifying nationalistic search for 
true heritage. The important aspect of an authentic identity is a sincere belief 
in the existence of bonds between individuals. However, this philosophical 
research does not seek to claim that the three conceptualisations of the 
people inform a self-understanding accepted by all citizens. The much more 
modest claim is that the contemporary conceptions of popular sovereignty rely 
on the plausible experience of these relationships. This brings us to the other 
dimension of peoplehood: the institutional relationships between individuals in 
a polity. The practical institutionalization of such relations has been deemed 
constitutive of a people (Lagerspetz 2004). As Stefano Bartolini argues, “the 
participation of an individual within a normative system of a group” creates the 
group in a sociological sense (Bartolini 2005: 211). The institutional part of the 
genealogy focuses on normative systems which give purchase to these 
conceptions in virtue of individuals’ membership of such normative systems. 
Individuals, for example, become a citizenry because their ascription of 
citizenship is made meaningful through the ability to claim rights against the 
state. These systems, moreover, create boundaries between polities through 
homogenization within the polity and differentiation from other polities 
(Bartolini 2005: 12-24). The plausibility of each conceptualisation of the 
people relies on different institutions. This institutionalisation of relationships 
between citizens results in the ‘practical resonance’ of these fictions of the 
people in everyday practices. The appropriateness of criteria of legitimacy 
depends upon the fact that citizens can plausibly make sense of themselves 
as ‘a people’ associated with each conception of popular sovereignty. The 
conceptual chapters will indicate the relevant institutions for each criterion 
associated with these conceptions. 
Popular sovereignty, however, does not merely aim to make sense of 
the relationships between the inhabitants of a polity, it addresses the political 
order within a polity. A legitimation story, by Williams’ definition, has to make 
sense of the organisation of power as a structure. Asymmetrical power 
relations are a core feature of the autonomous sphere of human endeavour 
known as politics, and are conceptualised, and justified, in the public mind 
through modern legitimation stories. Two institutional capacities define how 
the sovereign state embodies political power: decision-making and 
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implementation. This distinction is particularly fruitful for understanding the 
institutionalisation of political order within the European continent. The first 
capacity refers to a centre empowered to make an authoritative political 
decision, whilst the second one refers to the resources available to the centre 
for enforcing those decisions. The latter capacity contributes to making the 
former meaningful in everyday life (Mann 1984). In other words, the de jure 
claim to make sovereign decisions becomes matched by a de facto empirical 
ability to enforce them (Axtmann 2004: 262-263).27 This part of the 
institutional analysis focuses on the organisation of power structures which 
took shape in the European polity before and after integration. Yet it will be 
emphasised that political orders are not merely shaped by legitimation stories 
of popular sovereignty. As Sofia Näsström (2007: 629) reminds us, 
“peoplehood always is born out of a combination of coercive force and 
persuasive storytelling.” Contemporary realists recognise that politics and 
coercion play a crucial transformative role in the creation of unity among 
socially pluralistic populations (Sleat 2013; 2014: 17; Stears 2007). Normative 
theoretical discussions on criteria of legitimacy tend to overlook the 
importance of existing or emerging hierarchical regimes in legitimation 
processes (Geuss 2008: 90-94; Sangiovanni 2008). In these analyses, the 
focus is on the archetypical resource of power: coercive force. However, 
modern political orders also have other resources at their disposal to rule. 
Arguably, the most important are money and stories (Maloy 2013).28 The third 
source -- stories -- alludes to the importance of legitimacy in sustaining a 
political order. The agents of the political order shape legitimation stories. This 
insight, also found in subversive genealogical projects, is important because it 
tempers expectations of change. As previously stated, realists seriously 
consider political circumstances when theorising legitimacy. In practice, this 
means that, while avoiding deterministic status quo defences, it is important to 
take seriously the limits set on political change by the organisation of power, 
at least in the foreseeable future. To clarify and anticipate my argument, the 
analysis of the structure of power in contemporary Europe strongly suggests 
that its current two-tier political order is likely to persist into the near future. 
This comparative institutional analysis is essential to argue that our 
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commitment to the contemporary conceptions of popular sovereignty can no 
longer remain vindicated in contemporary Europe.  
 
VI - Plan for the rest of this thesis 
My argument will unfold as follows: the next chapter offers a more in-depth 
treatment of the theoretical framework. It starts with a more detailed 
description of Bernard Williams’ realist theory of legitimacy. I then argue that, 
within the modern disenchanted cosmology, popular sovereignty arose to 
replace divine right as the central concept to structure legitimation stories of 
the sovereign state. In legitimation stories of popular sovereignty a shared 
bond between citizens -- the constituent power or ‘the people’ -- sets the 
appropriate criteria of political legitimacy for a regime -- the constituted power. 
Finally, to frame the genealogical inquiry, the three prevalent criteria of 
legitimacy are presented in the context of the debate on the EU’s democratic 
deficit: output, democracy and identity. These three prominent criteria rely on 
a distinct understanding of the relationship between EU citizens. The three 
genealogies reconstruct the underlying contemporary conceptions of popular 
sovereignty from canonical arguments legitimating the modern state. This 
reconstruction sets the stage for the realist appraisal of these conceptions in 
making sense of political legitimacy in Europe’s novel political landscape. 
The third chapter is the genealogical reconstruction of the 
contemporary conception of popular sovereignty which informs output 
legitimacy. In canonical arguments which legitimate the state in virtue of its 
output, an individual interest in security and economic prosperity that is reliant 
on common rule binds citizens together. The sovereign state is the legitimate 
political order due to its ability to provide the preconditions, which procure 
beneficial outputs. A competent sovereign state can claim allegiance from 
individuals in virtue of these benefits. What this will demonstrate is that 
security and economic prosperity have become inextricably intertwined 
benefits in the modern technocratic conception of popular sovereignty. The 
state safeguards and manages a capitalist economy in a complex and 
competitive international environment, circumstances which require expertise 
in order to create beneficial outputs. In these canonical arguments, the people 
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is limited to those citizens partaking in the state-governed domestic economy. 
This conceptual border is not inherent to the relationships between denizens, 
because these particular necessities and conveniences are, in principle, 
universal. The border, instead, follows from the arguments’ inclusion of 
protection from other countries, and economic competition with them, to 
differentiate the polity. What these aspects imply is that beneficiaries’ interests 
are particular to, and aligned with, their political order. In short, these 
arguments rely upon a technocratic conception of popular sovereignty, 
because these interests rely upon competent rather than inclusive forms of 
rule. 
 The fourth chapter is a conceptual genealogy, which reconstructs the 
democratic conception of popular sovereignty. Canonical arguments on the 
state’s democratic legitimacy posit the people as demos. These canonical 
arguments focus on three institutions of modern democracies: a constitution, 
elections, and an (empowered) public sphere. The crucial point for the thesis 
is that this conception of popular sovereignty makes sense of the 
democratisation of the state. The conceptual borders of the demos derive 
from the arguments’ implicit assumption of pre-existing states rather than 
being inherent to a principle inherent to posited bond of collectivity. The 
conceptualisation of the people underlying these arguments consists of 
individuals with associational interests bound together through democratic 
procedures. The state’s democratic institutions should enable the citizenry to 
govern themselves. The democratic character of the state should thus 
legitimate its decisions and their (forceful) implementation. This democratic 
conception of popular sovereignty prescribes that the ruled are able to 
influence their rulers’ decisions, thereby engaging in self-governance. In other 
words, the state’s democratic institutions offer the means for citizens to 
govern themselves as the sovereign in modernity’s enlarged polities. The 
democratic state’s institutions constitute a necessary framework for a diverse 
citizenry to self-govern. A legitimate state should enable citizens to participate 
as free equals in collective decision-making, in determining ‘vital interest’ from 
a plurality of positions. In these canonical arguments, the bond of collectivity 
arises from citizens’ participation in these state-centered processes of 
democratic will-formation, where pre-existing state institutions set the 
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boundaries of the demos. These arguments rely upon a democratic 
conception of popular sovereignty in which a democratic bond of collectivity is 
posited between citizens.  
Chapter five consists in a genealogical reconstruction of the 
contemporary identitarian conception of popular sovereignty in which a 
communitarian identity legitimates collective rule. Canonical identitarian 
arguments emphasise the importance of cultural homogeneity, expressed in a 
national identity, for the legitimacy of the modern state for both normative and 
sociological reasons. This reconstruction becomes essential as this 
conception of popular sovereignty does imply a border with ‘the people’ in 
principle independent from the statist political order. The genealogy features 
nationalistic arguments of both a more ideological and sociological nature. In 
both cases, the state is the legitimate political order because its citizens’ 
identify with it as their own. Processes of socialisation, rather than particular 
socio-cultural markers, are necessary to maintain and shape this 
communitarian identity, which generates associative sentiments with the 
state. Conversely, the nation-state should protect these processes. The 
conceptual structure of popular sovereignty is that the people as nation have 
a communitarian right to self-determination. This argument stresses that the 
communitarian identity implies a shared understanding of the common good 
or, more ideologically, the existence of a national will. The legitimate nation-
state should empower its nation’s will in modern circumstances. The ultimate 
criterion for the state’s legitimacy is the congruence of the borders of the 
national identity with the nation-state. Later, less obviously ideological 
arguments emphasise that a national identity is a precondition for a well-
functioning mass democracy and welfare regime. The importance of a 
communitarian identity becomes more instrumental, but it nevertheless 
remains a fundamental precondition for state legitimacy. The posited bond of 
collectivity does inform a principle which can determine borders to the people. 
In these arguments on the nation-state, the borders of the identity and the 
state become fused together. The communitarian identity, however, offers a 
principle to render the borders of the polity conceptually distinguishable from 
the state. This identitarian conception of popular sovereignty posits a bond of 
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collectivity which informs a criterion of legitimacy, and a political principle to 
distinguish between peoples. 
In chapter six, these three contemporary conceptions of popular 
sovereignty are vindicated at the normative level, and then, by placing them in 
their institutional context, as functional heuristic tools. This chapter on the 
state’s legitimacy is essential for appreciating the importance of historical 
circumstances when appraising conceptions from a realist perspective. Firstly, 
the chapter vindicates the multiple-faceted conception of popular sovereignty. 
The contemporary conceptions can together offer an account of the sovereign 
state as the legitimate political order in relation to the key characteristics of 
modern enlarged polities: its complexity, value pluralism, and closure. From 
this realist perspective, I offer a vindication of the commitment to this 
conception of popular sovereignty at the normative level. The next part of this 
chapter moves to the institutional analysis to illustrate the historical 
circumstances in which these three conceptions could function as heuristic 
tools to make sense together. A central concern is to clarify how citizens could 
willingly suspend their disbelief of the political fictions of the people. In short, I 
argue that the three normative systems -- a state-governed domestic 
economy, democratic state institutions, and public socialisation into a national 
identity -- became institutionalised within the borders of the territorial state. As 
a result, relationships were created between the same group of territorially-
bound individuals, which gave a degree of plausibility to the people as 
beneficiaries, as demos, and as nation simultaneously. Congruency between 
these systems within the state’s borders meant that output, democracy, and 
identity became plausible as appropriate, and even complementary criteria for 
the state’s legitimacy. The particular organisation of political power within 
Europe’s polities is essential because it organises them around the sovereign 
state. The fiction of sovereignty, in turn, made sense due to the organisation 
of a single decision-making centre with extensive implementation power within 
its territorial borders. The central fictions of popular sovereignty were thus 
conterminously institutionalised within European state polities before 
integration. The contemporary conceptions of popular sovereignty gained the 
practical resonance necessary to act as heuristic tools for political agents to 
make sense of state legitimacy. 
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Chapter seven’s central aim is the appraisal of our commitment to this 
multi-faceted conception of popular sovereignty in making sense of the EU’s 
legitimacy. This systematic appraisal relies on an institutional analysis of the 
European polity in contemporary Europe. Before turning to the transformation 
of the institutional landscape, I reflect upon the particularity of national 
institutional arrangements and understandings of popular sovereignty in 
relation to the state’s legitimacy. The claim is that integration has not 
homogenised the national polities in a meaningful way, hence deep diversity 
characterises the European polity. Integration has, however, cumulated in a 
set of increasingly autonomous technocratic and political decision-making 
institutions at the European level. European integration, as a set of economic 
and political processes, thus resulted in a reconfiguration of normative 
systems of peoplehood within the European polity, and the organisation of 
power. The upshot, so I shall argue, has been that economic and democratic 
systems remain largely institutionalised at the national level but that borders 
between national polities have opened up. Moreover, judicial-economic and 
civic-democratic systems have become a reality at the European level. By 
contrast, attempts at pan-European identity building remain largely 
unsuccessful; particularistic national identities persist because national 
spheres remain relatively closed. European integration has impacted the 
organisation of power within the polity, substantially restructuring it; a second 
layer of decision-making now exists at the European level, which relies on the 
successful integration of national implementation structures. The 
reestablishment of a sovereign political order remains as of yet an elusive 
prospect. This novel political landscape is, as a result, likely to persist into the 
foreseeable future. After presenting Europe’s novel institutional landscape, I 
return to the political fictions in order to evaluate whether this multi-faceted 
conception of popular sovereignty can plausibly make sense of Europe’s 
political order. My conclusion is that the fiction of sovereignty has little 
practical resonance, and three conceptions of the people make sense but 
primarily if not exclusively at the national level. I then appraise whether the 
conceptual structure of these conceptions can function at the normative level. 
My conclusion of both analyses is that the commitment to this statist 
conception of popular sovereignty can no longer remain vindicated because it 
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cannot guide political agents nor make sense of the legitimacy of Europe’s 
political order within its circumstances.  
In the eighth and final chapter, I suggest a demoicratic 
reconceptualisation of popular sovereignty. This chapter constitutes the final, 
normative payoff of the genealogical enterprise into the contemporary 
conception of popular sovereignty, and its impact on attempts to make sense 
of the EU’s legitimacy. I argue that the institutional analysis gives purchase to 
the demoicratic analysis of the EU. I then suggest a practice-dependent 
interpretation of the European institutional bonds of collectivity as one of 
national peoples with transnational bonds between them. This realist analysis 
informs the subsequent, significant reconceptualisation of popular sovereignty 
along demoicratic lines. The most important shift is that the constituted power 
is no longer a single sovereign hierarchal centre. Instead, multiple popular 
sovereigns simultaneously create a two-tier political order to govern both 
national and transnational bonds. This conception is able to make sense of 
the two-tier political order in the European polity, whilst recognising the 
continued existence of deep diversity. It is, therefore, both normatively 
desirable, and can act as functional heuristic tool to guide political agents. 
Finally, I sketch how this demoicratic conception could make sense and guide 
future developments in Europe’s institutional design in overcoming the current 
democratic deficit. In this manner, chapter eight ultimately returns to the 
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 Achim Hurrelmann argues that permissive consensus did not disappear, however the 
unprecedented wave of integration does not align with citizens’ wishes. Institutional 
integration thus clashed with the established popular opinion (Hurrelmann 2007). 
2
 Many theories have proposed to make sense of European political integration. It has been a 
topic of normative political thought since medieval times (e.g. Cheneval 2010: 34; Føllesdal 
2007). Early twentieth century integration theorists, however, focussed more on scientific 
explanations for integration (Diez and Wiener 2009: 17; Dobson 2006: 511; Moga 2009: 809; 
Pollack 2005: 368-369). The most prominent theoretical currents were federalism (Burgess 
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2009),  (liberal) intergovernmentalism (e.g. Hoffman 1995; Moravcsik 1998), neo-
functionalism (e.g. Haas 1958), interactionism (e.g. Deutsch, Burrell et al. 1968), and various 
forms of institutionalism (e.g. Christiansen, Jorgensen et al. 1999; Pierson 1996; Tsebelis 
2002; Waever 2009). More recently, critical theorists have drawn out the normative 
dimensions underpinning the integration process (e.g. Elbe 2003; Manners 2007; Pollack 
2005). 
3
 For extensive overviews of the literature, see (Galston 2010; Rossi and Sleat 2014; 
Runciman 2012). 
4
 Some argue that these are compatible, intertwining claims (Mantena 2012: 455), whilst 
others believe that they contradict one another (Baderin 2014). I am committed to the former, 
but accept situations in which tensions might arise between particular interpretations. 
5
 The realist concept of domination is not the same as the republican value of non-domination 
(e.g. Pettit 1997; Skinner 1998). The realist concept of domination refers to violent domination 
through the voluntary application of force, rather than its arbitrary use. 
6
 Thomas Fossen’s pragmatist perspective on legitimacy echoes a similar account of the 
implicit normativity of politics (Fossen 2013). 
7
 For at least some outside the discipline of political philosophy, this is the sole purpose of 
normative philosophy (e.g. Wright 2007: 28; 2010: 20-21). 
8
 William A. Galston (2010: 409) argues that the realist dispute with between political 
moralists about human malleability is ‘largely empirical’ (see also Swift 2008: 371). 
9
 I contrast social reality with natural reality following John Searle’s ontological distinction 
between observer independent brute facts and observer dependent social facts (Searle 
2007). 
10
 Arguably, any academic engagement with politics is normative, however political theorists 
explicitly engage with these dimensions of politics, whether on a conceptual or normative 
level (Pierik 2011). 
11
 Williams actually uses the term legitimations more often than legitimation stories. He uses 
the latter in his reflection on his essay ‘From Freedom to Liberty’ (Williams 2005: 95). I opt to 
use legitimation stories, because it both stands out from the first term and, as I will clarify in 
the second chapter, stories resonates with my anthropological interpretation of Williams’ work 
(see also Hall 2014). 
12
 This perspective rejects the separation of materialism and idealism in establishing 
meanings of social reality, instead prioritising practices (see also Taylor 2004). 
13
 See also (see also Horton 1992: 7-12). In their own ways, Raymond Geuss (2008: 13-15), 
Ernst Gellner (Schubert 2014: 19), Charles Taylor (Bohmann and Montero 2014; Taylor 2004) 
and Jean-Marc Coicaud (2002) emphasize the importance of history for political philosophy.  
14
 In philosophy, this anti-foundational understanding has been associated with John R. 
Searle’s work (Searle 2007). In political science, Mark Bevir and Rod Rhodes work on 
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interpretivism and certain types of social constructivism which reflect this anti-foundationalist 
social ontology (Bevir and Rhodes 2010: 44). 
15
 In a similar vein, John Horton argues that the task of political philosophy is to “… help us to 
articulate and deepen our understanding of concepts and beliefs, and to clarify the issues at 
stake in assessing competing interpretations” (Horton 1992: 12).  
16
 This understanding of concepts shares similarities with conceptual historians’ 
understanding (e.g. Dahlstrom 2012; Gunnell 1998; Koselleck 1989; Kuukkanen 2008; 
Palonen 2002; Richter 1986). I have found Kuukkanen’s distinction between the history of a 
word and concept particularly insightful on this topic (Kuukkanen 2008). However, unlike 
these often contextually informed exercises in the history of political thought, realist 
philosophers focus firmly on the present relevance (Horton 1992; Williams 2005).  
17
 For overviews of the normative theoretical literature, see (Bellamy and Castiglione 2003; 
Dobson 2006; Føllesdal 2006; Friese and Wagner 2002; Jensen 2009; Lord and Magnette 
2004; Wimmel 2007) 
18
 Sangiovanni, however, focuses on the question of solidarity more closely associated with 
justice rather than legitimacy. Enzo Rossi argues that Sangiovanni’s reflection on justice 
(Sangiovanni 2008) is actually an analysis of legitimacy due to its focus on scope (Rossi 
2012). This critique could, by logic, extend to Sangiovanni’s analysis of solidarity within the 
EU. However, one might well argue that Sangiovanni proposes a conception of solidarity 
through a realist lens that takes seriously the particularity of the EU’s political regime. Political 
legitimacy, therefore, is not a separate concept from solidarity but neither is it identical with it, 
as Rossi suggests.  
19
 This methodological discussion might better be described as one of heuristics (Lamb 
2009a).  
20
 The method originated in the history of ideas and philosophy, but it has gained salience in 
the social sciences (e.g. Sassen 2006; Somers 2008; Vucetic 2011). 
21
 See among others (Bevir 2008; Mulligan 2006: 352-356). 
22
 Similarly, Mark Bevir distinguishes between forms of historicism. Yet, for him, genealogies 
refer to historical explanations of a critical guise (Bevir 2010). 
23
 As an opposing case, Quentin Skinner, for example, argues that he provides a description 
of an alternative tradition, thus implying the enterprise is descriptive rather than philosophical 
(Skinner 1998). 
24
 In philosophical terms, it might be fact-defective, however it is not law-defective. A law 
defective statement is a potential explanation with a false law-like structure, whilst a fact 
defective one has a false antecedent (Williams 2004: 31).  
25
 For prominent positions in the methodological debates in the history of political thought, see 
(e.g. Bevir 1999; Lamb 2009b; Pocock 1981; Skinner 2002).  
26
 For a similar distinction, see Sangiovanni on conventionalism and institutionalism 
(Sangiovanni 2008). 
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27
 I draw upon Michael Mann, who distinguishes between despotic power -- decision-making -
- and infrastructural power -- implementation (Mann 1984).  
28
 These closely relate to the well-established typology of three faces of power (Lukes 2005). 
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Chapter 2: Modern Legitimation Stories of Popular 
Sovereignty  
 
NOTHING appears more surprizing to those, who consider human affairs with 
a philosophical eye, than the easiness with which the many are governed by 
the few; and the implicit submission, with which men resign their own 
sentiments and passions to those of their rulers. When we enquire by what 
means this wonder is effected, we shall find, that, as FORCE is always on the 
side of the governed, the governors have nothing to support them but opinion. 
It is therefore, on opinion only that government is founded; and this maxim 
extends to the most despotic and most military governments, as well as to the 
most free and most popular. 
David Hume, ‘Of the First Principles of Government’, I.IV §1 
 
One of the central features of Western modernity, on just about any view, is 
the progress of disenchantment, the eclipse of the world of magic forces and 
spirits.  
Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, 49 
 
I - Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I presented the debate on the EU’s democratic deficit. 
This debate makes sense as first-order disagreement on how relationships 
between European citizens are to ground the EU’s institutions. The concept of 
popular sovereignty, so I argued, continues to shape attempts to legitimate 
the EU. This thesis aims to appraise the role of popular sovereignty in making 
sense of the EU’s legitimacy through a realist lens. Bernard Williams’ political 
realist thought provides a novel and fruitful approach to this topic. According 
to Williams, political theory should appraise our normative commitment to 
particular conceptions of a concept. A vindication depends on its ability to 
make sense of the legitimacy of a political order within particular historical 
circumstances at the normative level, and its ability to guide political agents’ 
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actions. On Williams’ philosophy, concepts are historically constructed 
repositories of meaning. To reiterate Sangiovanni’s distinction between a 
concept and conception, theorists can posit an abstracted account of a 
concept. This concept relies upon particular conceptions used in practices. 
The concept’s conceptual structure captures ‘family resemblances’ between 
actual historical meanings of a concept. Theorists should therefore turn to 
history to reconstruct concepts from their conceptions. In addition, a theorist 
should appraise them from within their particular historical circumstances. 
This ontological premise informs the choice for a genealogical reconstruction 
of the contemporary conception(s) of popular sovereignty. My genealogical 
enterprise consists of a conceptual and an institutional part. In the conceptual 
part (chapters 3 to 5) the dominant conceptions of popular sovereignty are 
reconstructed from canonical arguments on the sovereign state’s legitimacy. I 
focus on conceptualisation of the ‘the people’ because they are these 
conceptions’ normative heart and their crucial role in the normative appraisal 
of legitimacy in contemporary Europe. The second part (chapter 6 and 7) 
offers an institutional analysis of the historical context. It presents both the 
institutionalisation of the people and the organisation of power, before and 
after European integration. In order to assess, whether the commitment to 
contemporary conceptions of popular sovereignty displayed in attempts to 
make sense of the EU’s legitimacy remains vindicated. The theoretical 
underpinnings, however, warrant a more elaborate treatment to clarify the 
assumptions and rationale governing the thesis’ core argument.  
 In this chapter, I discuss Williams’ realist theory of legitimacy in more 
detail, as well as the conceptual structure of popular sovereignty and criteria 
of legitimacy that constitutes the substantive point of departure for the 
genealogical endeavour. This chapter is essential to the argument as it 
clarifies both my interpretation of Williams’ realist conceptual framework, 
which relates historical arguments on the state’s legitimacy to contemporary 
question of the EU’s legitimacy, and the empirical observations guiding the 
genealogy. This method and specific focus on popular sovereignty set this 
research apart from other contributions to the normative theoretical literature 
on the EU’s legitimacy. In particular, I emphasise the importance of 
legitimation stories as hermeneutical sense-making devices for political reality 
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in Williams’ political thought because this sets him apart from other normative 
approaches. In short, the commitment to particular conceptions of political 
concepts, such as popular sovereignty, can only remain normatively 
vindicated if the reasons make sense of political rule as a widely acceptable 
solution to a state of civil war, without becoming an instrument of domination. 
In addition, as a conception should guide agents’ actions, its political fictions, 
such as the people, have to have practical resonance in a particular context 
for them to act as heuristic sense-making devices. In Europe’s disenchanted 
modern circumstances, and here I diverge from Williams significantly, popular 
sovereignty arose as the central normative concept in legitimation stories of 
the sovereign state. Popular sovereignty describes the conceptual structure of 
legitimation stories in which ‘the people’ determine the appropriate criteria of 
the modern state’s legitimacy. In this conceptual structure, the appropriate 
criteria of legitimacy for the political regime are set by the conception of 
citizens’ bonds of collectivity. In order to create a meaningful, realist account 
of popular sovereignty, I employ a genealogical method. The point of 
departure is the contemporary debate on the EU’s legitimacy. Three distinct 
criteria feature prominently in assessing the Union’s democratic legitimacy, 
namely output, democracy, and identity. These three criteria hint toward the 
fact that our contemporary conception of popular sovereignty consists, in 
actuality, of three distinct conceptions. This debate focuses the genealogical 
reconstruction on these conceptions. 
This chapter proceeds as follows: the next section (section II) offers a 
more detailed account of Bernard Williams’ realist theory of legitimacy.  
According to it, political legitimacy emerges from a normative (set of) claim(s) 
which justify rulers’ coercive use of power against the immediate interests of 
the ruled. These claims are presented in practice as a holistic narrative; the 
legitimation story. The latter contain the normative arguments with which to 
make sense of a particular political order and its legitimacy. As such, on 
Williams’ realist account, a political conception of legitimacy has to provide a 
widely acceptable account of the desirability of the political order within its 
own historical circumstances in order to remain normatively vindicated. These 
stories are necessarily ideological, that is, in someone’s interest and culturally 
specific, but they are more than mere tools of manipulation and mass 
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subjugation. This is because legitimation stories are not only justifications, 
they also constitute hermeneutical sense-making devices. They make a 
political order and one’s place in it intelligible, often by reducing the 
complexity of real-world situations. Such simplifications, nonetheless require a 
degree of mythmaking and, therefore, the willing suspension of disbelief. The 
practical resonance of central fictions is important in vindicating a conception 
as a useful heuristic device to guide political agents’ actions. In this way, 
Williams’ realist perspective informs the appraisal of our conceptions at a 
normative and pragmatic level. The next section (section III) introduces the 
central concept of the thesis: popular sovereignty. The divine right of kings 
could no longer make sense in modernity’s disenchanted cosmology; popular 
sovereignty arose to take its place. The latter, so I argue, became the core 
concept in European legitimation stories, which established the authority of 
the modern state. Appropriate criteria of legitimacy in legitimation stories of 
popular sovereignty are set by a shared conceptualization of the people. The 
constituent power is, therefore, the central normative concept for any 
conception of popular sovereignty. Finally (section IV), the three prevalent 
criteria of legitimacy in the present EU legitimacy debate are introduced: 
output, democracy, and identity. These rely on markedly different accounts of 
the relationships between European citizens. These criteria often result in 
first-order disagreements on the legitimacy of Europe’s political orders, as is 
apparent in the persistent debate on the legitimacy deficit. As will become 
apparent throughout the thesis, this reveals that our contemporary conception 
of popular sovereignty consist of three sets of arguments which rely upon 
distinct conceptions of the people.  
 
II - Bernard Williams on legitimacy and legitimation stories 
Matt Sleat argues that “all analyses or reflections upon politics will inevitably 
need to embark upon its endeavour beginning with several theoretical 
assumptions about what the practice looks like, consists of, where its limits 
are (or what distinguishes it from other spheres of human activity), and what 
the appropriate aims of politics are, amongst others” (Sleat 2010: 497). 
Williams’ central realist assumption is that legitimation stories constitute the 
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normative core of our political practices. This central theoretical assumption is 
drawn primarily from Bernard Williams’ posthumously published realist work 
on legitimacy (2005). My interpretation of Williams’ political thought can be 
characterised as anthropological rather than analytical because I emphasise 
the importance of stories as hermeneutical sense-making devices rather than 
adopting his analytical formulaic approach to philosophy.1 In a nutshell, 
Williams argued that political philosophy should use “distinctively political 
concepts, such as power, and its normative relative, legitimation” (2005: 77). 
He argued that legitimation stories provide justificatory explanations of 
political order in specific contexts. The exact historical conception employed 
to make sense of legitimacy should be drawn from actual usage in first-order 
disagreements. On this interpretation of the practice of legitimation, Williams 
draws two criteria to appraise normative commitments: (i) does the conception 
offer a desirable answer to the first political question: meeting the basic 
legitimation demand? And interrelated, but analytically distinct, (ii) does the 
conception perform this function plausibly within its historical circumstances: 
the realist constraint? I shall commence with a description of Williams’ 
historicist understanding of social reality, as it informs these criteria. 
An anti-foundational political ontology informs Williams’ realist theory of 
legitimacy (e.g. Williams 2000). He argued that individuals use concepts to 
guide their practical behaviour in everyday life. Human beings therefore relate 
to the world through semantic relationships. Echoing Helmuth Plessner’s 
philosophical anthropology (Plessner 2003 [1627]), humans, as reflective 
beings, can give accounts of these relationships (Williams 2000: 483). This 
reflective mode turns humans into symbolic animals able to (re)construct 
concepts used in practice. Here, individuals construct stories to make sense 
their place in the (political) world. Such stories constitute reflective 
hermeneutical tools, which establish the meaning of the concepts guiding 
individuals’ behaviour (e.g. Askham 1982; Charles Taylor quoted in: Bohmann 
and Montero 2014; Mink 1978). Stories is, however, a rather common-sense 
notion, which makes it remarkably hard to give a precise definition of. A 
defining characteristic can nonetheless be drawn; stories provide answers 
(Askham 1982: 528). Cosmological stories, for instance, can answer 
questions about individuals’ place in the world. These narratives thus attempt 
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to make everyday life intelligible by making sense of our semantically 
constructed relationships to the natural and social world. These holistic 
devices aim to create coherence in a chaotic world of diverse practices (Lukes 
2000). In anthropological terms, stories perform ‘magic’ because new 
meanings are ascribed to objects without making any changes to their 
material properties. This phenomenological need to make sense of the 
political world lies at the heart of Williams’ realist theory of legitimacy (see 
also Sleat 2007).  
Legitimation stories make sense of individuals’ place in the political 
world by offering a coherent and intelligible account of the political order and 
its desirable functions. Williams attributes a constitutive role to legitimation 
stories in the creation of political orders: 
 
The idea is that a given historical structure can be (to an appropriate degree) 
an example of the human capacity to live under an intelligible order of 
authority. It makes sense (MS) to us as such a structure (Williams 2005: 10; 
italics in original). 
 
These stories, therefore, not only describe, but also make the practices of rule 
within the polity intelligible as an order. These stories provide what one might 
call a ‘political epistemology’ (Laborde 2004) which shapes individuals’ 
personal experience of politics (Tilly 2005: 7-9). Legitimation stories make 
sense of our place in the political space by organising both facts about rule 
and evaluations thereof. The latter normative dimension indicates an inherent 
evaluative focus on the normative acceptability of these hierarchical structures 
(Hall 2014: 555; Kratochwil 2006: 305; Williams 2005: 11). These stories thus 
offer guidance in appraising whether to accept hierarchical commands as 
authoritative or resist them as attempts illegitimate coercion. In summary, 
legitimation stories offer frames to simultaneously make descriptive and 
normative sense of hierarchical rule in a polity.  
In this context, Williams argues that legitimation stories should provide 
a normatively acceptable answer to the first political question. The two 
dimensions of any legitimation story are that they make sense of rule as a 
political order and, simultaneously, provide reasons for its desirability. Firstly, 
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legitimation stories should answer the first political question (2005: 3-6). The 
question concerns “the securing of order, protection, safety, trust, and the 
conditions of cooperation” (2005: 3), and constitutes, for Williams, a 
precondition of the human practices called politics. He argues that a 
hierarchical order with coercive powers is necessary to avoid an anarchical 
state of civil war. By his own admission, Williams provides a Hobbesian 
answer to a Hobbesian question (2005: 3). Yet, he quickly adds that the 
provision of order is insufficient to legitimate a political regime. Responding to 
the first political question is a constitutive part of any legitimation story. If 
rulers’ power over their subjects is to constitute a solution to the first political 
question, however, then something has to be said to those it coerces about 
what distinguishes hierarchical rule from a state of institutional domination 
akin to civil war (Williams 2005: 5). In other words, the solution to the first 
political question should not become part of the problem that politics should 
solve or at least alleviate. For Williams, rule without widely accepted 
legitimation stories simply amounts to successful banditry (Williams 2005: 95). 
The use of coercive power in politics gives rise to the normative principle 
inherent in politics, the ‘basic legitimation demand’, which holds that a political 
order should be deemed a desirable solution to the state of anarchy. A 
hierarchical order without a widely accepted legitimation story constitutes a 
state of domination. In a rather Rousseauian, moment Williams further 
clarifies that the power to coerce cannot justify itself; the critical theory 
principle. The creation of acceptance through manipulation is therefore not a 
state of legitimate politics but a situation of domination. On Williams’ account, 
hierarchical orders have to meet the basic legitimation demand in order to 
establish such a thing as politics rather than domination (Williams 2005: 5). At 
a normative level, legitimation stories should answer the first political question 
whilst meeting the basic legitimation demand when attempting to make sense 
of the political order under which people live. The latter touches upon the 
importance of a story making sense within particular historical circumstances.  
Williams’ realist conception of legitimacy remains context dependent. 
Legitimation stories dictate the appropriate criteria of legitimacy for the 
political order within particular historical circumstances. Williams argued that, 
although the first political question is foundational to politics, once it is solved 
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it does not remain so but rather requires the elaboration of a solution all the 
time (Williams 2005: 3). The first political question is a precondition in “the 
justificatory rather than temporal sense” (Rossi and Sleat 2014: 2). A political 
order however can only emerge if it is deemed normatively acceptable. Put 
differently, authoritative rule cannot emerge without legitimacy (Barker 2007; 
Mulligan 2006: 369). Hobbes, for example, argued that sovereign rule is 
legitimate only for as long as it provides physical security through order. 
Williams observed that, nowadays, we find Hobbes’ answer unacceptable 
because liberalism has added new demands, such as liberty from excessive 
government interference (Williams 2005). Contemporary citizens, for instance, 
might not cooperate or trust each other if their political regime does not 
conform to the principles of the ‘rule of law’. The concept of legitimacy might 
be considered constitutive of the practice of politics. Each legitimate political 
order should meet criteria of legitimacy in order to distinguish its rule from civil 
war and domination. Particular conceptions, however, change significantly 
from one set of historical circumstances to another or between different 
political regimes (Sangiovanni 2008).2 A conception of legitimacy is relevant 
to ‘us around here’ rather than being universal in any meaningful way pace 
high liberalism (Hall 2014). Legitimation stories contain criteria of legitimacy 
for a particular ‘we’ within a political order (Williams 2005: 68-69). They arise 
to make sense of legitimacy in particular polities. So despite being a universal 
aspect of politics on Williams’ interpretation, conceptions of legitimacy are 
ontologically bound up with particular historical circumstances. 
Turning to the heuristic dimension, the importance of the ‘willing 
suspension of disbelief’ for legitimation stories ability to guide political agents. 
Williams tends toward a sceptical position with regards to political fictions in 
modern politics. He argues that modernity’s self-consciousness undermines 
the usefulness of fictions (e.g. Williams 2004; 2005: 94-95). Nevertheless, 
political fictions continue to impact political actions, thereby shaping the 
political world. As Edmund Morgan points out, the story takes “command and 
reshapes reality”. An important reason is that these stories are often an 
imperative for rule, rulers must therefore bend fact to fiction in order to sustain 
the same order (Morgan 1988: 14). Legitimation stories are, thus, not only 
passive sense-making devices since they can also shape political practices. 
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Political fictions within them should, as a consequence, be taken seriously in 
the theorization of politics (Geuss 2008: 10-11; Morgan 1988: 13-15; Rossi 
2010b). Fictions actually perform an important function in legitimation stories 
because they reduce the complexities of political reality, making it intelligible 
for individuals. As Francis Bacon poignantly put it “Truth is so hard to tell, it 
sometimes needs fiction to make it plausible.” But fictions, however, require 
the willing suspension of disbelief (Morgan 1988: 14). The cognitive 
dissonance between practice and concept underlies this requirement to 
accept common myths that “defy demonstration” (Morgan 1988: 15). Popular 
sovereignty, for instance, requires citizens to believe that they are the 
authority within the polity, whilst being ruled by others. Individuals’ willingness 
to suspend disbelief can be deemed quite remarkable. As Gaetano Mosca 
observes,  
 
A conscientious observer would be obliged to confess that, if no one has ever 
seen the authentic document by which the Lord empowered certain privileged 
persons or families to rule his people on his behalf, neither can it be 
maintained that a popular election, however liberal the suffrage may be, is 
ordinarily the expression of the will of a people, or even of the will of the 
majority of the people (1939: 71). 
 
Stories’ ability to fulfil their functional aim of making sense of political 
life should, therefore, not be equated with a realistic reflection. The political 
fictions in them are attempts to make sense out of a complex political world. A 
fiction’s usefulness in guiding political agents’ everyday practices impacts 
likelihood of their willing suspension of disbelief of its mythical properties 
(Sleat 2014: 327-329). Its usefulness, in turn, relies on its resonance with 
political reality. As Morgan explains: “In order to be viable, a fiction must bear 
some resemblance to fact. If it strays too far from fact, the willing suspension 
of disbelief collapses” (Morgan 1988: 14). The willingness, however, also 
relies upon the perception of desirability. Legitimation stories should offer 
convincing normative reasons for the many to submit to the few. The 
legitimacy of rule remains closely tied to the attempt to make sense of 
hierarchical rule as a desirable solution to the first political question of politics. 
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Arguably the most controversial point for subversive genealogists, I 
want to suggest that these stories are not merely manipulative devices for the 
elite. Genealogists generally argue that the achievement of a legitimate 
political order relies on elite manipulation of the population. On this reading, 
legitimacy has been understood as no more than an ideological device for 
subjugating the masses (e.g. Bevir 2010; Foucault 2003 [1975-1976]). From 
this perspective, rulers engage in storytelling to pacify them.3 This pacification 
arguably constitutes a modern ‘achievement’. A relatively stable order can be 
taken to reflect the success of an elitist mission of civilizing society (Taylor 
2004: 31-48). Political legitimacy, as some argue, is therefore a cost effective 
alternative to both constant coercion and surveillance, and bribery through 
rewards (e.g. Bartolini 2005: 92; Matheson 1987: 200; Mulligan 2006: 359; 
Thornhill 2011). These observers seem to propose a rather inherently elitist 
dimension to the concept of legitimacy. A political order requires the 
acceptance of the legitimation story by a sufficient number of subjects to 
maintain its legitimacy. Williams’ conceptualisation of legitimation stories 
seems to echo a similar elitism when he argues that “the state has to offer a 
justification of its power to each subject” (Williams 2005: 4; Italics in original). 
This definition seems to describe the practice of legitimation as an act of 
convincing carried out by the rulers.  
Williams’ legitimation stories, so I want to suggest, can be understood 
as a product of contestation rather than an elitist practice to create consent of 
the status quo. Two important reasons inform this representation of Williams’ 
notion. First of all, Williams explicitly rejects the creation of obedience through 
the manipulative use of power in his critical theory principle. In short, if power 
is the cause of acceptance, whether through violence or manipulation, the 
subsequent state of affairs does not constitute legitimate politics but 
domination (e.g. Williams 2004: 225-232; Williams 2005: 6).4 The subjects 
should be able to reflect upon and reject rule. When Michael Oakeshott, for 
instance, argues that the importance of the Hobbesian myth of the state lies in 
the collective dream of order established through a sovereign state, he implies 
that citizens should accept this myth (Oakeshott 1975). Vindication of this 
political fiction lies in the practical outcome of a civic order. This tale of the 
sovereign state could, however, also result in collective domination through 
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elite-driven propaganda. In those historical circumstances it would no longer 
remain vindicated on Williams’ account.  
This touches upon the second reason to reject the elitist interpretation. 
Williams’ realist theory of legitimacy implicitly relies on the inherent dual-
function of legitimation stories in the practice of politics. That is, that 
legitimation stories are a source of obedience but also resistance in real 
politics. The modern usage of legitimacy (and thus its meaning) actually 
implies a closer link to resistance rather than obedience. Shane Mulligan, for 
example, observes that an ideological transfer of authority from the rulers to 
the ruled accompanied the introduction of legitimacy into modern political 
discourse (Mulligan 2006: 359). In a similar vein, the non-voluntary nature of 
our affiliation with a society could result in assumed obedience to a state (as 
in certain cast systems); legitimacy instead implies a predisposition toward 
resistance (Simmons 1999: 742; fn 8). The modern concept of legitimacy 
introduces the possibility of rejection of rule rather than the unquestioned 
acceptance thereof. On my reading of Williams, the construction of criteria of 
legitimacy thus derives from practices of (potential) contestation between 
rulers and ruled (see also Hall 2015: 8-9). Legitimacy should create “the glue 
that binds a rule(r) and its right, and directing the behaviour of subjects 
according to what is right.” Legitimation stories can therefore also “function as 
the wedge to divide the rule and the right, to overthrow either and replace 
them with another” (Mulligan 2006: 375). In a similar vein, Williams argued 
that legitimacy is a normative demand inherent to politics (Williams 2005: 5), 
subjects thus require justificatory explanations from their rulers.5 In practice, 
as Thomas Fossen’s pragmatist approach clarifies, the political practice of 
legitimation implies that agents aim to persuade others to change their stance 
toward authority (Fossen 2011; 2013; see also: Mulligan 2007). As such, the 
ruled can also use legitimation stories to resist political power. This 
perspective explicates a dimension of contestation between political agents in 
claiming authority. In practice, political agents engage in diverse practices in 
which different mechanisms function to establish criteria which make sense of 
the political order’s legitimacy. It brings to the fore that Williams’ concept of 
legitimation stories is better understood as a theoretical reflection on the 
semantic relationships established in these political practices rather than an 
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actual account of the practice of legitimation. This interpretation, so I want to 
suggest, is a logical extension of Williams’ practice-based theory of legitimacy 
as both are reliant on the anthropological notion of legitimation stories. 
This is not to say that ruling elites do not often have a privileged 
position to ‘tell’ the stories. The superior resources possessed by rulers 
favours them as public storytellers. No guarantee exists, however, that 
subjects of power will accept these stories. Rulers are consequently forced to 
present convincing stories to the ruled or risk losing their legitimacy. Rulers’ 
ability to govern relies upon the acceptance of these narratives by citizens, it 
is therefore not merely about spreading the stories but also about their 
widespread acceptance (Williams 2005: 10). The latter is necessary, but as 
discussed above, certainly not guaranteed on Williams’ view (Hall 2015: 8-9). 
In addition, and Williams does not explicitly address this point, these stories 
are not merely sense-making devices for the ruled but also for the rulers; they 
provide meaning to the practice of ruling. Rulers can, in the process, impose 
normative constraints on their rule (Barker 2001; Morgan 1988: 13-14). 
Nonetheless, rulers’ intrinsic reasons can differ from both their public 
justifications and their actual behaviour or the perception thereof. Rulers might 
well perceive an interest in creating allegiances through certain stories without 
sincerely believing in the story themselves. Yet that same insincerity can 
become a source for citizens to reject particular rulers. Furthermore, among 
other advantages, the ruled can contest rulers if they find the criteria built into 
the stories undesirable, if they believe that the rulers do not meet the criteria, 
or due to disagreement about the appropriate criteria. Citizens can reject the 
criteria of legitimacy proposed in the stories told by rulers, or any other 
political agents for that matter. Legitimacy can thus rightfully be deemed the 
treasure of politics (Kurtén 2011) for all participants. 
Historically, some degree of consensus has emerged around how to 
make sense of the state’s legitimacy, as is evident in the relative stability of its 
rule. Shared conceptions of legitimacy among the population are necessary to 
achieve a functioning political order. As Carl J. Friedrich argues, “legitimacy 
can be achieved only when there exists a prevalent belief as to what provides 
a rightful title to rule” (1974: 111). A broadly shared conception of the 
practices of rule and its normative foundation is therefore a prerequisite for 
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the emergence of a legitimate political order. In this context, a particular 
conception of a political concept is normatively vindicated “if it can be urged 
consistently with accepting a legitimate political order for general regulation of 
the society” (Williams 2005: 120). To return to the functions of legitimation 
stories, the political theorist should appraise them based upon their capacity 
to answer the first political question whilst meeting the basic legitimation 
demand, in a manner which is plausible from within the historical context. In 
addition, the central political fictions should have practical resonance in order 
to act as functional heuristic tools. First though, the theorist has to turn to 
legitimation stories so as to reconstruct the established conceptions of 
legitimacy and how they are used to make sense of the political order (e.g. 
Jubb and Rossi Forthcoming - 2015). The conceptual structure of legitimacy 
can differ significantly in various historical contexts. My claim in the next 
section is that popular sovereignty describes the shared conceptual structure 
of the modern legitimation stories which are used to make sense of the 
legitimacy of the sovereign state. 
 
III - Popular sovereignty in modern legitimation stories 
The thesis enquires into the normative commitment to popular sovereignty, 
which, so I will suggest, conceptually structures modern legitimation stories in 
Europe. Popular sovereignty is the central political concept of modern 
legitimation stories. Williams argues that a political theorist should not aim to 
delineate the correct definition of such a concept when seeking to solve 
political disagreements. The attempts of utilitarian and neo-Kantian 
philosophers to provide such definitions were the object of his criticism. 
Disagreements are, so he argued, part and parcel of the political. Instead, 
theorists should, firstly, clarify the conceptual structure behind these first-order 
disagreements and, secondly, appraise our commitment to such a structure in 
virtue of the practice it is supposed to govern (Williams 2005: 75). In this 
section, I shall clarify the conceptual structure of popular sovereignty in 
modern legitimation stories. Popular sovereignty delineates what one might 
call a genre of legitimation stories, which denotes a common conceptual 
structure even when the particular conceptions differ quite significantly. To 
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clarify with a metaphor, Agatha Christie’s classic detectives, such as Poirot, 
and James Ellroy’s L.A. Noir quartet are all crime mysteries, despite being 
markedly different stories. Like its predecessor, the ‘divine right of kings’, 
popular sovereignty describes a family resemblance between prominent 
modern legitimation stories on the modern sovereign state. The concept of 
popular sovereignty unpacks as a particular conceptual structure, one which 
now underlies modern legitimation stories. However, as Simone Chambers 
observes, “Hobbes and Rousseau are both advocates of some version of 
popular sovereignty, yet they have very different stories to tell” (Chambers 
2004: 153). As with murder mysteries, different legitimation stories emerged 
with their own distinct conception of popular sovereignty and concomitant 
criteria of legitimacy for the sovereign state. My claim is that popular 
sovereignty has become the most influential conceptual structure in Western 
legitimation stories. Williams’ normative theory, by contrast, focuses on the 
emergence of liberalism as the modern legitimation story.6 His emphasis on 
bare liberalism is not ‘wrong’ because liberalism, with its focus on freedom 
and protection of human rights, would arise as a particularly dominant 
legitimation story in the West. I nonetheless maintain that popular sovereignty 
became the dominant conceptual structure for embedding conceptions of 
freedom in legitimation stories of the modern state. Before presenting the 
conceptual structure behind popular sovereignty, I shall first briefly reflect 
upon the emergence of popular sovereignty as a functional conception of 
legitimacy in modern European legitimation stories. Expounding the particular 
historical circumstances will also contribute to the later clarification of its 
conceptual structure. 
Popular sovereignty arose in Europe, and more broadly the West, as 
part of a wider shift in cosmology. A brief reflection on the disenchantment of 
European cosmology offers a potential explanation for the emergence of 
popular sovereignty. Legitimation stories, as argued above, have to make 
sense within particular historical circumstances. These circumstances will also 
influence conceptions of legitimacy. The historicist rationale holds that popular 
sovereignty should not be understood as a necessary product of objective 
reason unfolding in history, pace certain Hegelian accounts of historical 
development. Rather, it is a contingent product of autonomous historical 
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processes. A complex nexus of events gave rise to the replacement of divine 
rule by popular sovereignty. Yet, philosophically, this shift can make sense as 
a functional response to significant challenges and, ultimately, to 
transformations of the political cosmology. The central change in modern 
Europe has been the upheaval of the cultural cosmology from a Christian to a 
secular one, or at least to a ‘temporalisation’ of religiosity (Taylor 2004). 
Ludwig Wittgenstein refers to the Lebensform in this context, which 
constitutes a broader cultural understanding of men’s place-in-the-world, in 
which other language games are embedded (Wittgenstein 2009 [1953]). 
Similar concepts include a horizon (Koselleck 1985), culture (Lukes 2000), or 
cultural background (Taylor 1995b).7 These concepts attempt to capture the 
existence of cosmological stories of how the world works and of individuals’ 
place within it. This cultural context impacts the plausibility of legitimation 
stories within particular polities. Too much divergence from the accepted 
understanding of the world might result in implausible stories which fail to 
convince enough denizens of the polity, if not outright making no sense at all. 
In his political theory, Gaetano Mosca provides interpretive evidence of this 
claim by comparing China, India, and the West. Each conception of legitimacy 
-- or in his words the political formula -- is situated within a broader cosmology 
specific to each society. (Mosca 1939: 70-71). In short, the conceptual 
structure of legitimation stories has to make sense of a political order within 
the local cosmology. Modernity, and its impact on politics, is a contested 
subject in academia (e.g. Sleat 2010: 498-500). Nevertheless, as Charles 
Taylor argues, “One of the central features of Western modernity, on just 
about any view, is the progress of disenchantment, the eclipse of the world of 
magic forces and spirits” (Taylor 2004: 49). Williams observed that ‘religious 
or other transcendental justifications’ do not function in modernity (2005: 95). 
Max Weber’s notion of Enzauberung captures how the processes cumulated 
in a disenchanted political space (e.g. Williams 2005: 9). This perspective can 
contribute to a functional understanding of the emergence of popular 
sovereignty in Europe.  
Pre-modern monarchical regimes justified their rule in reference to 
‘traditional notions of divine right and heredity’ (Barkey 2014: 3). Broadly 
speaking, the divine right of kings legitimates rulers because they represent 
Chapter 2: Modern Legitimation Stories of Popular Sovereignty 
 64 
God’s will on earth. In practice, legal notions, among others, were used to 
justify and restrain rule, but gubernaculum would ultimately rest with the 
monarch, in virtue of his or her divine right (Pocock 1975: 9-30). This 
justificatory explanation of Europe’s political and social order was dependent 
upon a shared Christian cosmology. The processes of reformation and the 
Enlightenment, however, would in their own way challenge the plausibility of 
this type of legitimation story. The rise of the empirical sciences, and their 
increased authority, would challenge claims to unobservable knowledge. The 
reformation, moreover, understood religious experience as an individualized 
and, ultimately, privatised matter (Habermas and Derrida 2003: 295-296); the 
impact on Catholicism was similar (Taylor 2004). These processes would 
challenge privileged religious knowledge as the grounds for justifying 
authority, including political authority. Furthermore, the reformation created 
the practical problem of the incongruence of religious beliefs within European 
polities. Catholic monarchs ‘found’ themselves governing primarily protestant 
populations, such as in English Isles, or populations became split across 
religious lines, as was the case in France. Regicides and bloodshed between 
religious communities was quick to follow in this context (e.g. Maloy 2013). 
Transformations in the socio-cosmological understanding of the world 
contributed significantly to intensifying the challenges facing Europe’s political 
orders. Within these historical circumstances, divine right became too 
contested to act as the structuring concept in legitimation stories of Europe’s 
political orders. In an increasingly disenchanted political world, the population 
would replace God as the source of political authority.  
Legitimate political orders historically came to justify their rule in the 
name of the people; popular sovereignty.8 In early modern Europe, the 
concept gained salience among monarchs searching for alternative sources of 
legitimacy to justify their power (Morris 2000: 6). The British monarch, for 
example, would claim to represent the overarching good of the denizens, 
including its subjects in the Americas (Morgan 1988: 17-148). This justification 
would often assume certain common interests. Monarchical regimes would 
thus turn to the disenchanted concept of popular sovereignty to replace their 
claims to divine rule. Parliamentarians drew upon republican theories to 
oppose the rule of absolute monarchs (Tully 1993: 301), with popular 
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sovereignty continuing to govern their most enduring arguments. Ultimately, 
their counterclaim of popular representation came to trump the monarchical 
claim to represent the population. In its early incarnations, however, the will of 
the people remained a hypothetical or rationalised fiction (Chambers 2004: 
154) which was often equated with some objective set of interests. 
Nonetheless, the people acted as the normative yardstick of the regime’s 
political legitimacy. This initially hypothetical theory of popular sovereignty 
became increasingly understood in more populist terms; Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau’s justification of sovereign rule of the population exemplifies this 
shift (Garsten 2009: 93-98). Accepting the idea of the citizenry as the authority 
of the modern political order, Rousseau argues that citizens should not 
relinquish their sovereign constitutional lawmaking power to a representative 
agent. Direct participation in lawmaking should ensure rule in accordance with 
their sovereign will (Rousseau 1987 [1762]). Rousseau explicitly adds actual 
consent as a necessary condition to the hypothetical model of popular 
sovereignty (Williams 2007). On this account, popular sovereignty becomes 
conceptualised as actual self-rule of the people rather than some assumed or 
rationalized model. Madison, Siéyès and other constitutional theorists would 
theorise more representative models better suited to modernity’s enlarged 
polities (e.g. Kalyvas and Katznelson 2008; Manin 1997; Urbinati 2006). In 
both direct and indirect models, however, the people are the constituent 
prince of modern secular democracies (Kalyvas 2000). In all three broad 
strands -- monarchical, hypothetical, and popular -- popular sovereignty 
conceptualises the modern state’s legitimacy in relation to the will of ‘the 
people’.  
The concept of popular sovereignty has become the dominant 
conceptual structure of modern legitimation stories within the West’s 
disenchanted cosmology. Despite being a contingent product of autonomous 
historical processes, philosophically, it can make sense as a functional 
conception of legitimacy within this disenchanted cosmology. Most importantly 
in this regard, popular sovereignty is not reliant on a religious or other 
metaphysical principle. Instead, it appeals to a disenchanted, temporal aspect 
present in every polity: the ruled (Kalyvas 2005). This shift has been 
characterised as ‘a marked break from the old world’ (Rosanvallon 2011: 
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120). The change from the divine right of kings to popular sovereignty implied 
a transformation from a vertical to a horizontal principle of legitimacy; 
normative authority in the polity transferred from the king to citizens (Laborde 
2004: 52). From a realist perspective, a vindication of this replacement lies in 
its ability to continue to make sense of the political hierarchy’s normative 
desirability in disenchanted circumstances. Its functional use to subjects 
became the principle for its legitimation (Thornhill 2011). The populist 
interpretation of popular sovereignty echoes throughout our contemporary 
democratic understanding, though popular sovereignty is not necessarily 
democratic (Morris 2000: 6-7). Let us now turn to the conceptual structure in 
more detail.  
Value pluralism offers a fruitful point of entry for clarifying popular 
sovereignty’s conceptual structure. On Williams’ interpretation of the practice 
of politics, legitimation stories should balance a coercive hierarchical order 
with the inevitable political fact of continued disagreement. Fundamental to 
political realism is the concern that coercion without acceptance creates 
resentment, which risks jeopardising the political order. This resentment 
constitutes the empirical source for civil war. On the other hand, manipulation 
would also undermine legitimacy as it solves the unsolvable disagreement, 
which is constitutive of politics. Legitimate politics should strike a normative 
balance between order and accommodating disagreement in a polity. In 
modern mass polities, value pluralism arguably transforms disagreement into 
a more fundamental and perpetual challenge to a political order than before. 
Citizens’ commitment to different values, each with their own objective worth, 
implies that they cannot be ranked hierarchically (Bellamy 2000). In these 
circumstances, citizens hold conflicting yet valid accounts of the good and the 
right, whilst also having to take collective decisions in order to attain order or 
pursue common projects (Elkin 2001: 1941; Glencross 2014: 3). A central 
question of legitimacy in modern politics is how far is it politically acceptable 
for collective decision-makers to coerce individuals? Too much force without 
legitimation results in resentment which endangers the political order, or raw 
illegitimate domination. Modern legitimation stories of popular sovereignty 
offer accounts of how to strike the balance in these particular circumstances. 
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In these stories, this diverse group of individuals invariably ‘transforms’ into a 
unitary source of political authority in virtue of a common bond.  
Turning to the conceptual structure of popular sovereignty, this concept 
frames first-order political disagreements on the state’s legitimacy as ones 
about the relevant bond between the ruled. Despite its internal 
disagreements, the citizenry acts (fictionally) as the constituent power of a 
political regime -- the constituted power (e.g. Canovan 2006; Frank 2010). 
The people are not only the constitutive authority of the constituted order, but 
should remain the authorizing agent within the polity after its creation (Kalyvas 
2005; Loughlin 2014).9 Power asymmetry, however, is the defining feature of 
(real) politics. Appropriate criteria of legitimacy are relevant specifically 
because the ruled cannot constantly act as collective ruler in modern 
circumstances (Kalyvas 2005). Legitimation stories of popular sovereignty 
derive the normative limits on rulers from the bond between the ruled. In an 
abstract sense, the people remain sovereign without actually ruling. First-
order disagreements on the state’s legitimacy, thus, resolve around the 
relevant relationship between the inhabitants of a polity. Jonathan White 
(2010; 2011) argues that communalities between individuals transform them 
into a people; the bond of collectivity. Ontologically, citizens’ beliefs in a 
particular bond creates a common identity; a first-person plural. This political 
identity grounds the bond of collectivity (see also Tilly 2005). This bond 
between citizens should dictate the appropriate standards for a democratically 
legitimate regime (White 2011: 4).10 From an ontological perspective, citizens’ 
beliefs should, in effect, dictate the constitutional restraints on the legitimate 
rule of the constituted power. Theoretically, as White puts it, “Different 
conceptualizations of the common suggest different positions on why citizens 
should accept decision-making when it runs counter to their perceptions of 
self-interest” (White 2011: 6). As argued above, the ‘sovereign people’ is a 
political fiction to some extent, and has therefore triggered extensive debates 
on the people as fact or fiction (e.g. Canovan 1996; Canovan 2006; 
Chambers 2004: 153-155). This discussion becomes essential in analysing its 
plausibility in chapters six and seven, however the question is irrelevant for 
the conceptual structure. If a conceptual structure of popular sovereignty 
governs first-order disagreements then political agents posit an established 
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bond(s) of collectivity to determine a political regime’s legitimacy. The 
appropriate criteria of legitimacy in stories of popular sovereignty thus rely, 
either implicitly or explicitly, on a conceptualisation of the people. A particular 
understanding of this bond shapes the conception of popular sovereignty. The 
conceptual genealogies shall reconstruct the bond of collectivity in canonical 
arguments on the state’s legitimacy, though they require a point of departure. 
The central aim of the thesis, to understand the impact of popular sovereignty 
on the EU’s legitimacy, offers the logical point from which to start.  
 
IV - Criteria for the EU’s legitimacy: output, democracy, and identity 
The academic debate on the EU’s democratic deficit reflects the most 
prominent criteria through which to make sense of the EU’s legitimacy. One 
central reason to turn to this ‘European’ debate is the particularity of national 
debates (e.g. Lacroix and Nicolaïdis 2010b). Europe’s national polities have 
their own unique understanding of many of these criteria, with each relying 
upon particular constellations of legitimation sources for their own stability. A 
selection of national cases would therefore privilege particularistic 
understandings. Moreover, the prominent positions permeate national 
debates. The reality of these distinct national experiences will feature in 
chapter seven, as part of an analysis of Europe’s contemporary institutional 
reality of deep diversity. This consideration informs the shift of focus toward 
the normative debate in EU studies. Three criteria of legitimacy have become 
dominant in this debate: output, democracy, and identity (e.g. Beetham and 
Lord 1998; Horeth 1999; White 2011; Zielonka 2006: 182).11 In their overview 
article, Friese and Wagner (2002) relate them to different nascent political 
philosophies on the acceptable form of rule within the European polity. In a 
similar vein, Marcus Horeth (1999) argues that these standards of legitimacy 
tend to favour a particular interpretation of Europe’s governance regime (see 
also White 2011). These distinct criteria reflect a similar first-order 
disagreement on how to make sense of the EU’s legitimacy in political and 
public debates (e.g. Eriksen and Fossum 2004; Middelaar 2009). These 
criteria rest on a distinct understanding of bonds of collectivity between EU-
citizens; it asserts a political ontology (Bellamy and Castiglione 2013; Pettit 
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2005). These ontologies provide an understanding of ‘how society works’ 
(Taylor quoted in: Bohmann and Montero 2014: 5). In other words, they posit 
existing relationships between citizens in Europe’s polity. I treat these as more 
empirically grounded variations of conceptions of the people, which feature in 
the genealogical reconstructions. This distinction, to some extent, is more 
analytical than actual, however it contributes to keeping these parts of the 
thesis separate. I will present the most paradigmatic arguments for each 
criterion in relation to the distinct political ontology, which frames Europe’s 
polity. 
According to many, the European regime can derive legitimacy directly 
from its ability to provide beneficial outputs to EU-citizens. The justificatory 
logic is described as consequentialist, utilitarian, and instrumental (e.g. 
Eriksen and Fossum 2004: 440; Horeth 1999: 253).12 A citizen will recognize 
these benefits and, as a result, will redirect their loyalty accordingly (Haas 
1958: 16; White 2011: 11-12). The argument often focuses on the primacy of 
economic necessities in an age of economic globalisation. A European market 
is necessary under globalization in order to continue generating economic 
benefits for citizens -- nation-states cannot adequately meet the requirements 
to generate these benefits for their citizens on their own (Friese and Wagner 
2002: 349; Scharpf 1999: 189-190).13 Fritz Scharpf argued that the EU should 
rely on output-orientated legitimacy (1999), thus, ‘Brussels can earn the right 
to act’ (Leonard and White 2002). This technocratic argument (e.g. Majone 
1996; Scharpf 1999; Vibert 2008) sketches the vision of a legitimate 
democratic European polity based upon independent institutions, depoliticized 
policy formulation, and expert implementation to gain popular support. Some 
argue that this is a democratic form of ‘government for the people’ (Friese and 
Wagner 2002: 348). Scharpf, for instance, states that:   
 
… in the language of democratic self-determination, what matters is the 
institutional capacity for effective problem-solving, and the presence of 
institutional safeguards against the abuse of public power (Scharpf 1999: 
188). 
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In a similar vein, Giandomenico Majone argues that the regulatory state 
represents an alternative non-majoritarian model of democracy (Majone 
1996). In this context, rights, such as the four freedoms, often take on a 
particular ‘output meaning’, such as being instrumental to economic outcomes 
or even as outcomes of expert rule (e.g. Beetham and Lord 1998). 
Technocrats often recognize the need to limit the scope of governance to 
regulatory instead of distributive policies, yet they believe that some decision-
making can legitimately be delegated to experts. Output can thus 
‘supplement’ and ‘displace’ democracy. The democratic deficit is, through this 
process, often reasoned away (Friese and Wagner 2002: 348-350). 
Democratization, moreover, poses the danger of politicizing the EU’s expert 
regime. The technocratic argument holds that “the public good is better 
realised through professionals in charge, who are not subject to the vagaries, 
biases, and distortions of democratic and especially electoral politics” 
(Beetham and Lord 1998: 16-17). These utilitarian legitimation stories rest on 
a minimalist, or thin, relationship between citizens. EU-citizens share 
individualistic interests which are reliant on their achievement of cooperation 
(e.g. Bellamy and Castiglione 2013; White 2010). The political ontology of 
political singularism captures these relationships between citizens of a polity: 
 
Political society is simply an aggregate of separate individuals with no 
politically significant relationship to each other apart from their various mutual 
contractual agreements. They enter these agreements solely to protect their 
rights and further their interests (Bellamy and Castiglione 2013: 211).14 
 
Whether or not technocrats are aware, or even hold consistent views on the 
nature of society, for these technocratic arguments to legitimate the EU’s rule 
logically implies such a conceptualization of EU-citizens, with identical shared 
interests. A particular theory’s exact conceptualisation of these interests will 
delineate the appropriate outcomes and competences which should act as 
criteria for the EU’s legitimacy. The output criterion of legitimacy posits a thin 
bond of common interests between citizens. 
Democratic theorists in the EU-debate reject the idea that utility should 
provide the legitimacy of a democratic regime, such as the EU, in the first 
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place (e.g. Bellamy and Castiglione 2003; Føllesdal 2007; Føllesdal and Hix 
2006: 548). Instead, ‘democracy’, or rather democratic procedures, are the 
appropriate criterion of legitimacy for the European regime. Shared 
democratic procedures should result in political allegiance to the EU. 
Theorists associated with this position seek a ‘civic, political and contractual 
Europe’ (Ferreira 2009: 23) through democratic procedures (Bellamy and 
Attucci 2009). Some theoretical positions are oriented toward reproducing 
liberal democratic institutions pace the modern state (e.g. Føllesdal and Hix 
2006). Some of these theorists are primarily concerned with piecemeal 
institutional innovations aimed at overcoming the democratic deficit (e.g. 
Bovens 2007; Føllesdal and Hix 2006; Hix 2007). Other so-called Euro-
republicans propose post-national institutional innovations to democratize the 
EU (Eriksen and Fossum 2004: 445), and even defend post-European 
commitments (Friese and Wagner 2002: 355; 357). In both models, a 
European public sphere is often deemed a necessary prerequisite for public 
opinion-formation (Closa 1998: 171; Eriksen and Fossum 2004: 445; Friese 
and Wagner 2002). Habermas’ political philosophy incorporates both 
traditional federalist concerns, such as a constitution and European 
parliament, and republican themes of deliberative and participatory 
procedures, such as a public sphere and referenda (e.g. Habermas 2001). 
The core of his democratic theory is that: “[The] exercise of popular 
sovereignty becomes the medium in which citizens give themselves a 
collective identity in the process of making laws, and solidarity with fellow 
citizens and attachment to the polity flow from participation in this system of 
political cooperation” (Cronin 2003: 4). Habermas argues that, ‘the collective 
identity […] exists neither independent of nor prior to the democratic process 
from which it springs’ (Habermas 2001: 15). His theory reflects a widely 
shared communicative logic which is sensitive to the heterogeneity of the 
European polity (Eriksen and Fossum 2004: 438). Democratic theorists agree 
that the institutionalization of democratic procedures should enable Europe’s 
citizens, or at least their associational representatives, to construct a version 
of the common good. Political allegiance should emerge from (the possibility 
of) participation in democratic procedures (Cronin 2003: 2). Europe’s 
democratic processes can thus create a degree of homogeneity from initial 
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heterogeneity (Everson 2011: 140).15 These democratic arguments rest on 
procedural bonds of collectivity. Democratic procedures enable oscillation 
between a minimalist interest and a maximalist democratic cultural bond 
(which I will discuss in the next part) (White 2010: 110). Bellamy and 
Castiglione (2013) capture this procedural bond in their definition of the 
political ontology of a civicity.  
  
… citizens within a ‘civicity’ regard themselves as forming a people with 
certain common interests and values. However, … they also have distinct 
interests, make divergent rights claims and so differ over many public policies 
(Bellamy and Castiglione 2013: 213). 
 
One vital interest is the attainment of civil peace, whilst a commitment to 
democratic values should prevent a return to civil war. Democratic legitimacy 
depends upon the procedural relationships between citizens. The 
appropriateness of this democratic criterion relies on the existence of 
democratic procedures to generate a sense of democratic collectivity.  
 The third and final set of arguments turns a communitarian identity into 
the appropriate criterion of legitimacy. Democratic rule, so these theorists 
argue, relies upon the co-identification of denizens as a cultural community. In 
other words, political legitimacy rests on a sense of belonging to a cultural 
community often expressed as a shared identity (Della Sala 2010; Eriksen 
and Fossum 2004: 442; Friese and Wagner 2002). Bellamy and Castiglione 
observe that nationalists tend to rely upon a mix of normative arguments and 
empirical claims (1997: 433-441). This observation is true of attempts to both 
legitimate Europe’s nation-states (on which Bellamy and Castiglione focus) 
and pan-European rule (e.g. Friese and Wagner 2002: 351-356). Sociological 
markers, such as a common language or religion, and more cultural-historical 
ones, such as claims to a common political heritage, ground these 
communitarian identities. Empirical arguments observe the existence and 
possible emergence of self-identification on either the national and/or 
European level: do citizens share a culture? And whether the pre-conditions 
for its emergence/construction, such as a genuine public sphere, exist or not 
(notice this was also deemed essential by democratic theorists). These 
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identitarian arguments have become associated with nationalist objections to 
further integration. Such theorists argue that the Union lacks a degree of 
social homogeneity, or at least a belief therein. A core argument is that a 
mass democracy requires a national identity to function properly. Shared 
sentiments between rulers and ruled generate trust (e.g. Grimm 2009), which 
functions as a precondition for reasonable debate (Eriksen and Fossum 2004: 
443) and properly functioning welfare arrangements (e.g. Miller 1999).16 The 
Union lacks such a communitarian identity; the no-demos thesis (e.g. Weiler 
1995). The preconditions for a legitimate authority at the European level are, 
therefore, not met. Moreover, the persistence of national communities results 
in the normative argument that sovereignty belongs to Europe’s nation-states 
(e.g. Malcolm 1991). Intergovernmentalists argue that the EU should remain, 
or once again become understood as an intergovernmental organisation (e.g. 
Lindseth 1999; 2011; Moravcsik 2002).17 In conclusion, the lack of a 
European identity results in scepticism toward further political integration, and 
it informs the perceived need for a degree of ‘disintegration’.  
This traditionally nationalist set of arguments has also been invoked to 
legitimate EU-rule. Larry Siedentop’s theory exemplifies this argumentative 
structure. He argues that ‘the future of Europe in the world – as well as its 
ability to create free pan-European institutions – will depend upon its 
becoming more conscious of that moral inheritance’ (2000: 214). Democratic 
political institutions depend upon a pre-existent community. Siedentop argues 
that “a coherent identity [needs to preside] over the process of European 
integration … a moral identity presupposes a story, a story we can tell 
ourselves about the origins and nature of our beliefs” (2000: 189). A 
communitarian identity is a precondition for legitimate political institutions. 
Siedentop argues that Europeans share an individualist Christian identity. 
(2000: 203) 18 The Union’s political legitimacy should rest on the recognition of 
this shared cultural heritage. Friese and Wagner distinguish between strong 
and weak theories concerning the necessary cultural relationships between 
European citizens (2002: 352-353). Strong theories imply that Europeans 
have a particular culture able to furnish the European project with a 
communitarian identity, such as Siedentop’s Christian heritage. Weak theories 
propose a more civic and diverse understanding of European culture (e.g. 
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Delanty 1995; Habermas and Derrida 2003; Smith 1992: 70) or argue that 
humanist philosophy is a European heritage (Friese and Wagner 2002: 352-
353). Both national and European identitarian arguments rest on claims of the 
existence of socio-cultural relationships between EU-citizens. A politically 
relevant cultural communality, such as a shared heritage, traditions, and/or 
values, or the existence of a hostile ‘other’, is stressed in order to forge a 
communal identity (Delanty 1995: 1-15; Eriksen and Fossum 2004: 436; 
Friese and Wagner 2002: 353). The citizens should identify as part of a 
community to which they belong. Political solidarism is the relevant political 
ontologies in both variations:  
 
This view assumes citizens and their representatives possess a sympathetic 
identification with each other and an underlying agreement on ethical 
principles. They regard themselves as forming a stable collective unit with 
common goals (Bellamy and Castiglione 2013: 213). 
 
Political society ‘works’ as an ontological whole. On a fundamental level, it 
does not consist of either individuals or groups; citizens, rather, constitute a 
socio-cultural group themselves. According to these arguments, a 
communitarian identity is the relevant thick bond of collectivity, which itself 
acts as the relevant criterion of political legitimacy. 
Before moving onto the conceptual genealogies, certain interlocutors in 
the European legitimacy debate have defended mixed or multi-layered models 
to legitimate the EU’s rule. These scholars argue that criteria can either 
complement one another in novel constellations (mixed) (e.g. Innerarity 2014; 
Jensen 2009; Lord and Magnette 2004; Lord and Pollak 2010), or particular 
criteria can legitimate the European regime whilst others the national regimes 
(multi-layered) (e.g. Bellamy and Attucci 2009: 214-217; Bolleyer and Reh 
2012). These theorists recognise that the European and national regimes 
undermine each other’s legitimacy, implying that Europe’s multilevel structure 
directly impacts legitimacy at both levels (Cheneval and Schimmelfennig 
2013; Lord and Pollak 2010). They thus argue that one should take into 
account the stratified structure of the European polity when making sense of 
the EU’s legitimacy. The restructuring of power is indeed a serious 
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consideration since, as Andrea Sangiovanni persuasively argues, conceptions 
of political concepts should suit the specific political regime that they intend to 
govern normatively (Sangiovanni 2008). The institutionalisation of de facto 
sovereignty, as well as the reorganisation of power within Europe’s polity 
since integration, will feature in the sixth and seventh chapters, respectively. 
Leaving aside whether these institutional proposals make sense to citizens 
(e.g. Innerarity 2014), they recombine output, democratic, and identitarian 
legitimacy in their attempts to make sense of the EU’s legitimacy. Similar 
conceptions of popular sovereignty, therefore, remain implied in these 
attempts, illustrating that the genealogical reconstructions are also relevant for 
these mixed and multi-layered proposals, because they continue to rely on the 
same conceptions of the bonds of collectivity. 
The three criteria, and their justificatory logic, offer a particularly fruitful 
point of departure for the genealogical reconstruction of contemporary 
conceptions of popular sovereignty. As shown, each criterion relies on its own 
particular bond of collectivity. Each argument therefore rests, on some level, 
on a distinct conception of popular sovereignty with at its heart a conception 
of the people informing criteria of legitimacy. These criteria have strong 
empirical ties to the past because they have often been drawn from the 
literature on the modern state’s legitimacy. The three criteria are not tabula 
rasa constructions of innovative political theorists. EU scholars often rely on 
existing literature on the democratic nation-state’s legitimacy to make sense 
of the empirical challenge that is the EU’s democratic deficit. Fritz Scharpf 
(1999), for example, drew upon David Easton’s system analysis (Easton 
1957) for his still influential input-output distinction (see also Sternberg 
2013).19 Habermas illustrates how these criteria can be associated with three 
received views of democratic politics: liberal, discursive, and communitarian 
(Habermas 1994). Unsurprisingly then, from this perspective, the criteria of 
output, democracy and identity were prominent in debates on the rise of the 
modern state (e.g. Bellamy 2004). During the French revolution, for instance, 
arguments for citizenship were given alongside instrumental, rational-
democratic, or communitarian lines (Stråth and Skinner 2003: 5-6). Therefore, 
despite the differential effect of the specific historical context and experience 
of each European country in finding a particular point of equilibrium, Europe’s 
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democratic nation-states became legitimated as the competent providers of 
benefits, democratic structure, and communitarian identity (e.g. Bartolini 2005; 
Bellamy 2004). The three criteria inform into a sincere first-order 
disagreement on how to make sense of the EU as a legitimate political order 
within national debates (Lacroix and Nicolaïdis 2010b). For instance, the 
identity criterion fuels Euro-sceptic Schmittian arguments in the German 
debate, whilst the democratic conception of this criteria informs Smendian 
justifications for European political integration (Müller 2010a). Despite 
reflecting the latter democratic impetus, Habermas’ constitutional patriotism 
has been deemed particularly German (e.g. Turner 2004). The distinct 
constellation of state legitimacy in national communities will feature in chapter 
seven. In national arrangements, however, these criteria became important 
justifications of sovereign state’s rule. In chapter six, I shall present a 
vindication of their complementarily in making sense of political rule in modern 
circumstances. However, I shall first reconstruct each of these conceptions of 
popular sovereignty from canonical arguments legitimating the state based 
upon these three criteria. 
 
V - Conclusion 
This chapter was essential to the argument as it further elaborates Williams’ 
realist theory of legitimacy, the centrality of the concept of popular sovereignty 
in modern legitimation stories, and sets the ground for the genealogical 
endeavour. William’s realist theory of legitimacy relies on his interpretive 
account of the practice of politics. Legitimation stories constitute attempts to 
make sense of individuals’ place in the political world by providing desirable 
accounts of the political order. These reflective stories contain arguments 
which propose appropriate criteria of legitimacy for a particular political order. 
Realist theorists appraise these conceptions in virtue of their capacity to 
provide a desirable answer to the first political question within specific 
historical circumstances. In addition, the central political fictions, such as the 
sovereign people, should be able to plausibly act as realistic heuristics to 
guide political agents’ political practices. Nonetheless, they require practical 
resonance to remain vindicated in specific contexts. Popular sovereignty, so I 
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continued, became the dominant conceptual structure of legitimation stories 
within the disenchanted European modernity. According to it, the constituent 
power authorises the constituted power. The bond of collectivity between 
citizens should, therefore, determine the appropriate criteria of the legitimacy 
of the political order. At this stage, popular sovereignty remains a rather 
abstract. My genealogical inquiry aims to reconstruct our contemporary 
conceptions to evaluate their influence and appraise them. The dominant 
criteria in debate on the EU’s legitimacy offer a fruitful point of departure for 
this enterprise. Each criterion rests on markedly different understandings of 
the relationships between European citizens. This genealogical enquiry will 
firstly reconstruct the conceptions of popular sovereignty from canonical 
arguments on the legitimacy of the sovereign state, thereby creating a more 
sophisticated understanding of the multi-faceted conception of popular 
sovereignty which governs the current debate on the EU’s democratic deficit. 
These reconstructions focus on the people’s principle and boundary because, 
on the one hand, they form the normative-conceptual underpinnings of each 
conception and, on the other hand, they shall set the stage for the institutional 
analysis. The latter is essential for appraising whether we can remain 
confident in our normative commitment to the contemporary conception of 
popular sovereignty, or if they can no longer remain vindicated in 




                                            
1
 The unfinished nature of Williams’ political theory can justify alternative readings. For similar 
interpretations, see (Hall 2014; Forthcoming; Sleat 2007).  
2
 In ‘Human Rights and Relativism’, Williams allows for the philosophical possibility that all 
humans might agree on some abuses of power (Williams 2005: 62-74). These abuses are 
often associated with situations of violent domination; hence one could argue that they arise 
from this interpretive analysis of ‘the political’, which underpins his body of work on political 
realism.  
3
 This interpretation of legitimacy is often associated with the Gramscian concept of 
hegemony (Kalyvas 2000) or the Foucauldian notion of governmentality (Foucault 2003 
[1975-1976]).     
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4
 Williams does observe that “Of course, the power to justify may itself be a power, but it is 
not merely that power” (2005: 6). To clarify, the power to justify is a power aimed at justifying 
another power, namely to coerce. The problem arises when coercive power is the source of 
justification. Arguably, Williams’ hermeneutical interpretation of stories clashes with 
Foucauldian accounts of governmentality. On the latter, the power to influence is sufficient to 
constitute a form of domination.   
5
 In a similar vein, Edmund Morgan argued that “Human beings, if only to maintain a 
semblance of self-respect, have to be persuaded (Morgan 1988: 13).  
6
 His liberalism is arguably not the standard account (compare Hall 2015; and Sleat 2010). 
7
 Stories from other spheres of human endeavour also constitute part of an implicit 
background to political practices (definitions of these spheres are themselves cultural 
products). 
8
 For more extensive overviews on the historical emergence of popular sovereignty in the 
West, see (e.g. Ackerman 1991; Kalyvas 2005; Morris 2000; Mulligan 2006; Pekonen 2009). 
9
 Challenges present themselves when offering a coherent account of the ruled as being both 
the source of authority and subjects to the same authority. Academics often concern 
themselves exactly with these challenges normatively (Kolodny 2014a; 2014b), theoretically 
(Loughlin 2014), and practically (Glencross 2014). Modern democratic theorists tend to 
emphasise the importance of the persistent political agency of the constituent power (e.g. 
Bellamy 2000; Glencross 2014). 
10
 Chris Thornhill (2011) argues that the functionality of a regime to its citizenries is the only 
grounding of legitimacy in modernity (see also Abizadeh 2012: 867). The defining feature of 
political values, however, is disagreement about the appropriate functions of a regime. 
Nevertheless, an analysis of ‘facts and values’ is the only plausible approach to reconstruct 
socially plausible functions, hence Williams turns to history to establish relevant meanings. 
11
 Different or more fine-grained definitions feature in particular accounts which are based on 
similar distinctions (Schmidt 2012). 
12
 An alternative ‘messianic’ argument relies on a future political paradise (Weiler 2012). The 
EU’s autonomous decision-making powers are justified as part of a process toward the future 
attainment of an ideal. This position is historically associated with the (hidden) agenda of neo-
functionalists (e.g. Burgess 2009; Haas 1958; Moga 2009). 
13
 This argument also often features in other accounts. Jürgen Habermas argues that the EU 
is an economic necessity for similar reasons, however he proposes a democratic rather than 
technocratic Union (e.g. Habermas 1996).  
14
 Bellamy and Castiglione’s account focuses on a democratic interpretation in which elected 
representatives act for the people’s interests (2013: 210). This ontology, however, can also 
apply to technocrats because Scharpf’s conceptualisation of self-determination rests on 
experts acting for the citizens as acting for the people. Nonetheless, the technocrats deny the 
need for reoccurring electoral mandate. 
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15
 For a general discussion of process-based conceptualisations of the people, see 
(Chambers 2004: 156-158). A similar logic underlies federalism-by-instalments (Burgess 
2009: 37) and neo-neofunctionalists (Schmitter 2004: 69). 
16
 To illustrate the importance of desire over fact, Friedrich Hayek (1949) broadly offers the 
same analysis as Miller, yet uses it to argue in favour of interstate integration. 
17
 Peter Lindseth has arguably moved toward a more demoicratic position. Though his 
continued emphasis on the administrative and judicial character makes his position 
debatable.  
18
 These models tend to eschew ethnic conceptualizations, which are generally deemed both 
undesirable and implausible (Friese and Wagner 2002: 352). 
19
 For a critical ‘Wittgensteinian’ perspective on the input-output distinction, see (Kratochwil 
2006). 
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Chapter 3: The People as Beneficiaries of the State 
 
I want a passionately independent government, because only it offers 
protection for freedom in the intellectual as well as the economic sphere … I 
don’t want this parliament and party business that will sour the whole life of 
the nation with its politics … I don’t want politics. I want competence, order, 
and decency. 
Thomas Mann, Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen1 
 
I - Introduction 
In the previous chapter I presented an in-depth treatment of Williams’ realist 
theory of legitimacy. This theoretical reliance on the political practice of 
legitimation stories translates into two interrelated functional demands for the 
vindication of conceptions seeking to legitimate political rule: make sense of 
hierarchical rule as a desirable civic order from within its own historical 
circumstances at the normative level. In addition, it should offer realistic 
guidance to political agents, meaning that its political fictions must therefore 
acquire a certain degree of practical resonance in order to act as heuristic 
tools. In a disenchanted cosmology, the divine rights of kings could no longer 
make plausible sense of the state’s legitimacy to large parts of the population. 
Popular sovereignty emerges as the core political concept of new legitimation 
stories. It describes a new conceptual structure in which the constituent power 
authorises the constituted power. In this conceptual structure, the people’s 
bond of collectivity should determine the appropriate criteria of legitimacy for 
the modern state. I then presented the three dominant criteria of legitimacy 
used to make sense of the EU’s legitimacy: output, democracy, and identity. 
Each of these sources rests, implicitly or explicitly, on some degree of 
communality between the citizens: a political ontology. Distinct conceptions of 
popular sovereignty thus govern these arguments. In the conceptual part of 
this genealogical enterprise, I will reconstruct the contemporary conceptions 
of popular sovereignty from canonical arguments on the state’s legitimacy 
using the same criteria applied to the EU. My focus, as said in the introductory 
chapter, is set on uncovering the politically relevant relationship for 
Chapter 3: The People as Beneficiaries of the State 
 81 
determining the state’s legitimacy. These bonds constitute, on the one hand, 
the normative heart of each conception of popular sovereignty. On the other 
hand, these conceptualisations are essential to appraise the commitment to 
these conceptions of popular sovereignty in contemporary Europe. This 
chapter is the first of three conceptual ones. In this conceptual genealogy, I 
reconstruct what turns out to be a rather elitist, technocratic conception of 
popular sovereignty underlying output legitimacy. Arguments on output 
legitimacy, as I will show, rely on posited interests between individuals. A 
limited number of politically relevant shared interests are served by the state. 
Furthermore, in these arguments, the state conceptually binds them together 
as a people, because the interests are often, in principle, universalisable. 
 In this first conceptual genealogy, I reconstruct the conception of 
popular sovereignty from different canonical arguments on output legitimacy. 
Broadly summarised, citizens (should) come together in a society so as to 
build the ‘necessities and conveniences of life’ (Morgan 2005a: 71-72). The 
people are conceptualised as beneficiaries of security and economic 
prosperity. The sovereign state is the legitimate political order due to its ability 
to provide the preconditions for achieving the beneficial outputs, which 
motivate submission to collective rule; a competent sovereign state can claim 
allegiance from individuals in virtue of these benefits. My argument is that 
security and economic prosperity have become inextricably intertwined in this 
contemporary conception of popular sovereignty. Early modern theorists 
argued that security was a precondition for an industrious capitalist society, 
and a capitalist society generated the necessary resources for it to fund its 
security apparatus. According to these theorists, the state is tasked with 
safeguarding and managing a capitalist economy in a complex international 
political economic environment. A competent sovereign state attains these 
aims effectively. The substantive interpretation of security and economic 
prosperity did significantly change from early modern commercial to late 
modern industrial societies. The early modern sovereign state’s ability to 
provide individual freedom and increases in overall prosperity were sufficient 
to secure its legitimacy. The emerging welfare state, however, was to provide 
the optimal degree of individual welfare to citizens within its borders; it 
therefore required an extensive expert bureaucracy to manage the demands 
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of a capitalist economy, capable of optimising the redistribution of resources. 
In these canonical arguments, ‘the people as beneficiaries’ consists of citizens 
partaking in the state-governed domestic economy. The interests are often 
universal -- John Locke, for instance, deemed property rights to be God-given. 
The arguments, however, started to include protection from other countries 
and economic competition with them. The latter implies that the beneficiaries’ 
interests are particularly dependent upon the political order; the sovereign 
state comes to provide the conceptual boundary to the popular sovereign. At 
this stage, I should clarify my use of ‘conceptual boundary’, as I only touched 
upon it in the first chapter, and because it will feature prominently in the 
following chapters. It refers to the principle of exclusion from a people or the 
effective borders to a people. To Charles Tilly’s paraphrase, the ties that bind 
also bound people from one another (Tilly 2005). The legitimacy of the 
sovereign state does not rest on cosmopolitanism, but on a people. As a 
result, the conceptual boundaries of the people constitute an intrinsic aspect 
of the sovereign state that is legitimated by a conception of popular 
sovereignty.  
 This chapter’s argument unfolds in four sections, which follow a 
chronological structure. The aim is to reconstruct, from these arguments on 
the state’s output legitimacy, our contemporary conception of popular 
sovereignty. The next section (section II) focuses on the period of the rise of 
the modern state, when feudal societies transformed into commercial ones. 
The central claim is that security and economic prosperity were yoked 
together in canonical arguments legitimating the modern state. Sovereign 
states had to meet these internal demands within the constraints of a 
competitive international environment. The complexity of the modern political 
economic environment required competent legislators able to secure these 
benefits. The subsequent section (section III) focuses on how the organisation 
of the modern state continues to retain legitimacy in industrialised 
democracies. The conceptualisation of the people’s security and economic 
prosperity came to include the individual welfare of citizens, benefits which, 
according to these arguments, required the optimal management of the 
domestic economy by an expert bureaucracy. The fourth section (section IV) 
reconstructs the conception of popular sovereignty governing these 
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arguments. The sovereign state’s legitimacy, so I argue, relies on the state 
being a precondition and vehicle for the attainment of a well-ordered capitalist 
polity in which produces security and economic prosperity for its citizens. The 
arguments limit the individuals included in ‘the people’ to those partaking in 
the state-governed domestic economy. Thus, in conclusion (section V), the 
canonical arguments rest on a conceptualisation of the people as 
beneficiaries of the state in terms of security and economic prosperity. This 
conception of popular sovereignty remains elitist and technocratic even in 
modern democratic welfare arrangements. 
 
II - The sovereign state securing commercial society 
In canonical arguments on the state’s output legitimacy, the dominant 
conceptualization of the people as beneficiaries yoked together the political 
logic of security, freedom, and justice with the economic one of prosperity, 
commerce, and welfare. In commercial society, the sovereign state’s rule was 
legitimated due to it being a precondition for the attainment of these benefits. 
The state relied upon domestic economic competitiveness to fund military and 
policing agencies which would maintain order, whilst domestic policies to 
improve the economic competitiveness secured civil liberties within a system 
of the rule of law. The two logics were conceptualised as co-dependent. 
According to these arguments, competent state officials are necessary to 
make the best decisions in an increasingly complex internationalised political 
economy. Citizens’ obedience to the state relies on the latter’s ability to 
deliver security and economic prosperity. State output is therefore the 
appropriate criteria for making sense of its legitimacy.  
The instabilities of the seventeenth century contributed to making 
physical security a central concern of Western political thought (Morgan 
2005a: 98; Rothschild 1995: 60).2 The state’s exclusive right over lawmaking -
- its sovereignty -- was deemed a pre-condition for securing the physical 
safety of its citizen-subjects. Written at the dawn of the modern state, Thomas 
Hobbes’ Leviathan exemplifies one of the most influential justifications for the 
sovereign state, grounded in the latter’s ability to secure the physical safety of 
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the multitude (Turner 1982: 367). Hobbes’ argument starts with a sketch of 
the state of nature as a war of all against all. He argues that: 
 
In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is 
uncertain, and consequently no culture of the earth, no navigation nor use of 
the commodities that may be imported by sea, no commodious building, no 
instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force, no 
knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time, no arts, no letters, no 
society, and, which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death, 
and the life of man solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short (Hobbes 1996 
[1651]: 89). 
 
 Individuals have the same interest in self-preservation, they thus share 
an interest in escaping the state of nature. Hobbes argued that individual 
security is “an absolute precondition of commodious life within a 
commonwealth” (Hobbes 1996 [1651]: 231).3 The only stable way to provide 
security for individuals, so he argues, is the establishment of an absolute 
sovereign with full discretionary power.4 Citizens should judge a sovereign’s 
legitimacy on the sole criterion that it does not directly endanger their lives. In 
Hobbes’ own words, “The end of Obligation of Subjects to Soveraign, is 
understood to last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth, by which he 
is able to protect them” (Hobbes 1996 [1651]: 153). Hobbes argued that 
citizens create a sovereign lawmaker through a social contract. Subjects 
remain individuals within society rather than becoming a collective people. An 
individual can therefore resist the sovereign if it threatens their life, but will not 
receive protection from other citizens because the sovereign continues to 
secure their interests. As Hobbes scholars observe, the people in Hobbes’ 
theory of popular sovereignty is the sovereign state rather than the multitude 
(e.g. Lagerspetz 2004: 227).5 According to the Hobbesian argument, the 
legitimacy of the state depends on securing citizens’ physical safety through 
the creation of a civic order. This argument does not rely upon subjects or 
citizens being the same, but rather posits a bond of collectivity purely in the 
interest of physical safety.  
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This interest in security would also come to include the protection of 
individual liberty from the interference of the sovereign lawmaker. John Locke 
famously critiqued Hobbes’ Leviathan when he argued that: 
 
… to think that Men are so foolish that they take care to avoid what mischiefs 
may be done them by Pole-Cats and Foxes, but are content, nay, think it 
Safety, to be devoured by Lions (Locke 1988 [1698]: 328). 
 
Locke’s objection relies on the analysis that the absolute sovereign could also 
pose a danger to citizens’ safety. The price for escaping continual fear from 
others was replaced by a similar fear of the arbitrary will of the sovereign. 
Hobbes’ main concern was how to solve severe internal disorder associated 
with civil war (Hardin 1995: 176). However, internal security had arguably 
become a less immediate concern in Locke’s time, which made other 
concerns more relevant. Locke’s classical liberal argument holds that 
authority should be limited as much as possible in favour of voluntary 
relationships between individuals (Geuss 2002: 323).  
In Two Treaties of Government (1988 [1698]), John Locke offers a 
paradigmatic argument for the state’s legitimacy in which security includes 
individual liberty. He argues that the state of nature is not a war of all against 
all, but rather a harsh but survivable existence. This redefinition of the state of 
nature changes the reasons for having citizens create a common government. 
In Locke’s state of nature, individuals know a degree of peace but prosperity 
is limited due to the lack of protection of their property rights. Citizens should 
opt out of the state of nature to gain “Safety and Security in Civil Society” 
(Locke 1988 [1698]: 329). Locke stands in the tradition of natural law in which 
individuals have inalienable property rights of ‘life, health, liberty, and estate’.6 
Individuals should contractually consent to the establishment of civil 
government in order to preserve their property rights (Locke 1988 [1698]: 
329).7 According to this argument, the protection of property rights constitutes 
the shared interest for living in society. In addition to the protection of these 
necessities, the establishment of civil society would also result in greater 
prosperity for the entire community. Locke’s argument exemplifies that the 
state’s enforcement of property rights was understood as essential to “achieve 
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social order and prosperity” (Spies-Butcher, Paton et al. 2012b: 96). He 
argues that the economic division of labour would result in greater prosperity 
because property rights would stimulate men’s industrious nature (Locke 1988 
[1698]: 285-302). The subsequent specialization of activities should 
furthermore result in overall increases of prosperity within society. With 
regards to state legitimacy, property ownership requires enforcement by an 
impartial civil government. The rule of law is therefore instrumental for 
securing civil liberties, which contribute to the attainment of individual freedom 
and economic prosperity. According to Locke’s theory, the bond of collectivity 
between citizens is not merely the protection of their security but also 
economic prosperity.  
In Europe, influential arguments on the state’s output legitimacy 
recognised that citizens’ interests, and by extension economic prosperity, 
relied upon the presence of an internationally competitive domestic economy. 
Resistance theories paid only limited attention to external factors impacting 
the political community. Hobbes’ theory, for example, did not take into account 
the impact of the scarcity of goods on the conditions of order (Hont 2005: 17-
22). Changing conditions in the seventeenth and eighteenth century, such as 
technological advantages in warfare and the creation of standing armies, 
resulted in significant increases in the costs of external protection and 
conquest. Istvan Hont argues that there a transformation from a ‘reason of 
state’ to a ‘jealousy of trade’ impacted the conditions of external safety (Hont 
2005). According to the latter logic, military survival of the state depended 
upon global competition for markets in order to finance defence. Commerce 
financed war efforts, yet it would also become a reason for waging war. 
Competition in international markets would come to include the national 
economy (Hont 2005). “Jealousy of Trade ceased to be a matter only of 
imperialism, colonization, and sea trade, of taking hold of external resources 
by practically any means. … economic preparation for war [became] the most 
important business of the economy as well” (Hont 2005: 24). Canonical 
arguments on the state’s output legitimacy started to include more explicitly 
this international dimension. The political thought of French economic minister 
Jean-Baptiste Colbert exemplifies the fusion of the warlike state and the 
capitalist economy. He wrote that, “commerce is a war of wit and energy 
Chapter 3: The People as Beneficiaries of the State 
 87 
(d’esprit et d’industrie) among all nations” (quoted in: Hont 2005: 23). Starting 
from this assumption, Colbert’s state policies aimed to ensure France’s 
survival in Europe’s global cutthroat political economy. The management of 
the domestic economy became an affair of the state. The maintenance of 
national military apparatus required funds, which were to be acquired through 
commerce. The latter, however, required that the domestic economy be 
competitive in international markets. Colbert argued in favour of the 
liberalisation of France’s internal trade, hoping it would accelerate urban 
growth, which should in turn stimulate agriculture (Hont 2005: 24). Colbert’s 
argument illustrates that the state’s survival relied on an international 
competitive domestic market in “Europe’s world economy” (Tilly 1975: 44-45). 
The performance of the domestic economy, by extension, came to be 
perceived as an integral part of citizens’ safety, and even of their liberty. 
Eighteenth-century debates on food supply further illustrate that, within 
these canonical arguments, the state’s output legitimacy relied upon its 
competitiveness within this international environment. A particularly important 
concern in Europe was the food supply. This issue was closely related to the 
state’s legitimacy as famine was a major cause of popular rebellion (Hont 
2005: 403-419; Tilly 1975: 61-62). The physiocratic argument exemplified how 
state legitimacy, in order to meet domestic needs, required the protection of 
national markets from external competition. Despite sharing Colbert’s liberal 
capitalist mindset, the physiocrats argued that the state should protect and 
prioritise agriculture over manufacturing, and that economic mechanisms 
required a social-legal order to function. They combined economic capitalism 
with political ‘legal despotism’: the so-called paradox of the physiocrats 
(McNally 1988). François Quesnay, for example, argued that a monarch’s 
enlightened reason of state and absolute power could create the conditions 
for the given natural order: l’Ordre Natural (McNally 1988: 122). The absolute 
monarch should create the conditions for a ‘natural’ laissez faire economic 
system. Both Quesnay and Turgot argued the natural economic order would 
require a single centralised state to overcome partisan interests and to guide 
the profits toward overall welfare of the citizens (McNally 1988: 123-125; 139). 
Lockean natural rights became not a source of resistance, but a resource to 
generate obedience to an absolute monarch (Hont 2005: 90; McNally 1988: 
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125-126). In order to avoid arbitrary despotism the physiocrats argued that 
enlightened councillors should guide rational policy-making to ensure the 
three principles of the natural order: “the right to property; liberty of work, 
trade, export, and expenditure; and security of person and property” (McNally 
1988: 126). After full domestic liberalisation, agriculture would consistently 
grow, creating a secure foundation for France’s competitiveness for other 
resources in the world economy (Hont 2005: 309; McNally 1988: 146). An 
enlightened absolute despotic state would secure the needs and 
conveniences of the people within a competitive international environment. 
This physiocratic argument incorporates “an objectified understanding of the 
economy” (Taylor 2004: 69-82). The modern capitalist economy is understood 
as “a connected system of transactions obeying its own laws … [These 
economic laws] apply to human actions as they concatenate, behind the 
backs of the agents; they constitute an invisible hand” (Taylor 2004: 164).8 
The state became understood as the necessary precondition for managing 
the domestic economy in the interest of the people.  
The Scottish Enlightenment thinkers would exemplify another canonical 
school of thought with this objective understanding of the capitalist economy, 
arguing that free government and an open economy should secure the 
greatest benefits for the citizens. The state’s interests in commerce and 
citizens’ interests in luxury converge, according to these theorists, in the realm 
of international political economy. In his political discourse Of Commerce, 
David Hume, for example, articulates this logic as follows: 
 
The greatness of a state, and the happiness of its subjects, how independent 
soever they may be supposed in some respects, are commonly allowed to be 
inseparable with regard to commerce; and as private men receive greater 
security, in the possession of their trade and riches, from the power of the 
public, so the public becomes powerful in proportion to the opulence and 
extensive commerce of private men (Hume 1987 [1752]: 31). 
 
Hume’s argument illustrates that commerce linked individual civil liberty 
to economic prosperity. The structural benefits of property rights, so these 
theorists argue, reintroduced liberty in modern circumstances. In contrast to 
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the physiocrats, Smith argues that the sovereign ruler, or any other individual 
or council, lacks the necessary knowledge to organise grain production to 
meet the requirements of a rapidly growing population. Instead, the ‘invisible 
hand’ of the market would ensure demand for grain would be met as with any 
other commodity (Hont 2005: 88-99). Smith’s argument thus explicitly relies 
on an objectified understanding of the capitalist economy. He argues that 
property rights provide structural benefits to the citizenry. The poorest laborer 
in England would become wealthier than the richest king in Africa (Smith 
1776a: 19). The legitimate state should thus protect citizens’ property rights in 
virtue of these structural benefits (see also Dunn 1994). Smith explicitly linked 
liberty to international commerce. He argued that the latter had become the 
reason for liberty rather than its result in his historical context (Hont 2009). In 
this regard, Smith’s and Colbert’s positions show some similarities (Hont 
2005: 100). The latter, however, argued that only a bureaucratic command of 
the economy could ensure the subservience of trade to the common interest 
(Hont 2005: 24). A strong state should protect the common good from 
mercantile and other factional interests. Smith and Hume argued, however, 
that the physiocrats’ legal despotism and Colbert’s command economy would 
threaten civil liberties (see also Hont 2009). This would, in turn, constitute a 
threat to citizens’ economic prosperity. To summarise succinctly, these 
canonical arguments conceptualise the people as sharing an interest in 
security and economic prosperity, benefits which the state must secure in 
competition with other polities in the international market.  
The impartial state has a legitimate role to play in securing domestic 
needs and conveniences. A version of this argument for state interference can 
be drawn from the paradigmatic theorist of the free market: Adam Smith. In 
his Theory of Moral Sentiments (2002 [1759]), Smith distinguished two 
sentiments, negative ‘harm’ and positive ‘happiness’, to which he established 
two corresponding principles of government: security of society sustained 
through allegiance to authority, and the improvement of society or the 
principle of common interest (Hont 2009: 169; Long 2006: 292). Associating 
positive moral sentiment with the improvement of the life of fellow citizens is 
desirable; “It is the ornament which embellishes, not the foundation which 
supports the building” (Smith 2002 [1759]: 100-101). Society “may subsist” 
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without it because the foundation of a society is (communicative) justice (Long 
2006: 306-307). Adam Smith’s position in the grain debate illustrates this 
prioritisation of needs over conveniences (Hont 2005; McNally 1988: 152). He 
recognised that shortcomings in grain supply could emerge. In dire situations, 
citizens’ needs should trump ‘the conveniences’ of property rights (Hont 2005: 
93-94). The state had to rely on political judgment in such situations to, for 
instance, open up grain reserves for the common good (Hont 2009). This 
political judgement could also inform other public works. In the Wealth of 
Nations (1776a), Smith argues that the legitimate sovereign has to fulfil three 
duties: external protection, internal justice, and the improvement of society 
(Smith 1776b: 43-192). The first two duties should protect citizens’ liberty from 
external and internal threats. The third one, however, is more closely 
associated with improvement in life’s conveniences due to economic 
prosperity. The sovereign state should engage in the construction of public 
works in order to stimulate the national economy, such as education and 
infrastructure, because of their benefit to all members of society. The state 
has to construct these public works, because individual citizens cannot afford 
to sustain them (Smith 1776b: 91-190). Therefore, the legitimate state should 
engage in projects for the common good if it embellishes society, without 
causing harm. The justification is the pursuit of the greatest possible output for 
its citizens. Sincere disagreement between French and Scottish theorists 
existed on how to achieve the best possible outcomes in the name of the 
common good. Yet their arguments posit a shared interest in security and 
economic prosperity among the population. These arguments further 
introduce a conceptual border distinguishing them from arguably universal 
interests, because they rely upon the state’s competent management of the 
domestic political economy within a complex international environment. 
Later canonical arguments would further emphasise the need for a 
skilled and impartial government in this complex environment. These 
arguments favour competence over inclusiveness in appraising the legitimacy 
of the (proto-)democratic state. Immanuel Kant’s argument on Schutzgenosse 
exemplifies the competence over inclusiveness argument in safeguarding 
citizens’ safety by the state. His argument proceeds as follows: citizens have 
the exclusive right to be co-legislators because they are capable of 
Chapter 3: The People as Beneficiaries of the State 
 91 
formulating rational policies. On this reasoning, children, women, but also 
laborers and shopkeepers were not allowed to participate in the legislative 
process. Kant, however, adds that they should still be considered free (as 
human beings) and equal (as subjects) (Kant 1991 [1793]: 77-78). Non-
citizens are co-beneficiaries of the security created by the rule of law 
(Rothschild 1995: 67). The latter secures objective interests for all the state’s 
subjects, thus generating output legitimacy. Kant’s defence of a constitutional 
monarchy in his Perpetual Peace further illustrates the lack of a necessary 
conceptual link in his political thought between civil liberties and political rights 
(Kant 1991 [1795]). His Schutzgenosse argument focuses on the attainment 
of security through capable government. A similar justificatory logic was found 
in the British parliamentary system of the time, which even included some 
welfare rights for subjects (Harris 2004; Mann 2005b: 56). A competent 
legislator would secure its subjects’ objective interests; competent rule was 
thus essential to generating output legitimacy for the state. 
In this context, even theorists of the democratic revolutions did not 
necessarily argue that natural liberty required political rights. In the French 
revolution, Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès argued that “society was constituted by 
mutual need and the exchange of goods and services” (Hont 2005: 134). A 
large state is necessary to secure the interests of “internal peace, external 
security, and common welfare” (Hont 2005: 484-485). In her interpretation of 
Sieyès, Nadia Urbinati argues that he associated civil rights with a universal 
pre-political status. Political rights, by contrast, derive from the artificial 
construction which is the state and therefore do not require universality 
(Urbinati 2006: 150-151). The extended political machine required to maintain 
a commercial society should be managed by the active few in order to pursue 
the good of the ‘politically passive, although socioeconomically active, many’ 
(Urbinati 2006: 143). The latter need only vote for representatives and should 
not be expected to govern a complex modern commercial republic. Capable 
rather than inclusive government is necessary to safeguard natural individual 
liberty in modernity’s complex circumstances (Urbinati 2006: 151). In the 
French context, the design of the French republic should ensure rule by the 
competent few, a natural aristocracy whose political judgement would be 
guided by impartiality and rationality towards the common good (Urbinati 
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2006: 151). A capable state elite should thus rule to achieve the objective 
interests of the masses.  
The argument also featured in the debates on the legitimate form of the 
early modern American republic. James Madison’s arguments on 
representative government, for instance, include a very similar meritocratic 
trope (Gueniffey 1994: 102-103) in that he advocates rule by a natural 
aristocracy (Hamilton, Madison et al. 1987 [1788]: 126). In this historical 
context, his argument did not refer to moral superiority but, once again, to the 
ability to govern in complex circumstances (Kalyvas and Katznelson 2008: 
101-103). Statesmen required a good education in order to form sufficient 
expertise in statecraft to rule a modern mass republic. The complexity of 
modern politics implied that the “permanent and aggregated interests of the 
society” (Hamilton, Madison et al. 1987 [1788]: 123)  were safer in the hands 
of educated elites. Thomas Jefferson, who is often considered more 
egalitarian than Madison (Brugger 1999: 115), argued, for the same reasons, 
that representatives need to be suited to the task of government (Helo 2009: 
42-43). These theorists’ arguments reflect a need for competent legislators 
able to attain safety and economic prosperity. In Elkin’s interpretation of 
Madison, property rights are essential outputs for the legitimacy of a modern 
commercial republic. “Without, such rights, the commerce that produced the 
economic prosperity that the new government promised, and on which it 
rested, would be impossible to achieve” (Elkin 2006: 799). These rights would 
result in a defence of other rights and liberties (Elkin 2006: 799). Other rights 
relied on limited government, and a system of checks and balances 
associated with impartial rule of law. In these canonical arguments, the 
legitimacy of the modern sovereign state relied on capable governors to 
secure optimal benefits for their citizenry. Citizens’ shared interest in security 
and economic interests constituted their bond of collectivity. State legitimacy 
depended on the creation of these outputs, which tended to inform a 
preference for competence-oriented rather than inclusive forms of rule.  
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III - The expert bureaucracy at the service of industrial society 
The arguments in the previous section make sense of the legitimacy of the 
modern state during the rise of commercial society. Centralised and 
impersonal forms of rule replaced earlier more arbitrary and personal feudal 
relationships. The modern state came to govern through a legal framework 
grounded in the protection of property rights and the freedom of contract. Its 
regular character facilitated emerging European market economies (Bellamy 
2004: 6). These well-regulated market economies enabled competition in an 
international capitalist environment (Lassman 2000: 93). Modern theorists 
redesigned political institutions to adapt to the emerging socio-economic 
reality of capitalism.9 Their canonical arguments emphasise the need for the 
competent governance of these complex economies in the pursuit of citizens’ 
necessities and conveniences of life. The initially limited role of the state, 
however, would significantly expand when, in the nineteenth century, most 
European societies transformed from commercial into industrial ones (Sartori 
1976: 20). In addition, the extension of political franchise, which now included 
non-property owning citizens, resulted in an expansion of the scope of political 
power in the private and public spheres (Habermas 1992a: 122-129). These 
changes in historical circumstances impacted the conception of what 
constituted citizens’ interests. Individual security, for instance, required 
protection from the insecurities of the market, while a more egalitarian ethos 
informed a greater degree of redistribution of the conveniences of life (Gellner 
1983; Marshall 1950: 26). The administration of late industrial mass society by 
experts became a precondition to the optimal fulfilment of these demands in 
an increasingly complex environment. These arguments thus hold that 
popular sovereignty requires a competent and extensive state bureaucracy to 
serve citizens’ interests. 
In these justifications, the modern state was provided with a greater 
degree of responsibility over redistribution of the outputs of the industrialised 
capitalist economy in order to better provide for citizens’ security and 
economic prosperity. Prussian Chancellor Otto von Bismarck’s defence of the 
social service state -- arguably a proto-welfare state (Briggs 1961) -- reflects a 
central shift in the conceptualisation of security within these circumstances. 
Bismarck argued that it was the state’s duty to provide for its citizens safety. 
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This duty also grounded their subsequent obedience.10 An inability to work 
would directly impact citizens’ physical safety due to the lack of income to 
secure food and housing. On this logic, therefore, the state should guarantee 
a social minimum for its citizens so as to protect the latter from the vagaries of 
industrialised life. This argument reflects an adaption of the concept of 
individual security to suit the context of industrialized market economics, 
namely through the inclusion of a social minimum. The state therefore 
became involved in a greater number of political-economic tasks. Bismarck 
introduced compulsory social security regimes in the 1880s to insure against 
sickness, accidents, old age, and invalidity (Briggs 1961: 246-247; Preuß 
2004: 38). In addition, he was committed to the “positive advancement of the 
working classes” and argued that “the state is not merely a necessary but a 
beneficent institution” (Bismarck quoted in: Briggs 1961: 248-249).11 The 
Bismarckian state could rely on Cameralism to implement these schemes: a 
“systematic application to government of administration routines” (Briggs 
1961: 247). The Bismarckian Cameral ‘welfare’ state illustrates that the 
broadening of the conception of individual safety in industrial society was 
accompanied by an expansion of the state’s capacity to implement decisions. 
Output legitimacy in Bismarck’s work would rely, once again, on an expert 
state bureaucracy. 
In a similar vein, influential political theorists asserted that governing a 
complex society to the benefit of citizens requires that the legitimate state 
possess a competent and impartial bureaucracy. In the section on the 
executive power in his Philosophy of Right (Hegel 1991 [1820]: 328-336), for 
instance, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel provided one of the first theoretical 
treatments of modern bureaucracy as a requirement for competent state rule 
(Shaw 1992: 381). He argued that private individuals lack impartiality because 
they exclusively pursue their self-interests. Societies, so he argued, require a 
‘despot’ that is guided by the best scientific knowledge. Hegel and other 
developmental thinkers of the time believed that the state was the carrier of a 
moral mandate (Kim 2002: 435). The judiciary, cameral bureaucracy, and 
military constitute the bureaucratic state apparatus responsible for the 
implementation of executive orders.12 On the issue, Hegel argued that this 
‘universal class’ protects civil society from fracture and advises the monarch 
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in matters of public affairs (Kim 2002: 436; Shaw 1992: 382). The influence of 
this logic on political practices is reflected in the eighteen-century flirtation with 
Enlightened monarchs, such as Frederick II, Joseph II, and Catherine the 
Great (Taylor 2004: 165-166). This emphasis on scientific knowledge reflects 
a continued commitment to objective accounts of social reality, which would 
allow an expert bureaucracy to make impartial decisions for the common good 
of the citizenry. The legitimate state should ensure the best possible 
outcomes in its citizens’ interests, though it was dependent upon this expert 
class to ensure delivery of these outputs.  
In canonical arguments, the Weberian bureaucracy would become the 
instrument of European states for achieving security and economic prosperity. 
Weber posited that the modern bureaucracy should be a technically 
competent implementer of policies within the state’s territory. The latter’s 
defining feature, famously, is its ability to maintain a monopoly on the 
legitimate use of physical force within a territory (Lassman 2000: 89);13 the 
bureaucratic administration of rule is pervasive and necessary in modern 
societies.  
 
… real rule, which becomes effective in everyday life neither through 
parliamentary speeches nor through the pronouncement of monarchs but 
through the day-to-day management of the administration, necessarily and 
inevitably lies in the hands of officialdom, both military and civilian (Weber 
1994: 145; italics in original).  
 
The bureaucracy should act as a disinterested implementer of values.14 It 
should occupy the space between civil society and decision-makers. An 
instrumental rationality should govern its practices: Zweckrationality (Kim 
2000: 215; Lassman 2000: 85). The expert bureaucracy’s authority derives 
from its rational-legal implementation of decisions.15 Weber, however, 
observed the danger of it ‘transcending’ its auxiliary status. Unlike Hegel, he 
deemed the bureaucracy as a closed group with its own powers and interests 
rather than as a Universalist class (Kim 2002: 436-437), but nevertheless 
aligns with him in that he saw an extensive bureaucratic infrastructure as a 
necessity for the implementation of policies in mass (democratic) societies. 
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The modern state would thus require an expert bureaucracy to pursue the 
common good. Weber’s thought exemplifies the logic according to which the 
emergence of a bureaucratic state is a necessary precondition for modern 
rule; in some canonical arguments however, the (assumed) impartiality of this 
group would justify their distinction from democratic decision-makers.  
The rise of modern bureaucracies made it feasible to imagine greater 
influence in attaining the common good. One particularly influential strand of 
thought, which often legitimated greater state interference, was utilitarianism. 
According to the paradigmatic utilitarian argument, state legitimacy relied on 
the creation of optimal overall utility, which was often defined as the 
minimisation of harm and maximisation of happiness. Historically, they would 
justify greater state interference than classic liberals, like Locke (Pettit 2005: 
158).16 The state could increase overall happiness through social reform 
projects, toward which Adam Smith expressed a clear sentiment of scepticism 
(Smith 2002 [1759]: 276-279). The rise of social sciences, however, bolstered 
confidence in such claims (Hardin 1995: 189). This utilitarian argument did not 
necessarily result a rejection of the rule of law in favour of arbitrary ad hoc 
decisions. For instance, in Civil Law, Jeremy Bentham legitimates the state 
(the legislator) as the guardian of rights (Kelly 1990) in virtue of the positive 
consequences of rights as part of individuals’ welfare (Binmore 1998; Goodin 
1995). In a similar vein, John Stuart Mill argued that physical and 
psychological security are a prerequisite for other utilities (Mill 2005 [1861]: 
52), which the state can only secure through the rule of law. The state should 
rely upon rational, impartial administration of the law due to the tendency of 
this process to produce the greatest happiness. The same argument could 
also inform more progressive policies and advocate for greater degrees of 
redistribution to increase the overall welfare of citizens. The state, however, 
could reasonably achieve these aims only through an extensive bureaucratic 
apparatus supplied with the scientific knowledge, resources, and other 
capacities for the implementation of these policies. As these utilitarian 
arguments serve to illustrate, a competent bureaucratic state will serve the 
objective interests of the citizens. 
This emphasis on objective interests would also inform a particular 
strand of democratic thought. Sceptical even of the moral wisdom of the 
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citizenry, some sought to safeguard liberal democracy from its citizens (e.g. 
Lippmann 1930; Schumpeter 1976). In these arguments, freedom was 
deemed an essential, objective interest, and elite corruption formed a threat to 
the citizenry. Joseph Alois Schumpter’s argument on electoral democracy 
exemplifies this stance against inclusive government. In response to the 
atrocities of the Second World War, he argued that citizens are reduced to 
animals in the realm of politics. Their political participation should therefore be 
limited to voting on representatives to rule in their name. The main purpose of 
an election is not to reflect the popular will, it is an institutional tool to keep 
elites uncorrupted (Schumpeter 1976: 269-283). Political elites are thus not 
fully trusted with the impartial protection of citizens’ interests. The main 
common purpose of politics was to secure the institutions which create liberty 
-- whether or not the public and elites wanted it. As David Held also observes, 
he characterises this ‘democratic’ vision as a technocratic one because 
citizens are subjects ruled over by a competent elite rather than governing 
themselves (Held 1996: 194-198). Further bolstering this characterisation, 
other democratic elitists, like Walter Lippman, argue that experts with the 
necessary knowhow for optimal decision-making in complex mass societies. 
This elitism implies a Hegelian paternalistic rather than a Weberian 
instrumental understanding of bureaucracy. The state’s expert elites would 
secure needs and conveniences of life for its citizens (Lippmann 1930). These 
theorists tended to embrace a limited state in order to avoid the terror of 
totalitarian regimes; underpinning these arguments was an objective interest 
in security. An expert bureaucracy would thus generate beneficial outputs 
legitimating state rule in mass democracies. 
Despite their differences17, Europe’s liberal democratic states became 
welfare states. The creation of state bureaucracies across Europe might well 
have contributed to this development. In contemporary politics, welfare tends 
to focus on economic prosperity and welfare (Beetham 1991: 140-142; Dahl 
1999: 917). Democratisation and nation-building contributed to ‘an equality 
area’ within European polities (Bartolini 2005: 111). To secure its output 
legitimacy, the state required an extensive administrative bureaucracy in order 
to balance economic performance with more egalitarian redistribution, as well 
as successfully delivering an expanding range of benefits to its citizens (e.g. 
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Mann 2005b: 62). This bureaucratic state is capable to negotiate, on the one 
hand, maintaining citizens’ motivation to remain productive and, on the other 
hand, achieving a relatively equal redistribution of wealth and resources, 
respectively (Hardin 1995: 180-181). In early modern commercial societies, 
the rule of law was the most feasible route to prosperity, with private charity 
as a complementary system to support destitute (Marshall 1950: 31-33).18 
Since the Second World War, it became more realistic to conceive of the 
possibility of sustaining growth whilst distributing resources more equally. 
Economic performance enabled fulfilment of the necessities and 
conveniences of life of citizens. According to canonical arguments, state 
bureaucracies possessing expert knowledge are a precondition of economic 
management capable of maximizing the overall welfare of its citizens in 
complex modern political economies. The state’s preferred economic policy -- 
Montarist or Keynsian (Morgan 2005a: 58-76) -- remains contested. The 
sovereign state, however, is deemed a precondition for a well-functioning 
capitalist market, regardless of the policy (Spies-Butcher, Paton et al. 2012a: 
114). The welfare state was thus deemed necessary for the generation of 
output legitimacy in the context of complex (post-)industrial societies. 
According to canonical arguments, states should both safeguard 
security for all its citizens and optimize their welfare through social services 
(Briggs 1961: 228; Marshall 1961: 288). T.H. Marshall’s arguments on the 
development of the British welfare state exemplify the increased importance 
of a more equal distribution of wealth in attaining output legitimacy.19 The 
concept of the welfare state reflects an established consensus on the modern 
state’s duties (Marshall 1961: 287). In his lecture Citizenship and Social Class 
(1950), Marshall argues citizenship makes individuals part of an egalitarian 
welfare community (Marshall 1950: 70). In this community, the universal 
demand for social rights results in a legalistic claim for social justice. The duty 
to work transforms from being a market outcome to an individual’s right to 
claim against the state (Marshall 1950: 43-44). The benefits of rule transform 
into rights against the state (see also Bellamy 2004). On this new theorization 
of outputs as rights, the state has to provide employment as a matter of 
entitlement, and must compensate in those cases in which it could not 
generate the demanded outputs. In the process, he observes the importance 
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of the modern expert bureaucracy; the rationalization of the economy through 
bureaucratic management should establish fair wage distribution (Marshall 
1950: 72-74). In the European context, social justice would become one of the 
most important objectives of welfare states, but its attainment relied on an 
expert bureaucracy. The transformed bond of collectivity in which outputs 
became claims to rights meant that the democratic state had to actively 
manage the domestic economy.  
An expert bureaucracy became an implicit assumption in modern 
theories of justice, which display a tendency toward favouring competence 
over politicisation. John Rawls’ influential Theory of Justice (1971) contains a 
canonical argument in favour of egalitarian redistribution of economic 
prosperity in the pursuit of social justice. Rawls famously used the individualist 
methodological device of the original position,20 in which citizens would 
determine the most just distribution of goods from behind a veil of ignorance 
which would mask social positions (Rawls 1971: 118-192). Citizens behind 
the veil, uncertain of their future position, would divide political rights equally, 
thus resulting in a fair distribution of social benefits. Yet, in an inversion of the 
classic liberal argument, Rawls theorised that economic equality must be the 
norm but that inequality is only acceptable if it benefits the least well off -- the 
difference principle (Rawls 1971: 75-83). Rawls’ argument echoes a utilitarian 
calculus on overall welfare in which the state has to balance motivation and 
redistribution.21 The theory suggests that an objective principle of social 
justice is determinable with sufficient knowledge. On this argument, the most 
equal outcome reflects the rational will of the people in the original position in 
the face of uncertainty. As has been observed, Rawls effectively requires that 
the citizens behind the veil of ignorance be experts in the social sciences 
(Hardin 1995: 189). In practice, the substantive ideal of social justice requires 
an extensive bureaucratic state to optimise the benefits for the citizens. 
Rawls’ political thought reflects a conception of popular sovereignty that posits 
a fictional rational will rather than an actual one. This final part of the 
genealogical reconstruction illustrates that the conception of security includes 
economic minimum incomes to survive in capitalist societies, and that 
economic prosperity starts to take equal individual welfare as the norm, rather 
than overall aggregate prosperity. The ties between citizens as beneficiaries 
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would be strengthened because citizens can only flourish in “a polity that 
seeks to ensure both a social minimum and an equitable distribution of 
wealth” (Morgan 2005a: 70). These arguments confer a pivotal position to the 
modern bureaucratic state in securing safety and economic prosperity for all 
citizens within the polity. As Rawls’ political thought exemplifies, a rather 
technocratic conception of popular sovereignty continues to structure 
contemporary arguments on output legitimacy. 
 
IV - The beneficiaries of a competent state in a complex political 
economy 
The importance of output legitimacy derives from understanding the state as a 
collective enterprise in securing benefits for citizens. In fictional accounts of 
the creation of the state, these benefits constitute the justification for 
submission to collective rule. The state’s provision is the source of its 
legitimacy. One can distinguish two output criteria legitimating the state’s rule. 
First, the sovereign state is a necessary precondition to achieving the 
necessities and conveniences of life. Some political ‘outputs’ are unattainable 
without a sovereign political order in modern circumstances, such as safety 
from foreign invaders and the rule of law. The modern state is therefore 
legitimate no matter how inefficient. Second, each modern state should 
provide citizens with security and economic prosperity. It thus has to actually 
provide these benefits for its citizens, and can be deemed illegitimate if it does 
not fulfil its purposes.22 On this interpretation, citizens are mere ‘fair-weather 
friends’ of a state, leading this source of legitimacy to often be characterised 
as unstable (Taylor 1995a: 197). Furthermore, the state is illegitimate if it does 
not pursue the shared interests of the polity. Elites pursuing their own 
interests or factional interests rather than the good of all citizens constitutes a 
state of corruption (Beetham 1991: 142-145).23 In this tradition, the output 
legitimacy of the modern state relies on scientific knowledge of the objective 
good of its citizens. The complexity of modern circumstances informs a 
meritocratic or technocratic trope in these arguments. Whether in the case of 
commercial republics or industrialised welfare regimes, the sovereign state 
provides security and economic prosperity. Furthermore, the state has to 
Chapter 3: The People as Beneficiaries of the State 
 101 
govern a capitalist economy in accordance with objective principles, and 
within a competitive international environment. This objectivistic background 
results not in a requirement of popular (democratic) rule per se -- if at all -- but 
in the need for a competent government, and so the arguments often imply a 
sovereign one. The legitimacy of enforcement agencies, impartial judiciary 
and expert bureaucracy lies in their competence in governing effectively and 
to the greatest utility within this complex environment. Canonical arguments 
thus stress competent, impartial government in order to attain the benefits of 
security and economic prosperity. Citizens are conceptualised merely as 
beneficiaries of these benign expert institutions which characterise the 
modern sovereign state. 
This genealogical reconstruction’s focus on the people brings to the 
fore the intertwinement of security and economic prosperity, and how the 
sovereign state should provide both these outputs. This conception of popular 
sovereignty posits self-rule in terms of whether common rule serves the 
shared interests of the ruled. These arguments conceptualise the people as 
sovereign in so far as the state is beholden to serve the good of the people: 
salus populi suprema lex esto. Citizens should obey the sovereign state, 
because it is in each citizen’s individual and, only by extension, collective 
interest.24 The sovereign state does not necessarily represent beneficiaries’ 
actual will, but rather their enlightened will or objective interests. On this 
understanding, the existence of diversity within the polity per se is not denied, 
but deemed politically insignificant. Certain values, such as religious 
convictions, have become part of the private realm, they are therefore 
inconsequential in determining the state’s legitimacy (Sleat 2013: 142). 
Throughout this genealogy it was argued that these canonical argument make 
sense of relevant collective bonds in terms of a shared interest in security and 
economic prosperity. The primary concerns of early modern theorists were the 
state’s monopoly on force and the capacity of the rule of law to ensure 
external security and domestic order respectively. The civil liberties 
associated with the latter were rightfully expected to stimulate the domestic 
economy and thus increase aggregate prosperity. In more contemporary 
arguments, economic prosperity has become more a matter of welfare 
increases for the entire population. Expert bureaucracies ensure competent 
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economic management, balancing productivity with redistribution. In both 
cases, state legitimacy continues to depend on the pursuit of the overall 
interests of all citizens. The ruled remain the popular sovereign in virtue of the 
fact that the state should pursue their shared interests. The people as 
beneficiaries of security and economic prosperity underpins these canonical 
arguments on the modern state’s legitimacy, and informs this conception’s 
criteria of output legitimacy.  
The centralised sovereign state provides a border to the political 
community. Citizens’ interest in the necessities and conveniences of life are 
theoretically universal, that is to say, the interest in security and economic 
prosperity is not particular to any set of individuals. A Lockean heritage, 
arguably, continues to echo through in this conception of popular sovereignty. 
As such the bond of collectivity sets criteria of inclusion, but it does not offer 
any for excluding individuals from the people. A capitalist economy is in 
principle without boundaries. Furthermore, essential rights and needs, such 
as sustenance, are also conceptualised as universals, even within these 
arguments. Several technocratic theorists, August Comte, Karl Marx, and 
David Mitrany, rely upon this feature of the conceptual structure to 
delegitimize the modern state or at least legitimate other regimes. Sovereign 
rule might be a precondition for security and economic prosperity, but this 
type of argument offers no inherent reason for allegiance to a particular state. 
A functional explanation could be given which, for example, coincides with the 
borders’ of the domestic economy. However, such an argument does not 
derive conceptually from the bond of collectivity, but from the historical 
contingency of a state’s particular circumstances. In their specific contexts, 
the provision of these benefits did nonetheless result in the legitimation of 
modern states. These arguments took for granted the effect of polity 
membership on the transformation of these interests. In the early modern 
grain debates, for instance, citizens’ prosperity relied on the ability of the state 
to secure their survival in an economically competitive international 
environment. The modern sovereign state continues to set the conceptual 
borders of the people as beneficiaries. It consists of apparatuses with experts, 
a diplomatic-military apparatus offering external defensive and offensive 
capabilities, an impartial legal system protecting individual liberty and 
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governing the capitalist economy, a rational administrative bureaucracy 
capable of implementing redistributive policies in a complex environment, and, 
most importantly, a sovereign legislature that defines shared interests. State 
apparatuses contribute to policy implementation capacities which are united 
under a sovereign decision-making centre. These institutions govern a 
particular territory which, as we shall see in chapter six, becomes essential for 
the modern conception of popular sovereignty to make sense of the state’s 
legitimacy. The people, conceptualised as beneficiaries, are tied together 
through shared interests in security and economic prosperity, and receive 
their conceptual borders from the sovereign state, which governs the 
domestic economy. 
 
V - Conclusion 
This chapter is essential to this realist analysis of the impact of popular 
sovereignty on the EU legitimacy debate by reconstructing the technocratic 
conception underpinning output legitimacy. Such a conception on the 
legitimacy of the state depends on its ability to provide for citizens’ security 
and economic prosperity. The definitions of security and economic prosperity 
transform over time, arguably adapting to historical circumstances. Leaving 
aside the exact definition, these shared interests in security and economic 
prosperity constitute the bond of collectivity relevant to setting appropriate 
criteria for the state’s legitimacy. This bond, however, offers no inherent 
borders to the people because its concerns are generally deemed universal. 
In principle, any provider of the necessities and conveniences of life could be 
a legitimate political authority. The sovereign state, however, determines the 
conceptual borders of the people by shaping their particular interests, implying 
that Smith and Colbert might be deemed correct in their distinct empirical 
analysis of the needs of the British and French populations’ shared interests. 
In both cases, and in more contemporary arguments, it was necessary to 
simultaneously provide security and economic prosperity. The technical 
expertise of statesmen, the judiciary, and, later on, bureaucracy were deemed 
essential in attaining these benefits in a complex and cutthroat international 
political economy. This shared interest constitutes the bond of collectivity, 
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which transforms a diverse group of individuals into a people qua 
beneficiaries, whilst the state-governed domestic economy sets the 
conceptual border of the people. Popular sovereignty is interpreted as 
government of the political economy by the sovereign state, in order to attain 
its citizens’ interesting security and economic prosperity. This conception is, 




                                            
1
 Quoted in (Kennedy 1985: xxiv). 
2
 The concern of political thought with security (securitas) can be traced back further to 
Ancient Greece and Rome (Mansbridge 1998: 7). 
3
 Hobbes aims for more than mere survival. He refers to the conveniences of life in the 
commonwealth. In relation to the role of the sovereign, he argues that, “The Office of the 
Soveraign, (be it a Monarch, or an Assembly,) consisteth in the end, for which he trusted with 
the Soveraign Power, namely the procuration of the safety of the people, to which he is 
obliged by the Law of Nature, and to render an account thereof to God, the Author of that 
Law, and to none but him. But by Safety here, is not meant a bare Preservation, but also all 
other Contentments of Life, which every man by lawfull Industry, without danger, or hurt to the 
Common-wealth, shall acquire to himselfe (Hobbes 1996 [1651]: 231).  
4
 The fear of disorder in the polity informs Hobbes’ choice in Leviathan for an absolute 
sovereign over an aristocratic or democratic council because the latter two run a greater 
danger of disagreement and subsequent civil war: a return to the state of nature. These 
options are still present in Hobbes’ De Cive (Hobbes 1998 [1651]), which inform more 
democratic interpretations of Hobbes’ political theory (see e.g. Tuck 2006).  
5
 Although coming from a markedly different metaphysical position, Samuel Pufendorf 
illustrates that the Hobbesian security argument might also rely upon a conception of the 
multitude contracting to become a people. Pufendorf argues that there are two contractual 
moments in which the would-be citizens first unite and then consent to common government 
(Pufendorf 1994: 208-217). In Pufendorf’s first contractual moment, households consent to 
establish a political community out of fear of other human beings (Pufendorf 1994: 202-208). 
This recognition of a shared interest in physical security informs the creation of a people. In 
the second contractual moment, the people establish the state as the sovereign lawmaker; 
output legitimacy thus becomes explicitly linked to the people’s bond of collectivity. 
6
 Locke arguably found his justification in the natural law tradition “The State of Nature has a 
Law of Nature to govern it, which obliges everyone: And Reason, which is that Law, teaches 
all Mankind who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm 
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another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions…” (Locke 1988 [1698]: 271). On the 
importance of theological beliefs in Locke’s political thought, see (Dunn 1990; Stanton 2011; 
Tully 1993). 
7
 Arguably Locke believed that citizens should sign the contract as an obligation to God (e.g. 
Dunn 1968; Stanton 2011), but his consent driven theory nonetheless echoes through in 
contemporary arguments on voluntary subjection to common rule in recognition of its benefits. 
8
 This theoretical intertwinement gives purchase to Marxist critiques of the modern Western 
state as necessarily being capitalist. Some argue that a market logic has become intrinsic to 
the state (Spies-Butcher, Paton et al. 2012a: 133-137). 
9
 Habermas argues that the liberal model of the state represents the legal institutionalization 
of economic society (Habermas 1994: 7), see also (Sassen 2006: 407). 
10
 Bismarck’s interpretation of security is reflected in his speech to the Bundestag on 20 
March 1884 during the introduction of the law for workers’ compensation. He argued that 
“[The real question] is whether the state – by state I always mean the empire – whether the 
state has the right to abandon to chance the performance of a responsibility of the state, 
namely, to protect the worker from accidents and need when he is injured or becomes old, so 
that private companies form that charge premiums from the workers and the employers at 
whatever rates the market will bear.  … Gentlemen, freedom is a vague concept; no one has 
a use for the freedom to starve. But here freedom is also in my opinion not at all limited and 
not in contradiction with itself. The proposal intends a freedom in the organization, but it 
makes the execution obligatory.” (http://www.germanhistorydocs.ghi-
dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=1809 last accessed 30 January 2015). 
11
 Other or actual motivation might well have been the creation of allegiance and the 
postponement of class war. Nevertheless this reasoning would feature in canonical 
arguments on the state’s legitimacy.  
12
 [Hegel’s] ideas can be summarized into three theses. First, the rationale of bureaucracy is 
the division between modern economic society and the constitutional state. Second, 
bureaucracy is an impersonal organization in which the separation between office and its 
incumbent is essential. Third, the mode of bureaucratic activities is mediation between 
constitutional norms and concrete situations, subsuming the particular into the universal and 
concretizing universal norms” (Shaw 1992: 388). 
13
 “An association of rule shall be called political association only inasmuch as its existence 
and the validity of its ordinances within a definable geographical territory are continuously 
guaranteed by the application and threat of physical compulsion on the part of the 
administrative staff” (Weber 1978: 54). 
14
 “The state itself has no intrinsic value in that it is a purely technical instrument for the 
realization of other values from which alone it derives its value, and it can retain this value 
only as long as it does not seek to transcend this auxiliary status” (Weber quoted in: Kim 
2002: 437). 
Chapter 3: The People as Beneficiaries of the State 
 106 
                                                                                                                             
15
 Weber’s famous ideal types of legitimate rule are the rational-legal, traditional, and 
charismatic (Weber 1978: 215-251). 
16
 Glover captures the moral essence of utilitarianism as follows: “Acts should be judged as 
right or wrong according to their consequences. Happiness is the only thing that is good in 
itself. Unhappiness is the only thing that is bad in itself. Everything else is only good or bad 
according to its tendency to produce happiness or unhappiness” (Glover 1990: 1-2). 
17
 Gosta Esping-Anderson’s (1990) well-known ideal models of welfare regimes are the 
liberal, corporatist, and social democratic ones. Alternatively, and more recently, Ferrera, 
Hemerijck, and Rhodes (2000: 20) distinguish between a Scandinavian, Anglo-Saxon, 
Continental, and South European model. 
18
 Charity is arguably typical for Anglo-Saxon models, whilst solidarity grounds continental 
systems of allegiance (Kapeller and Wolkenstein 2013). 
19
 As Richard Bellamy points out, however, Marshall’s narrative of rights expansion does not 
reflect the actual historical process (Bellamy 2004; see also Harris 2004). 
20
 I am departing from Pettit’s claim that the Rawlsian conceptualisation of the people is a 
civicity (Pettit 2005). In his later work, Rawls did seem to move more toward such a position. 
In his early writings, however, the logic of his argument tends to rely upon individual rather 
than group interests. 
21
 Rawls’ commitment to neo-Kantian position results in an explicit rejection of utilitarianism, a 
stance which has been criticized (Hardin 1995: 181-183). Moreover, contemporary utilitarian 
philosophers, such as Robert Goodin, defend the welfare state for similar reasons (1995). 
See especially chapter 5 ‘Responsibilities’ (Goodin 1995: 81-87), in which he argues that the 
distance between consequentialist and deontological positions on the role of the welfare state 
are minimal. 
22
 On a similar distinction drawn from Locke’s theory, see (Simmons 1999). 
23
 In the democratic argument, as we shall see, a partisan group can govern in its interest as 
long as it remains susceptible to popular democratic pressures.  
24
 Geuss argues that Rawls’ initial theory of justice represents such an exercise in ideology.  
The aim of the thought experiment is not to offer an objective account of the argument but to 
convince its public of the theory’s conclusions (Geuss 2008).  
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Chapter 4: The People as a Self-Governing Demos 
 
The populace that is subjected to the laws ought to be their author. 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract II.VII 
 
I - Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I argued that arguments on output legitimacy rest on 
a technocratic conception of popular sovereignty which posits the people as 
beneficiaries of security and economic prosperity. The latter constitutes the 
politically relevant relationship between the ruled. Following this conceptual 
structure, the sovereign state should serve citizens’ political-economic 
interests Expert institutions act here as precondition of, and vehicle for, the 
attainment of these benefits. The relationship between citizens offers no 
inherent exclusion criterion because security and prosperity are 
universalisable interests. In these arguments, the state effectively gives 
closure to this conception of the people, qua beneficiaries, by defining its 
conceptual border. David Hume argued that the right to rule only makes 
sense if the public good is self-evident (2000 [1740]: 359). The existence of 
pluralism in enlarged modern polities, however, clashes with any meaningful 
substantive claim of shared interest. The reality of social pluralism, and the 
attendant contestability of the public good, forms the point of departure for 
canonical democratic arguments. In these arguments, the benevolent state 
does not ‘correct’ the factional interests pursued by some in favour of the 
pursuit of an objective and overarching shared interest. Inclusion of citizens 
on an equal basis in democratic procedures should instead ensure that 
decision-makers pursue the popular will. The contemporary democratic 
conception of popular sovereignty posits the people as a demos prone to 
internal conflicts, but nonetheless bound together through free and equal 
participation in collective will-formation processes.  
 The genealogy in this chapter reconstructs the conception of popular 
sovereignty that underpins the argument in which democracy is the 
appropriate criterion of legitimacy. The conceptualisation of the people 
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grounding these arguments is one of individuals with associational interests 
bound together through democratic procedures; the people as demos. The 
term popular sovereignty is much more salient in these arguments, albeit a 
particular ‘democratic’ conception thereof. The democratic character of the 
state legitimates its own decisions because the constituent power governs 
itself through the constituted power (at least to some extent). Democratic state 
institutions constitute a necessary framework for a diverse demos to self-
govern, hence democracy becomes the appropriate criterion for state 
legitimacy. The focus is on three specific institutions of modern democracies -
- constitutions, elections, and an (empowered) public sphere -- which together 
provide citizens with the means to govern themselves as the sovereign of the 
political order. A legitimate state enables citizens to participate, from a 
plurality of positions, as free equals in collective decision-making, in 
constructing shared positions in the pursuit of ‘vital interests’ and commitment 
to common values. The democratic position thus holds that the relationship 
between citizens arises from participation in state-organised processes of 
democratic will-formation. It is, however, famous for not providing a criterion of 
exclusion; the well-known democratic paradox.  These arguments, in a move 
similar to the technocratic conception of popular sovereignty, instead rely 
upon the territorial closure of the modern state’s institutions to set borders 
around the demos. The conceptual boundaries again follow from the political 
order rather than the people.  
 This chapter unfolds in five sections. Unlike the previous chapter, the 
arguments are primarily clustered around specific democratic institutions; 
constitutions, elections, and the public sphere. These arguments, however, 
illustrate that they complement another in attaining democratic legitimacy. 
These institutions are discussed roughly in the chronological order in which 
they arose. The following section (section II) focuses on constitutions as the 
institution, which ensures the equality and liberty of citizens. According to 
early modern arguments a democratic constitution should protect individual 
citizens from the state. The interpretation of its role expanded to protect 
diversity and ascribe political rights to influence state decision-makers, both of 
which fall in line with a more inclusive and pluralistic conception of the demos. 
The next section (section III) introduces the key arguments on representative 
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government. Elections legitimate state institutions because parliamentary 
representatives should construct a conception of the polity’s common good 
from pluralistic positions within society. A more associational dimension of the 
demos is emphasised here, unlike early modern constitutionalists’ more 
aggregative focus. The same democratic conception of popular sovereignty 
nonetheless continues to govern these arguments. The subsequent section 
on the public sphere (section IV) focuses on a line of arguments which stress 
the importance of public deliberation for self-government in mass 
democracies. A public sphere creates conditions for continuous participation 
by enabling citizens to influence decision-makers and each other. Public 
deliberation should result in demos with a degree of common purpose, or at 
least agreement, on practical procedures. Deliberation, as a result, is also a 
means for self-governance. The next section (section V) reconstructs how the 
democratic conception of popular sovereignty informs the need for democratic 
legitimacy. The legitimate state has to institutionalise democratic procedures 
which enable its citizens to partake in their self-government. Democratic 
procedures thus constitute an egalitarian, procedural bond between citizens. 
And while democratic citizenship is a universal of principle, state citizenship 
establishes the conceptual border of the people. In conclusion (section VI), 
the arguments presented here rely upon the criterion of democracy, 
understood as a particular set of complementary institutions, to legitimate the 
modern state. The people as demos are bound together through democratic 
procedures, which enable their self-government. This democratic conception 
of popular sovereignty continues to inform modern demands for the 
democratisation of Europe’s decision-making centre. 
 
II - The democratic constitution as a guarantee of citizens’ equality and 
liberty 
Canonical democratic arguments make sense of the state’s legitimacy in the 
context of pluralistic modern mass polities. In contrast to Enlightenment 
thinkers and relativists, contemporary pluralist theorists acknowledge the 
existence of different value systems of objective worth and which cannot be 
hierarchically ordered (Bellamy 2000: 189). This particular understanding of 
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pluralism, however, did not permeate political thought until fairly recently. 
From Roman times until the 19th century, faction was a prerogative term to 
denote interest-based groups that endangered the common good (Sartori 
1976: 3). French revolutionary Saint-Just, for example, decried that: “All 
faction attempts at undermining the sovereignty of the people … In dividing a 
people factions replace liberty with the fury of partisanship” (Quoted in: Sartori 
1976: 11). This sentiment was not exclusive to Rousseauian republicans; 
American liberal republicans also feared the impact of social pluralism on the 
stability of modern republic. As a result, they introduced institutional 
mechanisms to deal with the instability caused by the unavoidable existence 
of societal pluralism (e.g. Brugger 1999; Kalyvas and Katznelson 2008). 
These mechanisms would enable democratic participation in state decision-
making procedures. In summary, a legitimate state should institutionalise 
procedures in which citizens can participate freely on equal footing. The 
democratic constitution is the first institution to ensure the state meets the 
criterion of democratic legitimacy. 
The political constitution has become understood as “the best means 
for the recognition and protection of the rights and liberties of the citizens” 
(Castiglione 1996: 417). Two sets of constitutional normative constraints on 
the powers of government ensure this aim: basic rights and the separation of 
powers (Habermas 1994: 7). First, basic rights should ensure a sphere of 
freedom from government interference for citizens to pursue their own aims. 
John Locke’s argument on inalienable property rights is representative of this 
paradigmatic argument. Federalists opposition to the inclusion of a bill of 
rights in the constitution drew upon Locke’s understanding of natural law 
(Morgan 1988: 282-283). The temporal popular sovereign, so they argued, 
cannot grant itself the rights given to them by their Creator (e.g. Rush 1993 
[1787]). In contrast to their Anglo-Saxon counterparts, rights and liberties 
were not self-evident truths for continental thinkers. Citizens had to first attain 
rights against their absolutist rulers. In these circumstances, popular power 
came to be deemed necessary to attain rights and liberties (Ackerman 1991: 
25-26; Gueniffey 1994: 106). From the contemporary perspective, the French 
revolution constitutes a historical instantiation of the citizenry ‘capturing’ the 
state from the aristocracy. Citizens (in practice some citizens) directly 
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participated in ruling over the polity. In one of his speeches, Siéyès describes 
this regime not as a ré-public, but as a ré-totale (Hont 2005: 140). The ré-
totale was “an inappropriate re-enactment of the ancient republic in large 
modern countries” (Hont 2005: 491). One reason for its inappropriateness 
was the inherent threat of factional rule. In a modern republic, rulers would 
only constitute part of the population. This ruling faction would coincide with 
other interests. A ré-public protected individuals from factional decisions 
through rights and freedoms. This constitutional protection was particularly 
important in representative systems in which majoritarianism was the practical 
decision-making mechanism.1 In a similar vein, the Anti-federalists in America 
argued that basic rights are an essential “method in limiting the legitimate 
sphere of action of public authorities” (Manin 1994: 43). A constitution should 
guarantee citizens’ private sphere since the legislature represents only part of 
the popular sovereign, it acts as a safeguard of their basic rights from 
factional interference by the state. A democratically legitimate state has to 
abide by these normative limits to its reach. 
The democratic constitution also institutionalises a separation of 
powers. The latter should further protect individuals from the concentration of 
power in modern states, which could threaten their freedom. Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau for instance -- a theorist more often associated with the French 
revolution -- argued for the Lockean distinction between the legislative and 
executive branches in his Second Contract (Rousseau 1987 [1762]: 173-176). 
He posited that direct self-rule would result in corrupt rule (Loughlin 2014: 
232). In his Spirit of the Laws (1949 [1748]), Charles-Louis de Secondat, 
Baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu, articulated the canonical argument on 
the separation of powers: the trias politica.2 Going a degree of separation 
further than Locke, he expounded the logic according to which the lawmaking 
powers of the state should be divided across three branches of government: 
executive, legislature, and judiciary. This organisation should avoid abuses of 
power, which could create fear among the population by crushing their sense 
of liberty (Montesquieu 1949 [1748]: 152; 183-184). The separation of powers 
would safeguard individuals from tyranny of the state. In the Constitutional 
debates in America, federalism was understood as another important 
institutional mechanism for restraining the federal state’s power. That being 
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said, many federalists argued that the system of checks and balances 
represented a means to temper passions in politics. Their function, therefore, 
was not to restrain power, but a tool to slow down decision-making 
procedures and ensure dispassionate decisions in the name of the common 
good. Parliamentary deliberation acted as a process of clarification for 
overcoming the limits of individual rationality (Bellamy and Castiglione 2013: 
210). Anti-federalists, however, argued that the system of checks and 
balances should act as a further limitation on the scope of state power (Dunn 
1994: 220-221; Manin 1997: 61-62). The separation of power across 
branches and levels of government should prevent state powers being 
monopolised by a tyrannical factional majority in order to protect the 
individual. 
Early modern canonical arguments tended to focus on individuals’ 
freedom from government interference. They tended to posit a conception of 
the people as beneficiaries sharing a common interest in individual liberty 
rather than as a demos. The protection of individual liberty was deemed 
beneficial to the citizens of commercial societies. Germaine de Staële and 
later Benjamin Constant observed that modern citizens came to cherish their 
private lives over public engagement (for better or worse) (Kalyvas and 
Katznelson 2008: 127). Constant, for example, argued that citizens might 
prefer to be set free from the burdens of public life (Constant 1988 [1819]: 
326), which would allow individuals to continue with their everyday lives 
without ‘wasting’ too much time on politics (Constant 1815 [1988]: 204). This 
public-private divide became a particularly influential re-imagination of society 
(Taylor 2004: 101-108). The private sphere would contribute to avoiding 
dissent in a pluralistic society because it offered a space for individuals to 
pursue their vision of the good. The public-private divide continues to act as a 
liberal mechanism to cope with the pluralism characteristic of modern mass 
societies (Sleat 2013: 142). The aforementioned restraints on state power 
should secure individual liberty in the private sphere. This protection, 
however, would also come to act as a recognition of pluralism in more 
contemporary democratic arguments.  
Nowadays, citizenship acts as a bond that recognises and 
accommodates social pluralism within the polity. According to canonical 
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democratic arguments, the democratic constitution institutionalised two core 
aspects of people as self-governing demos. First, the constitution attributed 
citizenship with associated rights and liberties. Subjects of the state thus 
became free and equal citizens within the polity. Second, citizens also came 
to be recognised as a sovereign collective. ‘We, the People’ are the rightful 
constitutional sovereign of the polity (e.g. Lindahl 2013; Loughlin 2014). 
Democratic constitutions should thus empower citizens collectively as well as 
protect their individual rights (Habermas 1994: 2). In modern democracies, 
citizens should freely enter the public realm with their private ‘factional’ 
interests, as Hannah Arendt observed (1998 [1958]: 33). Public processes of 
will-formation should enable the citizenry as popular sovereign to make, or at 
least influence, collective decision-making processes. Citizenship enables the 
autonomous participation of the ruled in processes of collective will-formation. 
According to these contemporary arguments, the democratic constitution is an 
essential institutional mechanism for ensuring citizens’ liberty and 
empowerment in these processes. The state’s democratic legitimacy, in part, 
relies on the manner in which the democratic constitution enables the popular 
sovereign to form a collective will. The next two sections analyse canonical 
arguments which legitimate the modern state through two central processes 
of will-formation: voting and public deliberation. These democratic procedures, 
together with the constitution, create the institutional framework through which 
the people, as demos, engage in their self-governance. On these arguments, 
as we shall see, these procedures constitute the politically relevant bonds of 
collectivity between an essentially diverse citizenry. 
 
III - Will-formation through elected representatives 
The democratic legitimacy of the modern state relies on the popular election 
of representatives in decision-making procedures. This popular dimension of 
democratic legitimacy is implicit in the etymology of democracy as rule by the 
demos. In the classic Greek typology, representative government fell into the 
category of the rule by the few rather than the democratic rule of the many. At 
root, therefore, the popular sovereign should engage in self-governance, 
though this has historically transformed from a direct to a representative style. 
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This conceptual transformation arguably altered the meaning of democracy 
(e.g. Dunn 2005; see however Manin 1997). Some therefore assert that 
modern democracy relies on a degree of guardianship (Dahl 1999). Early 
modern theorists, who drew upon the model of the Athenian city-state, also 
argued that real democracy was only possible in small communities. Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, for example, remained sceptical of whether legitimate 
republican rule would be possible in modern circumstances.3 The size of the 
modern republic made direct democratic self-governance impossible. 
Representation became a necessary institutional mechanism because neither 
social homogeneity nor constant participation were deemed feasible in 
modern enlarged polities.  
Electoral representative government became the necessary 
institutional form for democratically legitimate states. In modern 
circumstances, representation was necessary, desirable even.4 On the one 
hand, as we saw in the previous chapter, some modern theorists argued that, 
within complex societies, ordinary citizens did not have sufficient knowledge 
to secure the common good (e.g. Montesquieu 1949 [1748]: 154). (Proto-) 
democrats, on the other hand, affirmed that representatives could construct a 
common will. One can consider Sieyès, who has been considered as one of 
the founders of representative government (Manin 1997: 1), and who argued 
that a common opinion could emerge from a diversity of opinions by means of 
representative structures. He posited a state of equality between the 
members of the third-estate; the national sovereign body should therefore be 
represented equally in the nation’s legislature (Sieyès 2003 [1789]-b). This 
representative body could form a common will through a competition of views. 
In his Views of the Executive Means Available to the Representatives if 
France in 1789 (2003 [1789]-a), he argues that: 
 
Doubtless the general interest would be nothing if it were not someone’s 
interest: it has to be the one interest among various individual interests that is 
common to the greatest number of voters; hence the need for a clash and 
coincidence of opinions (Sieyès 2003 [1789]-a: 40). 
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This open debate should exclude the most extreme opinions from the 
decision-making procedure. The outcome of parliamentary debate is a single 
decision. This decision does not represent a ‘universal’ truth, but it represents 
someone’s interest. (Sieyès 2003 [1789]-a: 39-40). Still, it is peacefully 
constructed from a plurality of starting positions. In a similar vein, Thomas 
Paine (1997 [1792]) defended representation within the modern republic due 
to its potential to transform a plurality of positions into a singular position on 
the common good without the risk of regressing into civil war, in contrast to 
Ancient republics. The diverse interests of individuals could become a 
common good through the reasoned deliberation of their representatives. In 
other words, the representative system introduced the practical possibility of 
transforming diverse opinions into an account of the common good (Paine 
1997 [1792]: 180-181). Representative government, as demonstrated, is a 
legitimate form of decision-making because representatives can construct a 
common will from diverse interests in society.  
The democratic legitimacy of this form of rule rests on citizens’ equal 
footing within the electoral process. Bernard Manin argues that a 
transformation in the understanding of (democratic) political equality took 
place, shifting from equal access to office holding (lot) to equal opportunity via 
the right to vote to consent to officeholders (election) (Manin 1997: 92).5 
Locke’s contract theory exemplifies the conceptual structure of this canonical 
democratic argument. He argued that the state’s authority relied upon the 
consent of the people, thus introducing the notion of consent as criterion of 
legitimacy. Following this logic, the election of a parliament came to be 
deemed an expression of citizens’ consent to their common government 
(Stedman Jones 1994: 170). The democratic constitution should ensure 
citizens’ equality within electoral will-formation through the equal attribution of 
voting rights, namely ‘one (wo)man, one vote’. The system was not without its 
weaknesses; other forms of participation challenged the democratic legitimacy 
of the state because they would endanger the civic equality required in will-
formation process. Some theorists therefore argue against non-electoral 
participation, such as petitioning one’s delegate (Martin 2005: 379).6 
Therefore, Jason Frank argues that the American constitutional framework 
was aimed at delegitimating other forms of participation so as to stabilize the 
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modern enlarged polity (Frank 2013). European theorists articulated a similar 
objection to popular participation. Edmund Burke famously objected to 
instruction from his constituents (Burke 1908 [1774]). This argument on 
elections clarifies the importance of the equality of citizens for justify state 
democratic legitimacy; the equal footing of citizens in the election of 
representatives ensures the democratic legitimacy of state decisions. This 
argument posits a procedural equality between citizens whilst also 
recognizing the substantive diversity of views within the polity. 
The interpretation of the nature of diversity in the legislature would shift 
from regional interests to functional associational groups. Prominent 
arguments on state legitimacy, moreover, indicate a more positive appraisal of 
pluralism. James Madison’s argument on the legitimate modern republic 
exemplifies a regional, rather negative account of diversity. Drawing upon 
Montesquieu rather than Rousseau (Albertone 2009: 133; Manin 1994: 27), 
he argued that social homogeneity is necessary to avoid the diseases of 
republican government (Hamilton, Madison et al. 1987 [1788]: 123). He feared 
that factional government would result in violent civil war (Hamilton, Madison 
et al. 1987 [1788]: 123). Civic peace was deemed to be a ‘vital interest’ of 
citizens, though the size of the modern republic made social homogeneity an 
unrealistic assumption. Madison’s solutions to counter the effects of social 
pluralism were institutional. He deemed government by a natural aristocracy 
necessary in the pursuit of the permanent and aggregate interests of the 
people. Elections on a large-scale would ensure this objective without having 
to introduce explicit restraints, such as a minimum income for representatives 
(Manin 1997: 127-128). A rationalist account of knowledge informs Madison’s 
argument; as Jason Frank observes, he believed that ordinary citizens lack 
the necessary knowledge for modern statecraft (Frank 2013). Madison 
believed that the natural aristocracy would overcome these regional biases in 
favour of the common good. Madison’s Anti-Federalist opposition, by contrast, 
argued for mimetic representation in the legislature,7 but it nonetheless 
believed that the kind of knowledge required for good government was local-
contextual knowledge (Frank 2013). Both Madison and the Anti-Federalists 
thus grasped representatives in the legislature as advocates of regional 
interests.  
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Later arguments in favour of representative government would rely on 
analyses of pluralism, which represent functional-associative cleavages rather 
than just regional ones. An early example is Hegel’s argument on 
representative government. He argued that the Estates (Stände) represent 
interdependent factional-functional interests within civil society (Hegel 1991 
[1820]: 339). He explicitly rejected the aggregate interpretation of the people, 
which he equates to a mob acting against the organic state (Hegel 1991 
[1820]: 342). Leaving aside Hegel’s aristocratic vision of the legislature, his 
account of the popularly elected Estates reveals an associational 
conceptualisation of the people. To quote him at some length,  
 
This second section of the Estates encompasses the changing element in 
civil society, which can play its part only by means of deputies; the external 
reason for this is the sheer number of its members, but the essential reason 
lies in the nature of its determination and activity. In so far as these deputies 
are elected by civil society, it is immediately evident that, in electing them, 
society acts as what it is. That is, it is not split up into individual atomic units 
which are merely assembled for a moment to perform a single temporary act 
and have not further cohesion; on the contrary, it is articulated into its 
associations, communities, and corporations which although they are already 
in being, acquire in this way a political connotation (Hegel 1991 [1820]: 346-
347). 
 
What the above extract emphasises is that society consists of groups rather 
than individuals. Citizens became aware of the associational structure of 
organic society in the electoral moment. Elections thus function to create 
awareness of plurality within the polity, which he deemed a positive 
development. The delegates of these associational interests should deliberate 
and decide upon the common good, with the result that associational interests 
would transform into a universal or common good (Hegel 1991 [1820]: 348). 
As we saw earlier in his argument on bureaucracy, Hegel did attribute a place 
to the technical knowledge of statecraft in his overall theory (Hegel 1991 
[1820]: 350-351). He even argued that a constitutional monarch must educate 
its citizen-subjects after the legislative decision (Hegel 1991 [1820]: 352-358). 
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This observation places him in the German tradition in which the people 
require preparation for their liberty (Stedman Jones 1994: 171). Though one 
might also argue that this process also enables citizens to identify with the 
common good the legislature constructed, and which combines their diverse 
interests. The important point is that legislative representatives transform 
associative-interests into a decision for the common good. Hegel’s argument 
relies on the existence of associational interests, this diversity is a constitutive 
part of society rather than a threat to its stability. On this account, the demos 
affirms the plurality of the people in elections, but the legislative 
representatives play a pivotal role in the formulation of the common good. The 
democratic procedures perform a dual-function as a bond of collectivity 
between citizens.  
In the nineteenth century, as already argued, ‘an equality area’ arose in 
modern European democracies. The twin processes of industrialization and 
the expansion of suffrage impacted the social-economic structure of European 
democracies. The arguments in favour of representation would shift 
legitimation from the dispassionate competence-oriented decision-making 
echoing through in both Madison and Hegel, to an understanding of 
democratic procedures as taming and funnelling unavoidable societal conflicts 
in a pluralist society. The vital interest of civil peace would bind citizens 
together, though disagreement on how to achieve this aim, and other topics of 
public concern, was recognised as unavoidable. National parliaments should, 
so it was argued, function as a site of negotiation between antagonistic 
groups within the national political-economy (Manin 1997: 186-187; Sartori 
1976: 16-17). In European countries, the parliamentary multi-party system 
would become the dominant form of representative democracy (Dalton 2006: 
127). British parliamentarians were among the first to understand parties as 
constructive elements of the greater whole, rather than divisive factions 
subverting the common good. Following to some extent Viscount Henry St. 
John Bolingbroke (1738: 95-96) and David Hume (1987 [1752]: I.VIII; §2), 
Edmund Burke distinguished factions as being collectives of a very different 
kind to parties (Sartori 1976: 12-13). He argued that, “[a] party is a body of 
men united, for promoting by their joint endeavors the national interest, upon 
some particular principle in which they are all agreed” (Burke 1993 [1770]: 
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187). The principle indicates the importance of an ideological dimension to 
parties. Burke argued elsewhere “That general opinion is the vehicle and 
organ of legislative omnipotence” (1908 [1777]: 217), hence ascribing to 
popular sovereignty of the people. The multitude did therefore contain the 
right sentiment, a characteristic which parliamentary representatives needed 
to rationalise. Despite this hypothetical elitist account of popular sovereignty 
(Chambers 2004: 155), Burke’s parties indicate a legitimate place for diversity 
between elites in the legislature with different ideological commitments. Yet as 
Giovanni Sartori puts it rather bluntly: “Parties did not become respectable 
because Burke declared them as such” (1976: 13).8 In the current context 
they have lose their pejorative factional connotation as vehicle for group 
interests, tools for overcome the mass of irreconcilable positions which 
epitomise contemporary societies (Glencross 2011: 351).  
According to contemporary democratic arguments, Parteiendemokratie 
– party democracy – is the legitimate type of democratic government (Manin 
1997: 195; 206-218), as exemplified in Hans Kelsen’s political thought. He 
argued that ‘the people’ is a necessary unity for democracy because it is the 
ruling subject. “The unity that appears under the name ‘people’ creates the 
greatest problems for a study of reality. Split by national, religious, and 
economic conflicts, that unity is -- according to sociological findings -- more a 
bundle of groups than a coherent mass” (Kelsen 2000 [1929]: 89-90). From 
this Kelsen asserts that individuals remain free in the electoral process as 
long as they can freely express their preferences on an equal footing. Political 
parties are essential in modern democracies, because individuals are unable 
to be of any consequence in modern politics. Parties “unite the likeminded to 
ensure their influence in shaping public affairs. ... an essential aspect of the 
formation of the will of the community takes place within them (Kelsen 2000 
[1929]: 92; Italics in original). Parties are not merely a representation of 
diversity since they also shape that diversity in opinion. They propose a 
plurality of accounts of the common good with which individuals can align 
themselves. Subsequently, the elected representatives of the parties should 
transform these associational opinions into a common will to guide state 
decision-making within parliament. Kelsen’s democratic argument combines 
the individual equality of citizens in the electoral processes with the 
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engagement of political parties in will-formation process. This democratically 
constructed will should guide legitimate state rule.  
 
Parliamentarism is formation of the governing will of the state according to the 
majority principle through a collegial or ganelected by the people on the basis 
of a universal and equal right to take part in the full electoral process—that is, 
democratically (Kelsen 2000 [1929]: 96; Italics in original). 
 
Thus, a democratically legitimate state transforms individual votes into 
associative groups to govern in the name of the common good. 
Majoritarianism, however, can result in continuous domination, which 
constitutes a threat to both individual liberty and the tranquillity of the nation. 
On Kelsen’s logic, the vote replaced the bullet within nationally-bound ‘(class) 
war’, but if the vote were to no longer be a means to be heard then the bullet 
would once again be the only option.9 Unlike the social precondition of civicity 
(Bellamy and Castiglione 2013: 213), Kelsen does not posit any cross-cutting 
social cleavages.10 Compromise is therefore of vital importance for the 
functioning of Parteiendemokratie (Kelsen 2000 [1929]: 102). Compromise 
and bargaining between parties secures the stability of the nation because it 
avoids one group becoming the persistent loser without any recourse other 
than revolt to protect its (vital) interests (Kelsen 2000 [1929]: 102-104). The 
capacity to avoid civil war and reach common decisions ultimately comes to 
the democratic party system.  In this paradigmatic argument on electoral party 
democracy, the people as demos, while consisting of antagonistic 
associational groups, are bound together through a representative electoral 
system which serves to reach common decisions peacefully. 
From early modernity onwards, arguments in favour of representative 
electoral democracy accepted pluralism as the political reality of modern 
enlarged polities. A democratically legitimate state was to secure the equality 
of citizens in the electoral process, and protect their basic rights from 
illegitimate state interference. In the electoral process, citizens elect their 
representatives in the state legislature, who enable them to discharge 
themselves of their right of self-governance (Kalyvas 2005). Representatives 
should then transform the diverse points of view they stand for through 
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rationalisation or bargaining into a single will or, more accurately, a decision. 
The democratic constitution and election of representatives complement one 
another in legitimating the modern sovereign state as democratic. The former 
ensures liberty and equality through the attribution of right-based citizenship. 
The latter enables participation of a diverse citizenry in its self-governance. 
This democratic procedure creates a bond between a pluralistic citizenry. In 
the literature defending the creation of pan-European electoral institutions, 
theorists often posit the expectation that a common bond will arise from this 
democratic process (e.g. Føllesdal and Hix 2006). Other EU-scholars argue in 
favour of more deliberative forms of interest representation to attain 
democratic legitimacy in Europe’s novel political order (e.g. Besson 2006; 
Eriksen and Fossum 2002). In yet other canonical arguments on the state’s 
democratic legitimacy, this deliberation in the public sphere became deemed 
another essential institution of modern mass democracies, which we will turn 
to next. 
 
IV - Deliberation in a public sphere 
The third institution, which features prominently in paradigmatic arguments on 
the modern sovereign state’s democratic legitimacy, is the public sphere. 
Historically, in addition to voting rights, free deliberation became the second 
pillar of modern democratic citizenship (Gripsrud, Moe et al. 2006: xiii). 
Because citizens were now to publically deliberate on matters of common 
concern, deliberation became a moral requirement of political legitimacy 
(Peter 2008: 62). The public sphere, on the other hand, provided the forum for 
contestation amongst civil society. In contemporary political thought, 
canonical democratic arguments stress that associational groups have an 
interest in the opportunity to criticise and oppose the state if it threatens their 
interests. A public sphere offers citizens with a continuous arena from which 
to influence government actions; citizens thus remain relevant political agents 
between elections. In this process they can keep state decision-makers to 
account, whilst representatives can track the opinion of their electorate. What 
results is the responsibility of the constitutional state to safeguard the liberty 
and equality of citizens, and empower participants. In this manner, 
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constitution, representation, and deliberation remain intertwined in various 
ways. This emphasis on democratic institutions thus posits procedural 
democratic bonds between a pluralistic citizenry as source of legitimacy for 
political rule. To anticipate the next chapter, these arguments on the public 
sphere implicitly rely on certain sociological preconditions to attain meaningful 
democratic will-formation in mass societies. A functioning public sphere 
seems rather elusive without a shared language and, arguably, a meaningful 
understanding of the political context (e.g. Bellamy and Castiglione 2013: 213; 
Fossum 2005). Let us first examine the importance of deliberation in the 
public sphere for the democratic legitimacy of the modern state. 
 According to canonical arguments, the public sphere offers a forum for 
citizens to deliberate on matters of public concern. Early modern positions 
were concerned with the formation of a rational will to guide the public law, as 
exemplified by one of the most influential defenders of the public sphere, 
Immanuel Kant (e.g. Habermas 1992a). In his An Answer to the Question: 
What is Enlightenment? (1991 [1784]), Kant argued that the public sphere 
should remain separate from both state interference and private concerns. 
The public sphere should offer an open forum in which citizens would publicly 
and freely debate political matters, cumulating in the formation of a rational 
opinion. Kant deemed both the public and social nature of deliberation to be 
preconditions to reaching a rational agreement, which should then inform 
public law. Public laws should only be established through public agreement 
because legislators should not impose upon the people what they would not 
impose upon themselves. The universality of rationality guarantees a 
consensus (Kant 1991 [1784]). Kant’s argument exemplifies the importance 
attributed to public deliberation to attain a shared conception of the common 
good. His argument does not require the participation of the population but 
rather that the learned few determine the public good.11 Nevertheless, his 
argument adheres to a conceptual structure informing later democratic 
arguments on the public sphere: free public deliberation should produce a 
conception of the common good able to influence state decision-makers.   
The contemporary democratic argument stresses the importance of the 
participation of the masses in public debates. In the French constitutional 
debates, Marquis Nicolas de Condorcet offered an early defence of a mass 
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participatory form of deliberative democracy (Urbinati 2006: 176-222). His 
argument foreshadowed the democratic arguments of Dewey and Habermas 
(Lukes and Urbinati 2012: xxv). Underpinning Condorcet’s argument lies a 
conception of rationality as relying on probability and statistics (Lukes and 
Urbinati 2012: xxv). The probability of correct knowledge increases with the 
greater number of participants in deliberation. He consequently favoured 
extensive public deliberation taking place in formal and informal public fora. 
Condorcet argued that the attainment of knowledge is an indefinite praxis due 
to the limits on human capacity (Condorcet 2012 [1795]: 146). It follows that 
no one can establish the best decision with full certainty. Furthermore, and in 
stark contrast to Kant12, he argued that the citizenry should survey their 
government’s actions and be given the legal means to contest decisions 
(Urbinati 2006: 177). A public sphere is crucial to arriving at the best decision 
for the public good due to the increased probability of attaining knowledge. A 
legitimate state should therefore not only enable public deliberation but also 
empower the public opinion. On this account, public deliberation should act as 
a source of criticism, continuously holding the state to account. It is, thus, not 
only meant to inform the state on the best decision, but also empower citizens 
should they need to oppose, and possibly overturn state decisions. 
Democratic legitimacy depends upon democratic processes of public 
deliberation.  
The free press would become one of the most prominent forums of the 
deliberative public sphere. Print media arose in Western democracies in the 
18th century.13 In these early days it tended to articulate ‘rational’ elite 
opinions. A commercial basis secured the media’s independence from state 
interests, and it avoided capture by private interests (Martin 2005: 53). An 
assumption of continued contestation between different conceptions of the 
common good would replace the assumed possibility of a unified opinion, 
which, in later arguments, would come to constitute the public sphere as a 
space for the popular sovereign to express its diversity opinions. Theorists in 
the early American republic, for instance, argued that multiple public debates 
should inform and enlighten general opinion. These arguments 
conceptualised the people as a set of diverse publics constituting the popular 
sovereign (Martin 2005: 375-386); This is reflected in Thomas Jefferson’s 
Chapter 4: The People as a Self-Governing Demos 
 124 
work, which posited that the will of the people arises from a process of 
continuous deliberation, implying it remains in a constant state of flux (Helo 
2009: 39-42). The public sphere can only emerge here as the rightful place for 
the formation of the will of the popular sovereign. In the aftermath of the 
Chartist movement in Britain and the February revolution in Russia, the 
readership of newspapers would expend to include more groups in the public 
sphere than just the bourgeoisie. The extension of the right to vote also 
served to place new topics on the legislative agenda, with new laws being 
enacted under the “pressure of the street” (Habermas 1992a: 131-132). 
European liberals became ‘ambivalent’ toward public opinion expressed in the 
public sphere. Despite their rationalist tendencies, their arguments would 
become canonical defences of the public sphere within democratic societies. 
The liberals advanced the notion that the public sphere became a 
check upon state power rather than necessary for processes of will-formation. 
A commitment to popular sovereignty became combined with scepticism of 
the influence of uneducated masses on politics. Alexis De Tocqueville’s 
proposal for an enlightened public opinion exemplifies this duality (Tocqueville 
1998 [1848]: 343-346). He argued that a group of individuals from different 
functional backgrounds should be educated and properly informed. They 
should then critically deliberate to create a shared position on the common 
good which, in virtue of it being the Enlightened opinion of the people, must 
be acted upon by state institutions (Habermas 1992a: 136-137). This 
intermediate body should function as an important check on increasingly 
centralized bureaucratic apparatuses. De Tocqueville associated this 
centralisation with the rise of socialism, which constituted a threat to the 
liberty of the individual (Tocqueville 1998 [1848]: 347-361). An Enlightened 
public opinion built from diverse interests should thus act as a check on the 
state. J.S. Mill offers the paragon expression of the liberal legitimation of state 
rule through a free public sphere. His work On Liberty (1991 [1859]) argues 
that society could effectively tyrannise the individual through the social 
pressure to conform. On the one hand, the majority opinion expressed in 
public debate should act as a power in the system of checks and balances 
rather than conferring this role to the sovereign will. Parliamentary 
representatives should take it into account, but also oppose popular opinion 
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when it threatens individual liberty and progress. Representative democracy 
would thus become a solution to mediocre public opinion formation 
(Habermas 1992a: 135-136). On the other hand, the freedom of expression 
should safeguard minority opinion; the latter should be protected by the 
legitimate modern state because they can contribute to overall the progress of 
society (Mill 1991 [1859]: 19-55). Despite Mill’s penchant for binding citizens 
through a shared interest in progress, his argument became a canonical 
argument on justifying the democratic legitimacy of the modern state through 
its protection of a citizen’s equal and free position in the public sphere.  
In more contemporary accounts, free deliberation gained an essential 
place in democratic society, more broadly construed. The rise of methods of 
mass communication in the twentieth century, such as the radio and 
telephone, turned extensive public deliberation in modernity’s enlarged 
polities into a reality. John Dewey’s argument in The Public and its Problems 
(1954 [1927]) exemplifies the canonical defence of public deliberation as a 
precondition to the state’s democratic legitimacy. It additionally draws to the 
fore more sociological requirements for democratic will-formation. Dewey 
argued that the lack of a self-aware public with agency was a political problem 
for modern democracies, stating that “Communication can alone create a 
great community. Our Babel is not one of language but of signs and symbols 
without which shared experience is impossible” (Dewey 1954 [1927]: 181). In 
this context Dewey is referring to the United States, though the analysis is 
nonetheless relevant for grasping the creation of a demos in mass societies. 
He starts from the observation that all humans organise themselves in 
associations, though these relations do not yet constitute a democratic society 
(Dewey 1954 [1927]: 188). For a democratic society to emerge, the people 
requires a self-conception which offers common purpose to an essentially 
pluralistic citizenry. The value of public deliberation lies in the ability to create 
this self-understanding among citizens. Dewey’s argument exemplifies the 
importance of public communication in creating unity from plurality. It posits 
that the existence of majority opinion is less important than how the majority 
constituted itself from a plurality of opinions (Dewey 1954 [1927]: 207-208). 
This emphasis on process stresses how elections should motivate citizens to 
debate public matters on an equal footing. Citizens might not always influence 
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decision-makers, but they should feel agency in political matters. The public 
sphere comes to hold, through this line of reasoning, a vital position in modern 
mass democracies because it is here that the demos attains a sense of 
political agency. This canonical argument posits a pluralistic conception of the 
people but additionally emphasises the importance of citizens’ participation in 
the construction of a common majoritarian opinion for democratic politics. The 
legitimacy of the democratic relies on the existence of such a deliberative 
space because the political agency of the constituent power takes shape 
within it. To put it more concisely, democratic legitimacy relies on citizens’ 
participation in deliberation on matters of public concern, which creates a 
procedural bond of collectivity.  
An additional dimension which affects the importance of the public 
sphere in legitimating state rule, and which contemporary arguments tend to 
emphasise, is the presence of more distinct and antagonistic groups in 
European societies. This logic finds its expression in the work of Jürgen 
Habermas, who argues that state decision-making should remain responsive 
to the will of the demos. The democratic legitimacy of state decision-makers 
relies on the possibility of continuous influence by its popular sovereign 
through both formal and informal channels. Habermas argues that 
communicative acts constitute opinion and will-formation processes; 
“Subjectless forms of communication’ arise in a ‘network of fairly regulated 
bargaining processes and of various forms of argumentation” (Habermas 
1994: 8; 6). These processes include diverse modes of discourse, ranging 
from instrumental bargaining to ethical debates. In this context, the public 
sphere constitutes a set of arenas in which a more-or-less rational formation 
of popular opinion and will takes place. Here, the presumption of rationality 
derives from the diversity of opinions expressed in public debate14, whilst the 
practical issue requiring action shapes its normative content (Habermas 1994: 
6). The public nature of deliberation should exclude unjustifiable, that is non-
democratic, arguments. Habermas argues that a pluralistic demos creates 
shared standards of debate. In other words, the democratic citizenry 
establishes democratic procedural norms to which they are at least 
instrumentally committed. The latter remain open to legitimate changes 
through public deliberation. He explicitly posits a procedural understanding of 
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the demos, which derives from citizens’ participation in normatively regulated 
deliberative processes.  
According to this argument, the democratic legitimacy of the state 
relies on the existence of an empowered public sphere. Habermas argues, 
contra Kant, that public opinion should influence state legislation, hence 
retaining popular sovereignty as a central principle in his theory (e.g. Cronin 
2003; Habermas 1996). Representatives in a democratically legitimate state 
must, as a result, be pressured to remain responsive to public opinion 
because they depend on the popular vote. He describes the process as 
follows: 
 
Informal public opinion-formation generates “influence”; influence is 
transformed into “communicative power” through channels of political 
elections; and communicative power is again transformed into “administrative 
power” through legislation (Habermas 1994: 8). 
 
Habermas argues, like Condorcet, that processes of opinion-formation 
should “hold their own” against the widespread administrative power of the 
modern state. (Habermas 1994: 8). The legal apparatus of the constitutional 
state, for instance, should ensure the contestability of decisions within judicial 
arenas. Critical subjectless discourses, on the other hand, should ensure that 
citizens effectively govern themselves through their influence on modern state 
apparatuses. The demos should constructively engage in the creation of will-
formation processes, but first of all require a public sphere in which to engage 
productively in the creation of public will. The state must therefore ensure the 
preconditions for democratic public deliberation. In both Dewey’s and 
Habermas’ arguments, the electoral system is necessarily embedded in a 
public sphere. The latter has arguably grown in importance due to deep 
pluralism in multicultural societies (Bohman 2003), and therefore greater need 
for accommodation, within contemporary Western polities.  
These canonical arguments on the democratic legitimacy of the state 
rely on the constitutional formation of an equal and free citizenry. Habermas 
defines the demos as consisting of diverse voluntary groups that choose to 
participate in the public sphere, in public processes of will-formation, and that 
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they “find a basis in the associations of a civil society quite distinct from both 
state and economy alike” (Habermas 1994: 10). Some go so far as to say that 
the recognition of diversity act as a catalyst in getting the public to participate 
(Maynor 2003: 205). The contestation between groups should foster a 
dynamic energy marked by a republican thrust aimed at ensuring equal 
participation in decision-making. These contemporary republicans (Kalyvas 
and Katznelson 2008: 82), as well as theorists of pan-European party 
democracy (Føllesdal and Hix 2006: 549-551), argue that conflict has a 
constructive, energising dimension.15 These positions imply that partisan 
conflict within the demos generates participation in democratic processes of 
will-formation, the focus is on creating a demos through democratic 
procedures (Abizadeh 2010; Benhabib 2006; Loughlin 2014; Scherz 2013; 
Whelan 1983). As Chantal Mouffe skilfully demonstrates however, some 
degree of consensus is necessary even before agonistic democracy is 
possible in pluralistic societies (Mouffe 1999: 756). What the procedural focus 
highlights is that a constitution, which enshrines basic rights and the 
separation of powers, is not, on its own, protection from a factional, 
oppressive state. The status of citizenship empowers a diverse popular 
sovereign to discharge its rights to self-government through democratic 
procedures of will-formation. Citizenship within a democratic state should 
create a bond of collectivity between diverse publics. As Hannah Arendt thus 
argued, together, men create a common world completely dependent upon 
“the sharing of words and deeds” (Arendt 1998 [1958]: 198). The canonical 
arguments presented in this section posit an image of the people as a demos 
bound together through democratic procedures of will-formation, rather than 
relying on any form of pre-existing bond. In the late-capitalist West, deep 
pluralism, in the form of religious communities and other irreconcilable value 
communities (Bohman 2003), make the construction of a common will an 
elusive endeavour. Still, this procedural bond is consequently a particularly 
attractive notion in modern circumstances of socially plural, enlarged polities.  
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V - The diverse demos self-governing through democratic state 
institutions 
Democracy is the appropriate criterion of legitimacy for the modern state, 
because this form of rule ensures peaceful decision-making in pluralist 
contexts. The democratic constitution, the election of representatives, and a 
public sphere should ensure peaceful self-government of the sovereign 
demos. These canonical arguments combine two intertwined criteria of 
democratic legitimacy: popular and procedural in nature. First, popular 
legitimacy relies on the possibility of participating in state decision-making, or 
to at least meaningfully influence state decisions. The demos have to be the 
author of their laws, to borrow Rousseau’s famous phrase. As unanimity is 
deemed impossible in enlarged polities, state decisions reflect a majoritarian 
position or compromise. It therefore follows that an empowered public sphere 
should, in part, continue to act as a critical observer of state decisions. Public 
deliberation should at least transform a diversity of positions into a 
majoritarian one. The public sphere is also important for protecting 
unrepresented minority beliefs in legislative processes. Secondly, procedural 
legitimacy is attained if citizens, or their representatives, can democratically 
influence the state’s decision-making centre. The state should ensure citizens’ 
freedom and equality within these will-formation processes. This requires, on 
the one hand, that the legitimate democratic state enable free and equal 
participation in collective will-formation processes. On the other hand, it 
should ensure freedom from state domination or the tyranny of majorities over 
minorities. The democratic state is illegitimate if parts of the sovereign demos 
are either systematically excluded from or privileged in participating in will-
formation processes; democratic procedures should therefore legitimate the 
modern state. The two sources are clearly intertwined because democratic 
procedures should enable participation, whilst the legitimating force of these 
procedures derives from their ability to enable citizens to participate in their 
self-government.  
 The democratic conception posits citizens as bound together by the 
democratic procedures, which enable their self-government. The state cannot 
assume any shared objective interests between citizens in any meaningful 
way. Competent government is consequently a meaningless criterion for 
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evaluating state legitimacy, because there is no objective norm against which 
to measure its rule. Democratic procedures aim to maintain the vital interest of 
civil peace in modern pluralistic polities. Public will-formation processes 
should nevertheless result in a conception of the common good, which the 
state can, and should, pursue. Representation has become important in mass 
polities, whether in electoral, deliberative or participatory processes. Early 
modern arguments, as elaborated above, conceive of representatives as 
creating a common good from regional interests. Later theories, on the other 
hand, tend to rest on an associational conceptualisation that includes regional 
interests, but tends to focus on socio-economic and other cleavages, the 
irreconcilability of which results in greater emphasis on democratic 
procedures. Any decision made by the state legislature will privilege some 
interests and values over others; citizens should therefore participate as equal 
citizens in these processes because they constitute part the sovereign. It is by 
this logic that participation in democratic procedures creates a procedural 
unity between citizens. Citizens are bound together by the desirability of 
partaking in peaceful, democratic procedures, despite holding substantive 
disagreements as to what exactly should result from this association. The 
democratic procedure of self-government thus constitutes the people’s bond 
of collectivity. The conceptual structure of popular sovereignty coalesces 
around the notion that the constituent power should continue to at least 
influence its constituted power. What this means is that, democratic 
institutions are essential to the state’s legitimacy, because they enable the 
constituent power to continuously influence the constituted power. This 
democratic conception of popular sovereignty clearly governs the reasoning 
behind a wide array of democratic and republican proposals, which advocate 
greater participation of citizens in EU decision-making structures. 
 The conceptual boundary of the people derives from the constitutional 
state, because only citizens are equally empowered to act as the sovereign 
within its democratic institutions. These canonical arguments share a 
commitment to participation in democratic procedures, that is, to the 
democratic criterion of inclusion. This logic aligns with the conception of the 
sovereign as beneficiary in that it does not provide an inherent criterion of 
exclusion from the people due to the universality of its principles. A Lockean-
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Kantian universalist legacy arguably continues to resonate in contemporary 
democratic thought. As such, closure constitutes a persistent and ever more 
salient challenge for the democratic criterion of legitimacy; the democratic 
paradox (Espejo 2013; Whelan 1983). In other words, the universalist 
principles of democracy do not offer a coherent justification of the original 
borders of the demos (e.g. Abizadeh 2008; 2012). The foundational moment 
creates ‘the people’, yet paradoxically the creation seems to presuppose a 
people. The effect would thus have to become the cause (Rousseau 1987 
[1762]: 164). The borders of the demos cannot be delineated democratically 
because the democratic principle offers no evaluation criterion as to who may 
partake in the foundational democratic process. As Ben Saunders points out: 
“Historically, democracy was an inclusive ideal, […] but the political unit in 
question was always taken as a given” (2012: 282). The given of the political 
unity -- the sovereign state -- is essential in setting borders to the people in 
these arguments. Thus, conceptually, the territorial state determines the 
boundaries of the pluralistic demos, because its decision-making centre is the 
object of democratisation through citizen empowerment. The democratic 
constitution, electoral system, and public sphere complement one another to 
institutionally enable self-government of modern enlarged and diverse mass 
polities. According to the canonical arguments, democratic procedures which 
enable self-government, as part of the modern state and protected by it, bind 
the people as demos despite internal pluralism. The demos derives its 
conceptual borders from the state since the latter offers the institutional 
framework in which the people can participate autonomously in its sovereign 
self-government.  
 
VI - Conclusion 
This chapter offered a genealogical reconstruction of the contemporary 
conception of popular sovereignty as expounded in arguments on the EU’s 
democratic legitimacy. This reconstruction was essential to the project 
because the distinct conception offered here continues to inform the debate 
on the EU’s democratic deficit. These legitimations posit the people as a 
demos, which self-governs through democratic procedures. Despite the lack 
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of a pre-existing consensus, vital interests require collective decisions in order 
to avoid regressing into armed conflict. It becomes the role of the state to act 
as the vessel through which the demos can discharge its sovereign rule in a 
meaningful way. Popular sovereignty comes to be conceptualised as the 
democratic self-government of citizens through the sovereign state decision-
making institutions. Democratic will-formation processes should offer citizens 
the opportunity to participate as equals, albeit often as part of a group and 
through representatives; it is indeed this element, which grounds the 
democratic legitimacy of the state. This (constitutional) equality in procedures 
constitutes the relevant relationship between the ruled. So despite the initial 
assumption of diversity, this democratic conception posits a unity among the 
citizenry. The borders to the demos, however, are set by the territorially 
sovereign state rather than by a principle inherent to the conceptual 
relationship between the ruled. In practice, the democratic constitution of a 
state delineates ‘we, the people’ through the ascription of citizenship rights, 
which ensure equal footing in democratic procedures. A democratic 
constitution, representative electoral system and public sphere create an 
institutional framework of self-government around the state’s decision-making 
centre. In these arguments, thus, the state implicitly sets boundaries to a 
particular demos rather than the bond of collectivity. In summary, this 
democratic conception of popular sovereignty stresses the importance of 
participation in coming to common decisions. This understanding has taken 
hold of the modern popular imagination in the West (Chambers 2004; Kalyvas 
2005), and arguably informs analyses of the EU’s democratic deficit. The 
procedural democratic relationship, however, offers no criterion for exclusion 
beyond implicit sociological constraints on a functioning public sphere. In this 
regard, the arguments effectively rely upon the existing territorially organised 
state for the conceptual closure of the demos. The final genealogy will 
reconstruct an identitarian conception of popular sovereignty that does 
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1
 Thomas Jefferson, by contrast, argued that natural rights are safe under majoritarian rule 
(Helo 2009: 37). 
2
 On the Trias Politica, see (Montesquieu 1949 [1748]: 151-162). 
3
 On his own account, Rousseau’s political theory of republican government might legitimate 
modern city-states, like his hometown of Geneva, or smaller countries, such as Corsica 
(Rousseau 1987 [1762]: 170) and Poland (Rousseau 1782). 
4
 Some theorists argued that this procedure could challenge individual liberty through interest 
aggregation, such as Hans Kelsen (2000 [1929]: 94-95).  
5
 See also Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws (1949 [1748]: 11). 
6
 Other practices of participation were also pursued historically (Morgan 1988: 209-230). 
7
 Brutus, for example, argues that, “The very term, representative implies that the person or 
body chosen for this purpose, should resemble those who appoint them—a representation of 
the people of America, if it be a true one must be like the people. It ought to be so constituted 
that a person who is a stranger to the country, might be able to form a just idea of their 
character, by knowing that of their representatives.  They are the sign—the people are the 
thing signified” (Brutus 1993 [1787]: 320).  
8
 It is important to note, firstly, that Burke probably did have in mind something more analogue 
to his American counterparts than to contemporary European parties. Secondly, Burke was 
an exception, an important and influential thinker in the Western canon, yet his view on 
parties made him stand out in the intellectual landscape of his time (Manin 1997: 194; fn 191). 
9
 American minimalists often appeal to a similar rationale. The Madisonian concern with 
domination as a threat to the republic, however, is absent, see (Lippmann 1930: 54-62). 
10
 On the relationship between parties and particular cleavages, see (Rokkan 1999: 276-340). 
11
 In his practical political theory, Kant argues that a constitutional monarch should prepare 
citizens for liberty, which follows coherently from his (not so democratic) rationalist 
underpinnings. The aim is nevertheless to prepare citizens for democratic self-government 
(Kant 1991 [1793]). As with Hegel, the educational dimension indicates the transformative 
possibility of citizens’ opinion. He further aligns with Hegel in that he does not defend a mass 
participatory form of deliberative democracy relying on a pluralistic understanding of the 
people. His position on popular sovereignty relies, rather, on a fictional or hypothetical 
understanding of the people (Chambers 2004: 154; Urbinati 2006: 101-137). 
12
 As Kant puts it in ‘What is Enlightenment?’, “Argue as much as you like and about whatever 
you like, but obey!”(Kant 1991 [1784]: 59; Italics in original). 
13
 For the rise of the modern print media and its impact on the conceptualisation of public 
deliberation, compare (Habermas 1992b)  and (Martin 2005). 
14
 Others have argued in a more Kantian vein that “the power of rational deliberation to 
counter self-interested claims and demagogic appeals, thus underwriting the normative 
legitimacy of the reasoned agreement that emerges from such dialogue” (Martin 2005: 387). 
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15
 Kalyvas and Katznelson argue that eighteenth-century Scottish republican theorist Adam 
Ferguson held the very same beliefs. In the democratic revolutions, however, the emphasis 
was on reason and interest (Kalyvas and Katznelson 2008: 51-87). 
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Chapter 5: The People Identifying as a Nation 
 
We have not willed our nationality … the patrie is a natural society or, which 
comes absolutely to the same thing, a historic one. Its decisive characteristic 
is birth. We no more choose our patrie – the land of our forefathers – than we 
choose our father and mother.  
Charles Maurras1 
 
I - Introduction 
The preceding chapter reconstructed the democratic conception of popular 
sovereignty, which informs the corresponding criterion of political legitimacy. 
The pluralistic citizenry is understood here as constituting its politically 
relevant relationship in the democratic procedures through which it influences 
state decision-makers. The democratic constitution, electoral process, and 
public sphere create the institutional circumstances, which enable the 
sovereign’s self-government. The democratic principle behind this conception 
of popular sovereignty does not offer a criterion to exclude individuals from 
the demos. The state’s ascription of citizenship, which protects and empowers 
the ruled to participate in the democratic life of their polity, is what sets 
boundaries to the demos. This conceptual border results from the pre-existing 
sovereign state being the object of democratisation. The conceptual 
reconstruction in the previous chapter was essential as this democratic 
conception influences much of the debate on the EU’s democratic deficit, 
however the no-demos thesis, often invoked in relation this deficit, is arguably 
more about identity than democracy (e.g. Friese and Wagner 2002; Weiler 
1995). The third genealogy reconstructs the contemporary conception of 
popular sovereignty underlying these identitarian arguments. This conception, 
so I shall argue, relies on the positing of a shared communitarian identity. The 
legitimate sovereign state’s borders should coincide with those of the nation, 
which, in turn, changes the criteria of legitimacy from democracy into a shared 
identity. The cultural particularity of this identity constitutes a normative 
boundary to the people, the criterion of inclusion, therefore, also acts as a 
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criterion for exclusion and closure. This conceptual structure relies upon this 
exclusiveness in its legitimation of political rule.  
This final conceptual genealogy reconstructs the conception of popular 
sovereignty, which underlies the criterion of identity. This chapter is vital to 
this thesis, alongside chapters 3 and 4, because this conception governs the 
diverse arguments in the EU-debate, which invoke cultural identities, whether 
at the national or European level. Historically, these arguments emphasise the 
importance of a national identity for the legitimacy of the modern state. I shall 
therefore refer to these arguments as nationalistic since they posit the nation 
as necessity. Some argue that one should distinguish between nationality and 
nationhood, however the practice of justification is insensitive to this 
distinction in making sense of legitimacy. The distinction, moreover, is often 
dismissed as cosmetic or rhetorical in academic arguments.2 One can 
observe a historical shift in emphasis from the ideological-ethnic toward the 
more functional-civic; compare, for instance, Fichte and Mill. These two 
canonical theorists nevertheless agree that the legitimate state requires that 
its citizens’ identify as nation, thus belonging to a particular state. The people 
as nation share cultural membership in a political community, which is 
grounded in an associative identity. Later arguments recognise that processes 
of socialisation, rather than shared socio-cultural markers, are necessary to 
maintain and shape this communitarian identity. The nationalist argument 
posits a shared understanding of the common good -- a national will -- which 
should guide the constituted power: the sovereign state. The legitimate 
nation-state empowers the national will in the realm of politics. On this 
identitarian conception of popular sovereignty, popular self-government 
reflects a communitarian right to self-determination. An essential criterion for 
state legitimacy, therefore, is the congruence between the borders of the 
national identity and the state. Contemporary democratic arguments 
emphasise that the presence of a national identity is a precondition for a well-
functioning mass democracy and welfare state. Nevertheless, these 
arguments support the congruence of identity and state without an explicitly 
ideological nationalist agenda, and its associated fervent sentiments. 
Conceptualising the people as a nation with a communitarian identity in this 
Chapter 5: The People Identifying as a Nation 
 137 
manner provides a form of closure to the polity based upon the cultural 
distinctiveness of the citizenry.  
 The rest of the chapter unfolds in five sections. In a different vein to the 
two previous genealogies, each section reconstructs a part of the 
paradigmatic nationalistic argument, which is governed by identitarian 
conception of popular sovereignty. The first reconstruction (section II) focuses 
on how the nation is conceptualised in modern political thought. Early 
conceptualisations of the nation as a factual ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ nation were 
replaced by an emphasis on its self-identification as a community. The 
recognition of a shared identity nonetheless remained a central dimension 
throughout these conceptualisations of the relevant bond of collectivity. The 
following section (section III) shifts toward the political relevance of this 
communitarian identity in legitimating the modern state. In short, the 
particularity of the national will justifies the organisation of the world into 
nation-states. The sovereign state’s legitimacy relies, on the one hand, on the 
protection of the national community and, on the other hand, on its 
responsiveness to the national will. For both these functions, the state borders 
have to coincide with those of the nation. The next section (section IV) 
explores the importance of communitarian identities, mainly in liberal and 
democratic justifications, because they occupy a central position in the 
contemporary conception of identitarian popular sovereignty. This more 
sociological perspective focuses on the canonical arguments that deem 
nationhood to be essential for a legitimate modern state. These might be less 
ideological, but they nevertheless posit a communitarian identity as a 
precondition of mass democracy and welfare redistribution. In the final section 
(section V), I reconstruct the contemporary understanding of this conception 
governing the identitarian arguments in the EU’s legitimacy debate. It will 
demonstrate how popular sovereignty is understood as the discharging of a 
nation’s right to self-determination by their sovereign nation-state. Sociological 
arguments, on the other hand, emphasise the functional purposes of a 
communitarian identity. In both cases, the existence of a national identity is 
the source of legitimacy for the modern state. This conception of popular 
sovereignty rests on the positing of a cultural bond of collectivity, which limits 
the people to those socialised into the communitarian identity. In the 
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conclusion (section VI), I summarise that this identitarian conception of 
popular sovereignty, which understands the people as a nation.   
 
II - The nation: From brute fact to shared identity 
The conceptualisation of the nation has broadly shifted from an understanding 
the nation as brute fact toward one of shared identity. In contrast to the 
previous chapters, this chapter will start from a definition rather than drawing it 
out of arguments on criteria for evaluating state legitimacy. The reason is that 
these definitions feature explicitly in the canonical arguments. To appreciate 
these arguments, therefore, it is fruitful to have a clear understanding of their 
definition of the people as nation. The latter has become associated with 
Rousseauian republicanism, communitarian, and nationalist political theories 
(e.g. Bellamy and Castiglione 2013: 213; Habermas 1994: 9; Vincent 2002). 
These traditions share a conceptualisation of the citizenry as socio-cultural 
community. The exact definition of the nation remains the object of much 
contestation. Two variations have become particularly influential in modern 
political thought: the so-called ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ nations. The former identifies 
nationhood with a set of ethnic markers, such as race or religion, whilst the 
latter is constituted by political markers, such as a shared history or political 
values (e.g. Canovan 1996; Singer 1996).3 In both cases, emphasis is 
implicitly or explicitly on the need for citizens to identify as a community 
derived from, but not reducible to, facts about their homogeneity. The need to 
identify as a nation would become more significant in these arguments than 
any particular markers. The conceptualisation of the people as nation shifts 
from brute fact toward shared identity informing a sense of belonging.     
In early modern political thought, a civic conceptualisation of the nation 
emerges in which shared values and political enterprises shape the present 
political institutions and particular ways of life of a society. Edmund Burke’s 
justification of the English constitutional monarchy exemplifies this type of 
definition of the people as civic nation. He argued that it is historically specific 
politico-legal institutions which constitute the unity of the polity rather than any 
ethnic components (Burke 2004 [1790]). Burke uses the image of an 
intergenerational contract to illustrate that the political community constitutes 
Chapter 5: The People Identifying as a Nation 
 139 
a historical enterprise greater than its constituent parts (Burke 2004 [1790]: 
194-195). In a similar vein, Liah Greenfeld characterizes the American 
revolution as a Herculean task, because it appeals to common values in order 
to draw citizens together in a political enterprise (Greenfeld 1992b: 423). For 
instance, the American Declaration of Independence (1776) appeals to God-
given rights.4 The principle author of the declaration, Thomas Jefferson, used 
the shared pursuit of Universal values to justify American self-government. 
His position toward other ‘races’, however, reveals a more ethnic component 
to this Universal self-understanding. Michael Mann’s chapter, ‘Genocidal 
Democracies in the New World’ (2005a), brings to the fore an ethnic 
dimension in Western liberal democracies, which was indicated by their 
attitude toward Native Americans, slaves, and Hawaiians.5 This sentiment did 
not contain itself to frontier settler communities in direct competition for land 
with these communities; during his presidential tenure, Thomas Jefferson 
declared that higher civilizations should rule over lower ones, squarely placing 
Indians in the second category. As Jefferson put it, “they must be crushed’ if 
they resisted American campaigns to obtain land” (Jefferson quoted in: Mann 
2005a: 92-93; see also Morris 2000: 9-10). This declaration reveals an implicit 
ethnic dimension to this civic, even Universalist definition of the nation.  
This intertwinement arguably finds its clearest reflection in the political 
thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In his foundational argument of the 
legitimate republic, he conceptualises the people as an ethnic-civic entity. In 
his On the Social Contract (Rousseau 1987 [1762]), Rousseau argued that a 
legislator creates a constitution to which individuals have to agree voluntarily 
so as to ‘escape’ a relatively tranquil state of nature. An act of will transforms 
a “blind multitude” into a sovereign people (1987 [1762]: 162-170).6 The 
constitution creates a single political body with a uniform will: the so-called 
volonté générale. The people seem to emerge as a civic entity. His ‘blind 
multitude’ constitutes a culturally homogeneous group.7 Rousseau’s 
conceptualisation of this multitude, however, incorporates a long list of 
‘demands’ in order to be considered suitable for legislation.8 Civic religion, 
education, festivals and other ‘social’ institutions have to further enshrine 
mores into the hearts of the people after the foundation of the polity 
(Rousseau 1987 [1762]). On this account, the nation is “a community bound 
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by spiritual ties and cultural traditions” (Barnard 1983: 250-251). Egalitarian 
thinkers lament this requirement of sociological unity in his political thought 
(Douglass 2013: 735-736). It is, however, crucial for Rousseau’s argument 
because it ensures citizens’ identification with a unified ‘general will’. This 
conceptualization of the people as nation combines a ‘civic’ with an ‘ethnic’ 
dimension. Rousseau represents, to some extent, a shift from a contractual 
concept of the people to an organic one (Shell 2003: 49-50).  
Modern nationalist arguments in which identity is the criteria of state 
legitimacy often rely on an ethnic definition of the nation. Prominent markers, 
such as ethnicity, religion, geography, and language, have often been weaved 
into theories in which the nation is primordial or divine entity. Giuseppe 
Mazzini has been one of the most eloquent defenders of modern nationalism 
(Canovan 1996: 6; Rowley 2012: 39). His definition of a nation draws together 
all the aforementioned ‘material’ characteristics. He argued that God divided 
mankind into natural nations, however modern artificial empires destroyed this 
natural order (Mazzini 2009 [1814-60]: 93). Membership in a nation is not a 
voluntary choice but quite literally a God-given fact. Another influential strand 
of ethnic theorists emphasised the importance of a shared language. Fichte’s 
Reden an die deutsche Nation (2008 [1808]) exemplifies this linguistic 
definition of the nation. He argued that a core characteristic of the German 
nation was its Ürsprache. In his Reden, Fichte defined language as an 
epistemology for understanding the world. He argued that German Ürsprache 
is rooted in God’s will. Being part of the German language community is, 
consequently, not a matter of choice (Abizadeh 2005: 340; Moore 2008: xxiv). 
In a similar vein, Johan Gottfried Herder defined the nation as a cultural 
community with its own language (Zammito, Menges et al. 2010). Cultural 
communities have a shared language required for their self-governance. He 
thus dismissed the growing international relations culture as mere 
‘Papierkultur’ (Rothschild 1995: 68), which was not based upon a ‘cultural 
language’. Language reflects the naturally developed cultural character of the 
nation. On Herder’s account, communities can develop and merge through 
human (divinely inspired) agency; nations, thus, ultimately find their natural 
roots in divine will (Patten 2010: 685-686). An important point to highlight is 
that Fichte and Herder’s arguments reveal a communitarian dimension to the 
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fact of sharing a common language with co-nationals. A vernacular language 
is more than an instrument to communicate with others, it reflects a common 
‘life world’. Membership of a nation nonetheless remains a brute fact. 
More contemporary definitions of the people as nation shifted from 
social homogeneity as empirical fact to a belief therein. Such a national 
identity was nevertheless deemed authentic and politically significant. In his 
Qu’est-ce qu’une Nation? (1992 [1882]), Ernest Renan argued that in wanting 
authentic relationships with one another citizens turn to the past to make 
sense of themselves in the present. Renan explicitly rejected ‘material 
elements’ such as race, language, religion, and geography (1992 [1882]);9 the 
nation is a moral consciousness with which citizens identify. Renan’s 
argument incorporates a more psychological understanding of the nation 
grounded in citizens’ felt need to live in an authentic community (see also 
Williams 2004: 201-205). According to him, the common experience of past 
suffering was one of the most powerful forces of national unity. Citizens 
identify with events in which one did not even necessarily partake, an 
‘imagined’ shared experience which imposes duties on the future generations 
of the nation (Renan 1992 [1882]). This national identity becomes engrained 
through everyday socialisation processes, which informed Renan’s assertion 
that the nation constitutes a ‘daily plebiscite’ (Renan 1992 [1882]). Citizens’ 
participation in a national public sphere cultivates a shared culture, which also 
is as an expression of political unity (Laborde 2004). This national identity 
generates a sincere feeling of community among citizens.  
This communitarian identity remains the cornerstone of the definition, 
thereby mirroring previous arguments, but the exact definition would become 
more an object of political engineering. Benedict Anderson’s ‘imagined 
community’ captures the core of this conceptualisation of the nation as 
portrayed in contemporary literature. He argued that communities are no 
longer based on face-to-face interactions, but citizens are nonetheless able to 
imagine themselves as part of a national community due to their participation 
in a public sphere (Anderson 2006). Anderson stresses the importance of 
print media, because it enables citizens to participate in a shared political 
space without the necessity to interact directly. In a similar vein, Charles 
Taylor describes the public sphere as “a common space in which the 
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members of society are deemed to meet through a variety of media: print 
electronic, and also face-to-face encounters; to discuss matters of common 
interest; and thus to be able to form a common mind about these” (Taylor 
2004: 83). The public sphere is essential to the creation of a national identity: 
a ‘common mind’. The communitarian identity is the creation of ‘shared 
frames’ to interpreted the world in the public sphere (Frost 2001; Tamir 1993). 
Other state institutions also play a formative role in the creation of this identity, 
such as the military and national education, by creating common experiences 
shared by citizens’ whom need not have met (Anderson 2006; Maynor 2003). 
The exact definitions of the nation become less central to these arguments, 
but the existence of a shared identity remains an essential dimension of the 
people as nation.  
The national identity should be a communitarian identity, as Max 
Weber describes as a Nationalgefuhl (Weber 1978: 385), which captures the 
emotive nature of the national identity. From a philosophical perspective, the 
difference between ethnic and civic nationalism becomes largely 
inconsequential. What is important, however, is that citizens should not 
experience community as a choice, a dimension emphasised by more 
sociological arguments.10 Membership in the national community is not a 
choice (Tamir 1993: 20-22), or at least it is not experienced as such. Having a 
nationality feels as natural as having one’s nose, to paraphrase Ernest 
Gellner (1983: 6). The lack of (perceived) choice should create the experience 
of partaking in a community with a shared culture. This emotional 
identification should result in the feeling of belonging to a national community 
and to a particular political order. Sharing an identity in this manner should 
further generate a sense of obligation and allegiance between citizens and the 
state; “[I]ndividuals assume [associative] obligations because they see the 
state as their state, its laws as their laws, and its government as their 
government” (Tamir 1993: 135). These more contemporary arguments thus 
define the nation as a shared identity which relates citizens to another, and by 
extension to their political regime, through a sense of community. 
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III - Popular sovereignty as national self-determination  
Both ethnic and civic definitions feature in making sense of the modern state’s 
legitimacy from a nationalist perspective. Max Weber observed that 
nationalism is the politicization of socio-cultural features which have no 
inherent political significance. To clarify, he did not argue that the belief in the 
nation is insincere or does not exist but rather that the nation “directs us to 
political power” (Weber 1978: 398). To rephrase Weber’s observation, the 
nation became the politically relevant community in determining a state’s 
legitimacy. The arguments presented in this section are closely associated 
with the political doctrine of nationalism. What they contribute is the 
understanding that the ‘fit’ between the national socio-cultural community and 
the political state is essential for the latter’s legitimacy (Walzer 1977) because 
states should act as political representative of their socio-cultural communities 
in the realm of politics. In other words, the state’s sovereignty is an expression 
of the nation’s right to (cultural) self-determination; “The patriotic national 
identity […] become[s] the site of consensus on the legitimacy of the state” 
(Nakhimovsky 2011: 170). A legitimate state is thus a nation-state; its 
antonym is the medieval empire (Hont 2005: 449-450). Fichte’s Reden 
exemplifies the canonical argument in favour of national self-determination 
(Fichte 2008 [1808]). As said earlier, Fichte argued that the linguistic nation 
constitutes a life world with its own distinct will, to which only other members 
of the community have direct access: Taylor’s aforementioned common mind. 
The state enables the nation to freely pursue its will, or at least express it 
(Abizadeh 2012: 869).11 To make the national will politically viable, the 
nations’ borders must delineate the borders of the states (Canovan 1996: 5). 
On more practical grounds, Friedrich List argued that the nation should decide 
over its own economic policy in full autonomy. The nation-state constitutes the 
precondition to ensuring a degree of economic autonomy in which the nation 
can discharge its will (e.g. Hont 2005: 148-155; Levi-Faur 1997). The 
aforementioned Fichte committed the A-B-C paradox of nationalism, that is, 
not assigning equal right of self-determination to each nation (Morgenthau 
1957). This paradox, however, is not inherent to nationalism. Herder, by 
contrast, explicitly embraced a kind of interpolity cultural pluralism between 
nations with different but equally valid interpretations of the good (Geuss 
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1996: 156). He ascribed to the ideal of self-confident friendly nations (e.g. 
Patten 2010). In both versions of the argument, the legitimate state should be 
a nation-state, that is, the borders of the nation should coincide with those of 
the state. 
Two canonical nationalist arguments further flesh out the legitimate 
relationship between the state and the nation. Firstly, the sovereign state has 
a duty to ensure the continuity of the nation. The sovereign state’s legitimacy 
rests on the nation’s right of self-determination, hence the state should ensure 
the existence of the nation. Herder’s ideal is an example of a world consisting 
of self-governing nations living in harmony. According to him, however, the 
creation of artificial empires caused the demise of self-governing nations. 
Herder argued that the ‘artificial’ modern state should act as a ‘utilitarian 
entity’ in these circumstances (Patten 2010). The state had a role in the 
paleogenisis of the nation (Eggel, Liebich et al. 2007: 62). A legitimate state 
should pursue the cultivation of a mature self-confident nation through 
formative, moral, defensive, educative, and integrative functions (Eggel, 
Liebich et al. 2007: 66-71). According to this logic, the modern state’s 
legitimacy relied on securing the national identity. This protection of national 
unity remained an important consideration for judging the sovereign state’s 
legitimacy.  Max Weber, for instance, argued that the nation should act as the 
criterion for judging state policies’ legitimacy (Weber 1994 [1895]: 16-17). 
Social policies are legitimate if they avoid threats to the unity of the German 
nation which arise from class conflict (Weber 1994 [1895]: 26). Moreover, 
Weber explicitly stated that welfare policies should build the ‘kind of people 
they will be’ (Weber 1994 [1895]: 15; italics in original), meaning that the state 
should secure the nation’s future. National unity is not taken for granted, but it 
requires state protection in modern circumstances. Implicitly underlying his 
argument is that the state has to coincide with the nation to fulfil this role (or 
attain congruence), making the existence of nation-states a precondition to 
the fulfilment of this specific criterion. 
A second set of canonical arguments requires that the legitimate 
sovereign state submit to the nation’s will. Authoritarian regimes often appeal 
to the nation’s will, though without any democratic structures. Carl Schmitt 
exemplifies the logic of this authoritarian ideal when he argues that the 
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sovereign derives its legitimacy from representing the community’s shared 
identity. The polity should constitute a political community of friends with a 
shared identity -- the sovereign should represent this collective identity and 
ensure the unity of the nation. His theory, however, ultimately relies on identity 
rather than institutions to ensure coherence between ruled and rulers (Schmitt 
2007 [1932]). State citizens need a collective identity to guide the rule of the 
sovereign (Müller 2010b). This conception of popular sovereignty can thus 
inform undemocratic, hypothetical constructions to legitimate sovereign state 
rule rather than popular self-determination. Historically however, the state has 
gone from “something that dictates to the [individual] will to something that 
empowers it” (Frost 2001: 501).  
The congruence between rule and rulers’ will informs democratic 
proposals for a nation-state. These democrats tend to be sceptical of the full 
transfer of sovereignty to the regime. Rousseau famously stated that citizens’ 
unified volonté générale should determine the republic’s laws and that the 
regime’s legitimacy therefore relied on this direct expression of the national 
will (Rousseau 1987 [1762]). In other words, he rejected mediated rule, as 
argued for by Hobbes and Locke (Hont 2005: 465; Shell 2003: 56), at least for 
constitutional laws. Explicit consent had the added value of generating a 
sense of obligation to follow laws (Williams 2007: 480-481). Mazzini similarly 
argued in favour of nationally organised republics (Recchia and Urbinati 
2009). In these republican legitimations of rule, the distinction between state 
decision and popular consent collapses to a large extent because the nation 
participates directly in its self-legislation. Unlike their republican counterparts, 
liberal nationalist arguments legitimated representative models of democratic 
will-formation. John Stuart Mill, for example, made a primâ facie case for 
determining the boundaries of representative government using nationality 
because rulers and ruled share the same sentiments (Mill 1865: 120).12 
Representation of the national identity is important because the liberal modern 
state should reflect the popular will. In modern mass societies, direct 
representation of the popular sovereign in the legislature is not feasible. 
Instead, shared sentiments should ensure congruence between legislative 
decisions and popular will, nationhood comes to be understood as an 
“expression of a people’s collective will” (Barnard 1983: 231). Some theorists 
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argue that, from this point, the democratic right of self-government is 
transmuted into the similar yet conceptually distinct right to national self-
determination (e.g. Abizadeh 2012; Tamir 1993; Yack 2001). According to 
both strands of argument, the nation requires democratic state institutions to 
express and pursue its national will.  
The nationalist line of thought depends upon the congruence between 
the borders of state and nation. Despite the constructed nature of the cultural 
identity, it remains a conceptual precondition for the possibility of a legitimate 
state because the sovereign state’s authority depends on the nation’s right to 
self-determination. Each nation finds its freedom in the active pursuit of its 
own understanding of the common good. In modern circumstances, theorists 
argued that the state is a necessary political vehicle to discharge this right in a 
meaningful manner. The ‘first’ justificatory requirement of legitimacy, 
therefore, is that the state coincides with the nation: the nation-state. The 
legitimate state should actively contribute to the construction of the nation, or 
in more primordial terms, it must ‘awaken’ it (Abizadeh 2012: 868-873). The 
two canonical arguments, which flesh out this relationship, clarify that the 
state’s legitimacy depends on the congruence between the state’s actions and 
the nation’s will. Unlike their authoritarian counterparts, democratic 
nationalists argue that democratic practices of popular will-formation are 
necessary to ensure the expression of the national will in state decisions. 
Andrew Vincent observes that although popular sovereignty and national self-
determination might not conceptually necessitate one another, they do have a 
‘deep intuitive’ connection (Vincent 2002: 32), to the extent that the modern 
state’s sovereign authority even became equated with the national 
community’s right to self-government (Vincent 2002: 28-34). Nationalist 
positions thus came to express popular sovereignty as a form of national self-
determination which relies on the congruence between the borders of the 
state and the nation.  
 
IV - The national identity as social precondition for the state 
This section focuses on current democratic arguments which hold nationhood 
as a precondition of legitimate state rule. These justifications tend to focus on 
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the presence of a communitarian identity as precondition for the functioning of 
mass democracies and welfare regimes. They are often less concerned with 
exact definitions of the national identity than with the associative sentiments 
that a communal identity should generate. This process of identification has 
become the linchpin in these contemporary arguments. The term ‘associative 
sentiments’ is drawn from Yael Tamir’s Liberal Nationalism (1993).13 
According to her, identification with a national community generates 
associative sentiments. In a similar vein, Liah Greenfeld asserts that “the 
psychological rewards inherent in nationality [is] its status-enhancing quality. 
Nationality makes people feel good” (Greenfeld 1992a: 489-490). This status 
relates to partaking in a greater whole that transcends individual’s finite 
existence (Vincent 2002: 95-96). This status should generate allegiance to 
one’s state despite injustices and the lack of fair play within it (Tamir 1993: 
134). In the previous conceptual genealogies, I alluded to the importance of 
nation-building for the modern ‘equality area’. Despite its elitist origins 
(Greenfeld 1992a: 487-488), nationhood became an egalitarian concept. Its 
presumption of essential sameness -- whether practically reflected or not -- 
was essential to the generation of associative sentiments. These sentiments, 
according to these arguments, are essential for the functioning of modern 
mass democracies and their welfare regimes.  
The associative sentiments of nationhood should motivate citizens to 
participate in public life. In this context, modern nationalism can be 
understood to re-forge patriotism, a concept which has historically been in 
close connection to the raison d'État (Vincent 2002: 36-61). Traditionally, 
patriotism referred to a republican patrie (e.g. Vincent 2002: 110-135; Viroli 
2002). It became evident during the French Revolution that the sentiment of 
patriotism could inspire citizens on a large scale.14 The French revolutionaries 
utilised this affect to draw the masses into revolt against the ancien regime, 
and in pursuit of the good of mankind rather than the particular national one 
(Hont 2005: 494-508). In the aftermath of the revolution, this Universalist 
patriotism was transformed into a Spartan nationalism. Istvan Hont (2005) 
argued that absolute monarchs understood the potential of this militaristic 
patriotism and harnessed it for themselves. Early modern states would draw 
upon this sentiment to mobilise their population for military and economic 
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struggles (Hont 2005: 508-526). Inspired by this nationalism, citizens made 
great sacrifices for their nation. Absolute monarchs and commercial states 
alike harnessed the psychological force of patriotism in order to fuel collective 
pride (Hont 2005: 115). Political theorists, like Herder, had been suspicious of 
patriotism specifically for the reason that it could become the object of state 
manipulation (Hont 2005: 117-156). Patriotic sentiments nevertheless became 
a source of competition and envy between nations rather than confidence and 
emulation (Hont 2005: 115). This motivational force was also recognised by 
early modern theorists; the lack of patriotism was a cause of concern for many 
influential republican thinkers, like Smith, Ferguson, Madison, and Constant 
(e.g. Brugger 1999; Kalyvas and Katznelson 2008). James Madison argued, 
for instance, that a democratic citizenry has to remain vigilant of its 
government so as to prevent abuses of power (Elkin 2006). The motivational 
force of republican patriotism should ensure citizens’ participation in modern 
republics. So nationality, rather than democratic citizenship, motivates 
participation in democratic self-governance. In more contemporary 
arguments, the nation also features as a “battery” for mobilization within mass 
societies (Canovan 1996: 72-75). The people as nation is thus a necessary 
precondition for mass democracy because it motivates citizens to vote and 
participate in other aspects of the political life of enlarged polity.  
The shared national identity is also deemed essential for securing 
freedom in representative democracies. Modern liberal nationalist theorists 
did not believe in the possibility, or necessarily value, mass participation. Yet 
this practical impossibility informed their defence of nationhood, as 
exemplified by J.S. Mill (Varouxakis 2002: 5-6). He argued that representative 
government is a necessary institutional innovation in modern mass societies. 
What results however is that the sovereign people only occasionally have the 
opportunity to directly participate in self-government (Ten 1998: 377). 
Physical, social, and technical distances separate the citizens from their 
representatives. In the main, free institutions can only function properly in a 
situation of shared sympathies that constitute nationality (Mill 1865: 120).15 
Nationhood, therefore, is an important consideration in the organisation of 
political regimes. 
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Where the sentiment of nationality exists in any force, there is a primâ facie 
case for uniting all the members of the nationality under the same 
government to themselves apart (Mill 1865: 120; italics in original). 
 
The reason, according to Mill, is that a regime with multiple nationalities 
would result in distrust in government. The acceptance of common decisions 
relies on the existence of a degree of trust between ruled and rulers. Only if 
common sympathies exist will citizens trust the representative government to 
rule for the common good (Mill 1865: 120-121). This canonical argument on 
trust features in arguments on the EU’s identitarian legitimacy (e.g. Dehousse 
2003; Føllesdal 2006: 455).16 The reason for its importance however is that 
citizens comply with regulations which do not necessarily seem in their 
interest. If this were not the case, mass enforcement would be necessary. 
This observation features in arguments stressing the role nationality plays in 
the prevention of abuses of power in liberal regimes. Mill argued, for instance, 
that common sympathies of nationality bind citizens and their military. He 
argued that if an army would identify with its fellow citizens it would be less 
likely to turn against them, ensuring citizens’ confidence in their freedom (Mill 
1865: 121). On this account Harrington’s lieutenants should identity with the 
real popular sovereign in mass democracies rather than the temporary 
governors of the polity. Citizens’ freedom in mass societies, thus, relies on 
trust between ruled and rulers, a relation which can only be generated by a 
shared associational sentiment. This sentiment relies on the existence of the 
people as a nation.  
 A communitarian identity is also deemed essential in common 
decision-making and redistribution processes within pluralistic polities. 
According to an influential communitarian argument, neither weak interests 
nor procedures are sufficient to avoid armed conflict within a polity. Charles 
Taylor argues that “[citizens] have to be able to trust one another and have a 
sense of commitment to another, or the whole process of common decision 
will poisoned by division and mutual suspect” (Taylor quoted in: Canovan 
1996: 16). A national identity generating trust and solidarity -- ‘commitment to 
another’ -- is thus posited as a necessity for a functional mass democracy. 
These arguments also draw upon historical evidence to bolster these claims. 
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Greenfeld, for instance, argues that nationhood becomes an idea which 
attenuates internal divisions of class, gender, and other social position 
(Greenfeld 1992a: 488).17 The communitarian identity transforms value 
conflicts into ‘mere’ conflicts of interest. The liberal settler societies that faced 
indigenousness populations, by contrast, engaged in ethnic cleansing abroad 
despite their seemingly civic self-understanding (Mann 2005a). Trust and 
solidarity would also be attributed an important role in the sustainability of 
extensive welfare state regimes. According to identitarian arguments on the 
state’s legitimacy, a national identity is a precondition for reaching the 
necessary degree of solidarity required for welfare redistribution. This means 
that citizens’ identification as equal members of a nation can be channelled 
into a willingness to sacrifice resources to provide for other members (Miller 
1999; Scharpf 1999). Communitarian critiques of liberal theories of justice 
echo the same theoretical objection; namely that redistributive policies require 
a national community (Tamir 1993: 118) because the degree of redistribution 
associated with welfare regimes would require mass enforcement. Without 
solidarity, mass resentment risks being generated and the stability of the 
established order undermined. The Beveridge report expresses a similar 
understanding of the psychological foundation of the British welfare state 
(Canovan 1996: 31). These arguments assert that democratic welfare states 
require associative sentiments of nationhood to function properly. Thus, 
following Greenfeld, the idea of a sovereign nation persists due to its 
sentimental value despite the disappearance of the original circumstances 
(1992a: 489-490). Identitification remains a precondition for legitimate state 
rule due to its ability to generate associative sentiments. 
Finally, contemporary arguments stress that a national identity remains 
essential for the functioning of the public sphere. Earlier in this chapter, the 
existence of the nation was linked to the existence of the national public 
sphere. According to canonical arguments, however, the existence of a 
linguistic nation is also necessary for a functional public sphere, which is itself 
essential for democratic popular sovereignty. To anticipate my argument, the 
connection between these conceptions is the essential observation in the 
functional vindication of popular sovereignty, as well as its condemnation in 
contemporary Europe. For the canonical formulation of this argument I turn 
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once again to J.S. Mill. He argued that the existence of a functioning public 
sphere is the essential precondition to will-formation processes. His argument 
focuses primarily on a shared media to create a public opinion to guide 
government. Mill argued that,  
 
Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different 
nationalities. Among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read 
and speak different languages, the united public opinion, necessary to the 
working of representative government, cannot exist. […] The same books, 
newspapers, pamphlets, speeches, do not reach them. One section does not 
know what opinions, or what instigations, are circulating in another (Mill 1865: 
120-121). 
 
Mill’s focus is on how the public sphere acts as a precondition of legitimate 
representative government. The previous genealogy’s emphasis on public 
deliberation and accountability parallels his argument, but he posits the 
people as nation rather than demos. The socio-cultural bond acts as a 
precondition for the emergence of procedural democratic bonds of collectivity. 
More recently developed arguments assert that public processes of 
socialisation can continue to shape the common will (e.g. Frost 2001; Tamir 
1993). They nevertheless continue to posit socio-cultural identitarian bonds 
between citizens prefiguring procedural democratic ones. Contemporary 
arguments effectively continue to make sense of the legitimacy of the modern 
state based on a common identity among rulers and ruled. This argument 
therefore relies on a high degree of congruence between the borders of the 
nation and the sovereign state. 
 
V - The self-determination of a socio-cultural community 
A conceptualisation of the people as nation grounds these identitarian 
legitimations of the state. Exact definitions differ, but a common focus is set 
on sharing a socio-cultural identity, which should inform a sense of communal 
belonging. The national identity is the source of the state’s legitimacy for both 
normative and sociological reasons that often intertwine (see also Abizadeh 
2012). The conceptual structure describes the nation as a socio-cultural 
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community with a right to self-determination. This identiarian conception of 
popular sovereignty prescribes that the borders of the nation and the 
sovereign state should coincide with another. The sovereignty of the 
legitimate state thus relies on the existence of an underlying socio-cultural 
community. The nation-state enables the discharging of nation’s right of self-
determination; conversely, a legitimate state pursues the national will of this 
community. According to more contemporary and sociologically-oriented 
arguments, patriotism, trust, and solidarity are important sentiments that 
ensure the proper functioning of modern democratic welfare states. 
Furthermore, a communitarian identity is necessary for the functioning of a 
public sphere which enables the democratic process of will-formation within a 
political community. The legitimacy of the modern state, as a result, continues 
to rely on a communitarian identity between citizens; the people as nation.  
The definition of the people is an explicit concern in these canonical 
arguments. They posit a communitarian identity based upon participation in 
the public life of the nation. The exact definitions include both ethnic and civic 
aspects, however the essential aspect for many arguments has been citizens’ 
identification with others as part of a national community. The citizens should 
identify as an authentic community with a shared heritage. This heritage can 
find its expression in either sociological characteristics, such as race, or 
political values, as expressed in foundational declarations. The exact 
definition, however, is not essential for the conception of the people as nation. 
In practice, this identity derives from socialisation and participation in a public 
sphere, as broadly construed. These common practical experiences give rise 
to a set of shared cultural frames of reference (Frost 2001). National identity is 
the product of public life. These canonical arguments, it must be remembered, 
propose that the nation and state require congruent borders. These 
socialisation processes (should) consequently take place within the borders of 
the nation-state. Yet this particular cultural community has a right to pursue 
this publically constructed common will. According to these identitarian 
arguments, the particular national will justifies nations’ right to self-
determination, which translates into a political right of sovereignty. The 
identitarian conception of popular sovereignty consequently implies the 
pursuit of the nation’s will. Conversely, the sovereignty of the state is a mirror 
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reflection of the underlying community’s right to self-determination. As a 
nation-state, the sovereign state functions as a tool to discharge the nation’s 
will. The communitarian identity is a precondition to the legitimate sovereign 
state. The national identity, therefore, constitutes the relevant bond of 
collectivity underpinning this wide range of more or less ideological 
nationalistic arguments. 
 A national identity sets boundaries to the people as nation. This identity 
is (re)produced through nationally organised socialisation processes. This 
bond of collectivity eschews the universalism of those underpinning the 
technocratic and democratic conceptions of popular sovereignty. The people 
as beneficiaries and as demos had no inherent criteria of exclusion within 
their criteria of legitimacy. Identitarian arguments on the state’s legitimacy, by 
contrast, revolve around the existence of boundaries between political 
communities. Substantive markers limit the ability to identify with the 
community, which is more pronounced for ‘ethnic’ than ‘civic’ markers. The 
relevance and meaning of these symbols, however, remains malleable. This 
criterion is, in principle, generalizable across polities because each nation has 
a right to its own polity, and every individual is part of a national community.18 
The national identity should determine the borders of the sovereign state, 
which implicitly assumes membership to co-nationals living in close proximity. 
As a result, this conceptual border does have some relationship to the state in 
these arguments. Nationalist arguments in colonial and anti-imperialist 
contexts, by contrast, illustrate that the state is not a necessary pre-condition 
to the establishment of the borders of a nation (e.g. Anderson 2006). The 
aforementioned reliance on a public sphere can further ground this 
assumption. Everyday life cultural processes have become institutionalised in 
a shared public sphere with educational, political and social aspects. In this 
context, the legitimate nation-state should contribute to the creation, 
protection, and stability of a national identity, as Rousseau already advocated. 
In democratic versions of the argument, citizens should be able to shape their 
identity through these socialisation processes (e.g. Frost 2001; Tamir 1993). 
In short, the boundaries of the people as nation derive from a communitarian 
identity which arises from nationally organised public spheres through which 
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citizens gain common frames; a culture. The communitarian identity of the 
people sets borders to the polity. 
 
VI - Conclusion 
This conceptual genealogy reconstructed the conception of popular 
sovereignty which governs first-order disagreements on the European identity. 
As such, this reconstruction is an essential part of this thesis’ argument. The 
underlying identitarian conception of popular sovereignty governed canonical 
arguments on the nation-state’s legitimacy. These arguments posit an 
identitarian bond which arises from public socialisation processes. Particular 
historical contexts shape theorists’ definition of this national identity: civic, 
ethnic, and more recently imagined. Despite this diversity, a recurrent point is 
that modern state legitimacy requires that citizens share in such a 
communitarian identity. A legitimate state is a nation-state because the 
national community requires a sovereign state in order to freely pursue their 
will. On this identitarian conception of popular sovereignty, the constituent 
power authorises the constituted power in virtue of the national right to self-
determination. In more sociologically-oriented arguments, a sincerely held 
national identity is deemed necessary for the functioning of the modern 
democratic welfare state. Congruency of the borders between nation and the 
modern state remains an essential precondition of legitimate politics in 
modern circumstances. This mix of normative and sociological reasoning 
legitimates modern state rule based upon a common national identity. This 
bond of collectivity is continuously reproduced in socialisation processes 
contained within the borders of the nation-state. Citizens’ identification with 
one another creates an inner boundary between nations, whilst nationally 
organised socialisation processes give territorial borders to national identities. 
The people’s conceptual borders thus remain related to the state. Unlike the 
previous conceptions however, this conceptualisation of the people does offer 
a separate criterion of exclusion, in principle distinct from the state: national 
identity. This conception of popular sovereignty therefore has strong 
exclusionary tendencies since each nation has the sovereign communitarian 
right to autonomous self-government. The cultural particularity justifying the 
Chapter 5: The People Identifying as a Nation 
 155 
polity’s closure, which, as we shall see in chapter seven, creates a particular 
challenge in making sense of legitimacy in contemporary Europe, grounds this 
particular conception of popular sovereignty. To appreciate this challenge, I 
will first analyse the three conceptions’ vindication in making sense of 
legitimacy in Europe’s modern statist institutional landscape at the normative 




                                            
1
 (Maurras quoted in: Canovan 1996: 56) 
2
 I will not appeal to any particular theory of nationalism. For a good overview of the 
philosophical accounts on their moral worth, see (Frost 2001). But as Catherine M. Frost 
herself observes, “they all point to some dimension of the truth about nationalism” (2001: 
487).  
3
 In a similar vein, Michael Mann distinguishes between a liberal and organic version of the 
people: the demos and the ethnos, respectively (2005b). 
4
 For the original, see http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/declaration_zoom_2.html (last 
accessed 3 July 2014). 
5
 On this and other inequalities among American citizens, see (Greenfeld 1992b: 449-460). 
6
 An interpretation stressing the importance of the divine legislator for choice, see (Inston 
2010). Consent is important for Rousseau because physical force cannot justify a political 
order.  The moral acceptability of the order depends upon an act of will (Rousseau 1987 
[1762]). This interpretation, however, does not address the importance of social homogeneity 
before and after establishment of a sovereign people in Rousseau’s political thought. 
7
 The literature on republicanism in relation to other models, such as liberalism and discourse 
theory, tends to stress the communitarian nature of republican accounts of the people, see 
e.g. (Bellamy and Castiglione 2013; Habermas 1994; Michelman 1989).  
8
 To quote Rousseau at length; “One that, finding itself bound by some union of origin, 
interest or convention, has not yet felt the true yoke of laws. One that has no custom or 
superstitions that are deeply rooted. One that does not fear being overpowered by sudden 
invasion. One that can, without entering into the squabbles of its neighbors, resist each of 
them single-handed or use the help of one to repel another. One where each member can be 
known to all, and where there is no need to impose a greater burden on man than man can 
bear. One that can get along without peoples and without which every other people can get 
along. One that is neither rich nor poor and can be sufficient unto itself; finally, one that brings 
together the stability of an ancient people and the docility of a new people” (Rousseau 1987 
[1762]: 169-170). 
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9
 For similar rejections of materialism in modern political thought, see, for example, (Mosca 
1939: 72; Weber 1978). 
10
 One might talk to a degree about individual choice in individual experience (Tamir 1993: 13-
34), the choice however does not relate to nationality but rather to support for a regime that 
claims to be its representative. 
11
 In his Der geschlossene Handelsstaat, however, Fichte argued that nobody is free in the 
state of nature, because absolute freedom inevitably results in conflict. The only way out was 
“a self-limitation of activity by the creation of a state” (Nakhimovsky 2011: 147). He concluded 
that “[the state] unites an indeterminate crowd of men into a closed whole, into a unity.” 
(Nakhimovsky 2011: 147). This argument echoes the Rousseauvian concept of the nation. 
12
 Mill did not ascribe the possibility of representative government to all nations, but set a 
certain level of civilization as necessary precondition.  On Mill’s perspective on lesser 
peoples, see (Smits 2008). See also (Mill 1991 [1859]: 13-14). 
13
 See also John Horton’s theory of obligation (Horton 1992). 
14
 Taylor indicates that French revolutionaries were arguably already directed toward 
participating in mobs (Taylor 2004). Jason Frank further indicates a similar sentiment among 
settlers in the United States (Frank 2010). 
15
 The case is only primâ facie because Mill did not believe that all populations had reached 
the necessary level of political maturity (Smits 2008) and geographical considerations, or 
other situational circumstances, would prevent the formation of a nation-state (Mill 1865: 120). 
16
 Føllesdal focuses on other contingent compliers to ensure trust and trustworthiness 
(Føllesdal 2006: 454-462). It should however be noted that he includes elements that could 
be deemed part of a more civic conception on nationhood because he stresses the creation of 
a shared public philosophy and political practices. 
17
 On societal cleavages, see (Rokkan 1999). Unlike regions and classes, religious divides 
resist reduction to purely interest-based explanations. It has unsurprisingly been, and 
continues to be, one of the historical markers of various stories of nationhood. Moreover, the 
politicization thereof remains a source of secessions, as in the case of Sudan, and conflict, as 
in Northern Ireland for instance. 
18
 The historical contingency of nations might well pose insurmountable challenge to theories 
of nationhood (e.g. Abizadeh 2012; Hont 2005: 451; Vincent 2002: 4). In a different vein, one 
can legitimately question why the nation is the politically relevant cultural community 
(Näsström 2007). The nationalist arguments do not explicitly reflect on these questions, but 
instead assume the nation to be relevant community.  
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Chapter 6: The Institutionalisation of Peoples in 
Sovereign States 
 
[The] ‘coincidence’ of the various boundaries is what had brought about out 
common sense perception of what a state-society should be and how it 
should work. This coincidence produces a collectivity of human beings that 
share a common understanding about what is important in their lives 
(identities); mostly interact with each other inside this collectivity through 
social and economic practices and activates; share rules and have ways of 
deciding how to regulate their lives in common 
Stefano Bartolini, Restructuring Europe, 112  
 
Each phase of [state] development left some vestiges of the past in the more 
recent functions: the sovereign warlike state has left the defence of the 
community and order; the closed commercial state left the attention to 
economic prosperity and a focus on the economic internal resources as 
weapons in international trade competition and international power; the liberal 
constitutional state has left the rights and procedure to defend individual 
economic freedom, first, and later on, other freedoms; the national state has 
left the national community and identity… 
Stefano Bartolini, Restructuring Europe, 1111 
 
I - Introduction 
The previous three chapters reconstructed contemporary conceptions of 
popular sovereignty from canonical arguments on the state’s legitimacy. Each 
chapter focussed on those arguments closely associated with a justificatory 
logic, which grounds a prominent criterion of legitimacy in the contemporary 
debate on the EU’s legitimacy. Popular sovereignty emerges from this 
genealogical endeavour as being conceptualised in a technocratic, 
democratic and identitarian manner. The contemporary conception of popular 
sovereignty, therefore, is a multi-faceted one. The reconstruction 
demonstrated that each conception of popular sovereignty posits a distinct 
bond of collectivity, which transforms a multitude of individuals into a popular 
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sovereign. The people are conceptualised as beneficiaries of security and 
economic prosperity, as a demos engaging in self-governance through 
democratic procedures, and as a nation due to public socialisation into a 
national identity. These bonds set a principle for inclusion, which directly 
relate to a specific criterion of legitimacy. The boundaries, as I nonetheless 
suggested, are often conceptually dependent upon the existence of a 
sovereign state. As we shall see, Europe’s modern states pursue and shape 
the shared interests, institutionalise democracy, and enclose socialisation 
processes in a manner, which institutionalises such conceptual boundaries 
congruently. The vindication of this multi-faceted conception depends upon, 
on the one hand, meeting the basic legitimation demand from within specific 
historical circumstances and, on the other, the capacity of political fictions to 
make sense to agents within existing institutional realities. Following a 
vindication at the normative level, this chapter situates this conception in 
Europe’s statist polity before integration, and in which, so I will argue, it 
became a plausible heuristic device for guiding citizens’ actions. The central 
reasons are that the normative systems associated with each conception of 
the people became sociological realities within each state’s territorial borders. 
Secondly, sovereignty found practical resonance in the structuring of power 
within these polities. That the different national systems institutionalised 
congruently played a fundamental part in ensuring that the core political 
fictions made sense simultaneously.  
In this chapter, I argue that the reconstructed conceptions of popular 
sovereignty could make sense in the European state system before European 
integration. To return to the framework introduced in chapter two, a 
legitimation story of popular sovereignty relies on the ‘willing suspension of 
disbelief’ to generate legitimacy. Citizens have to come to accept themselves, 
without clear evidence, as united and self-governing, and even to accept or 
ignore some dissonance between practice and fiction. The conceptual 
structure of popular sovereignty, for instance, faces the challenge of making 
sense of the everyday reality of rulers who command the constituent power 
(e.g. Loughlin 2014). Two broad conditions make the willing suspension of 
disbelief a plausible prospect: (i) a conception makes sense of a political order 
as normatively desirable -- Williams’ first political question and basic 
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legitimacy demand -- within its own historical circumstances and (ii) a 
conception can plausibly act as a heuristic device within the institutional 
context. In this sense, a realist vindication requires a conception to make 
sense at the normative and the heuristic level. The latter relates to popular 
sovereignty in that the political fictions of the people and sovereignty should 
make sense within the historical circumstances. My claim is that the multi-
faceted conception of popular sovereignty could simultaneously and plausibly 
make sense of the modern state legitimacy because conceptualisations of the 
people and sovereignty were institutionalised congruently within state 
territories. Before turning to the institutional landscape, I firstly argue that the 
three conceptions meet the basic legitimation demand together in modern 
state polities, hence allowing me to provide a vindication of the contemporary 
multi-faceted conception at the normative level. I then reconstruct the 
institutional landscape in which the normative heart of these stories -- the 
political fiction of the people -- could make sense to political agents. I argue 
that normative systems associated with the people became institutionalised 
conterminously within Europe’s territorial states, and resulted in the 
integration of the same group of territorially bounded multitude into a people. 
For my institutional analysis, I draw extensively upon Stefano Bartolini’s work. 
I embed his institutional analysis within this normative evaluative framework 
on the state’s legitimacy. Bartolini, by contrast, takes a starkly empiricist-
positivistic approach to question of legitimacy (see Bartolini 2005: 165-174). I 
additionally draw upon other historiographies to draw out particular aspects of 
these legitimation processes in Europe, especially those that pertain to nation-
building. After this institutional analysis of Europe’s peoples, I reflect on the 
political fiction of sovereignty through an analysis of the organisation of power 
within the European polity. The centralisation of decision-making power and 
resources turned this judicial fiction into an empirical reality. I hope to 
convincingly show that the acceptance of the state’s sovereignty relied, in 
part, on meeting the criteria of legitimacy. State agents were therefore spurred 
to actively pursue the institutionalisation the people in order to make fact and 
fiction align to a greater degree. In these circumstances, I conclude, the core 
political fictions of the contemporary conception of popular sovereignty could 
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make sense and could guide citizens’ normative appraisal of their rulers, that 
is, to judge the state’s legitimacy.  
 This chapter will unfold in four sections. The next section (section II) 
offers a brief diachronic genealogy, which proposes a potential explanation of 
the complementary role of conceptions of popular sovereignty in making 
sense of the legitimacy of the sovereign state in modern circumstances. This 
realist analysis vindicates the conceptions at the normative level. The 
subsequent section (section III) illustrates that bonds of collectivity became 
institutionalized within the borders of the modern state in Europe. The same 
group of individuals became integrated through multiple systems within the 
territorial state’s ‘hard shell’ (Hertz 1957). These largely coinciding systems 
were a crucial condition for these conceptions of popular sovereignty to make 
sense simultaneously. In the next section (section IV) an analysis of the 
organisation of power indicates that the de facto sovereignty of the state 
made sense in this context. The political agents of the sovereign state have 
an interest in keeping the political fictions of popular sovereignty in place, 
therefore; I therefore suggest that they actively pursued the congruence 
between fiction and fact during state-building processes. In the conclusion 
(section V), I summarize that the vindication of this multi-faceted conception 
relied upon its ability to make sense of the legitimacy of the modern sovereign 
state at the normative level. The plausibility of the fictions meant that they 
could guide citizens’ attempts to make sense of the state’s legitimacy in 
practice. Hence, I offer a vindication of this multi-faceted conception of 
popular sovereignty in modern Europe before European integration. 
 
II - A vindication of the multi-faceted conception of popular sovereignty 
This section offers a normative realist analysis of the contemporary, multi-
faceted conception of popular sovereignty. The vindication, or condemnation, 
of a political conception relies on its functionality in making sense of a political 
order’s normative attractiveness from within a particular set of historical 
circumstances. I shall argue that the complementary functions of making 
sense of aspects of modern politics can vindicate this three-fold conception of 
popular sovereignty. Drawing inspiration from Williams’ fictional genealogical 
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method (Williams 2004), I offer a potential explanation for these conceptions 
as functional responses which make sense of the three key features of 
modern enlarged polities: their complexity, value pluralism, and closure. This 
brief potential explanation offers an account of how output, democratic and 
identitarian legitimacy came to complement one another. The claim is, of 
course, not that the conception emerged in accordance with this narrative. 
The latter is clearly a simplification for the purposes of the argument. I leave 
out objections, details, and arguments found in the previous chapters to keep 
this section parsimonious. This fictional genealogy nevertheless constitutes a 
realistic justification of the commitment to this conception. Upon reflection, 
‘we’ can remain confident in our normative commitment to this conception of 
popular sovereignty because it can functionally make sense of the state as 
the desirable political order for achieving civic order -- the first political 
question -- in modern circumstances. This section, thus, does not offer a thick 
moralistic argument, but rather a realist functional vindication of the 
contemporary conception of popular sovereignty in its ability to legitimate the 
modern sovereign state. 
The technocratic conception of popular sovereignty offers a fruitful 
point of departure. This conception can make sense of the sovereign state as 
the political order most able to deal with the complexity of enlarged 
commercial polities. Modern citizens have a shared interest in security and 
economic prosperity. Commercial society, which is a necessary feature of 
modern polities (Hall Forthcoming: 7), relies on state government. The 
citizenry thus constitute a group of individual beneficiaries with a shared 
interest in the establishment and continuation of a hierarchical regime, one 
which protects them and serves their economic interests. The latter, however, 
requires the competent government of an increasingly complex social system, 
which is in turn embedded in a competitive global environment. The sovereign 
state, with its expert bureaucratic apparatus, is in a position to safeguard 
citizens’ security and maintain the conditions for economic prosperity, which 
enable individual flourishing. A sovereign state, as the canonical arguments 
suggests, makes sense as a precondition to the attainment of these benefits 
in a complex political economy marked by interrelating internal and external 
dimensions. The competent sovereign state is thus legitimated even when 
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citizens’ do not directly benefit from its rule. The associated criterion of output 
legitimacy succeeds in generating allegiance on an individual basis in virtue of 
the benefits each citizen receives. The expertise of the modern state remains 
essential to attaining these economic benefits in enlarged polities. The 
vindication of this conception derives from the modern bureaucratic state’s 
ability to deal with the complexities of enlarged modern commercial polities.  
This technocratic conception, however, cannot make sense of two 
other key features of modern politics: its closure and value pluralism. The 
particular closure of polities does not make sense because the shared 
necessities and conveniences the technocratic state should provide are 
universal concerns of all humans. Some might assert that the arguments 
recognise the existence of distinct polities. The conception of popular 
sovereignty did indeed become historically related to the conceptual 
boundaries of the state. As I argued, however, the bond of collectivity offers 
no normative principles with which to make sense of this particular feature of 
modern polities -- it simply asserts it as fact. In addition, concerning the key 
feature of value pluralism, sincere disagreement exists between citizens on 
the practical conception of the public good in modern enlarged polities (e.g. 
Bellamy 2000: 189; Mansbridge 1998). Citizens might agree upon vital 
interests, such as security, or even certain normative commitments such as 
basic rights. The practical conceptualisation or, put differently, the role of the 
state nonetheless remains deeply contested in the pursuit these interests and 
values. The existence of value pluralism in modern mass polities challenges 
the normative assumption underlying arguments on the state’s output 
legitimacy. Taking sincere contestation seriously means that experts cannot 
determine the best decisions for all citizens. Competent, sovereign rule can 
remain vindicated to deal with complexities of modern polities in a competitive 
international environment, it cannot, however, convincingly claim practical 
knowledge of the common good. From a fictional genealogical perspective, 
the democratic conception of popular sovereignty can be understood as a 
functional response to this shortcoming. 
This conception of popular sovereignty posits a need for collective 
government, though it also recognizes that no substantive agreement exists 
on preferable outcomes. The inability to objectively establish the ‘correct’ 
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interests and values means that state elites cannot govern homogenously 
without causing resentment among certain groups. A high degree of internal 
pluralism can even threaten civic peace in the political order. The sovereign 
people, so the democratic conception posits, should therefore decide upon 
their understanding of the good from a plurality of standpoints through 
democratic procedures. Institutionally, constitutional safeguards have to 
protect the citizens’ individual liberty and equality. Whilst democratic 
procedures channel the citizens’ diverse opinions within the polity, 
transforming them into acceptable collective decisions. A decision taken by 
the legislature will often only reflect certain parts of the popular sovereign. The 
collective participation of the citizenry in such processes should ensure 
support for state decisions because the constituent power has actively 
consented to, and even influenced, these decisions. The design of institutions 
for self-government should therefore conform to democratic principles in order 
to attain legitimacy. At a minimum, these institutional procedures offer 
institutional mechanisms to prevent value pluralism from digressing into civil 
war between potentially antagonistic groups, or into domination by the ruling 
group. The vindication of this conception lies in making sense of the 
legitimacy of the modern state within the modern circumstances of value 
pluralism. 
The democratic and technocratic conception can complement one 
another, thereby vindicating both simultaneously. The modern enlarged polity 
possesses two interrelated characteristics; it is complex to govern and it is 
composed of a pluralistic population. These features should therefore be 
made sense of simultaneously. Enlightened self-interest can offer a lynchpin 
between them; a vast majority of citizens agree upon certain broadly defined 
vital interests, such as security, and motherhood values, such as basic rights.  
Disagreement arises however on the substantive definition to adopt, what 
trade-offs to make between them, or the best way to attain these aims in 
practical ways. A technocratic administration cannot determine the 
sovereign’s will due to disagreement among the citizens on these issues. 
Democratic decision-making procedures should ensure the state’s decisions 
reflect a broadly acceptable compromise or majoritarian position without 
causing too much resentment among minorities. Yet the democratic multitude 
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still requires a competent state apparatus to implement their democratic 
decisions effectively. Moreover, the sovereign state’s enforcement institutions 
secure the democratic process to some extent; the legitimate state is 
represented as a democratic decision-making centre fused with a 
bureaucratic implementation apparatus. The legitimacy of the state’s 
decisions relies on democratic procedures, while its expertise legitimates their 
particular implementation. These two conceptions can thus complement each 
other in vindicating the sovereign state, with output legitimating 
implementation power and the democratic process its decision-making power. 
Like the technocratic conception however, the bond of collectivity 
underpinning the democratic one cannot make sense of the particular closure 
of modern polities. In short, the technocratic and democratic arguments 
assume the existence of state borders, but neither can make sense of the 
particular closure of the political community.  
The vindication of the identitarian conception of popular sovereignty 
lies in its ability to make sense of the closure of modern polities. As such, it 
acts as a functional response to the shortcomings of the other two 
conceptions. The modern polity, for better or worse, knows a high degree of 
closure. The historical fact is that “men live in society, but there have always 
been many societies and not one society” (Aron 1995: 32). The identitarian 
conception makes sense of the closure of state-polities in virtue of the 
existence of cultural distinctiveness between polities. Socio-historical markers 
demarcate a particular community as a nation with a particular agreement on 
the common good. Each nationalist narrative is tailored to a particular national 
community, hence diverse definitions of the nation exist. The identitarian 
conception of popular sovereignty is nonetheless applicable to all polities; the 
diverse polities simply reflect the existence of multiple nations in the world. 
Moreover, these communities should rule themselves because they have 
particular understandings of the common good. Polity borders should 
therefore coincide with territorially organised nations. Conceptually, the 
communitarian identity legitimates the existence of a particular state. This 
conception finds its vindication by making sense of states’ legitimacy in 
relation to the key feature of closure.  
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The identitarian conception further complements the others in making 
sense of the sovereign state as the legitimate modern political order. The 
modern state’s infrastructural power impacts the vast majority of the citizenry 
(Mann 1984: 113-114). The democratic conception can legitimate this 
increased scope, however public decisions are also more likely to impact 
some group negatively in a pluralistic polity. The communitarian bond of 
collectivity could generate a societal glue with which to prevent high degrees 
of resentment and to create a degree of solidarity which enables 
redistribution. On this interpretation, the nationalist conception mediates 
disagreements between societal factions because it posits certain (imagined) 
socio-cultural communalities. The latter can thus function to temper conflict 
between antagonistic elements in a modern polity. Furthermore, this 
communitarian identity generates trust, which should ensure that modern 
rulers do not misuse the unprecedented degree of infrastructural power 
granted to them in order to pursue factional interests. From this perspective, 
therefore, this identitarian conception also provides the necessary common 
sentiments between rulers and ruled for a modern sovereign regime to avoid 
domination. In addition to making sense of the legitimacy of the state in 
relation to the polity’s closure, this conception functionally complements the 
other conceptions, which also deal with the internal challenges of a complex 
and pluralistic political environment. Ultimately, the identitarian conception 
alone cannot be vindicated from this realist perspective. The communitarian 
identity makes sense of closure through the cultural distinctiveness between 
modern polities. Yet it cannot function alone, it requires a technocratic 
conception to direct the national will toward an object of interest, namely, 
security and prosperity. Furthermore, the democratic conception is necessary 
to accommodate the continued reality of pluralism within these cultural 
communities. Most importantly, the modern polity is not only bounded, it is 
also complex and pluralistic. The identitarian conception offers no functional 
response to these realities, as its silent on the first and denies the latter. The 
three conceptions make sense of three prominent features of modern polities 
-- complexity, pluralism, and closure -- and are therefore vindicated together 
at the normative level, because they meet the basic legitimation demand for 
the sovereign state within its own historical circumstances. 
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This fictional genealogy offers a potential explanation which vindicates 
the contemporary conceptions of popular sovereignty in their ability to make 
sense of the sovereign state as the legitimate modern political order. As 
outlined in chapter two, a normative commitment can only remain vindicated if 
it offers a widely acceptable answer to the first political question, that is, if it 
meets the basic legitimation demand. A political concept also has to make 
sense of the legitimacy of a particular political order within its own historical 
circumstances The previous three chapters reconstructed the contemporary 
concept, or rather conceptions of popular sovereignty. Their vindication relies 
upon their complementarity in making sense of the sovereign state as a 
desirable political order in modernity’s complex, pluralistic, and closed polities. 
The rather elitist and technocratic conception provides an initial justification for 
state rule. Citizens come together in commercial society to pursue objective 
benefits for all. This conception cannot, however, make sense of the social 
pluralism which characterises modern polities. The democratic conception 
legitimates the modern democratic state as the institutional means through 
which to funnel and transform diverse opinions into legitimate decisions on 
collective needs and interests. The constitutional state accommodates its 
sovereign’s diversity in democratic will-formation processes. Neither 
conception, however, posits a criterion of exclusion from the polity, therefore 
neither can make sense the closure of state polities. The identitarian 
conception complements the other two by positing a principle of legitimate 
closure based upon the existence of culturally distinct socio-cultural 
communities, and, as we will see below, it can furthermore make sense of the 
segregation of Europe’s polities from one another. The central aim of this 
section has been to hopefully offer a convincing potential explanation of this 
multi-faceted understanding of popular sovereignty. This realist reflection thus 
provides a vindication of a normative commitment to the multi-faceted 
conception of popular sovereignty simultaneously when making sense of the 
legitimacy of the sovereign state. From a realist perspective however, it can 
only remain vindicated if it can plausibly act as a heuristic device. To analyse 
this plausibility, I will move from the normative level to the institutional one, 
and create a more sophisticated understanding of popular sovereignty 
through an analysis of the plausibility of its central fictions. 
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Before moving on, however, two observations of the contemporary 
conception of popular sovereignty are important to recognise at this stage. 
Firstly, as I argued in chapter two, a unitary conception of popular sovereignty 
governs legitimation stories within Europe’s disenchanted political cosmology. 
The genealogies illustrate that canonical arguments conceptualise popular 
sovereignty, the people, and the criteria of legitimacy differently. These 
legitimation stories, however, share a normative commitment to popular 
sovereignty, because the people’s sovereignty should authorise the state’s 
sovereignty in all three accounts. On this conceptual structure, the appropriate 
criteria of legitimacy for the state should reflect norms inherent to the people’s 
bond of collectivity. This agreement on a conceptual structure is important 
because, as stated, human practices require that recognised intersubjective 
criteria persist over time. Even agonistic theorists have recognised the need 
for a degree of value congruence (Mouffe 1999; White 2011), despite some 
arguing that political legitimacy can never remain permanently fixed due to a 
fundamental conflict of values between individuals (Sternberg 2013: 230). A 
widely-spread agreement is a precondition for the materialisation of the 
modern state’s legitimacy (Friedrich 1974: 111). In modern states, the widely 
accepted assumption that underpins the contestatory practice of legitimation 
is that the issue at stake is a proper interpretation of the sovereign people 
which authorises the sovereign state. In other words, they share a 
commitment to a unitary conceptual structure of popular sovereignty. This 
shared structure contributes to the distinct conceptions being plausible 
simultaneously despite disagreement on the proper meaning of the concept.  
Secondly, the words used to express popular sovereignty 
accommodate the multiple meanings of these distinct conceptions.2 Istvan 
Hont rightfully argues that the nation-state and popular sovereignty yoked 
together conceptually incongruent discourses. In this context, early modern 
statesmen consciously promoted these compound words to their advantage. 
Since then, so Hont argues, state elites have had to balance their inherent 
tensions (Hont 2005: 527-528). A more recent example from the EU debate is 
the no-demos thesis. The term demos seems to invoke a democratic criterion 
of legitimacy, but on closer examination more often refers to an identitarian 
one. Weiler’s thought experiment on the democratic incorporation of the 
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Danes into a German empire illustrates this well (Weiler 1997: 116). Luuk van 
Middelaar, on the other hand, uses demos to refer to a democratic public 
along explicitly Deweyian lines (Middelaar 2009: 373-421). The meaning of 
these concepts need not be restricted to an either/or dichotomy, and that can 
contribute to the consensus relying on three distinct conceptions. These so-
called ‘mongrel concepts’ (Blaazer 2007: 509) can accommodate multiple, yet 
distinct conceptions of popular sovereignty. Skilful rhetorical use can hide the 
underlying disagreement on the appropriate interpretation. Another more 
important reason for their simultaneous plausibility, so I wish to suggest, is the 
specific institutional context of Europe’s statist polity before integration. These 
historical circumstances made the multi-faceted conception into a plausible 
sense-making device which, arguably so, also shaped these conceptions. To 
make this argument, I turn to the institutional context in Europe before political 
integration. 
 
III - The institutionalisation of the people in congruent systems  
The following institutional analysis focuses on the historical circumstances in 
which the contemporary conception of popular sovereignty could plausibly 
make sense to citizens. As Williams argued, a vindication of normative 
commitments relies on their ability to make sense in specific historical 
circumstances. A realistic vindication, however, also relies on these 
conceptions ability to plausibly guide political agents in (real) politics (Hall 
Forthcoming: 13). One central challenge for conceptions of popular 
sovereignty is the fictional nature of the people as self-governing. The 
vindication of the contemporary three-fold conception of popular sovereignty 
further requires that the three distinct conceptions of the people make sense 
simultaneously. This three-fold conception of distinct bonds can potentially 
become a source of dissonance between everyday practice and political 
fiction. My argument is that the willing suspension of disbelief relies on the 
historical circumstances in the European continent. In short, the same 
territorially organised multitude became part of three normative systems which 
institutionalised relationships between them. These systems gave practical 
resonance to the posited bonds of collectivity which underpin the 
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contemporary conception of popular sovereignty. In this manner, this 
genealogy also reconstructs the institutional context in which legitimation 
stories of popular sovereignty functioned as a heuristic sense-making device. 
Many historiographies have been written on the emergence of the 
modern state and its legitimation in Western Europe (e.g. Axtmann 2004; 
Bellamy, Castiglione et al. 2006; Bobbitt 2002; Hertz 1957: 475-485; Hont 
2005; Sassen 2006; Tilly 1975). My analysis focuses on the importance of the 
institutionalisation of the bond of collectivity in the European context. As 
mentioned in chapter one, Stefano Bartolini’s Restructuring Europe offers a 
particularly fruitful historiography. Like any historiography, Bartolini’s work has 
its own particularities. His choices are historically sound, but distinct 
nevertheless. I therefore engage critically with his account by drawing upon 
other sources to balance certain emphasises. That being said, Bartolini 
focuses on normative systems which institutionalise relationships between 
members of a polity (Bartolini 2005: 56-115). These systems, so I will argue, 
create a degree of practical resonance to the posited bonds which 
conceptually underpin each conception of popular sovereignty. This analysis 
is essential for appreciating how citizens could plausibly engage in the 
suspension their disbelief toward the three political fictions of the people, as 
well as the fiction of the sovereignty of the modern state. In line with the 
expectations outlined in chapter two (Barker 2001; Morgan 1988), my analysis 
concludes that state agents contributed to turning these fictions into 
institutional realities. The people might well have started as a political fiction 
(and arguably remains one to some extent), but it came closer to a fact due to 
the institutionalisation of these relationships through these normative systems. 
Moreover, the different bonds of collectivity bound together the same 
multititude, and the bonds reinforced one another. The latter also separated 
European citizenries one from another, as they created distinct 
understandings within different historical circumstances. This particularity will, 
however, feature in the next chapter. The political fictions of the people could 
make sense to citizens simultaneously because normative systems created 
institutional relationships between them as beneficiaries, demos, and nation.  
At this point, two technical remarks are worth considering. Firstly, 
boundary formation processes and the exact institutionalisation of normative 
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system varied between European countries. This initial analysis leaves aside 
many of Bartolini’s, as well as others’, reflections on the differences between 
countries. The differences between national arrangements are currently quite 
significant. In the seventh chapter, I shall focus on their particularity and what 
impact this has upon the understanding of the contemporary European polity. 
In addition, I highlight that the substantive understanding of legitimacy, 
particularly in relation to European integration. For now I instead focus on the 
similarities between these processes, which Bartolini summarizes as  “a 
historical configuration of highly coinciding and mutually reinforcing 
boundaries” (Bartolini 2005: 109). Secondly, while recognizing that processes 
of boundary formation are not neatly separable historically (Bartolini 2005: 
112), most agree that state building preceded democratisation and nation-
building. Yet the order of nation-building and democratisation remains 
contested in the literature. Bartolini maintains that democratization took place 
after nation-building (see also Axtmann 2004).3 Others, however, argue that 
this process took place in reverse. Charles Taylor, for example, concludes 
that “Nationalism […] was born out of democracy, as a (benign or malign) 
growth” (2004: 191). More elitist forms of representative rule certainly 
preceded nationalist self-understandings (e.g. Canovan 2005; Greenfeld 
1992b; Hont 2005; Tamir 1993). On this point, Bartolini also argues that the 
liberal constitutional state prefigured the national state (Bartolini 2005: 111). In 
line with the thesis, the rest of the section proceeds through an analysis of the 
following; firstly the normative systems which give practical resonance to the 
people as beneficiaries, then as demos, and finally as nation. Each analysis 
takes as its point of departure the bond of collectivity posited in each 
conception of popular sovereignty.  
 
The people as beneficiaries share an interest in security and economic 
prosperity. The sovereign state through its expert institutions governs the 
domestic economy within its territorial borders. It institutionalises the people 
as beneficiaries and separates them as a collective from other ‘competitor’ 
polities. State formation simultaneously refers to a process of retrenchment of 
the politico-administrative space of former empires, and to one of enlargement 
of very localised communities within the medieval feudal system (Bartolini 
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2005: 59-60). The modern sovereign state is the result of processes of 
“power, juridical, symbolic and systematic centre accretion” (Bartolini 2005: 
59). The centralisation of a legalistic administrative apparatus for tax revenue 
became essential to train, equip, and maintain professional standing armies 
(Bartolini 2005: 60-61; Tilly 1975). The monopolisation of force meant the 
state could maintain order within the polity, which become essential to and 
reliant on the enforcement of legal contracts (Bartolini 2005: 62-65; Bellamy 
2004). Europe’s ‘warlike sovereign states’ actively treated the population on 
its territory as its subjects, but it also became their protector from threats, 
external and internal, to their physical safety (Bartolini 2005: 111). The 
enforcement agents of the state institutionalised a normative system of 
security provision within its territory; the state’s subjects thus became 
beneficiaries, as a collective and as individuals, from threats to their security. 
To achieve its Machiavellian aims, the sovereign warlike state 
increasingly started to use domestic economic means in the international 
competition for markets (Bartolini 2005: 111; Hont 2005), ultimately resulting 
in the emergence of the closed commercial state. The security of citizens 
became intertwined with commercial interests in the reason of state. Around 
the same time as these consolidation processes, capitalism arose as a 
“powerful drive to boundary transcendence in the economic sphere” (Bartolini 
2005: 72). The agents active in the market required the enforcement of 
contracts and other rules, a degree of material safety, and possibilities for 
communication between participants in the market (Bartolini 2005: 73-74). 
The centralised state could secure these requirements within its territorial 
boundaries; it would come to guarantee material safety and enforce property 
laws (Bellamy 2004: 4). In the process, the state rationalised and 
territorialised the capitalist economy.4 A national market was created through 
the destruction of traditional internal economic borders, such as those around 
rural villages and city markets (Axtmann 2004: 259-261; Bartolini 2005: 74; 
Gellner 1983; Hont 2005: 456-463). National economic institutions were 
introduced, such as a single currency, national banks, and stock exchanges 
(Bartolini 2005: 75-78). In this manner, the borders of the domestic economy 
would come to coincide with those of the territorial state. The state-governed 
domestic economy institutionalised a normative system of judicial-economic 
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relations between individuals within the national state’s territory. The coercive 
institutions of the state thus secured the economic system in which citizens 
would come to relate to one another. And it is through these structures that 
state subjects were institutionalised as legal subjects with economic relations, 
thus transforming the bond of collectivity of beneficiaries into an institutional 
reality.  
Around the 19th century, the closed commercial state had transformed 
into a welfare state in which citizens became part of an extensive system of 
redistribution of economic prosperity by the state. The state’s policy 
competences had progressively expanded beyond mere military, tax, and 
macroeconomic policies into the realms of social security and other 
redistributive services (Axtmann 2004: 261; Bartolini 2005: 104; see also 
Mann 1984). Under pressure of democratisation, combined with nationalism, 
the inequalities and poverty within modern industrialised capitalist economies 
were no longer acceptable within national contexts; the ‘equality area’.  In this 
context, the welfare state arose to redistribute prosperity among the 
democratic community. This was also, in part, because European states were 
no longer able to provide security autonomously. The European sovereign 
state systems were restabilised with support from the United States economic 
support (Bartolini 2005: 106; Milward 1992; Sassen 2006). In addition, state 
control of and alignment with the interests of large companies contributed 
significantly to the successful rise of the welfare regime between the First 
World War and the 1970s (Bartolini 2005: 108-109). These industrialised 
economies gained a degree of freedom from external economic pressures 
(Bartolini 2005: 80). The shift to the welfare state marked the moment from 
which state institutions could perform tasks traditionally associated with 
kinship bonds and other a face-to-face communities (Bartolini 2005: 95). In 
other words, “social sharing institutionalised solidarity in terms of [state 
benefits] linked to the status of citizens and members of the national group” 
(Bartolini 2005: 104). This increase in policy competences would result in 
material benefits for the vast majority of the citizenry. Despite distinct 
differences between the particularities of welfare states (e.g. Esping-Andersen 
1990; Ferrera, Hemerijck et al. 2000), modern welfare systems were 
compulsory in nature (Bartolini 2005: 107). The enforcement agencies of the 
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sovereign state therefore play a vital role in its success. The maximisation of 
benefits relied on “the bureaucratic machinery and technical extractive 
capacities that the modern state provided” (Bartolini 2005: 106). The 
bureaucratic apparatus of European states enabled efficient redistribution, 
thereby reducing the individual contributions of citizens whilst generating 
greater overall welfare. This normative system also intensified other 
relationships of security and economic prosperity between citizens, and 
created new ones. In this context, modern citizens became collective and 
individual beneficiaries of the sovereign state. 
This normative system gave practical resonance to the people as 
beneficiaries within the state’s territorial borders. The state not only provides 
security and economic prosperity to the population within its territory, it also 
created relationships between them as part of a legally governing socio-
economic order. In short, the warlike sovereign state, with its extensive 
enforcement capacity, arose as protector of the population within its territory 
from both external and internal threats. It relied upon the performance of the 
domestic economy in competing for resources in the international sphere; the 
warlike state became a closed commercial state. What resulted was the 
containment of the forces of capitalism within the domestic economy. The 
state’s subjects became integrated through centrally administrated economic 
laws and policies which served to increase overall competitiveness. This 
state-led economic management would generate unprecedented economic 
prosperity for European citizenries. The democratization and nation-building 
processes thus jointly created an area of equality by raising the standards and 
expectations of the modern state. State citizenries became part of compulsory 
systems in which economic prosperity was shared among citizens through 
social insurance schemes and public services. The beneficiaries’ bond of 
collectivity became an institutional reality within the borders of each European 
state. These coercively administered systems of legal-economic relations 
were consequently attributed a territorial border by the state. The fiction of the 
people as beneficiaries could plausibly make sense to citizens of the modern 
state. This conception of popular sovereignty therefore found resonance in 
political practices within the ‘hard shell’ of the sovereign state’s territory. The 
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contemporary multi-faceted conception, however, also relies on the political 
fiction of the people as demos. 
 
The people as demos share a bond of collectivity in democratic 
procedures that enable self-government despite sincere disagreements on 
shared interests and values. The democratisation of the state polity created a 
normative system of procedural bonds between citizens in the state territorial 
borders. Historically, democratisation has become associated with the dual 
processes of (liberal) constitutionalism and mass participation in politics 
(Bartolini 2005: 89). The first process relates closely to the emergence of 
rather elitist liberal republics. The political constitution lies at the heart of 
modern liberal republics. These (unwritten) documents attribute the status of 
citizenship to the denizens of the state. The subjects of the state gained rights 
against it (Castiglione 1996: 417). These constitutions initially emancipated 
only a rather elite group of ‘citizens’. Furthermore, despite appeals to 
universal values, these constitutional documents institutionalised a civic order 
within the pre-existing territorial borders of the sovereign state (Bartolini 2005: 
91-95). The constitutional state creates civic relationships between the 
denizens of the polity. However, as allude to above, in many countries, 
democratic citizenship was exclusively limited to property-owning men. 
Subsequent extensions of the franchise included the vast majority of citizens 
in the electoral process, such as women, tenants, and so on (e.g. Habermas 
1992a: 122-129). Citizens could elect representatives in state decision-
making procedures, and could therefore only influence decisions in a 
particular state. In this context, parliaments were useful heirlooms of elite 
interest representation rather than institutional innovations (Manin 1997: 183-
187). They had been part of state decision-making centres before mass 
democratisation. In addition to the constitution and mass elections, a public 
sphere took shape within the borders of the state (e.g. Habermas 1992b). 
These elections further institutionalised procedural relationships between the 
citizens of a state. They gave the citizenry institutional tools to capture and 
influence the decision-making centre. Citizens tried to capture state 
institutions in order to advance their particular claims. Elections were the most 
institutionalised method, but not the only one. Civil rights movements, for 
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instance, pushed forward their claims through mass mobilisation (Axtmann 
2004: 261). The creation of national media outlets also enabled public 
deliberation, an integral element of will- and opinion-formation processes in 
mass societies (Bartolini 2005: 82; Habermas 1992b). The normative system 
of the constitution, electoral politics, and the public sphere institutionalised the 
people as demos, transforming Europe’s liberal republics into mass 
democracies. The universal values informing democratic procedures would 
effectively create procedural relationships between the inhabitants within each 
European state polity.   
The territorial closure of European states contributed to the creation of 
politically competing groups within the polity which required cementing 
through a procedural bond so as to avoid civil war. In contrast to the main 
theoretical narrative, the need for procedural ties might itself be a product of 
the institutional closure of European societies. The macro-processes of 
modernisation generated value communities and socio-economic cleavages 
(Bartolini 2005: 96). These only became politically relevant, however, because 
democratic society was ‘caged’ within the state’s borders (Axtmann 2004: 
261). This closure limited the available resources and social positions to 
distribute, and severely constrained citizens’ options for exiting the state 
system (Bartolini 2005: 98). Citizens in similar positions formed groups to 
pursue their interests more effectively (Bartolini 2005: 99). National cleavages 
turned into group boundaries within the polity (e.g. Rokkan 1999); the 
pluralistic dimension of the demos was thus, in part, a product of the state-
enforced closure of the polity. Put differently, the pluralism posited in the 
demos’ bond of collectivity directly relates to the closure of European states. 
European societies consisted of internal groups with distinct relationships 
which competed politically. This perspective, however, also clarifies that 
certain vital interest and value commitments might derive from this closure. 
Citizens retain an interest in the civic order in order to democratically pursue 
these interests specifically because they cannot exit the national polity. On the 
other hand, state agents reached a powerful position within their territory, 
though the pluralism which resulted from its closure endangered their rule. For 
ruled and rulers, the democratic framework became a vital interest. This 
normative system created procedural bonds between competing interest 
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groups. It is through this process that the people as demos gained institutional 
resonance. The constitutionally organised and centrally enforced order of 
civic-democratic relations became a reality within the border of the territorial 
state. As with the beneficiary conception, the people as demos could plausibly 
make sense within the closure of the modern state. In conclusion therefore, 
the democratic conception of popular sovereignty could guide appraisals of 
legitimacy within the territorial borders of the sovereign state. 
The modern sovereign state would integrate the population within its 
territorial borders through both a normative system of security and prosperity, 
and a civic-democratic procedural one. Genealogically, the constitutional state 
acts as an institutional lynchpin between these normative systems. The 
state’s coercive legal apparatus was at first primarily meant to enable 
economic freedom. The functions of this initially liberal institution would, 
however, extend to include the protection and enforcement of citizens’ political 
rights (e.g. Castiglione 1996; Dunn 1994). The democratic constitution 
governed the practices of the modern state. The claim, however, is not that 
the liberal state transformed fully into a purely democratic one; the modern 
state continues to protect and govern the domestic economy. The members of 
state-polities were part of both a judicial-economic and civic-democratic order, 
and were consequently tied to their state through two corresponding sets of 
relationships. The output and democratic criteria of state legitimacy could 
reinforce one another in this institutional context. Democratically legitimate 
decisions were, for instance, implemented through the state’s legal-coercive 
infrastructure, whilst the competent state apparatus protected and facilitated 
democratic procedures. The universalist bonds of collectivity, positing the 
people as beneficiaries and demos, gained sociological plausibility within the 
borders of European states. Moreover, the political fictions of beneficiaries 
and the demos gained practical resonance in relation to the same group of 
citizens. The technocratic and democratic conception of popular sovereignty 
could plausibly inform agents’ normative evaluation of their state within these 
historical circumstances. The vindication of the contemporary multi-faceted 
conception of popular sovereignty is still incomplete however as it also 
requires that the people as nation have practical resonance. 
 
Chapter 6: The Institutionalisation of Peoples in Sovereign States 
 177 
The people as nation share a bond of collectivity in a communitarian 
identity. Public socialisation processes within the state borders create such 
socio-cultural relationships between citizens. Boundaries between the peoples 
from different (European) states are additionally created. National political 
agents use symbolic materials to forge these communitarian identities (Closa 
2004). The social and historical markers of the European identities are 
diverse, however each state’s agents politicised and depoliticised cultural 
features among the majority of its population (Bartolini 2005: 88). Nation-
building processes have successfully taken place in each European state. 
Even in the outlier case of the United Kingdom, an overarching British identity 
was constructed with specific features which set it apart from other nations 
(Miller 1999: 155-182). Some countries have of course been more successful 
than others, as a comparison between Denmark with Belgium can illustrate. 
Furthermore, sub-national political identities fuel micro-nationalisms, such as 
in Catalonia and Scotland, which challenge state authority (e.g. Guibernau 
2000). In the past, however, this internal socio-cultural diversity was publically 
denounced as irrelevant, all while participation in national public life continued 
socialize people into a public culture (Bartolini 2005: 89; Laborde 2004). As 
Bartolini concludes, despite differences in degree of enforcement, timing, and 
constitutive ideational elements, the ‘technical’ processes of nation-building 
“brought about an area of cultural equality among ‘nationals’ that transcended 
primordial and culturally localized identities, when it was not directly 
reinforcing them” (Bartolini 2005: 88). Distinct cultures emerged within the 
territorial borders of European states which grounded national identities. 
These cultures, however, relied upon participation in public socialisation 
processes. 
These socio-cultural systems were created within the territorial borders 
of the state. Socialisation into a communitarian identity has historically been a 
state-led process. Leaving aside pre-existing degrees of socio-cultural 
homogeneity within state territories, European states have actively pursued 
policies to homogenise and territorialise national cultures (Axtmann 2004: 
260-261; Bartolini 2005: 81-89). These official nationalist policies aimed to 
achieve a form of loyalty grounded in social homogeneity (Anderson 2006: 83-
112; Mann 2005b: 61-68). Unlike the ethnic cleansing which occurred in 
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Eastern countries, liberal European states engaged in linguistic cleansing, 
thereby setting the stage for the emergence of a national public space (Mann 
2005b: 55-61). In effect, the state created linguistic borders between 
European polities. Print, and later radio and television outlets would, at least 
initially, operate exclusively within state borders (Bartolini 2005: 82). 
Compulsory education also played a crucial role because it socialised citizens 
into national frames from a young age. School textbooks offered official 
accounts of subjects, such as history, in which the nation features 
prominently; it created conformity of thought; and finally, incited children to 
engage in more symbolic practices which invoke the nation (Bartolini 2005: 
85-86; Billig 1995: 50-51; Foster 1995: 17). Nationalist policies thus created 
shared meanings, values, and symbolism (Costa 2004; Smith 1992: 57) 
between citizens and state elites (Bartolini 2005: 81), markers which would 
become ever more inconspicuous features in citizens’ everyday life. The 
habitual priming of nationhood continues to happen in European states (Billig 
1995). This normative system was arguably intentionally institutionalised 
within borders of the state so as to generate support among its population. 
Leaving aside intent, these systems of cultural socialisation were 
institutionalised within European states’ territorial borders, establishing and 
maintaining national cultures within the nationalised public sphere. Socio-
cultural relations became institutional realities within European states’ 
borders.  
The closure of the state would also strengthen these socio-cultural 
relationships, though they would also gain a degree of independence from it. 
The cultural caging of society took place alongside its democratic capture. 
Within the state’s borders, citizens would participate on the basis of shared 
socio-cultural frames which make sense of their (political) reality. The 
communitarian identity was passed on as a(n) (unintentional) heritage to 
successive generations. The public sphere, as broadly construed, created 
cultural relationships between the inhabitants of the modern polity, with the 
result that these bonds grounded processes of co-identification. This 
normative system initially constructed by the state gave territorial borders to 
the nation, because the sociological preconditions for such an order were 
primarily contained within the state’s borders. Identity did gain some degree of 
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independence from the state, with democratic agents losing their moral 
capacity and right to interfere with these identification processes (Axtmann 
2004: 267). In this regard, Étienne Balibar (2004b) draws attention to how the 
citizenry embraced the organisation of power in Europe into nation-states. He 
argues that the nation-form, or national social formation, became the 
dominant form of organisation in modern politics. This institutional reality, he 
argues, gave rise to the homo nationalis.  The modern citizen makes sense of 
their place in the world using the category of the nation-state. This political 
self-understanding informs their actions and beliefs (Balibar 2004b: 11-12). 
The organisation of Europe into nation-states reinforced the inner boundary of 
cultural identity by giving it a form of political representation. Citizens would 
became the protagonists of the national form in the international arena (Aron 
1995: 33). The homo nationalis would justify the division of the world into 
nation-states, even when state agents deem integration or cooperation more 
favourable. In short, the people as a nation gained institutional resonance, yet 
it remained a plausible self-understanding without needing active state 
interference in its construction. Historical processes of nation-building, 
however, meant that this conception made sense primarily within the state’s 
borders. The identitarian conception of popular sovereignty could plausibly 
inform citizens’ actions when partaking in public socialisation processes. The 
political fictions of beneficiaries, demos and nation might operate on 
conceptually distinct levels, but the normative systems which validate them 
integrated the same group of individuals; those within the territorial borders of 
the modern state. 
 
Finally, these normative systems would enforce each other within their 
territories, and bolster borders between European polities. In the latter, the 
judicial-economic, civic-democratic, and socio-cultural relationships between 
individuals were institutionalised congruently within territorial borders of each 
state. These systems therefore created relationships between the same 
individuals, which gave institutional purchase to the three conceptions 
simultaneously within each state polity. The historical circumstances of each 
polity influenced these processes and strengthened or weakened their role in 
the legitimation of the state. Each European polity established it its own 
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particular constellation of systems within a particularistic conception of 
sovereignty (e.g. Bellamy 2004: 3; Nicolaïdis and Young 2014: 1410). The 
specific particularities are discussed in the next chapter. The essential 
observation for this analysis is that these processes also reinforced 
differences between European populations. Socio-cultural relationships 
played an important role in the reinforcement of borders, in part because the 
nation-state meant an enshrinement of each peoples’ particularity (Axtmann 
2004: 260-261). To avoid seeming to offer too nationalistic an interpretation, 
this particularity was also, in part, a product of each state’s particular 
geographical and demographic circumstances (e.g. Bellamy 2004: 3). The 
identitarian conception of popular sovereignty could justify the distinctiveness 
of national systems based on the same universalist principles, such as the 
rule of law and democracy.  
The public sphere constitutes an important institutional lynchpin which 
binds together the three systems. Firstly, this sphere offers both a forum for 
socialisation processes and for deliberative processes of will-formation, as 
recognised by contemporary democratic theorists (Bellamy and Castiglione 
2013: 213-214; Crum 2013: 616). As Bartolini concludes, “democracy […] 
operated within areas of considerable cultural homogeneity” (2005: 89; see 
also Habermas 1996). The civic-democratic normative system relies here on 
the socio-cultural identitarian one. Processes of mass will-formation require a 
public sphere to debate matter of the public good, yet the shared cultural 
frames will also impact on these democratic debates. Furthermore, 
democratic deliberation becomes part of the construction of the public 
socialisation processes, focussing them on the state (Frost 2001). Due to this 
process, democracy can become part of the national identitarian boundary 
between the Europe’s peoples. On this reading, the political fictions of the 
demos and the nation are no longer neatly separable in this institutional 
context. This dual-institutionalization also contributed to an area of equality in 
which deep inequality of benefits became unacceptable, with the result that 
civic-democratic and socio-cultural relationships shaped judicial-economic 
ones. The state’s role in greater redistribution, such as through national 
insurance and social services, is an adaptation to pressure from the national-
democratic public sphere (Habermas 1992a: 132). The question of social 
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justice -- ‘the social question’ -- became the responsibility of the sovereign 
state. In these circumstances, the conception of beneficiaries came to be 
shaped by the democratic and identitarian conceptions of popular sovereignty. 
The particularity of each European state, such as its size and natural 
resources, required, in addition, that these polities develop defence policies 
and forms of economic management distinct from one another. These civic-
democratic and socio-cultural systems also depended upon the trust and 
solidarity drawn from socio-cultural relationships. In this context, a national 
identity conceptualised along more organic lines enabled more extensive 
redistribution (e.g. Greenfeld 1992a). Anglo-Saxon systems, with more civic 
models, became reliant in this regard on private charity rather than the statist 
or corporatist solidarity found in their European continental counterparts 
(Kapeller and Wolkenstein 2013). The particular substance of the socio-
cultural relationships between citizens shaped the judicial-economic, as well 
as the democratic systems within state territorial borders.  
The state-governed domestic economy, liberal democratic institutions, 
and national cultures became particularised, effectively reinforcing the 
boundaries between European state populations. As Bartolini observes, the 
highly congruent borders between these systems would progressively 
separate European polities (Bartolini 2005: 56). The people as beneficiaries, 
demos and nation became institutionalised conterminously. “[This] historical 
configuration of highly coinciding and mutually reinforcing boundaries” 
(Bartolini 2005: 109) made the willing suspension of disbelief plausible in 
European polities because these systems created networks of relationships 
within the ‘hard shell’ of the modern territorial state. The political fictions of 
beneficiaries, demos, and nation gained practical resonance for the members 
of the same political constituency. The three distinct criteria could thus make 
sense simultaneously of state legitimacy, and even complement one another 
in these historical circumstances. In conclusion, the citizenry of modern states 
in Europe could plausibly make sense of themselves as a people in the form 
of beneficiaries, demos, and nation, because these political fictions found 
resonance in institutional systems within the borders of the territorial state. 
Moreover, as we will see, the denial of any of the three bonds would come to 
face the challenge of making sense of the existence of these normative 
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systems, especially their particularity. In these historical circumstances, the 
conceptions of popular sovereignty became intertwined, at least in practice. 
The three conceptions of popular sovereignty, however, do not merely posit 
bonds of collectivity, but they also make sense of practices of rule as an 
order. In short, they posit the existence of a sovereign state.  
 
IV - The institutionalization of state sovereignty  
The concept of the sovereign state posits an idea of the political order which 
makes sense of ruling practices within a polity. The organisation of power is 
an essential historical circumstance to factor in for any conception of popular 
sovereignty to make sense to the ruled and rulers alike. Like the people, the 
sovereign state is a political fiction which makes political rule intelligible “as a 
structure” (Williams 2005: 10). A process of abstraction therefore takes the 
place of a complex and diverse set of ruling practices. David Runciman (2003) 
explains that the state is a fiction akin to money (and the people) which 
citizens have chosen to believe in. Its sovereign status is as a Searlian social 
institution attributed to it by the collective political imagination. As such, a 
willing suspension of disbelief is necessary to accept diverse political 
institutions as a unitary sovereign state. A clear-eyed reflection shows that 
European states do not constitute Hobbesian-Kantian sovereign regimes in 
practical terms, but instead tend to conform to pluralistic Lockean-
Montesquieuian separation of powers models (Stedman Jones 1994). Here, 
an institutionally fragmented regime takes decisions without needing a 
singular sovereign decision-making centre, pace the Schmittian-populist 
conception of popular sovereignty. These decision-making centres further rely 
upon the capacity of a diverse set of bureaucratic institutions for the effective 
implement of their decisions. The sovereign state, in effect, refers to a variety 
of cultural practices (Bevir and Rhodes 2010). The modern state has 
nevertheless taken on certain ‘marks of sovereignty’ (Balibar 2004a) that 
provide plausibility to its sovereign status, again within its territorial borders.  
The core characteristic of the modern state is its territoriality. The 
state’s high degree of territoriality sets the early modern statist order apart 
from the personalised structures of rule and allegiance in medieval feudal 
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systems (Bartolini 2005: 58). The territoriality of the modern state describes 
not only the impenetrability of its geographical borders, but also its exclusive 
and effective rule over that territory -- its monopolisation of coercive structures 
(Aron 1995). In this regard, the historical process of state formation have been 
a series of “protracted efforts of rulers and their staff to translate ‘judicial’ 
sovereignty into ‘empirical’ sovereignty” (Axtmann 2004: 263). The 
organisation of power was centralised within Europe’s territorially structured 
polities. The state formed a ‘hard shell’ around its territory, granting the polity 
with an unprecedented degree of impenetrability (Hertz 1957). Dynastic 
practices played an important initial role in the centralisation of power in the 
hands of fewer and fewer elite (Sharma 2015). This process of centralisation 
became complemented by a Weberian rationalisation in order to suit the 
demands of the international capitalist marketplace (Lassman 2000: 93). The 
hierarchical coercive centre penetrated its territory through the rationalisation 
of various administrative sub-systems under its control (Axtmann 2004: 259-
260; Bartolini 2005: 60-64). The twin-processes concentrated power into the 
hands of state elites, who then became empowered to take and implement 
autonomous decisions within the territory. The peace treaties of Westphalia in 
1648 internationally recognised territory as the organisational principle for 
states (Axtmann 2004: 260; Bartolini 2005: 64). Territorial sovereignty 
became the judicial norm of political organization in the European continent 
(Aron 1995). European regimes tried to conquer or at least claim one 
another’s territories, though the destruction of a state was considered unlikely 
and deemed illegitimate (Bartolini 2005: 65). Bolstering this de jure claim to 
sovereignty, the decision-making centre acquired unprecedented 
infrastructural power, that is, “the capacity of the state actually to penetrate 
civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions through its realm” 
(Mann 1984: 113). The modern territorial state had a single hierarchical centre 
of decision-making, and the resources to implement its decisions through the 
territory. This organisation of power made sovereignty into a plausible fiction. 
 The democratisation of centralised decision-making bodies set 
normative limitations on their range of autonomous actions (Mann 1984: 114). 
The state could no longer use its coercive force against its citizens without 
their consent (or at least that of their representatives). The exercise of the 
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infrastructural power of European modern states might have been princely at 
one point, though it would come to be constraint (Mann 1984: 113). Modern 
democratic regimes, for instance, lost some of the (moral) capacity to 
integrate their societies in similar ways to their predecessors (Axtmann 2004: 
266-268). Even if the state ceased to played a less violent a role in the polity 
(see, however, Balibar 2004a; Bobbitt 2002), the existence of its institutions 
nonetheless influenced the political practices of its citizens. Modern 
democracies continue to organise power in hierarchical structures within 
polities to this day, maintaining a high degree of territorial closure. State 
institutions remained the focal point of political mobilisation for territorially 
bounded group of individuals (Axtmann 2004: 262). The reason is, in part, that 
citizens recognise that the bureaucratic state remains the source of 
authoritative decision-making over a territory, and continues to have control 
over extensive resources to implement policies. Both decision-making power 
and implementation power remain centralised within these polities. The 
political fiction of sovereignty thus continues to make sense of these 
democratic states. The political fiction of sovereignty gained practical 
resonance, which, in combination with the three fictions of peoples, made the 
three-fold conception of popular sovereignty into a functional heuristic device 
for political agents.   
The centralised organisation of power also influenced the 
institutionalisation of the people into state-governed economic, democratic, 
and socio-cultural normative systems.  The historical evidence alludes to the 
fact that the highly coinciding institutionalisation of the people within state 
borders was in fact not a fortuitous coincidence. As argued in chapter two, 
rulers’ authority relies upon their ability to make the facts of politics align 
sufficiently with the fictions of popular sovereignty so as to sustain a willing 
suspension of disbelief among the ruled. In the literature, a debate exists on 
the intentions of the agents of the modern state in these processes. Some 
argue that the state pursues legitimation strategies to mask its violence from 
its citizens (Balibar 2004b; Bobbitt 2002). From a different perspective, 
Rodney Barker argues that legitimation stories shape elite political actors’ 
identities as much as other denizens, the former therefore act in such a way 
as to attain reputation (Barker 2001). The rulers are thus homo nationalis, 
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much like the ruled themselves. Again others argue that policies resulting in 
these normative systems were the product of alternative motivations. The 
state’s homogenisation and rationalisation of educational system, for 
example, were informed by economic considerations (Gellner 1983). From 
this perspective, system building was, at least in part, an unintentional 
consequence of sovereign decisions. The homogeneous implementation of 
decisions within its territory also contributed to the integration of citizens within 
this same space. In practice, policies might well have been both intentional 
and unintentional. Yet the institutionalisation of sovereign states contributed to 
the creation of coinciding systems because the orders were homogeneous 
and protected within their ‘hard territorialised shell’. The state’s coercive 
institutions played a central role in forming coinciding boundaries of domestic 
economy, democratic institutions, and processes of socialisation (Balibar 
2004b: 23-24; Bartolini 2005; Sleat 2014: 330). The ‘sovereign’ state’s 
institutions thus contributed to the institutionalisation of the people as 
beneficiaries, as demos and even as nation. 
Whether the consequences of processes are always intentional is 
unlikely. But state elites nonetheless have a clear interest in citizens’ 
continued commitment to popular sovereignty, and the concomitant invocation 
of the image of the sovereign state. From this perspective, the state’s 
sovereignty came to depend on meeting the criteria of legitimacy, as 
established by the popular sovereign. The state could, for instance, peacefully 
generate support by offering citizens’ legislative representation and groups’ 
voice (Bartolini 2005: 89). State agents had to meet the appropriate criteria of 
legitimacy for the ‘sovereignty’ of the state to remain a plausible and attractive 
political fiction.5 As Edmund Morgan observes, rulers engaged in a process of 
aligning political reality with its legitimating fictions (Morgan 1988: 14). These 
hierarchical rulers would further shape the concepts to suit their purposes, as 
alluded to in the first section (Hont 2005). In addition, and to illustrate by way 
of a counter-example, pluralism, anarchism and communism, as the most 
influential modern critiques of power formations, explicitly criticise the 
sovereign status of the state (Stråth 2003), consequently invoking its 
existence in the process. The organisation of power thus matters, not only to 
give practical resonance to the fiction of sovereignty, but also because the 
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agents active in them also shape the normative systems of peoplehood. 
European integration, so I will claim, has meant the effective reorganisation of 
decision-making and implementation power in a manner which challenges the 
fiction of the sovereign state, and has not been without consequence for these 
systems in making the bonds of collectivity plausible. This dissonance 
between, on the one hand, the political fictions of people and sovereignty and, 
on the other hand, institutional reality will inform a condemnation of the multi-
faceted conception of popular sovereignty in contemporary Europe. 
 
V - Conclusion 
This chapter vindicated the multi-faceted conception of popular sovereignty in 
Europe’s pre-integration polity through a realist analysis. Firstly, a fictional 
genealogy justified the three-fold conception of popular sovereignty in modern 
circumstances at the normative level. The sovereign state could make sense 
of the legitimate political order governing a complex, pluralistic, and enclosed 
polity. The chapter focussed on the institutional reality providing plausibility to 
the contemporary conception of popular sovereignty as a heuristic tool despite 
its reliance on political fictions. The institutional relationships of the legally 
governed domestic economy, state-centred democratic order, and socio-
cultural sphere bound members of the state together, and further reinforced 
and shaped the relationships between citizens. They also separated 
European citizenries from one another as each created distinct 
understandings from within their own historical circumstances. Europe’s 
centralised states formed a hard territorial shell around their populations and 
institutional systems. The particularity of these arrangements will feature in 
the next chapter. For now it only matters that the multi-faceted contemporary 
conception of popular sovereignty could plausibly make sense of the 
sovereign state’s legitimacy in these historical circumstances. This analysis of 
the normative desirability and heuristic plausibility of popular sovereignty 
offers a sophisticated theoretical understanding of the legitimacy of the 
modern state. The question before us however, is whether the contemporary 
multi-faceted conception of popular sovereignty remains vindicated in the 
contemporary European polity. The next chapter addresses this question by 
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firstly starting from an institutional analysis, before appraising the heuristic 





                                            
1
 Italics in original 
2
 See again Kuukkanen on the distinction between words and concepts (or conceptions) in 
this instance (Kuukkanen 2008). 
3
 Bartolini argues that the limitation of ‘exit’ options, in combination with a lack of benefits for 
parts of the population, resulted in the need for the democratisation of states in order to 
regain legitimacy. Nation-building therefore prefigured democratisation (Bartolini 2005: 89). 
4
 The relationship between the development of the modern capitalist economy and territorial 
administrative consolidation was entangled and complex (Bartolini 2005: 72). In short, the 
state elite required the funds generated by the market for the consolidation of state building 
processes, as much as the capitalist agents in capitalist markets required the preconditions 
offered by the state (Bartolini 2005: 79). The historical developments give purchase to Marxist 
analyses which posit that a capitalist logic has become intrinsic to the state (Spies-Butcher, 
Paton et al. 2012a: 133-137). 
5
 The lack of clear brute fact strengthens rather than weakens the state (Runciman 2003: 37). 
A poor policy choice, for example, can be attributed to a government or specific agency rather 
than to the state. Agents’ legitimacy diminishes, but the state’s authority remains untouched. 
The initial illusion of a sovereign state as found in Hobbes’ Leviathan became an institutional 
reality despite, or maybe thanks to, its fictional nature.  
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 Chapter 7: Popular Sovereignty in a Novel Political 
Landscape 
 
[The European entity] represents a very original attempt at pooling or 
blending “sovereign” powers, and it also creates central authorities that exert 
powers transferred to them by the states … [Its relationship to its nation-
states] is not a zero-sum game and … the European entity has, indeed, 
helped the restoration and consolidation of its member states.  
Stanley Hoffman, The European Sisyphus, 4  
 
I - Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I demonstrated how the three conceptions of popular 
sovereignty could plausibly make sense together in Europe’s political 
landscape before integration. I firstly argued that the contemporary 
conceptions could complement one another in making sense of the state as a 
legitimate political order in modernity’s enlarged polities. This vindicates 
commitment to this multi-facetted conception at the normative level. Secondly, 
I turned to the question of whether this multi-faceted conception could act as 
heuristic device despite the need for political fictions. I demonstrated how 
normative systems institutionalized existing bonds of collectivity which inform 
these conceptions within the ‘hard shells’ of Europe’s territorially organized 
states. The people as beneficiaries, demos, and nation could plausibly guide 
citizens’ appraisals of the state’s legitimacy in this institutional landscape. 
Thirdly, the contemporary conception of popular sovereignty relies upon the 
political fiction of sovereignty. I argued that the organisation of power turned 
this fiction into a plausible way to make sense of the state’s power. From this 
perspective, the state agents would furthermore aim to sustain the 
aforementioned normative systems, because they had a clear interest in 
sustaining the fiction of the people in order to maintain the related fiction of 
sovereign authority. The political fictions gained increasing practical 
resonance, increasing the purchase of the willing suspension of disbelief in 
the process. The contemporary multi-faceted conception of popular 
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sovereignty could thus make sense in a desirable and plausible way in these 
circumstances. In addition, the creation and politicisation of these institutional 
relationships between citizens made their denial a less plausible prospect, a 
feature which will become important in the following analysis. I shall argue 
that European integration has cumulated into changes in the configuration of 
normative systems and in the restructuring of power. The present-day 
European polity has gone through a transformation (e.g. Bohman 2004; 
Cheneval and Schimmelfennig 2013) from its statist predecessor, which 
impacts the ability of the multi-faceted conception of popular sovereignty to 
act as heuristic device, and challenges its vindication at the normative level.  
This chapter appraises the multi-faceted conception of popular 
sovereignty, as reconstructed in the conceptual genealogies, in contemporary 
Europe through a realist lens. The chapter’s central argument is that the 
institutionalisation of the people and sovereignty has undergone fundamental 
changes due to European integration. The latter engendered numerous 
processes which have reconfigured the boundaries of normative systems and 
reorganized power structures. The institutional analysis commences with a 
parsimonious reflection on the particularity of different contemporary 
European state polities. This section stresses that the European polity 
consists of very distinct statist institutional arrangements, and cumulates in an 
analysis of deep diversity within the contemporary European polity. In the 
aftermath of the Second World War however, the pursuit of economic 
prosperity set the initial impetus for European integration. This process has 
cumulated in a significant reconfiguration of the normative systems which 
create relationships between denizens of the European polity. The boundaries 
between Europe’s economic and democratic statist orders have become 
porous in parallel to the opening up of the ‘hard shell’ which bordered 
European territorial nations. These systems have not yet been replaced with 
supranational equivalents. Yet, political power has nonetheless been 
reorganized; states’ infrastructural power has been integrated and a second 
authoritative decision-making centre has been built-up. A two-tier political 
order has thus emerged in contemporary Europe. The reestablishment of a 
territorially sovereign state, whether at the European or national level, is an 
unlikely prospect, as is the concomitant closure of normative systems which 
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institutionalises the people. Contemporary conceptions of popular sovereignty 
are therefore unable to act as heuristic tools for assessing the EU’s legitimacy 
in this novel institutional context. Moreover, I argue that this contributes to a 
condemnation at the normative level, because neither the multi-faceted 
conception, nor the conceptual structure can make sense of Europe’s novel 
two-tier political order within these historical circumstances.  
This argument unfolds as follows: I commence (section II) with a sketch 
of deep diversity, also referred to as radical pluralism, in Europe. Historical 
circumstances have resulted in particular institutional arrangements which 
continue to shape and reflect national consensuses on political legitimacy. 
The third section (section III) turns to the current constellation of boundaries of 
the normative systems. The most significant institutional changes at the 
European level have been the European regulation of increasingly integrated 
national markets, and the increasing power of the democratic centre for 
collective decision-making at the European level. As a result, the boundaries 
between national normative systems have become more porous. 
Nevertheless, welfare regimes, democratic will-formation processes, and the 
reproduction of a communitarian identity through public socialisation persist at 
the national level. The subsequent section (section V) reflects on the 
institutionalization of sovereignty, or rather lack thereof. European integration 
has resulted in a significant restructuring of infrastructural power and the 
multiplication of decision-making centres. National implementation systems 
have become increasingly interdependent and institutionally linked-up through 
a set of legally authoritative supranational and transnational institutions. This 
European governance system also added a second authoritative decision-
making centre. The very limited resources at its disposal to implement its 
decision make it dependent upon the national political orders for their 
implementation. The decision-makers of these national orders, however, 
perceive a dependence upon European cooperation, hence they willingly 
albeit not always enthusiastically comply with their decisions. Reflecting upon 
the balance of power, I argue that the recentralisation of decision-making to 
one centre remains an unlikely prospect for the foreseeable future. The final 
substantive question (section VI) analyses the contemporary multi-faceted 
conception of popular sovereignty through a realist lens. Starting with a 
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reflection on the fictions of peoplehood and sovereignty, I argue that the 
former makes sense at a national level, but both find only very limited, if any, 
practical resonance at the European level. Sovereignty, so I suggest, has 
become an implausible political fiction to make Europe’s two-tier political order 
intelligible. The contemporary conception is therefore a poor heuristic tool for 
making sense of the legitimacy of Europe’s political order. Turning to the 
normative level, I then argue that the contemporary conception of popular 
sovereignty is ill-suited to making sense of the core characteristics of 
Europe’s transformed polity. The conclusion (section VII) summarizes that the 
realist reasons for a condemnation of the commitment to the contemporary 
multi-faceted conception of popular sovereignty in attempts to make sense of 
the EU’s legitimacy.  
 
II - Deep diversity in Europe: Similar arguments, distinct consensuses 
Europe’s national states’ particular circumstances and trajectories continue to 
shaped institutional and ideational arrangements along national lines to the 
present day. This section illustrates that historical circumstances continue to 
shape national polities. This heterogeneity significantly limits the prospects of 
meaningful integration into a unified European identity. As already indicated 
several times in the thesis, the national processes of state building, 
democratisation, and nation-building have followed distinct trajectories. This 
recognition of variation is essential for appreciating the deep diversity in 
contemporary Europe. John Erik Fossum uses Charles Taylor’s concept of 
deep diversity to describe the current state of affairs in the EU (Fossum 
2003). The notion describes how a plurality of conceptions of the common 
good and the polity exist next to one another (see also Bellamy and 
Castiglione 2013). This Taylorian concept captures the radical pluralism 
between the national units which constitute the European polity. The 
particularity of each national citizenry’s beliefs and institutional arrangements 
mutually reinforce one another within their national arrangements. This deep 
diversity is best understood as the product of each European polity having to 
deal with particular historical circumstances. The relationships between 
citizens became shaped by:  
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“… the structure of the state and the nature of its political regime, the 
character of class relations, the existence and the sources of any tensions 
between centre and periphery, the types of ideology and cultural divisions, 
contingent events such as war, and the available legal and political languages 
through which the demands of different groups could be expressed” (Bellamy 
2004: 3).  
 
Such diverse circumstances have become reflected in the great variations 
between national institutional arrangements. These arrangements impact and 
reflect citizens’ beliefs on the state’s legitimacy, which in turn continue to 
impact the debates on the Union (e.g. Lacroix and Nicolaïdis 2010b; Schmidt 
2006). An in-depth study of this variety would take us too far afield; 
highlighting some key differences should however illustrate the deep diversity 
present in contemporary Europe. Before turning to this analysis, it should be 
recognised that this variation is essential, but it should not obscure the 
similarity of underlying institutional and normative building blocks (e.g. 
Bellamy 2004). The three core normative systems which institutionalised 
bonds of collectivity were intertwined in the shaping of national consensuses 
on legitimate rule (Bellamy 2013), with knock-on effects between 
understandings of the polity and of the regime (Bellamy and Castiglione 2003: 
12). The same sources of legitimacy are drawn upon in making sense of the 
state. In practice however, these national systems and consensuses have 
taken on nationally specific forms which reflect the particularity of their 
historical context and other contingent factors. To further explore deep 
diversity, I turn to the institutional organisation of judicial-economic, civic-
democratic, and socio-cultural systems in the European countries. 
Welfare distribution is one of the most important dimensions of 
contemporary state-governed capitalist economies. The three main models 
are the Anglo-Saxon, statist, and corporatist welfare regimes (Esping-
Andersen 1990) and which give rise to liberal or coordinated market 
economies (Hall and Soskice 2001). In the former empires, the sovereign 
determined the borders of the body politic (Harris 2004: 75-76; Ramos 2004). 
This sovereign would then transform into the parliament (e.g. Morgan 1988: 
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17-121). In the British case, the Anglo-Saxon economic model reflected a 
more individualised approach to allegiance. The benefits of rule are reaped at 
an individual level, with the state merely ensuring the rule of law. Unlike in 
Britain, the French state did not rule over a Union. The republican ethos and 
nation-building efforts instead resulted in a shared culture around the state, 
even among its dependencies beyond the European continent (Laborde 2004: 
47-56). The French state intervenes extensively in the economic and socio-
cultural sphere to secure the rights and freedoms of its republican citizenry 
(Laborde 2004; Stuurman 2004); a practice that continues to the present day, 
though multiculturalism now poses some challenges to the republican ideal 
(e.g. Jennings 2000; Laborde 2004). In stark contrast to both approaches, the 
Dutch welfare system is organised along corporatist lines -- the so-called 
Poldermodel -- which reflect this society’s historical divisions: pillarisation, or 
Verzuiling (Stuurman 2004). These markedly different welfare system 
arrangements reflect different consensuses on the state’s legitimate role in 
providing security and prosperity in modern economies. 
The three states would also develop markedly different democratic 
systems of representation. A consensus democracy would emerge in the 
Netherlands. In combination with economic corporatism, the state acted in a 
meditational role between societal interests so as to maintain order in a 
divided society. The British majoritarian model, by contrast, reflects a clash 
between two antagonistic classes within society (e.g. Lijphart 2012; Rokkan 
1999). The French semi-presidential system illustrates a third mode of 
democratic organisation. The president represents the unity of the state, 
whilst the parliament became the representative of Sieyesian sovereign. 
These three systems all advance a unitary form of organisation for the state. 
This can be contrasted with other European states which have federal 
structures, such as Belgium and Germany. In Belgium, this structure copes 
with the radical diversity of its antagonistic cultural communities. Germany’s 
federal structure, on the other hand, is an institutional response to the high 
degree of territorial pluralism present since the days of the Holy Roman 
Empire (Preuß 2004: 39-40). The Scandinavian model, in turn, differs from the 
aforementioned countries due to its unicameral democratic arrangements. 
These Northern countries have consolidated democratic structures which 
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make them quite distinct from Mediterranean, and Central and Eastern 
European countries. Many of the current member states, however, have had 
recent experiences with dictatorial and totalitarian regimes. The Spanish 
consensus, for instance, continues to deal with the historical heritage from the 
recent Franco period (Closa 1998). A similar historical impact is found in 
Central and Eastern European countries, which have only recently emerged 
from totalitarian fascist and communist rule. The two core challenges for these 
countries have been the building up of institutional capacity to govern a 
capitalist economy effectively, and the creation and stabilisation of a 
democratic culture (Góra and Mach 2010). The non-democratic regimes 
effectively provided basic socio-economic securities; thus, in Marshall’s 
terminology, social rights prefigured political and civil liberties. State 
consensus became increasingly geared toward the provision of minimal 
incomes to secure survival: the ‘erst kommt das Fressen’ principle (Williams 
2005: 61). Democracy is also valued in many of these countries, but it is not 
deeply engrained in their political culture. The diversity in Europe’s 
representative democratic arrangements reflects diverse historical 
consensuses on the meaning of democratic legitimacy between countries 
despite their shared commitment to representative democracy (Bellamy 2013: 
507-508). 
In all these countries, public socialisation processes were organised 
within their borders. The rise of nationalism, as argued in the previous 
chapter, justified the presence of national particularities between countries. 
The national identity arguably reflects such particularities. Nationhood is, 
however, not constructed from nothing, but rather relies on particular traits 
from reality (Costa 2004). The historical circumstances offered diverse 
materials to construct a national identity. The German and Polish 
constructions of nationhood rely upon ethnic materials; ius sanguine (Góra 
and Mach 2010: 221-223; Preuß 2004: 25-28). These ethnic self-
understandings developed with a relative degree of separation from the state. 
Yet this insight is unsurprising, as both these states did not come to overlap 
with their cultural communities for a long time. To paraphrase Ulrich K. Preuß, 
Germany achieved congruency between state and nation only recently, when 
it arguably matters least (Preuß 2004: 40). In stark contrast, the French nation 
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has long been wed to the state. Here, a political civic culture became the 
source of socio-cultural unity (Laborde 2004). In the British imperial context, 
elites tended to stress political heritage and underplay the political relevance 
of ethnic diversity (Bartolini 2005: 88). The borders of the British people 
would, however, become increasingly understood in terms of nationhood 
(Harris 2004). This move from less ethnic to increasingly ethnic can be 
observed across Europe, even in republican France (Laborde 2004). The 
Spanish case, where the lack of ethnic homogeneity prevents such 
identification, provides a counter-example to this tendency. The multiplicity of 
‘micronationalisms’ have resulted in dual-identification with state and region, 
with the state’s consensus relying more on benefits than any other criteria to 
attain legitimacy (Closa 2004). States with more ethnic notions of nationhood, 
by contrast, gained stronger popular resources within these orders (Greenfeld 
1992a: 490), contributing to these consensuses being less dependent upon 
output and democratic legitimacy. The European polity’s persistent deep 
diversity is reflected in the persistence of these intertwining, mutually 
reinforcing normative systems in contemporary Europe.  
Turning to this more ideational level, the national debates illustrate a 
high degree of diversity in the narrative utilised. Historical factors have 
resulted in variations in how polities employ the same multi-faceted 
conception of popular sovereignty. The statist fiction of sovereignty remains 
an influential heuristic device to make sense of democratic legitimacy of the 
Union (e.g. Beetz 2015; Nicolaïdis 2013), though European integration 
remains understood against national backgrounds (Auer 2010; Pélabay, 
Lacroix et al. 2010). In these debates on the EU, national consensus on 
democratic legitimacy influences proposals to improve its legitimacy. Nordic 
countries focus on the inclusion of civil society, Southern countries on 
securing benefits, whilst France focuses on political identity (Nicolaïdis and 
Young 2014: 1410). These historically formed systems shape the 
relationships between citizens, further solidifying the distinctiveness of 
national consensuses in Europe. They also continue to shape national 
debates on the Union’s legitimacy. Homogeneous decisions at the European 
level impact national systems in diverse ways. Prime ministers, for instance, 
have become more powerful in consensus democracies, because they 
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negotiate EU-treaties. The French president, by contrast, remains the most 
powerful politician in the democratic system. The debates on Turkey have 
further indicated the existence of distinct debates on the need for a European 
identity and on its substance (Beetz 2015; Delanty 2005). Deep diversity 
between national polities remains characteristic of the current Europe polity.1 
Nevertheless, these normative systems and power structures have adapted to 
meet the challenges posed by historical circumstance. 
 
III - The reconfiguration of the normative systems of peoplehood 
The second half of the twentieth century was deemed ‘the golden age’ of the 
democratic nation-state, though recent developments challenge this form of 
political organisation (Hurrelmann, Leibfried et al. 2007). In the literature, 
some of the more prominent challenges include total nuclear war, economic 
and technological globalization, inter- and transnational political integration, 
and deep social pluralism. The impact of such diverse changes has been 
diverse and contested (e.g. Axtmann 2004; Bartolini 2005; Goldmann 2001; 
Hertz 1957; Lavdas and Chryssochoou 2011; Mann 1997; Sassen 2006). A 
thoroughly pessimistic analysis holds that these processes “subvert [the 
democratic nation-states’] political independence, to undermine the collective 
identity on which it is based, and to weaken its democracy” (Goldmann 2001: 
1). These developments have thus become linked to a series of legitimation 
crises to which state elites have had to respond (see e.g. Bobbitt 2002; 
Habermas 1984). In this regard, Western democracies face similar 
challenges, however European political integration has shaped how European 
countries can respond to them (Rasmussen 2014: 14). The original intent 
behind European integration was to resolve nation-states’ legitimacy crisis 
after the Second World War. In its aftermath, nationalism had lost some of its 
persuasive force, and whilst democracy was valued, citizens had more 
immediate needs. Europe’s state elites cooperated to acquire the necessary 
funds to provide the material benefits which would generate allegiance to 
democratic capitalism rather than to Soviet Union style communism (e.g. 
George and Bache 2001: 44-55; Milward 1992; White 2015: 13-14). State 
elites chose the pathway of integration so as to continue providing security 
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and economic prosperity. In order to achieve this policy aim, European states 
opened up their borders in order to create a common market (Bartolini 2005: 
116). Various other political considerations have further informed closer 
cooperation and integration, such European federalism, and increasing 
problem-solving capabilities. The result has been a reconfiguration of the 
systems which institutionalise the people and a significant restructuring of 
power.  
This section (section III) and the following one (section IV) describe the 
reconfiguration of the normative systems and the restructuring of power, 
respectively, in contemporary Europe. Two methodological issues of a more 
technical nature warrant brief treatment. First, this section partly draws upon 
Bartolini’s Restructuring Europe (Bartolini 2005: 116-176; 177-247); more 
recent academic and EU publications have however been consulted in order 
to ensure that the account remains up-to-date. Secondly, historical 
explanations and specific policies feature more prominently compared to the 
previous chapter, the reason being the lack of agreement on the nature of the 
European polity. The aim is not to reproduce a causal history from the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) to the current landscape.2 
Historical explanations instead feature to bolster the claims made in this 
description. Additional empirical details further substantiate my claims. My 
central claims are, firstly, that the normative systems which institutionalise the 
people have been opening up, but they remain primarily organised at the 
national level. Still, judicial-economic and civic-democratic systems have 
become a reality at the European level. In section IV, I claim, secondly, that 
the reorganisation of the political order has been the source of this 
reconfiguration, and the underlying balance of power between decision-
makers renders any significant changes therein unlikely. In the rest of this 
section, I will again present the normative systems associated with the 
political fictions of the people as beneficiaries first, then as demos, and finally 
as nation. 
 
 The state’s competent coercive-administrative infrastructure bound 
subject-citizens within the state-governed domestic economy. Historically, the 
state emerged as the military defender of, and judicial authority over, a 
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particular territory. This state’s enforcement apparatus was instrumental in 
containing the forces of capitalism within its territorial borders. Domestic 
markets generated the economic prosperity essential for the necessities and 
conveniences of life. In the nineteenth century, the state became responsible 
for more redistributive functions so as to increase the material well-being of 
citizens. Europe’s commercial night-watchman states became less warlike 
and more welfare oriented. European integration is often attributed an 
essential role in both pacifying the warlike states and enabling welfare 
regimes on the European continent in the 20th century. This process resulted 
the creation of institutions at the European level, which replaced some 
national normative systems.  
The normative systems that ensure the protection of individuals’ safety 
from external threats remain institutionalised at the national level. The EU has 
nevertheless taken on certain roles in the provision of safety. Policy areas 
associated with external security have been institutionalised at the European 
level. The Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) suggests the 
creation of an enforcement apparatus which is institutionalising a European 
bond of security. The European External Action Service (EEAS), on the other 
hand, is a European diplomatic core which represents Europe’s common 
good abroad, and consequently institutionalises an external diplomatic 
identity. Yet national interests remain present within this institution. The EEAS 
treaty reflects this tension between internal division and external unity (Vooren 
2011), because intergovernmental interests set the goals for the eternal 
representatives to pursue. Despite this intergovernmental structure, Europe 
has been given, at least, a degree of institutional agency. Furthermore, the 
EU’s Rapid Reaction Force gives external military agency to the Union, 
however it is still fairly limited in both size and scope of action. This force is 
more a policy tool than an apparatus against existential threats to the 
European polity. Broadly, the CFSP indicates a willingness to cooperate in the 
acknowledgement of limitations in the individual agency of states abroad. 
Recent history has however made it apparent that state interests dominate 
foreign policy (Bartolini 2005: 201-202). European states’ geopolitical interests 
diverge to such an extent that even a ‘declaratory’ unity has been hard to 
establish (Bartolini 2005: 201; Meunier and Nicolaïdis 1999: 478). Military 
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defence of the European continent continues to rely on cooperation between 
nationally organised armed forces. European states have pooled and created 
some additional military and diplomatic resources rather than integrating them 
into one normative system. In short, common security remains largely 
institutionalised within the borders of national states, but with some 
supranational additions. 
The normative systems responsible for internal security, by contrast, 
have become increasingly integrated in Europe. The accompanying economic 
integration meant an increase in cross-border activity, which created new 
challenges for law enforcement agencies. In response, resources have 
increasingly been pooled to pursue criminals across member state borders 
and to monitor entry into the Union. Enforcement agencies pursue common 
policies regarding immigration, drugs, human trafficking, and also terrorism 
(Bartolini 2005: 206-207). Bartolini observes that “the traditional functions of 
border-crossing controls have moved rapidly from being the exclusive 
competence of member states to being an intergovernmental policy, and, 
finally, at least in part, an area of Community competence” (Bartolini 2005: 
208). A ‘network of infranational bureaucracies’ of intelligence, police, and 
prosecuting judiciary has been erected (Bartolini 2005: 210), that is to say, 
national agencies cooperate extensively under the guidance of umbrella 
institutions. The ‘back office’ of policy-making has increasingly become trans- 
and even supranationalised; the ‘front office’, however, remains organised at 
the national level. So despite state and judicial systems entering a phase of 
profound change (Bartolini 2005: 211), European judicial institutions continue 
to rely on member states for law enforcement (Sangiovanni 2013: 229). The 
normative systems of internal enforcement of the rule of law remain national, 
but they have gained a strong transnational dimension in order to address the 
challenges of (economic) borders opening up between European states. 
The normative systems associated with economic prosperity have 
arguably undergone the most change. At their heart lies the formation of a 
common market, which has opened up the boundaries between Europe’s 
economies, and erected a common economic boundary between EU-citizens 
and the rest of the world. Economic integration, or more precisely the creation 
of a common market, was originally understood in terms of a project designed 
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to attain both peace and economic reconstruction (Milward 1992; White 2015: 
13-14). The Single European Act (1986), however, changed economic 
integration from a strategy to the creation of transnational connections 
between national economies, and then to the economic rationalisation of 
capitalist production structures within the Union. The aim of market integration 
is to make Europe economically competitive on the world stage (Bartolini 
2005: 181). To enhance Europe’s economic competiveness, policies were 
implemented for, on the one hand, the creation of a customs union and, on 
the other hand, the harmonisation of Europe’s economies. The former 
institutionalises a single border around the European market, whilst the latter 
aims to destroy the internal boundaries between the states’ markets. The 
Union has moved much further in the removal of internal boundaries and 
setting up external ones than any previous customs unions (Bartolini 2005: 
185). The accumulation of these policies has resulted in a pan-European 
normative system of commercial prosperity. 
Regulatory institutions govern the pan-European market. The essential 
liberal market-making policy domain of competition law has effectively been 
centralised at the European level. The Commission acts autonomously as a 
federal institution (Bartolini 2005: 184), and the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) enforces these policies authoritatively within 
Europe’s legal order (Bartolini 2005: 198). Since the onset, the policies aimed 
at ensuring economic integration were linked to a legal order which enforced 
common decisions among multiple member states (e.g. Weiler 1997). This 
order focused primarily on the protection of EU-citizens’ four economic 
liberties (Bartolini 2005: 222-226), though its decisions tended to favour 
further integration. Substantively, neo-liberal competition law reigns over most 
markets, with the structural exception being the Common Agricultural Policy 
(Bartolini 2005: 186). This attributes the European economic design a 
(probably unintentional) physiocratic character. The Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) is the most far going process of integration of European 
markets. Monetary sovereignty of states passed to the European Central 
Bank (ECB) so as to create a fully integrated financial market (Bartolini 2005: 
195). The ECB acts as a ‘federal agent’ within Europe’s market governance 
regime, and possesses unprecedented independence in comparison to its 
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national predecessors (Bartolini 2005: 196; see also Streeck 2014). Its sole 
policy objective is price stability. To achieve this aim, this institution has only 
been given only macroeconomic monetary tools, like control of foreign 
exchange rates and lending money to countries. The EU also created an 
external economic identity by delegating authority for trade negotiations, to a 
large extent, to the European Commission (Meunier and Nicolaïdis 1999: 479-
488). The trade commissioner represents the Union in most international 
trade negotiations. National representatives, however, determine the position 
and bargaining space of the Commissioner in negotiations, which has enabled 
states to regain certain competences over past years (Meunier 2000; Meunier 
and Nicolaïdis 1999). This type of government has been described as 
‘executive federalism’ (Crum 2013) because a mix of technocratic and 
national-executives are the political decision-makers. What matters for now is 
that this normative system creates relationships between citizens within the 
European polity.  
The EU regime has only limited policy tools at its disposal, creating at 
best very thin relationships between citizens. Many economic relationships 
remain institutionalised at the national level. To set the tone of this paragraph, 
Andrea Sangiovanni observes that “… the EU, on its own, does not have the 
financial, legal, administrative or sociological means to provide and guarantee 
the goods and services necessary to sustain and reproduce a stable market 
and legal system” (Sangiovanni 2013: 229). In effect, EU-institutions only 
have only a limited range of macroeconomic instruments to pursue benefits 
for ‘their’ citizens, which are arguably skewed toward the Northern trade-
oriented economies (Streeck 2014). European institutions have neither 
levying capabilities nor direct control over any budgets. Taxation policy is the 
most important budget policy for monetary policy. Contributions from national 
governments fund the EU, as well as a fixed percentage of customs and value 
added tax (VAT). The overall rate of VAT has been harmonised between 
European levels, but supranational institutions neither collect nor set a flat 
rate for the Union (Bartolini 2005: 191-194). Furthermore, supranational 
institutions cannot officially exercise direct control over national budgets, the 
EU-regime can therefore not use budget policies to manage the European 
market. Notwithstanding some treaties, policies, and minor funds, the EU also 
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has no policy instruments to manage employment directly (Bartolini 2005: 
190). The ECB has more recently influenced national policy, but only through 
a set of emergency powers (Streeck 2014: 214).3 The pan-European 
economic system governs a limited range of aspects compared to national 
systems, however it does do so authoritatively. This normative system 
therefore institutionalises bonds at the pan-European level.  
The normative systems of compulsory redistribution of economic 
prosperity, however, remain organised at the national level. European states 
also continue in their role as the primary providers of education, social 
insurance, and healthcare for their citizenries. The EU lacks redistributive 
mechanisms to compensate for the negative impacts of restructuring the 
European market (Bartolini 2005: 197-198). European ‘welfare benefits’ are 
insignificant in comparison to the state, and are deeply contested among 
member states (Bartolini 2005: 226-233). The European regime does not offer 
anything approaching a normative system of public goods and welfare 
redistribution to take its place (Bellamy and Castiglione 2013: 217-218). The 
state level thus remains the most important site for employing coercion and 
redistribution to resolve of societal conflicts in the foreseeable future 
(Axtmann 2004: 271; Stråth and Skinner 2003: 2). The pan-European 
economic regime challenges the autonomy of national regimes, because it 
impacts the range of policy options, and at times even enforces its decisions 
upon the national regimes. Competition law, for instance, results in an 
opening up of national judicial-economic systems (Bartolini 2005: 235-237). 
The impact of these laws is significant, such as in the realm of healthcare, and 
furthermore illustrates the continued heterogeneity of Europe’s judicial-
economic orders. Compulsory national welfare regimes significantly shape the 
individual impact of Europe’s macroeconomic policies on citizens. Similarly, 
the implementation of macroeconomic policy at the national level results in 
diverse outcomes in different state polities due to the “heterogeneity of socio-
economic, and productive structures” (Bartolini 2005: 198; see also Bellamy 
2013: 506). Normative systems of prosperity continue to bind citizens together 
within domestic polities. 
 The normative systems that create relationships of security and 
economic prosperity between citizens remain largely organised within the 
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borders of the European states. Europe’s legally governed market constitutes 
a European normative system which creates new relationships between EU-
citizens.  This system combines internal market integration with external 
economic interest representation. The normative systems of the European 
market and the national economies are asymmetrical systems. The European 
regime should generate more economic prosperity than the states would 
achieve independently. The European system therefore creates bonds 
between European citizens, but it continues to rely on the state’s 
infrastructural power, which funnels this commercial prosperity (or lack 
thereof) down to the individual. These nationally governed domestic 
economies transform European commercial results into a national experience 
of economic suffering or prospering rather than a European one. The legal 
and economic institutions associated with output legitimacy remain largely 
organised at the national level, but the common pursuit of commercial 
interests at the European level results in an opening up of national systems. 
The effects of European systems at the individual level, therefore, remain 
inflected along national lines. A European system of peace and prosperity has 
emerged, which gives plausibility to citizens as beneficiaries. However, these 
individuals remain institutionalised within heterogeneous normative systems 
at the national level. European supranational and transnational integration 
takes place, but deep diversity also persists. 
 
The democratic bond of collectivity found its institutional plausibility in 
democratic procedures which enable stable self-government, despite the 
competition of different groups for scarce resources. European integration has 
resulted in the institutionalisation of EU-citizenship and pan-European 
elections. Continuous diplomatic and political negotiations have been 
instrumental in the achievement of peace on the European continent (e.g. 
Middelaar 2009; Rosamond 2000). In recent years, the EU-regime institutions 
have taken on an increasingly statist character. This decision-making centre 
governs authoritatively over the European polity. The Commission, Councils, 
and European Parliament (EP) have become understood as Europe’s 
government, mirroring to some extent national democratic arrangements 
(Bartolini 2005: 160-165). Furthermore, the Euro-bureaucracy resembles a 
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quasi-ministerial arrangement, drafting rules and regulations which are 
directed at national structures (Bartolini 2005: 136-141). The European 
assembly, on the other hand, became the EP, a shift which implies the 
existence of a European demos (Middelaar 2009: 379-385). This arguably 
symbolic shift would become more important as the EP gained further powers 
within European decision-making procedures. Institutional reproduction at the 
European level has not been identical to any national arrangement. Key 
normative questions are whether it should mirror a national system, and if yes, 
which of Europe’s (or other countries’) democratic systems should act as its 
model. Leaving these questions aside, the democratisation of Europe’s 
decision-makers centre has resulted in a normative system of democratic 
procedures at the European level. 
The ascription of citizenship created civic relationships within the 
territorial borders of the constitutional state. Historically, the constitution 
limited the state’s power by protecting liberties and ascribing rights to citizens 
against the state. Europe’s ‘constitutional court’, by contrast, empowered the 
European decision-making centre. From a historical perspective, the 
constitutionalisation of the Union is rightfully characterised as unusual 
(Bartolini 2005: 160-165). And as mentioned before, the main role of the 
constitutional court has been to protect the four economic freedoms, in line 
with the early modern liberal state. The lack of coercive policing power has 
long been matched by a lack of European rights. The recently ratified Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union does restrain the Union and 
Member State’s powers.4 The treaty, however, represents a tool for the 
supranational enforcement of intergovernmental agreements. As Article 52 
clarifies, the Charter’s origins lie in the (intergovernmental) treaties, which it 
may not contradict. EU-citizenship has furthermore meant the attribution of 
rights to citizens in virtue of being part of Europe’s legal order. EU-citizenship 
institutionalises a pan-European boundary between ‘communautaires’ and 
‘non-communautaires’ (Bartolini 2005: 222). Among others, asylum seekers, 
non-European wedding partners, and visiting students are excluded from the 
democratic life of the Union. These democratic institutions create relationships 
between European citizens, and establish an external boundary between 
them and ‘outsiders’. A civic-democratic system has been erected at the 
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European level. That being said, the creation of an external border has not 
been paralleled by the destruction of internal democratic boundaries between 
national demoi. EU-citizenship is a transnational institution which is contingent 
on national citizenship. The most important upshot is that European states set 
the requirements of European citizenship on a national basis (European 
Council 2010: Art. 9, 20). Nicolaïdis rightfully characterises this process as the 
Europeanization of national citizenship (Nicolaïdis 2013: 365). The limitation 
of EU-citizens’ rights in other European states further reflects how it is a 
transnational rather than a supranational status. European citizens residing in 
other member states, for example, can be excluded from employment within 
sensitive state institutions (European Council 2010: Art. 45). The most 
common areas of exclusion are those associated with national sovereignty of 
the state, such as the military, police, and high civil service positions (Bartolini 
2005: 223). National citizenship remains in place and underpins EU-
citizenship. The latter does create a normative system of citizenship at the 
pan-European level. 
An essential modern democratic right is to vote for democratic 
representatives. Democratic voting rights are an essential part of citizens’ 
empowerment within the representative system of democratic will-formation. 
The EU-citizens can vote for their representatives in the EP. The European 
‘electorate’, however, only participates in nationally organized elections to 
decide upon their national representatives in the EP. European elections 
constitute a transnational process of aggregate will-formation, which 
contributes to European elections remaining second order ones (Bellamy 
2013: 506). EU citizen’s right to vote is therefore limited at the national level. 
EU-citizens can vote in European and municipal elections in all member 
states. But those residing in another member-state are not allowed to 
participate national elections. After consideration, the evidence suggests that 
even the transnationalisation of public spheres is very limited (Bellamy 2013: 
506; Cheneval and Schimmelfennig 2013: 336-337). A European public 
sphere to debate in and keep decision-makers to account does not exist, a 
lacuna which I will address in more detail in the next section. It moreover 
means that democratic closure remains at the national level, thus bringing 
transnational processes of interest-formation into competition with pan-
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national ones (Bartolini 2005: 248-308; Eder 2014). EP elections and EU-wide 
empowerment in municipal elections creates further democratic relationships 
between EU-citizens. Despite these processes, national democratic will-
formation through elections and deliberation in a public sphere remain a 
reality in the European polity. Citizens, therefore, also remain part of national 
civic-democratic systems. 
In conclusion, the current European polity consists of normative 
systems at the European and national level. European integration has 
cumulated in the formation of a second decision-making centre, which has 
been increasingly democratised. The number of policy areas over which the 
European regime could make autonomous decisions has expended over time. 
The EU, as it is currently structured, has a significant range of issues on 
which it can make decisions that take effect across the entire European polity. 
In return, EU-citizens have gained rights and liberties at the pan-European 
level. The boundaries between national democratic systems opened up via 
this European level. European democratic institutions continue to only reflect 
transnational rather than supranational relationships, because the boundaries 
between the domestic normative systems remain in place and citizens partake 
in the European democratic system through national arrangements. In 
European elections, EU-citizens elect national representatives within 
nationally organised elections after having debated issues in national public 
spheres. This means that national elections do not secure the free 
participation on equal footing of other EU-citizens residing in the territory. 
European citizens have still gained democratic relationships absent in other 
intergovernmental regimes, and boundaries which institutionalise democratic 
bonds between normative systems have remained in place. The entire 
normative system associated with the demos -- a constitution, electoral 
representation, and deliberation in a public sphere -- are only institutionalised 
at the national level. The European system is a partial secondary spin-off of 
this order. The civic-democratic relationships between citizens remain an 
institutional reality primarily at the national level, but a democratic normative 
system has materialised at the European one.  
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The final political fiction of the people as a nation was the product of 
systems of public socialisation. These processes integrated citizens into a 
symbolic order. The state’s nation-building efforts resulted in the emergence 
of a national identity within its territorial boundaries, which have to some 
extent become a self-reproducing cultural artifice within the national public 
sphere. Citizens thus experienced socio-cultural relationships with one 
another, despite varying degrees of diversity. Before turning to the normative 
system, I will first reflect on the possible outcome; the production of a 
communitarian identity at the European level. The outcome at the European 
level has been very limited, at best. EU-citizens do not identify, or only 
weakly, as Europeans (Bellamy 2013: 506; Cheneval and Schimmelfennig 
2013: 336-337). The creation of democratic decision-making processes might 
act as the germ of a normatively more desirable and rational European 
identity (Guibernau 2011). It does not, however, generate the characteristic 
associative sentiments which result in social legitimacy. These institutions 
effectively generate a sense of European identification, but its indicators 
remain abstract and universalistic rather than communitarian commitments 
(e.g. Delanty 2005: 19-20). Marco Antonsich concludes, for instance, that 
“EUrope still remains subordinate, in people’s minds, to the sentiment and the 
logic of national belonging” (Antonsich 2008: 517; original capitalisation). 
Moreover, identification with the nation remains a sociological reality within 
Europe’s political landscape, as predicted by early theorists of regional 
integration (Mitrany 1975) and European integration in specific (Deutsch, 
Burrell et al. 1968). The exception which proves the rule is the group of 
bureaucrats active within European institutions. European supranational elites 
share a European identity (Shore 2000) through both a pre-disposition to, and 
subsequent socialisation into it (Bartolini 2005: 137-138). Nevertheless, the 
vast majority of citizens do not identify with a European community.  
This lack of a communitarian identity can, in part, be explained by the 
lack of symbolic resources. Classic social and historical markers utilised in 
nation-building are not only hard to delineate for the Union, but often 
contested (Bartolini 2005: 213-214). The EU-elite attempted traditional 
examples of nation-building, such as the introduction a flag, anthem, and 
currency (Bartolini 2005: 216-217; Middelaar 2009: 313-335). Nation-building 
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has, to some degree, historically relied on the invention of such traditions to 
create a shared identity (e.g. Hobsbawn 1983). A shared heritage has, for 
instance, been recognised in the preamble of the constitution (Eriksen and 
Fossum 2004). Appeals to this heritage, however, are both deeply contested 
(Delanty 1995) and deemed undesirable for politico-ethical reasons (Bartolini 
2005: 213-214). Another candidate is the ‘European experience’ with 
totalitarianism, which was fuelled by initial integration efforts. This experience, 
however, has been diverse, with Eastern and Central European countries only 
recently becoming democratic. Language might offer one of the least 
normatively contested markers, but Europe’s diversity of tongues makes it an 
unlikely candidate (Bartolini 2005: 113). Citizens might be proficient in English 
-- the language of another hegemonic political power -- but this foreign 
language functions as a technical tool for communication (Bartolini 2005: 213; 
Goldmann 2001). The lack of symbolic resources to politicise can, in part, 
explain the lack of success in creating a European identity. 
Finally, and most importantly for this analysis, the normative systems 
for public socialisation into a communitarian identity are lacking on a pan-
European scale, European elites lack the institutional infrastructure for nation-
building. In mass societies, a public sphere became the substitute for face-to-
face interaction (Anderson 2006). These institutions are also important for 
democratic deliberation, but they do not exist at a pan-European level (Díez 
Medrano 2010; Goldmann 2001: 101-104; Risse 2010). Furthermore, 
vernacular languages remain institutionalised and protected at the national 
level (Bartolini 2005: 213). The lack of even a transnational connection 
between public spheres implies national frames continue to shape European 
citizens’ perception of European integration. Modern communication 
technologies, such as the Internet, also complicate this process by making 
fragmentation likely and cultural exit easier. For the time being, the normative 
system of socialisation necessary to the creation and reproduction of a 
communitarian identity at the European level is neither present nor likely to 
emerge. The European political regime also has very limited control over 
historically important policy domains. A traditionally influential nation-building 
tool, for instance, has been education policy, an area over which the EU-
regime has no significant control is over national curricula, and which would 
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allow it to shape common frames (Bartolini 2005: 216). The European 
Erasmus program, for example, finances student exchanges, but it does not 
directly impact curriculums (Bartolini 2005: 217). Such cultural exchanges 
remove internal boundaries and intensify interactions, thus creating a social 
infrastructure. Yet this normative system is primarily transnational as students 
do not enter into a ‘European administrative pilgrimage’ (Anderson 2006), but 
temporarily visit another European country. This supports the strong evidence 
which suggests that national public spheres exist and are likely to persist in 
the foreseeable future (Axtmann 2004: 267; Cheneval and Schimmelfennig 
2013: 336-338). The reproduction of historical processes of nation-building at 
the European level has become a highly elusive prospect against this 
institutional background (Bartolini 2005: 217). A socio-cultural system at the 
pan-European level has not emerged, let alone a communitarian European 
identity. Socio-cultural normative systems instead continue to reproduce 
boundaries between Europe’s national polities. This final observation further 
bolsters the analysis of deep diversity. The claim of identitarian relationships 
at the European level is highly disputable, whilst national claims continue to 
shape the European continent. 
 
In summary, this institutional analysis reflected on the normative 
systems at the European level. Firstly, the normative systems of security and 
economic prosperity have developed asymmetrically in the European 
landscape. Integration resulted in a normative system which created 
relationships at the European level. The heteronomy of national orders, 
however, significantly altered the local impact of the European system along 
national lines, even while the boundaries separating national states have 
been opened up. An outer border has furthermore been reproduced at the 
European level. Security, welfare, and even judicial enforcements, however, 
remain primarily institutionalised at the national level. Secondly, democratic 
systems have to some extent multiplied with the creation of democratic 
relationships between EU-citizens by a second European democratised 
decision-making centre. Democratic relationships at the European level are 
institutionalised in a transnational manner because EU-citizenship is a 
transnational status, and citizens elect national representatives into the EP. A 
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democratisation of the European tier of the political order has effectively taken 
place along transnational lines. A second civic-democratic system has 
become a ‘European’ institutional reality. It must be remembered, however, 
that democratic relationships remain first and foremost organised at the 
national level, where citizens engage on an equal footing in processes of 
democratic will-formation. Economic and political integration thus resulted in 
the development of relationships between citizens at the European level. The 
same is not true of socio-cultural systems. Any ‘European’ identity reflects the 
institutions of the previous two orders, both of which rely upon universalist 
values. These values lack the particularity which can give rise to a 
communitarian identity. The lack of public processes of socialisation makes 
the emergence of a particularistic system, pace the historical role of the state 
in nation-building, into an elusive prospect. One important conclusion is also 
that the social precondition of a shared sphere of democratic will-formation is 
lacking in these historical circumstances. As argued in the previous chapter, 
the public sphere accommodates the dual-process of democratic will-
formation and public socialisation. This public forum shapes and 
democratically justifies particularistic decisions which guide state policies, 
which in turn shapes the economic regimes. In contemporary Europe, the 
population remain embedded in intertwined, mutually reinforcing judicial-
economic, civic-democratic, and socio-cultural relationships at the national 
level. Pan-European relationships exist in contemporary landscape, though 
they are dependent upon these national relationships. 
 
IV - The reorganization of political power in the Union 
Having described the deep diversity and the reconfiguration of normative 
systems of peoplehood in the Union, I turn to the effective reorganisation of 
political power within the European polity. Grasping the latter is vital for 
appreciating the implausibility of the political fiction of sovereignty. It is also 
essential for coming to grips with the elusiveness of reproducing the same, or 
even a very similar, institutional context as before European integration, at 
either the national or European level. One important conclusion of this 
analysis is that the transformed European polity is likely to persist in the 
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foreseeable future. This is essential in realist appraisal of the contemporary 
conceptions of popular sovereignty’s ability to act as a heuristic device with 
which to make sense of Europe’s political order, but it also implies that 
transformed historical circumstances act as new realist constraints on 
analysis at the normative level. This analysis commences with a description of 
the organisation of autonomous decision-making and (infrastructural) 
implementation power in contemporary Europe. The EU is neither an 
intergovernmental nor a supranational regime. William Wallace famously 
describes the European Community as less than a federation, more than a 
regime (Wallace 1983), a description which continues to capture the current 
state of affairs. The EU has been labelled an empire (Marks 2012; Zielonka 
2006), regional state (Schmidt 2006), regulatory state (Majone 1996), and 
post-sovereign state (MacCormick 1996; 1997), to name but a few. These 
models share the understanding that the ‘European entity’ is not a state but a 
political order with marks of sovereignty (Balibar 2004a: 198-202; Hoffman 
1995: 4). The current political order is, so I will argue, best characterised as 
having (i) two relatively autonomous decision-making centres relying on (ii) an 
integrated multi-level governance regime. The first characterisation describes 
the lack of a single sovereign decision-making centre, whilst the second 
captures the organisation of implementation power.   
The first characteristic of Europe’s political order is the existence of 
two-tier order without an existing consensus on the hierarchy between them. 
In other words, two relatively autonomous decision-making centres have 
emerged in European polity. With the question of sovereignty undecided 
(Glencross 2012; White 2015), some argue that the European landscape 
should be characterised as anarchical (Dobson 2006: 512), whilst others 
argue that ambiguity better captures the institutional reality (Glencross 2012). 
These characterisations are accurate in so far as, empirically, no sovereign 
decision-making centre exists within the Union. In this context, supranational 
and intergovernmental decision-makers compete for autonomous decision-
making power in Europe’s political landscape (e.g. Fabbrini 2005; Zielonka 
2006). The relationship between them has been characterised as a struggle 
(Bickerton 2011: 669; Glencross 2011: 356-359; Middelaar 2009); the 
guardians and masters of the treaties represent two mindsets competing for 
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authority (Kröger and Friedrich 2013; Middelaar 2009). Supranational elites, 
which includes both technocratic (ECB, CJEU) and democratic (EP and 
Commission) institutions, claim authority in the name of an overarching 
European interest or people. They even pursue legitimation strategies which 
reflect statist logics (e.g. Eriksen and Fossum 2004; Middelaar 2009: 293-
422). National decision-makers nonetheless retain much of their decision-
making power with regard to the Union. European integration processes have 
effectively been a series of intergovernmental treaties (Bellamy 2013: 504) in 
which state power matters (Eriksen and Fossum 2004: 438). 
Intergovernmental agents even continue to claim sovereignty despite strong 
empirical evidence against it (Aalbers 2004; Ham 2001). National 
representatives nevertheless remain, or arguably have become, less willing to 
cede substantial decision-making powers to the EU due to, amongst others, 
national electoral considerations and sincere commitments to national 
sovereignty. Intergovernmental executive decision-makers are embedded in 
governance structures at the European level. Nation-states have, moreover, 
become member states as a technocratic mindset disciplines the negotiations 
between state representatives in European policy formation processes and 
treaty negotiations (Bickerton 2013; Schimmelfennig 2004). In summary, 
decision-making power has become restructured within the European polity 
into a two-tier order, though the question of sovereignty remains largely 
undecided, resulting in a degree of competition between sets of decision-
makers.  
The second characteristic of the European political order is the 
interconnectedness and integration of implementation power in the Union. 
The European decision-making centre relies on an increasingly integrated 
network of national infrastructural power to implement its decisions. European 
supranational and transnational institutions can make decisions with a certain 
degree of autonomy within particular policy areas. Once legislation (regulation 
and directives) has been approved, states and their citizens should comply. 
The supranational tier of Europe’s political order, however, depends on a 
network of national courts and bureaucracies to implement these decisions 
(Bartolini 2005: 136-141; Sangiovanni 2013: 229). The decision-makers at the 
European level cannot directly penetrate the everyday lives of ‘their’ citizens. 
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Even in domains in which European institutions have unrivalled autonomous 
competences and expertise, such as competition policy, they remain 
dependent upon Member States’ territorially organised infrastructural power 
for implementation. Andrea Sangiovanni persuasively argues that the states 
could govern without Europe, but Europe could not govern without the states 
(Sangiovanni 2013: 229). The state’s coercive force, however, tends to be 
useless for resisting already ‘delegated’ powers to European decision-making 
centre. As Bartolini observes,  
 
“coercion is not the only way to create dependency. If it is true that centres 
can no longer be created and sustained though coercion, it is equally true that 
centre formation and the dependencies that it creates can no longer be 
resisted with force, either” (Bartolini 2005: 125).  
 
The characterisation of the EU as a system of multi-level governance (Marks, 
Hooghe et al. 1996) captures both the integration of implementation power 
and the interdependence between levels. Their co-dependence also 
contributes to the elusiveness of the re-establishment of a sovereign statist 
order in Europe. 
Both European federalists and nationalist communitarians have 
advocated the reestablishment of sovereign decision-making power in the 
European polity. These solutions attempt to realign coercive order, and to 
some extent the normative systems, to a pre-integration constellation. Neither 
solution, however, is a very likely prospect in the foreseeable future. First, the 
federal dream has endured since the early days of European integration 
(Burgess 2009; Spinelli and Rossi 1941). A sovereign federal European state 
should guarantee security and subsequently economic prosperity (Morgan 
2005a; 2005b), re-establish democracy (Bickerton 2011), and reflect a 
European identity (Siedentop 2000). These arguments tend to recognize that 
a democratic European people is a tall order, but nonetheless deem it 
necessary to reconcile pan-European governance with democracy (Bickerton 
2011: 680).5 Glyn Morgan argues that the three principle objections to a 
sovereign European state -- desirability, behaviouralism, and institutional 
design -- can be overcome (Morgan 2005b: 205-206). His arguments seem 
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only feasible in the very long run. More importantly, the central role of member 
states’ executives in the institutional design and direction of the Union make a 
sovereign European state a rather elusive prospect. These intergovernmental 
elites will protect their decision-making power and sources of authority; they 
are a self-identifying people. Maybe “some form of federalism” could create a 
legitimate democratic European polity (Bellamy and Castiglione 1997: 423-
433), but a federal state is rightfully characterized as utopian (Horeth 1999: 
263). The expectation of a European federal state is, therefore, an implausible 
expectation for the Europe’s political order. 
On the other hand, nationalist communitarians argue that European 
integration has undercut the sovereign authority of Europe’s national 
democracies (Malcolm 1991). The proponents of this model argue that 
sovereignty should remain with nation-states (Bellamy and Castiglione 1997: 
433-441). Their point of departure is often the ‘no-demos thesis’ (e.g. Bellamy 
and Attucci 2009: 212-214; Friese and Wagner 2002: 345-348). These 
nationalists place the right to rule firmly with Europe’s nation-states because it 
is the site of a communitarian identity. As a result, the EU as an organisation 
should rely upon indirect legitimacy through sovereign representatives. The 
most prominent communitarian (Bellamy and Attucci 2009) or cultural theories 
of the polity (Friese and Wagner 2002) thus dismiss the possibility of a 
legitimate European political order (e.g. Grimm 2009). This ideal, however, is 
a politically unviable option. Although technically possible, member states 
would have to give up on a range of benefits (Sangiovanni 2013: 229), on top 
of which “the costs of unilateral withdrawal for recalcitrant members seem to 
have grown exponentially” (Bartolini 2005: 125). Moreover, many perceive a 
firm interest in European cooperation in a global economy (e.g. Habermas 
1999; Majone 2005). The retrenchment to national sovereign statehood is not 
impossible, but the political will seems absent in most European countries. 
Some member states might choose to leave the Union, such as the British 
referendum on membership, or they might be forced out of certain 
agreements, such as the Greek exit out of the currency Union. Still, Marcus 
Horeth is right to characterize the reintroduction of fully sovereign European 
states as an anachronism (1999: 265). In both cases, the reestablishment of a 
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political order which can give institutional resonance to the political fiction of 
sovereignty ends up being an unlikely prospect.  
This situation also makes significant boundary reconfigurations 
unlikely. The current constellation of normative systems is likely to remain 
largely in place because it reflects the European balance of power. First of all, 
the commercial system reflects the perceived shared interest in a limited 
degree of European economic integration. The coordination between systems 
for internal order reflects the interdependence which emerges within a system 
of multilevel governance. Second, the multiplication of democratic systems 
reflects the perceived necessity for a two-tier political order which requires 
democratic legitimacy at both levels. Finally, the persistence of national 
identities mirrors the continued influence of Europe’s nation-states in 
integration processes. This identity finds institutional resonance in both 
Europe’s compulsory redistributive systems and its national public spheres. At 
a sociological level, a national identity would generate the solidarity and trust 
required to sociologically legitimate the extensive infrastructural power of this 
political regime, as even many technocrats agree (e.g. Scharpf 1999). Radical 
diversity remains a cultural and institutional reality within the European polity. 
The likely persistence of the current balance of power, therefore, strongly 
suggests that the current organisation of power and configuration of normative 
systems of peoplehood are also likely to persist.  
This argument is not strictly speaking causal, but rather that the 
processes of reconfiguration and reorganisation are co-produced in Europe’s 
contemporary historical circumstances. This process is similar to the impact of 
the sovereign state on the formation of normative systems within its borders. 
As highlighted in the first and second chapter, one cannot predict the 
transformative acts of rulers nor of other historically contingent raptures, 
including revolts. Such events have the power to reshape the balance of 
power and cause another reconfiguration of normative systems. While 
accepting historical contingency, the above analysis indicates that significant 
changes in Europe’s contemporary political landscape are elusive. Its two-tier 
political order is therefore likely to persist. State representatives remain in 
control of the European integration process, but exit costs (or at least the 
perception thereof) make disintegration an implausible prospect. Even though 
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intergovernmental decision-makers have become more hesitant, and even 
sceptical, to delegate powers to supranational institutions (e.g. Meunier and 
Nicolaïdis 1999), the perceived interests of economic integration contribute to 
a sense of dependency on the European regime, the only entity capable of 
enforcing decisions within a deeply diverse polity. This three-fold institutional 
analysis shall inform the realist appraisal of the contemporary multi-faceted 
conception of popular sovereignty which dominates the EU legitimacy debate. 
 
V - A condemnation of popular sovereignty in contemporary Europe 
In this thesis, I reconstructed the contemporary conception of popular 
sovereignty from the canonical arguments which inform distinct criteria of 
legitimacy. The previous chapter vindicated the present-day multi-faceted 
conception at the normative level because it can make sense of the legitimacy 
of the modern state in relation to three key features of modern enlarged 
polities: their complexity, social pluralism, and closure. I then argued that this 
conception could plausibly act as a heuristic tool because the political fictions 
of the people and of sovereignty found practical resonance in the European 
polity before political integration. The highly coinciding borders of the state 
and these normative systems resulted in the creation of multiple 
institutionalised relationships between citizens. The conception could 
therefore guide political agents in their appraisal of the state’s legitimacy, 
using the criteria of output, democracy, and identity simultaneously. In this 
final analysis, I shall reverse the order of the realist analysis – placing 
plausibility before desirability – because, firstly, the institutional context also 
sets the stage, to some extent, for the normative analysis. The normative 
analysis requires that one takes into account historical circumstances; the 
realist constraint. The above analysis implies that these features have 
changed in contemporary Europe. Deep diversity constitutes a new constraint, 
whilst the two-tier political order is a new object to make sense of. Still, the 
reflection on desirability requires a further degree of abstraction to do justice 
to the normative impetus of the realist method. My analysis nevertheless 
results in a condemnation of the contemporary multi-faceted conception of 
popular sovereignty at both levels. The first task is to analyse the plausibility 
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of the political fictions of the people and of sovereignty in making sense of the 
EU’s legitimacy, the success of which depends on their practical resonance. 
This analyses focuses on the four political fictions at the heart of the 
contemporary conception of popular sovereignty; namely, the people as (i) 
beneficiaries, (ii) demos, and (iii) nation and (iv) (state) sovereignty. I shall 
relate each fiction to the relevant types of relationships and organisations of 
power, looking at both the European and the national level. In a nutshell, the 
three fictions of the people retain a high degree of plausibility at the national 
level, but fail to achieve a similar degree of resonance at the European level. 
The concept of sovereignty does not retain much institutional plausibility at 
either level.  
Starting with the beneficiaries, the plausibility of this conception of the 
people relies on it being part of a judicial-economic system. The modern state 
shaped, protected, and advanced citizens’ security and economic interests, 
and bound them together into a society of mutual beneficiaries. National 
welfare states further bound their polities through their compulsory 
redistribution systems. In present day Europe, states continue to maintain 
these normative systems within their territorial borders. In addition, states 
maintain policing apparatus to maintain internal order and provide security 
from external threats. Integration has resulted in the creation of a normative 
system of security and economic prosperity at the pan-European level. The 
Union has a diplomatic service of sorts and even a rapid response force, but it 
also cooperates closely in the realm of law enforcement and border patrol. 
This system coordinates normative systems rather than integrating them. The 
most far going process of integration, however, has taken place in the 
economic sphere. A set of authoritative, legal, and bureaucratic institutions 
maintain a normative system of open economic borders, and represent 
shared economic interests aboard. The introduction of the Euro created a 
single monetary order for some EU-citizens. The political fiction of the people 
as beneficiaries therefore finds some institutional traction at the European 
level. Practical resonance, however, remains very limited because, on the one 
hand, supranational decisions result in distinct national experiences and, on 
the other hand, important enforcement and redistributive systems remain 
firmly organised at the national level. The current economic crisis has, 
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however, made the openness of these normative systems and 
interdependencies more salient to the greater public. Yet deep diversity 
remains a fact of life for most citizens, despite varying degrees of cooperation 
and even some integration at the European level. The political fiction of 
beneficiaries remains most plausible at the national level, where boundaries 
between particularistic national polities are maintained. The plausibility of this 
fiction is challenged at the pan-European level, where the heterogeneity of 
judicial-economic systems means EU decisions are implemented, and 
therefore experienced, in varying manners. In short, the fiction of beneficiaries 
remains mostly plausible at the national level, albeit it has some traction at the 
European level.  
The people as demos relied upon citizens being able to partake in 
representative democracies. This normative system creates procedural 
relationships between citizens within the polity based on liberty and equality in 
will-formation processes. The three core institutions were a democratic 
constitution, the election of decision-makers, and a deliberative public sphere. 
These three institutions democratised states, transforming subjects into 
citizens. European integration has opened up these democratic systems, 
which means that national groups can pursue interests at both levels, thus 
offering a degree of power to ‘exit’ one system or another. Certain democratic 
relationships have additionally been created between European citizens, such 
as EU-citizenship and the right to elect some representatives in the European 
institutions. The political fiction of the demos therefore has a certain degree of 
practical resonance. European democratic bonds, however, continue to rely 
upon membership of national polities. Representative democracies continue 
to integrate citizens at the national level. Moreover, the lack of a public sphere 
means that deliberative processes remain institutionalised at the national 
level. The essential integrative process of democratic will-formation is almost 
completely absent at the pan-European level. As such, the political fiction of 
the people as demos remains most plausible at the national level. Individuals 
remain citizens of their nation-state, elect representatives in national 
elections, and participate in national deliberations on the public good first and 
foremost. These particular systems also reflect distinct understandings and 
consensuses of democratic legitimacy at the national level. In summary, the 
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opening up of national systems has given some degree of practical resonance 
to the demos at the European level. Nevertheless, this political fiction remains 
highly plausible at the national level due to the persistence of democratic 
representative systems at this level.  
The lack of a European identity and infrastructure for its creation 
makes the political fiction of the people as nation implausible at the European 
level. Within nation-states on the other hand, the people as nation gained 
plausibility due to public socialisation into shared cultural frames. Citizens 
became part of a socio-cultural system, which in turn gave rise to a 
communitarian identity. These cultural relationships gave practical resonance 
to the claims of particularistic nations underlying European nation-states. The 
socio-cultural system at the European level, in so far as any emerges, lacks 
exactly this particularism at the core of its supposed communitarian identity. 
Europe’s shared (democratic) values are too universalistic to ground such an 
identity. Public socialisation processes, moreover, remain institutionalised at 
the national level. European integration has done relatively little to challenge, 
reproduce, or open up this normative system, let alone replace it. Citizens 
remain embedded in socio-cultural relationships at the national level. The 
heterogeneity of judicial-economic and civic-democratic orders at the state 
level further bolsters claims to national particularity. Deep diversity within the 
EU, therefore, is not a widely shared belief that is ungrounded. The 
particularity of national systems within different states makes it an institutional 
fact on the ground. As a result, the people as nation is not plausible at the 
European level, whilst it continues to resonate at the national level. 
The political fiction of sovereignty has become an implausible claim at 
both the national and European level. Historically, it became an institutional 
reality at the national level. State formation was a process in which the judicial 
fiction of sovereignty increasingly became an empirical reality. The 
centralisation of decision-making power and the accumulation of resources 
necessary for the implementation of its decisions gave plausibility to this 
political fiction. State agents could appeal to the three conceptions of popular 
sovereignty to legitimate this state formation process. A two-tier political order 
has nonetheless emerged in contemporary Europe. Integration has not only 
intensified cooperation between sovereign states but also integrated parts of 
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their decision-making power, which is euphemistically referred to as pooling, 
or delegation of powers. In contrast to, for instance, Lindseth’s (2011) or 
Cheneval’s claims (2008), I want to suggest that this (normative) delegation 
can no longer remain combined with claims to sovereignty in the statist sense. 
Some suggest that European integration has been the official death sentence 
of sovereignty (Bellamy and Castiglione 1997: 421). The modern concept of 
sovereignty was never as absolute in practice as in theory, and was hence a 
political fiction from its inception. Early modern theorists, such as Adam 
Smith, reflected on the political economic constraints on rulers’ range of policy 
choices (Hont 2005: 185-266). The transformative aspect of European 
integration has not only meant that sovereign authority has become contested 
within the polity (see also Glencross 2012), but also that the institutional 
centralisation which gave it practical resonance is no longer an everyday 
reality of rule. What this means is that neither the European regime nor the 
national one can continue to plausibly claim full sovereignty. This contested 
claim warrants further attention. 
The organisation of powers into a two-tier political order implies that 
neither can autonomously decide on all policy matters. The strongest claim to 
sovereignty arguably lies with national representatives, as the masters of the 
treaties. This claim is bolstered by the monopoly on the resources necessary 
for enforcement, national executives can decide upon the direction of the EU, 
and remain incorporated in decision-making procedures at the European 
level. Three interrelated processes of European integration nonetheless 
emerge to strongly contest their empirical claim to sovereignty. First is the 
judicial delegation of competences over entire policy domains to the 
supranational level, which has been accompanied by the integration of 
implementation powers. One example is the domain of competition policy 
enforced by Commission and CJEU. Second, the European tendency toward 
executive federalism (Crum 2013) challenges the claim that sovereignty 
remains with national representatives. This process has resulted in the 
transfer of powers to technocratic institutions, such as the ECB. More 
importantly, national executives institutionalised their transnational rule at the 
European level, a space in which they can take decisions through qualified 
majorities rather than through unanimity. Third, the supranational elite often 
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rely upon the dissonance which arises between national governments. The 
European centre can make decisions in relative autonomy by filling the space 
in the decision-making vacuum left by conflicting states. The masters of the 
treaties can, therefore, not always keep the guardians to account. In such 
situations, the latter at times share a higher degree of common purpose. The 
ECB, for instance, makes decisions with direct and undoubtedly political 
consequences concerning Greece’s membership of the Eurozone. These 
processes challenge Moravcsik’s liberal-intergovernmental claim (Moravcsik 
1998; 2002; see also Schimmelfennig 2004). Even if states might ultimately 
chose to leave the Union, these processes challenge the political fiction of 
sovereignty in citizens’ everyday experience of politics. The claims of 
nationalist populations that they have ‘lost’ their national sovereignty are not 
without institutional merit. However the opposite claim of a transfer of 
sovereignty to the European level remains implausible. The restructuring of 
power has meant that the political fiction of sovereignty no longer finds 
practical resonance. The willing suspension of disbelief becomes unlikely due 
to the concept’s inability to act as a heuristic tool in making sense of Europe’s 
contemporary political order.  
This realist analysis has, I hope, convincingly demonstrated that the 
three fictions of the people remain anchored to the national level. The national 
particularity of this three-fold fiction of the people might challenge the 
legitimacy of European integration. New interpretations of these political 
fictions however are gaining some practical resonance. The people as 
beneficiaries and demos both find some resonance at the European level. 
Moving on to the political fiction of sovereignty, it is the most problematic to 
maintain at either level. The restructuring of power in Europe means that it 
holds little practical resonance. The historical congruence between a 
particularistic people and a political order’s sovereignty is no longer in place, 
hence neither the three-fold conception, nor any of three distinct conceptions, 
can make sense due to the implausibility of the fiction of sovereignty. A 
holistic realist appraisal of these four political fictions therefore results in a 
condemnation of our commitment of popular sovereignty as a heuristic tool in 
contemporary Europe. The conclusion, however, is not set on justifying the 
previous status quo (e.g. Rossi and Sleat 2014). As argued in chapter one, 
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normative realists can demand the impossible. The contemporary 
commitment might require some new substantive fictions or an alignment of 
fact and fiction, as has happened in the past. The dismissal of political 
plausibility is therefore not sufficient to dismiss this conception at the 
normative level. If one can make the normative claim that this conceptual 
structure could make sense of the EU’s legitimacy in relation to the key 
features of the contemporary European polity, then a vindication of our 
commitment is possible. The second part of the analysis therefore assesses 
whether commitment to the contemporary conception of popular sovereignty 
could make sense of legitimacy in Europe’s political order.  
 The normative appraisal of a political conception relies on an analysis 
of its functionality in making sense of a political order’s normative 
attractiveness, within a particular set of historical circumstances. In the case 
of contemporary Europe, the political order is no longer a centralised, 
relatively autonomous state with a hierarchical decision-making centre. The 
European and statist regimes are no longer separable, but integrated, or at 
least institutionally interconnected, into a two-tier political order. The 
conception of popular sovereignty should therefore accommodate legitimation 
stories able to make sense of these ‘orders’ together. Turning to the historical 
circumstances, the three key features of modern enlarged polities -- their 
complexity, value pluralism, and closure -- remain in place, but one also 
needs to take into account deep diversity within Europe. In the following 
normative analysis, I will appraise each contemporary conception of popular 
sovereignty and, to avoid objections of historical particularity, the more 
abstract normative conceptual structure of the contemporary conception of 
popular sovereignty. This normative analysis illustrates that, from the realist 
perspective, the plausibility of political fictions is not the primary challenge for 
our normative commitment. The main challenge is that the contemporary 
multi-faceted conception of popular sovereignty, which governs the legitimacy 
debate, cannot make sense of Europe’s political order in this historical 
context. 
 In the previous chapter, the vindication of the technocratic conception 
of popular sovereignty emerged as a functional response to the complexity of 
the modern enlarged polity. On this conceptual structure, output legitimacy 
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could become an appropriate criterion to evaluate the EU’s legitimacy. 
Technological advancements have contributed to an increasingly competitive 
and complex international political economy. The EU’s highly specialised 
administrative bureaucracy is a functional response to the continued need to 
produce benefits for the citizenry in this complex environment (e.g. Lindseth 
2011). This technocratic conception could make sense of the European 
interest in a global context -- “Smith abroad, Keynes at home” (Ferrera quoted 
in: Sangiovanni 2013: 224). The persistence of extensive national 
bureaucracies can thus be conceived as means to deal with the heterogeneity 
of the political orders. The contemporary European political order can 
consequently be understood as continuing to attain benefits for citizens in 
changing historical circumstances. This intertwinement, however, means that 
neither regime can monopolise this source of legitimacy. Further the EU lacks 
any meaningful powers to generate support through non-monetary economic 
instruments (Bartolini 2005: 199) which can compensate for the popular 
resentment caused by macro-economic integration. The impact of the 2008 
global financial crisis on the Eurozone, including multiple bailouts, enforced 
austerity on multiple countries, and the enforced instalment of the technocratic 
Monti-government, further challenges this fair weather story. European 
citizenries had distinct national experiences, with some being significantly 
more severe than others. Europe’s deep diversity then also shapes attempts 
to make sense of these “traumas”. ‘European’ outputs transform into diverse 
economic outputs due to domestic (redistributive) economic systems. The 
heterogeneous domestic judicial-economic systems challenge the principle 
assumption of the beneficiaries’ story, namely that EU-citizens share 
economic interests. In summary, the globalisation of the political economy can 
offer a functional explanation for the creation of a two-tier political order based 
upon the technocratic conception of popular sovereignty. Deep diversity, 
however, grounds some serious doubts at the normative level about this 
conception’s ability to make sense of the output criterion for the Union.  
The idea of meaningful interests has historically been challenged in 
democratic cultures. The democratic conception of popular sovereignty found 
its vindication as a functional response to circumstances of value pluralism. 
Democracy offers means for peaceful conflict resolution within this context, 
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thereby answering the first political question in relation to modern 
circumstances in a desirable manner. For the EU, a functional vindication 
might lie in the peaceful resolution of conflicts between historically 
antagonistic political communities. The European democratic order offers the 
infrastructure to funnel these conflicts, whilst national orders would funnel 
interests between the groups within the state’s borders. The existence of two 
democratic regimes, however, might in itself result in the mutual undermining 
each one’s democratic legitimacy (Cheneval and Schimmelfennig 2013; Lord 
and Pollak 2010). The contemporary conception explicitly connects one 
demos to one centre in order for it to express its sovereign will; the 
competitive conception (Glencross 2012) is, thus, no longer in line with 
contemporary conception of popular sovereignty. This conception of popular 
sovereignty cannot make sense of dual sovereigns competing to represent 
the common will (leaving aside the diversity of 28 national ones) in Europe’s 
two-tier political order. Moreover, each polity has particularistic 
understandings of legitimate democratic will-formation. Deep diversity also 
characterizes national democratic arrangements. Yet it also constrains pan-
European democracy. The European polity lacks common forums to 
accommodate mass deliberation, or at least opinion-formation. The European 
regime has to functionally deal with a community of strangers (Castiglione 
2009), with a polity which lacks the tools to connect a European democracy to 
will-formation processes at the national level (Crum 2013: 615-619; Fossum 
2005). The pluralism in Europe’s polity is effectively of a markedly different 
species; value pluralism within the polities and deep diversity between them. 
In summary, the democratic conception of popular sovereignty could make 
sense as a functional response to peacefully govern relationships between 
antagonistic groups. The deep diversity of the European polity, however, sets 
constraints on the central process of the democratic conception of popular 
sovereignty: procedural will-formation. In other words, the democratic 
conception cannot remain vindicated at the normative level in these 
circumstances.  
In the previous chapter, I argued that neither the technocratic nor the 
democratic conception could make sense of the closure of a polity. These 
conceptions assume closure. On the identiarian conception, socio-cultural 
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distinctiveness came to legitimate the high degree of closure of state polities. 
The state’s legitimacy, in turn, relied on the congruence between the 
communitarian identity and the political order. The identitarian conception 
finds its functional vindication in the ability to make sense of the closure of the 
modern polity. The European polity, on the other hand, lacks a communitarian 
identity which makes sense of its closure, despite some theorists, like Jürgen 
Habermas, attempting to ground it in a non-consumerist culture (Cheneval 
2010; Friese and Wagner 2002; Habermas and Derrida 2003). Leaving aside 
empirical plausibility, this identity does not make sense of social legitimacy in 
a polity marked by deep diversity. First, the defining feature of deep diversity 
is the existence of multiple communitarian identities in the polity. The question 
of closure is already answered in functional terms at the national level by the 
identitarian conception. Second, the European political community would 
compete with national political communities because this conception 
exclusively relates a nation’s sovereignty to political independence. If the 
European identity were to overcome national ones, then the polity would be 
transformed once more, though this remains an elusive expectation. 
Alternatively, a European identity of some sort might emerge by virtue of the 
EU’s institutional infrastructure; a rational ‘embryonic’ identity (Guibernau 
2011). Such an identity would not offer a functional response to the need of 
closure in the polity however, because the principles are too universalistic to 
relate a national identity to a political regime. These principles might inform a 
story to legitimate why diverse polities are together, but they cannot justify 
why the closure of the EU should be contained to European countries. EU-
institutions would, therefore, have to change to include others with similar 
commitments, or forfeit its legitimacy. Closure of the European polity remains 
a persistent challenge from this realist perspective. The nationalist conception 
of popular sovereignty can make sense of the closure at the national level, but 
it cannot offer an account of the closure, and hence legitimacy, of the second 
tier of the political order, and can therefore not remain vindicated in 
contemporary Europe.  
This appraisal results in a condemnation of the three conceptions of 
popular sovereignty at the normative level. At this stage, I move to a higher 
level of abstraction to further clarify the significance of the two-tier order and 
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of deep diversity for this condemnation. Popular sovereignty, as a genre of 
legitimation story, possesses a particular conceptual structure. The latter 
posits that a constituent power bound together by a bond of collectivity is the 
authoritative source of a unitary constituted power, at least normatively. My 
genealogical enterprise illustrated that the constituted power became 
understood as the sovereign state. A possible vindication of this conceptual 
structure lies in its ability to offer a functional explanation for European 
integration. To remain sovereign in an increasingly competitive international 
political economy, the constituent powers had to ‘aggregate’ their sovereignty 
within a second decision-making centre. Bernard Williams explains that initial 
functional explanations can lose their force due to unforeseen consequences 
(Williams 2004: 20-40). An arguably unintended consequence has been the 
incremental dismantling of state sovereignty at the national level. As a result, 
so I will argue, the conception of popular sovereignty which informed change 
in Europe no longer remains normatively vindicated in the contemporary 
context. The emerging two-tier political order and the circumstance of deep 
diversity challenges the contemporary conceptual structure of popular 
sovereignty. On the one hand, deep diversity means that the European polity 
lacks a single popular sovereign to make sense of its two-tier political order. 
Furthermore, the more abstracted conceptual structure of popular sovereignty 
does not provide a functional justification to merge these polities into a single 
constituent power. On the other hand, the two-tier political order also 
challenges this conceptual structure. The stories of popular sovereignty have 
crystallised to make sense of a single authoritative decision-making centre: 
the unitary structure discussed at the start of the previous chapter. Europe’s 
two-tier political order, however, consists of two decision-making centres. The 
structure cannot offer a functional explanation for the persistence of this 
fractured order. In summary, the conceptual structure does not act as a 
functional heuristic device in these circumstances, or at the normative level. 
The conceptual structure of popular sovereignty cannot make sense of 
Europe’s two-tier order’s legitimacy, and might even contribute to its 
delegitimation. My realist claim becomes explicitly normative; statist 
conceptions of popular sovereignty should not govern our attempts to make 
sense of the EU’s legitimacy. To clarify, my argument is not an empirical claim 
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that popular sovereignty has no practical resonance in the institutional 
structures of Europe. The persistence of states and the strength of national 
institutions which shape relationships between national citizenries gives it 
some degree of empirical relevance. The persistence of this political formation 
reinforces the belief that homo nationalis makes sense of the political world as 
a form of popular sovereignty (Balibar 2004b). The institutional reality of 
European politics, however, makes it into a poor heuristic device to make 
sense of the organisation of power. Further in relation to citizens’ beliefs, the 
research is to some extent predicated on the opposite hypothesis; popular 
sovereignty does discipline processes of making sense of the EU’s legitimacy. 
Moreover, this conception has shaped the European polity, as I argued in the 
previous chapter. From this perceptive however, the European regime 
imposes its foreign will upon national orders, resulting in high levels of 
resentment (e.g. Bartolini 2005; Siedentop 2000). This kind of resentment 
fuelled decolonisation movements; hence it is a political force to take 
seriously. Klaus Eder’s proposal to place the nation on par with functional 
interest groups (Eder 2014) seems to also overlook this reality, because these 
groups also directly challenge peoples’ self-determination. In the current 
climate of financial crisis, the rise of Euro-sceptic parties across the Union 
reflects the delegitimating force of this conceptual structure. More accurately, 
the conceptual structure of popular sovereignty becomes a source of 
resentment toward part of the European body politic. One might argue that 
this gives rise to a strange sort of self-hatred of the two-tier political order. 
From a realist perspective, therefore, this political conceptual structure no 
longer meets the ‘realist constraint’ of making sense of the legitimacy of a 
political order within its own historical circumstances. The contemporary 
conceptual structure of popular sovereignty can no longer guide political 
agents in meaningful ways in Europe’s novel political landscape. The three 
associated criteria of legitimacy thus primarily become sources of contestation 
rather than legitimation. This realist analysis results in a condemnation of our 
commitment to the contemporary conception of popular sovereignty at the 
normative level. 
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VI - Conclusion 
This chapter presented the institutionalization of the people and of sovereignty 
in Europe’s contemporary political landscape. In the aftermath of the Second 
World War, European states engaged in processes of restructuring power and 
reconfiguring boundaries so as to retain their legitimacy. Most normative 
systems of peoplehood remain institutionalised at the national level in very 
particular ways, as was explored in the analysis of deep diversity within the 
European polity. The institutional analysis also showed that the boundaries 
between national systems have been opening up. Parts of the judicial-
economic and civic-democratic normative system at the national level have, in 
parallel, been transferred and reproduced at the European level. These 
systems coincide with a significant restructuring of power within the European 
polity. National implementation systems have become increasingly 
interdependent and institutionally linked-up through a set of legally 
authoritative supranational and transnational institutions. The European 
system also includes a second authoritative decision-making centre, which 
added a second tier to Europe’s political order. The re-establishment of a 
sovereign order at either the national or European level has become an 
elusive prospect, most importantly, because the more powerful 
intergovernmental decision-making powers are reliant upon supranational 
authority. In these circumstances, the political fictions of people continue to 
find practical resonance at the national level. Furthermore, the people as 
beneficiaries and demos find some limited resonance at the European level, 
while the political fiction of state sovereignty finds little resonance at either the 
national or European level. A holistic appraisal shows that popular 
sovereignty, therefore, cannot realistically act as a heuristic device to guide 
political agents’ appraisals of legitimacy in contemporary Europe. Moreover, 
the conceptions and conceptual structure of popular sovereignty cannot make 
sense of the desirability of Europe’s two-tier political order within the historical 
circumstances of deep diversity. Popular sovereignty, therefore, cannot 
remain vindicated at the normative level. This realist analysis results in a 
‘condemnation’ of our commitment to the contemporary multi-faceted 
conception of popular sovereignty. This lack of vindication should result in a 
‘loss of confidence’ in our current conception of popular sovereignty, which is 
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arguably reflected in the EU’s democratic deficit and the wider crisis of 
democracy. This confidence, however, can be restored if our statist 
conception would transform to adapt to current historical circumstances in 
Europe. In the last chapter, I suggest that a commitment to popular 
sovereignty in this novel institutional landscape requires a demoicratic 
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 Saskia Sassen similarly observes that globalisation processes build up from assemblages of 
national particularities (Sassen 2006). 
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[S]tate-bound demoi can no longer do their thing separately, nor organize 
their co-operation by borrowing from traditional notions of domestic law and 
democracy, that is, democracy of the kind we are familiar with and whose 
vocabulary has become second nature to most Europeans – predicated on 
the constructed existence of a ‘people’. 
Kalypso Nicolaïdis, ‘European Demoicracy and its Crisis’, 366 
 
By considering alternative futures, we begin to see that the future is shaped 
not only by the past but by what we think is possible and by the choices we 
make. 
The Shell International Petroleum Company1 
 
I - Introduction 
The previous chapter concluded that a normative commitment to the 
contemporary conception of popular sovereignty could no longer remain 
vindicated in Europe’s contemporary historical circumstances. This appraisal 
rested upon a three-fold institutional analysis of Europe’s novel political 
landscape. The first part of the analysis focussed upon the outcome of the 
highly coinciding normative systems within the state’s territory. I argued that 
these reinforcing boundaries have resulted in deep diversity. National 
arrangements depend on the output, democratic, and identitarian criteria to 
make sense of European states’ legitimacy. Heterogeneous institutional 
arrangements of the judicial-economic, civic-democratic, and socio-cultural 
normative systems within the state territories reflect distinct consensuses on 
the state’s legitimacy, shaped by each state’s particular historical 
circumstances and understandings thereof. After this national-level analysis, I 
examined the reconfiguration of the normative systems of peoplehood in 
contemporary Europe, with a focus on the European level. The analysis 
showed that national economic and democratic arrangements had opened up 
due to the creation of judicial-economic and civic-democratic systems at the 
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pan-European level. Thirdly, I analysed the restructuring of political power that 
has taken place. The European polity has a two-tier political order 
characterised by autonomous decision-making power at both the national and 
European level, with implementation power being integrated through a system 
of multi-level governance. The current balance of power has made the 
transformation of this institutional landscape an unlikely prospect in the 
foreseeable future. In the realist appraisal, I argued that the contemporary 
conception of popular sovereignty cannot act as a heuristic tool due to the 
loss of practical resonance of its core political fictions, nor make sense of the 
legitimacy of the political order within current historical circumstances. This 
inability might well contribute to the persistent debate on the EU’s democratic 
deficit, and is a negative conclusion which further raises a set of normative 
questions. In this final chapter, I will argue that another conception of popular 
sovereignty could potentially make sense of the EU’s legitimacy through a 
realist lens. 
 This chapter proposes a demoicratic reconceptualisation of popular 
sovereignty. This reconceptualisation of popular sovereignty can make sense 
of the legitimacy of Europe’s two-tier political order within the European 
context of deep diversity. This chapter constitutes the normative payoff of the 
genealogical enterprise into the conception of popular sovereignty which 
governs the EU legitimacy debate. This extensive genealogical enterprise was 
necessary due to the historical constitution of the contemporary conception of 
popular sovereignty, and because the appraisal relies upon the concept’s 
functionality within its own historical circumstances. This genealogy 
contributed to a more sophisticated understanding of the multiple facets of the 
contemporary conception of popular sovereignty, and its functional reliance 
upon a particular institutional context. Furthermore, commitment to this 
conception in a statist polity was vindicated from a realist perspective. The 
transformation of the European polity, however, challenges not only its 
heuristic functionality, but also its normative ability to make sense of the 
existing political order from within its socio-political context. Taking this 
conclusion as its point of departure, this chapter departs from the Williams’ 
inspired assessment of a conceptual commitment to a realist method of 
conceptual formation. The theoretical approach nevertheless remains 
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embedded in Williams’ wider political philosophy, in which political 
commitments should make sense of particular political orders. Using Andrea 
Sangiovanni’s practice-dependent method of concept formation, I intend to 
propose an interpretation of the institutional European bonds of collectivity. I 
argue that the judicial-economic systems resulted in a commercial bond of 
collectivity, and the civic-democratic ones in a demoicratic one at the 
European level. This interpretation grounds the case for a demoicratic 
reconceptualisation of popular sovereignty, because the conceptual structure 
of popular sovereignty connects multiple constituent powers to non-sovereign 
constituted power. The significant insight here is that it breaks the conceptual 
relationships between (state) sovereignty and popular sovereignty. In addition 
to this normative attractiveness, I continue by suggesting that this conception 
could act as heuristic tool to make sense of EU legitimacy as part of Europe’s 
novel contemporary political landscape. The chapter, thus, ultimately returns 
to the real world problem triggering this genealogical enterprise: the EU’s 
democratic deficit. 
 The argument unfolds as follows: the chapter starts (section II) by 
placing this chapter within the wider literature on demoicracy in the European 
Union. This increasingly salient literature aims to make sense of the 
persistence of peoples -- deep diversity -- and the EU as a novel regime 
through which to manage dependencies between them. I will align their 
position with the core findings from the previous chapter; deep diversity and a 
two-tier political order. This section also distinguishes my point of departure 
from some of the more idealist demoicrats. In the subsequent section (section 
III), I suggest that a two-tier interpretation of the institutional bonds of 
collectivity within the European polity is appropriate for the Union using 
Sangiovanni’s institutionalist realist method (Sangiovanni 2008). Individual 
citizens remain institutionally bound up in national peoples, the latter, 
however, have gained transnational bonds as a result of European 
integration. These bonds make sense of the interconnectedness of the 
European political landscape, this two-tier conception of the people can 
therefore act as a realistic heuristic tool resulting in the willing suspension of 
disbelief of this political fiction. This interpretation of the bonds of collectivity 
informs my subsequent proposal (section IV) for a demoicratic 
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reconceptualisation of popular sovereignty. I emphasise that multiple 
constituent powers do not just create nationally political orders, but also a 
multinational order to govern their transnational bonds. This demoicratic 
conceptual structure can govern stories which make sense of the EU’s (and 
the member states’) legitimacy. Finally (section V), I return to the real world 
problem of the EU’s democratic deficit by sketching the consequences for the 
EU’s democratic institutions in relation to these commercial and demoicratic 
bonds. To anticipate my argument, a demoicratic conception of popular 
sovereignty can largely legitimate the EU democratically. The conception, 
however, suggests a greater role for national parliaments, and scepticism 
toward the institutional consequences of the monetary union. A demoicratic 
conception of popular sovereignty could guide the behaviour of political 
agents in making sense of the Union’s deep diversity and interdependencies 
without losing critical potential. I conclude (section V) on the hopeful note that 
a legitimate demoicratic European polity is a realistic prospect for the 
foreseeable future.   
II - The EU as (legitimate) demoicracy 
The conclusion of my normative realist assessment is that the commitment to 
a multi-faceted conception of popular sovereignty can no longer remain 
vindicated. This contemporary conception can neither act as a functional 
heuristic nor as a realistic normative commitment to make sense of the EU’s 
(or states’) legitimacy within Europe’s transformed political landscape. The 
normative payoff of this thesis lies in this chapter’s proposal for a demoicratic 
conception of popular sovereignty. Demoicracy is increasingly salient concept 
in EU studies literature. The affinity with this position warrants a more in-depth 
treatment than in the first chapter because my institutional analysis resonates 
with this literature. From the institutional analysis, I conclude that the 
combination of deep diversity and a two-tier political order contribute 
significantly to the condemnation of popular sovereignty. The coinciding of 
these national orders within the ‘hard shell’ of the territorially sovereign state 
resulted in a progressive separation between European statist polities. The 
latter entered the process of integration with differing agreements on how 
each of the three criteria of legitimacy intertwine in the legitimation of their 
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state, shaping and being shaped by their specific social and political 
institutions. This deep diversity also results in distinct perspectives on the 
legitimacy of the EU (e.g. Lacroix and Nicolaïdis 2010b; Nicolaïdis and Young 
2014: 1409-1411). The particularity of Europe’s domestic politico-statist, 
judicial-economic, civic-democratic, and socio-cultural institutions continue to 
shape individuals’ relationships to one another in the Europe’s contemporary 
polity. The theoretical upshot is that deep diversity sets a realist constraint on 
a political theory of EU legitimacy. Broadly, demoicrats share this analysis of 
deep diversity at the national level, and reject the existence and desirability of 
a European people. Richard Bellamy, in particular, explicitly rejects the 
existence of any supranational equivalent to these national peoples (Bellamy 
2013). In line with this demoicratic analysis, therefore, a conception of popular 
sovereignty which is aiming to make sense of EU legitimacy can rely upon the 
political fiction of the people but only at the national level.   
The justification of European integration has developed since early 
integration. The initial justifications for integration were the benefits of 
preventing war and attaining prosperity. These outputs were initially Pareto-
optimal zero-sum games (Lord 2011). Both the permissive consensus and 
overwhelming European elite preference for integration can make sense in 
these circumstances. The emphases in legitimation stories of European 
integration have changed in contemporary political landscape. Two strands 
have been particularly salient, and which focus on specific issues at the 
European level: (i) the interdependence in attaining global economic 
competitiveness and tackling other problems, and (ii) the interdependence in 
governing these issues, and other interdependences, democratically. The first 
type of argument justifies executive federalism (Crum 2013). Technocratic 
institutions accountable to intergovernmental ones can arguably pursue set 
aims without need for direct democratic legitimation (Scharpf 1999). The 
second type of argument justifies Europe’s multilateral, transnational and 
supranational decision-making authorities as long as the regime incorporates 
direct democratic legitimation mechanisms in its institutional infrastructure. 
The Union should offer democratic tools to manage interdependencies 
between Europe’s democracies (Nicolaïdis 2013: 351). Leaving aside the 
(initial) empirical validity of these justifications for integration, the EU 
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contributes to the creation of institutional interdependencies. The progressive 
pooling of sovereignty at the European level, and democratisation of 
established decision-making institutions -- whether to attain legitimacy (e.g. 
Føllesdal and Hix 2006) or fulfil a federal (messianic) telos (Weiler 2012) -- 
resulted in the structuration of a second tier in Europe’s political order. The 
impact on the relationships between citizens has primarily been the opening 
up of borders between statist polities weakening their economic and 
democratic-political boundaries. From this perspective, national autonomy let 
alone sovereignty has become an outdated concept to capture this reality 
(see however Cheneval 2008; Lindseth 2011). The existing political order 
challenges such Kantian statist conceptual frameworks of republican 
autonomy.2 The main point, by contrast, is that European integration resulted 
in the institutionalisation of interdependencies between national orders 
through a European political order, which, in turn, created particular 
relationships between citizens in the European polity (more on their nature to 
come later on).  
Demoicratic scholars propose models to do justice to this reality of 
national orders and European interdependence. Many argue that the current 
state of affairs is more normatively desirable than a statist order at the 
national or European level. The demoicratic literature attempts, therefore, to 
make sense of the EU’s legitimacy as (part of) a novel non-state political 
regime able to govern this demoicratic polity (Nicolaïdis 2013: 354). The 
literature is more diverse on the issue of appropriate legitimate institutional 
design for the Union. Idealist contributions take a principle-first approach to 
the question of the EU’s legitimacy (e.g. Bohman 2004; Cheneval and 
Schimmelfennig 2013; Scherz 2013). These approaches start with an ideal of 
democracy to then apply it to the EU. Unlike Morgan’s federal statism, these 
accounts aim to make sense of a demoicratic polity. They tend to propose an 
institutional form based upon a single principle that should justify the Union in 
the eyes of reasonable citizens. James Bohman, for instance, uses a 
deliberative principle to theorise legitimate governance in the Union (Bohman 
2004). However, the most prominent ideal theorist of the EU as legitimate 
demoicracy has been Francis Cheneval (Cheneval 2008; 2011; Cheneval and 
Schimmelfennig 2013). Cheneval takes a Rawlsian political constructivist 
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approach (Cheneval and Schimmelfennig 2013: 335) akin to Glyn Morgan 
(Morgan 2005a). In his article together with Frank Schimmelfennig, 
Cheneval’s ideal benchmark is applied specifically to the EU (Cheneval and 
Schimmelfennig 2013: 340; fn 4).3 They argue that a Union is a realm of 
justice between the international and the domestic (Cheneval and 
Schimmelfennig 2013: 334). After offering some free standing, broadly 
accepted empirical claims on the EU, they claim that the democratic deficit is 
a product of the unrecognised normative nature of the EU as an in-between 
polity. The EU should be made sense of as a demoicracy. To quote the 
authors at length on their definition,  
 
Demoicracy is a specific political order that takes into account the two 
fundamental normative references of liberal democracy: citizens and 
statespeoples. It does not compromise on core fundamental rights of 
individuals, but it balances the political rights of individuals and statespeoples. 
Democratic statespeoples ought to recognize each other’s institutions of 
freedom – most of all each other’s popular sovereignty. However, as decent 
statespeoples, they should also take into consideration the negative 
externalities their democratic decisions have on each other and on the 
fundamental rights of citizens of other statespeoples. Hence, they ought to 
co-ordinate their decisions and decision-making bodies accordingly. 
Furthermore, liberal democracies ought to respect the individual rights of 
citizens (Cheneval and Schimmelfennig 2013: 340).   
 
In an earlier article, Cheneval argues that “Territories and formal sovereignty 
of states are thus valued to the extent that they enable the orderly and 
legitimate existence of liberal democratic peoples” (Cheneval 2008: 45). This 
definition relies on an ‘ideal’ democratic conception of popular sovereignty, as 
he also recognises (Cheneval and Schimmelfennig 2013: 341). The normative 
principles for an ideal demoicracy are, as a result, distilled from behind a veil 
of ignorance (Cheneval and Schimmelfennig 2013: 341). After formulating 
principles on fundamental rights and matters of representation, Cheneval and 
Schimmelfennig hold the current EU-institutions to this standard to conclude 
that the Union actually meets their standards, but that state institutions are the 
source of delegitimation (Cheneval and Schimmelfennig 2013: 346-347). The 
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conclusion is indeed thought provoking. This Rawlsian ideal approach to 
theorising the Union’s legitimacy is legitimate in its own right.  
The source of divergence from my approach is probably most fruitfully 
found in the conceptualisation of the people. Firstly, Cheneval effectively co-
identifies a liberal democratic people with a set of state institutions. This 
‘liberal democratic’ definition, I assume, results in the somewhat 
unsatisfactory term ‘statespeoples’. Unsatisfactory in so far that it becomes 
hard to analytically distinguish between the bonds of collectivity and the 
organisation of power. This definition also seems unsatisfactory as an ideal 
argument. Behind Cheneval’s veil of ignorance, both peoples and individuals 
emerge as normatively relevant, but logically speaking the statespeoples are 
those same individuals. Put differently, Cheneval (implicitly) argues that those 
‘statespeoples’ are the states; he thus attributes moral agency to a set of 
institutions. This conceptualisation seems unsatisfactory because it results in 
a normative upgrading of the state from constituted into constituent power. 
This interpretation is bolstered by his application of this ideal to the EU, a 
move in which the logical step from statespeoples to state-representatives 
remains unproblematised (Cheneval and Schimmelfennig 2013). The move, 
however, would be problematic if Cheneval believed that citizens are the 
statespeoples. In his argument, popular sovereignty is effectively equated with 
state sovereignty. In my proposal for demoicratic popular sovereignty, I argue 
against the inclusion of this conceptual relationship between state sovereignty 
and popular sovereignty as part of the conceptual structure which makes 
sense of the EU’s legitimacy at the normative level.  
The second point of departure between our two accounts is his specific 
conceptualisation of the people. This point is intertwined but analytically 
distinct from the previous reflection on states. Cheneval’s conception of a 
people does not actually do justice to our normative commitment to popular 
sovereignty. Cheneval argues that his ideal of demoicracy connects with 
decision-making and deliberation “in concrete life worlds and political 
communities” (Cheneval and Schimmelfennig 2013: 341). Yet the theory 
offers no substantive appreciation of these concrete life world and political 
communities, it holds no real relationship to the experience of being a people. 
The genealogical reconstruction showed that the contemporary conception of 
Chapter 8: Demoicratic Popular Sovereignty in Europe 
 238 
the people is multi-faceted. Political agents can use these conceptions to 
make sense of their political place in the world. The issue is not that Rawls’ 
liberal democratic story is unconvincing to many at first glance. Realists have 
argued that many citizens have bought into the Rawlsian ideology (e.g. Geuss 
2008: 60-89). But if this realist analysis is correct then this ideology masks at 
least two other conceptions which also continue to impact European citizens’ 
attempts to make sense of legitimacy. In its classic role, my genealogy 
subverts Rawlsian democratic popular sovereignty by exposing other relevant 
conceptual dimensions in legitimating modern democracies. Turning to 
Cheneval, the issue is that his definition overlooks relevant aspects of the 
contemporary conception of the people. My conceptualisation of the people 
takes seriously the historical constitution of our conception, the influence of 
political institutional contexts in shaping them, but also their reliance upon 
them for their functioning. For these reasons, my realist conception of the 
people is multi-faceted rather than solely focussed on democratic conception, 
even in attempts to make sense of democratic legitimacy. I thus depart 
company from Cheneval’s idealist conception of the people. To clarify, these 
differences set my realist method apart from his idealist one. The latter has 
merit, but it is markedly different from my realist approach to political theory. 
My argument broadly aligns more with the prominent non-ideal 
contributions to the demoicratic literature, such as Bellamy, Castiglione, 
Neyer, and Nicolaïdis. I share these theorists’ more practice-orientated mode 
of the theorisation of EU legitimacy. Especially, this final chapter takes an 
institutionalist practice-dependent approach aligning with these non-ideal 
theorists. I shall therefore present their positions to then outline my 
contribution to this part of the present body of work. First of all, Bellamy and 
Castiglione propose an open form of constitutional republicanism (Friese and 
Wagner 2002: 354-355), which they have recently linked to the idea of a 
European demoicracy (e.g. Bellamy 2013; Bellamy and Castiglione 2013; 
Bellamy and Weale 2015). In line with my contribution, Bellamy and 
Castiglione theorise the people first and then derive appropriate principles and 
political forms which could legitimate the Union. Their argument emphasises 
the persistence of particularistic communities, each with their own 
understanding of the common good, within the European polity (Bellamy and 
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Castiglione 2013). Their conclusion is that the European polity is a 
‘community of strangers’ (Castiglione 2009) akin to my analysis of deep 
diversity. Their normative solutions to the democratic deficit include proposals 
for a republican ethos of non-domination between state representatives, and 
demoicratic representation by national parliaments at the European level (e.g. 
Bellamy 2013; Bellamy and Castiglione 2013; Bellamy and Weale 2015).  
In his recent contributions, Jürgen Neyer focuses more on the 
legitimate form of the EU’s institutional design (e.g. Neyer 2012; Neyer 2014). 
He does not explicitly identify as a demoicrat, however focuses on the 
structures of justification appropriate for Europe’s multi-level governance 
regime (Neyer 2014). Neyer draws upon Auel’s account of the principle-agent 
relationship (Auel 2007) to theorise the constituent-constituted power 
relationship. This route results in a top-down justificatory model in which after 
delegating power the ruled demand justifications from the rulers. Drawing 
upon Rainer Forst ‘justice as a right to justification’ (Neyer 2012), Neyer 
argues that citizens’ expressed unwillingness to a merge into a European 
demos makes national parliaments the prime source of justified justifications 
for European integration. These institutions should therefore provide a 
justification to the ruled. He further proposes that they should gain greater 
influence within the constitutional process of the Union (Neyer 2014). In this 
justification, Neyer’s demoicratic analysis of the nature of the European polity 
comes to the fore; it is a polity with multiple constituent powers. This argument 
follows a cultural conventionalist route (Sangiovanni 2008: 144-146) because 
his argument’s normative impetus is drawn from citizens’ beliefs. Their 
unwillingness to unify informs the appropriate conception of the people as 
national peoples. Like Bellamy and Castiglione, he emphasises the 
importance of national peoples and parliaments in making sense of the EU’s 
legitimacy.  
Finally, in a recent article which synthesises much of her extensive 
writings on the topic (e.g. Lacroix and Nicolaïdis 2010b; Nicolaïdis 2003; 
Nicolaïdis and Howe 2002), Kalypso Nicolaïdis defends demoicracy as the 
appropriate form of European governance. Her defence of this non-statist 
form ultimately rests on the analysis that “the name of the democratic game in 
Europe today is democratic interdependence” (Nicolaïdis 2013: 351; italics in 
Chapter 8: Demoicratic Popular Sovereignty in Europe 
 240 
original). After outlining this third way, Nicolaïdis argues in favour of a 
normative-inductive approach to theorising the EU as a legitimate demoicracy. 
Drawing inspiration from non-ideal philosophers, she argues that immanent 
normative principles can be extracted from European governance practices, 
such as the open method of coordination. Historical and social interpretations 
can contribute to determining norms, which can then act as a source for the 
immanent critique of recent developments or articulated aspirations 
(Nicolaïdis 2013: 357-358). The idea of demoicracy should act as a selection 
criterion for appropriate norms within these practices. Her conclusion is that 
transnational non-domination and mutual transnational recognition of diversity 
form the immanent norms appropriate for the Union. These norms suggest ten 
tentative principles to guide the governance and design of the Union. Albeit 
distinct, my realist method aligns closely with Nicolaïdis in this final chapter, 
because I develop (‘induce’) the appropriate conception of popular 
sovereignty (‘norms’) from existing institutional relationships.  
My contribution to this theoretical body of work lies, firstly, in an 
interpretation of the European bonds of collectivity which underscores 
Europe’s demoicratic polity and, secondly, in the proposal that a demoicratic 
conception of popular sovereignty should act as the conceptual structure with 
which to govern attempts to make sense of the EU’s legitimacy. My argument 
shares the central conclusion of these demoicratic theorists’ work; the EU 
should be understood as a legitimate demoicracy. The interpretation of the 
bonds of collectivity proposes a further argument to understand the European 
polity as a demoicratic one through a sophisticated interpretation of the 
institutional European bonds of collectivity in addition to national ones. The 
two-tier political order has to balance deep diversity and institutionalised 
interdependencies. Non-ideal theorists offer convincing cases for employing 
particular norms of legitimacy to govern relationship between rulers and ruled 
in a demoicratic polity. Republican non-domination, mutual recognition and a 
right to justification ethoi could govern the institutional relationships within the 
EU legitimately. Yet I will not focus on particular legitimation stories, but rather 
on their conceptual structure. My demoicratic conception of popular 
sovereignty diverges from other contributors to some extent, however the 
specific differences arise at the normative-conceptual level rather than at the 
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practical-institutional one. On the latter, my institutional sketch will align to a 
large extent with the aforementioned non-ideal contributors. However, my 
underlying realist argument at the conceptual level adds a new justification to 
this literature. My argument starts with an interpretation of EU-citizens’ bonds 
of collectivity, based upon the previous chapter institutional analysis. Rather 
than repeat the details, I focus on a plausible interpretation of current 
institutionalised bonds of collectivity. This interpretation should bolster the 
demoicratic case from a different perspective, and will also serve to ground 
the reconceptualisation of popular sovereignty in the subsequent section. 
 
III - Europe’s institutional bonds of collectivity 
My philosophical method of concept formation is based on Sangiovanni’s 
practice-dependent approach (Sangiovanni 2008). Drawing inspiration from 
Bernard Williams, among other realists (Sangiovanni 2008: 159; fn 49), he 
develops an interpretive method in which the move from a concept to a 
specific (normative) conception should take place with reference to the 
concept’s role in a particular political context (Sangiovanni 2008: 164). Human 
rights, for instance, might be a ‘thin universal’ -- a concept -- but it only 
becomes meaningful within a specific institutional context -- a conception. 
Sangiovanni distinguishes his institutionalist approach from cultural 
conventionalists. The latter argue that peoples’ beliefs should prescribes a 
politically relevant conception. Certain communitarians argue that 
philosophers should determine the relevant conception of the people by 
inquiring into individuals’ specific beliefs (e.g. Walzer 1977). Institutionalists, 
by contrast, argue that an appropriate concept is one able to govern a specific 
set of institutions (Sangiovanni 2008: 144-148). This method consists of three 
stages (Sangiovanni 2008: 146-150). Stage one is a pre-interpretive phase in 
which the general contours of a concept are outlined, such as justice or 
legitimacy. These contours consist of broad family resemblances upon which 
most theorists should agree. Stage two is a delineation of the point and 
purpose of the specific institutions to which this conception should apply. A 
Hobbessian state’s point and purpose, for instance, is civil order. A 
conception of justice in a Hobbessian state (if at all possible) should 
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consequently result in order. Sangiovanni argues that a political order grounds 
other orders, which creates relationships between individuals partaking in 
these orders (Sangiovanni 2008: 147). The impact of these institutions on the 
relationships between regime’s subjects should therefore affect the 
conception. The third post-interpretive phase is one in which a critical 
reflection can take place on a particular conception’s appropriateness for 
political institutions. Global justice, for example, cannot consist of 
redistribution because the necessary coercive structures are absent at the 
international level. In his paper on solidarity in the EU, however, he uses this 
approach to develop a particular conception of solidarity. This institutional 
analysis ultimately grounds his three-fold conception of the duties of solidarity 
in the EU (Sangiovanni 2013). What this illustrates is that instead of criticism, 
the third stage can also consist in the formation of an appropriate conception 
for a particular context. In this chapter, I shall first offer an interpretation of the 
bonds of collectivity within the Union, and then suggest how a demoicratic 
conception of popular sovereignty follows from this interpretation. 
Chapter two can be considered as having carried out the pre-
interpretive phase. To briefly recap however, citizens become a people in 
virtue the bonds of collectivity. In practice, a shared identity grounds a self-
conception of the people. From a theoretical perspective, thinkers posit a 
similarity between a multitude of individuals, such as interests or values. From 
an institutional perspective, participation in a normative system, such as a 
democratic order, creates relationships between them. In this analysis, I focus 
exclusively on these institutional relationships. These institutional bonds of 
collectivity can ground a realistic theoretical account of the political fiction of 
the people and, ultimately maybe, a self-conception. The analysis focuses on 
the question of how European integration has changed citizens’ institutional 
bonds of collectivity. In contrast to Sangiovanni (2013) and arguably 
Nicolaïdis (2013) as well, I shall not reflect or assume the point and purpose 
of the Union as demoicracy or otherwise. Instead, ‘the point and purpose’ 
guiding this analysis of the people are the historical normative systems that 
legitimated the modern democracies in virtue of output, democracy, and an 
identity. In a more presentist move, I suggest a coherent interpretation of the 
existing institutional bonds of collectivity because, as argued in the previous 
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chapter, these institutions are likely to persist. For the interpretation of the 
institutional bonds, I draw upon the evidence of the previous chapter. Rather 
than merely repeat the exact findings, I focus on providing reasoned 
elaborations which can inform a coherent interpretation which makes these 
bonds intelligible. 
In this section, I offer a two-tier interpretation of the institutional bonds 
of collectivity in the European polity: (i) the reinforcement of bonds of 
collectivity persists at the national level, and (ii) European integration has 
resulted in two partial, mediated bonds of collectivity which are associated 
with its economic and democratic order. The first tier describes how 
individuals remain deeply embedded in economic, democratic, and socio-
cultural relationships within their national orders. Deep diversity remains a 
constitutive fact of the European polity. In its political landscape, the nation-
form continues to institutionalise judicial-economic, civic-democratic, and 
socio-cultural bonds of collectivity between individuals. The multi-faceted 
conception of the people can therefore continue to make sense as a political 
fiction at the national level. This practical resonance can continue to inform 
the willing suspension of disbelief. That being said, economic and democratic 
normative systems have emerged at the European level. In the second tier, 
these systems have given rise to novel bonds of collectivity absent in other 
parts of the world. I characterise these bonds as novel because of two 
particular characteristics. Firstly, European systems only partially reconstruct 
their national counterparts. Secondly, the radically diverse national systems 
continue to inflect these institutional bonds. These bonds are, as a result, 
more coherently and accurately interpreted as binding together national 
peoples as wholes rather than as individual citizens. In addition to the 
persistence of national bonds are ‘European’ bonds of collectivity. The diverse 
national networks of relationships and the partial and mediated European 
relations should be taken seriously in a realist interpretation of the bonds of 
collectivity, and will lead me to argue in favour of their conception in two tiers. 
Firstly, I propose that these institutional bonds of collectivity bind 
together individual citizens at the national level. This first claim connects two 
institutional analyses: the persistence of national welfare regimes, national 
processes of democratic will-formation, and of national identities; and the 
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particularity of these institutional arrangements in giving rise to deep diversity 
within the European polity. These two analyses inform the interpretation of 
heterogeneous institutional bonds of collectivity within the European polity at 
the national level. The normative judicial-economic, civic-democratic, and 
socio-cultural orders are analytically distinct, but institutionally reinforced and 
intertwined with one another. The institutional bonds of collectivity give rise to 
an interpretation of individuals as integrated into a national people. This 
historical process has given rise to distinct interest-based, democratic, and 
identitarian bonds of collectivity within national contexts. The rise of 
micronationalisms in the United Kingdom, Spain, and Belgium do not 
necessarily challenge this analysis, because the legitimacy of the institutional 
relationships has become contested based on the same criteria. Yet these 
institutional orders have not broken down.4 One further important justification 
for this interpretation is the persistence of the territorially organised state. 
European integration has meant a weakening of its ‘hard shell’ through its 
embeddedness within a two-tier political order. Nevertheless, as Nicolaïdis 
and Young observe, it remains an important nexus for a consensus on 
legitimacy (Nicolaïdis and Young 2014). This function as nexus is a historical 
product of these national-level institutional bonds of collectivity. These 
institutional relationships between individual citizens remain organised within 
the territorial borders of the state.  National bonds of collectivity, so I propose, 
consequently bind individuals together in particularistic relationships at the 
national level. On my interpretation, therefore, contemporary Europe consists 
of peoples at the national level. 
That being said, European integration has resulted in new institutional 
relationships. Europe’s judicial-economic order, as outlined in the previous 
chapter, pursues the commercial interests of the Union as a whole. Since the 
Single European Act (SEA), the pursuit of the ‘rationalisation’ of Europe’s 
economic order was meant to increase overall competitiveness in the 
international environment. With the exception of agriculture, liberalisation 
efforts have created a single market within the Union. The transnational 
common market increasingly transformed into a single European market. The 
economic integration process has primarily been one of boundary destruction 
through administrative coordination. The relationships between EU-citizens 
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have also changed as a result of these efforts. The single market creates 
interdependencies with regards to economic performance between European 
economies. Furthermore, the European Commission has started to represent 
the Union abroad in an increasing number of international forums, such as the 
WTO. Clearly, EU-citizens would benefit (or suffer) from the deals made by 
these European representatives. In addition to external representation, the 
EU-regime enforces contracts between states (the treaties) at the domestic 
level, such as in the realm of competition law. Matters of enforcement have 
not remained limited to commercial contracts. The opening up of economic 
borders, associated with the four freedoms - freedom of movement of goods, 
capital, services, and people - has given rise to cross border crime. A 
transnational EU-regime now coordinates a network of infranational 
bureaucracies concerning matter of criminal justice. These latter institutions 
aim to secure the rule of law within this new institutional reality. The European 
process of economic integration reflects a capitalist logic according to which 
the rule of law is a precondition for economic prosperity. From this 
perspective, transnational coordination reflects a shared interest in the 
enforcement of a system of rights at the national and European level.  From 
the process of economic integration, a judicial-economic normative system 
has emerged at the European level that creates an institutional bond of 
collectivity between European citizens as beneficiaries. 
These institutional interest-based bonds, however, are only partial and 
remain nationally inflected. From a contemporary perspective, the bond of 
collectivity is only a partial reconstruction of the national counterpart. The 
pressures of democratic and nationalist movements cumulated in an ‘area of 
equality’ within state. In these historical circumstances, the judicial-economic 
systems in Europe’s states transformed so as to pursue a greater number of 
economic redistributive and social services. The European regime is primarily 
concerned with trade and macro-economic policy, and it moreover only has a 
limited number of macro-economic instruments at its disposal. Europe’s 
staunch Anglo-Saxon outlier (Esping-Andersen 1990; Hall and Soskice 2001) 
-- the United Kingdom -- performs a greater number of far reaching welfare 
services than the European governance regime. Moreover, unlike the United 
State and other regimes, the ‘federal’ level’s decision-making capacities are 
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limited by national entities. The European commissioners bargaining space, 
for instance, is constrained by the decisions of national ministers. In short, the 
scope of legal-economic aims and instruments inform this characterisation of 
European bonds as only partial compared to its statist counterparts. The 
interrelated qualification of national inflection draws upon the same 
observations, but stresses the heterogeneous consequences of Europe’s 
judicial-economic order. The consequences of this regime are essential 
because a political order should derive output legitimacy for its people from 
the government of its legal-economic normative systems. The economic crisis 
effectively showed the lack of homogeneous outcomes in matters of political-
economy. The output associated with the Union is not only negative -- 
generally a concern for output legitimacy -- but differentiated among the 
various European peoples. The positive as well as negative effects of 
economic cooperation and integration are channelled through national level 
welfare arrangements. Enforcement agencies also remain national, following 
at times supranational or transnational directives. Europe’s institutional bonds 
of collectivity, associated with the people as beneficiaries of a legally 
governed capitalist economy, therefore remain nationally inflected. I 
consequently propose that these European bonds of collectivity are both 
partial reconstructions, compared to their national counterparts, and remain 
nationally inflected. 
I propose to call this first ‘European’ bond of collectivity the commercial 
bond. The term ‘commercial’ is coined with Hume’s observation in On 
Commerce in mind, that individual citizens’ luxury and the state’s security and 
grandezza align in the pursuit of commercial interests abroad (Hume 1987 
[1752]: 31). Broadly, this pursuit of commerce became identified in the 
cutthroat competition for markets abroad and liberalisation of the domestic 
economy. These Lockean regimes ensured civil liberties, such as property 
rights, but not necessarily political ones. Property rights had an instrumental 
justification in creating regularity to stimulate industry, rather than possessing 
an intrinsic (democratic) value (Bellamy 2004: 6). This early modern regime 
secured liberal rights and liberties in order to attain internal peace and 
prosperity. Competent statecraft was identified as a necessary precondition of 
legitimate rule rather than inclusiveness. I want to suggest that the European 
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judicial-economic order resembles this early modern Lockean-Humean state. 
The purpose of the European regime is the pursuit of the commercial interests 
of the Union aboard. Since the SEA, the European judicial order officially 
enforces economic property rights to increase international competitiveness 
through internal market integration. Market integration has resulted in closer 
cooperation on issues of internal order and border control. The historical order 
is essential for my interpretation because I do not propose that the 
coordination on criminal enforcement and commercial interests were 
interrelated aims of the EU. My argument is that the capitalist logic of market 
integration to pursue of commercial interests forced European states to 
coordinate on matters concerning property. The successful integration of the 
common market forced national administrations to coordinate in order to 
maintain national judicial orders, which, in turn, are the foundation of their 
compulsory redistributive economic regimes. Therefore, in a capitalist 
European polity, commercial-economic aims continue to relate to rely on 
judicially enforced transnational system of property rights. The judicial-
economic normative systems remain largely in place at the national level, but 
institutional connections have additionally been made in the pursuit of 
commercial interests. At the European level, the most plausible interpretation, 
so I suggest, is a commercial bond of collectivity between national peoples 
rather than individuals, in addition to the national compulsory bond of welfare 
redistribution between individuals.  
European integration, however, has not merely resulted in the 
institutionalisation of a legal-economic normative system. A civic-democratic 
system has also been erected at the European level. Integration resulted in 
the autonomous exercise of power at the European level. The new political 
regime offers the means to avoid war within a historically antagonistic polity. It 
thus ensures a civil order of states akin to the Hobbessian state’s ‘point and 
purpose’, albeit through a rather Kelsenian democratic logic of compromise.  
This order, however, was perceived to lack a necessary degree of democratic 
legitimisation; the democratic deficit. The process of democratisation resulted 
in a European civic-democratic system. The three key democratic institutions 
are a democratic constitution, the election of representatives in decision-
making procedures, and a public sphere. Focusing on the constitution and the 
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parliament for now, EU-citizenship exists in virtue of the constitutional treaty. 
The European Parliament (EP) consists of national representatives who are 
directly elected by EU-citizens. Furthermore, in line with federal regimes, 
intergovernmental representatives in the Councils represent the interests of 
the constituent parts of the European Union. Unsurprisingly, some argue that 
the European demos exists, at least on a nascent institutional basis (e.g. 
Føllesdal and Hix 2006; Habermas 2001). The opening up of borders between 
European peoples has been accompanied (and enforced) by the creation of a 
civic-democratic normative system at the European level. This procedural 
order creates institutional democratic bonds of collectivity at the pan-
European level. 
This second ‘European’ bond of collectivity is, however, also distinct 
from the national democratic bond. Both citizenship and electoral 
representation have been institutionalised in a particular, transnational 
manner. Citizenship is a transnational institution, because citizens are not EU-
citizens in virtue of being a subject of European power. EU-citizenship 
depends on institutional membership of a polity at the national level. 
Moreover, EU-citizens’ political rights are limited within other national 
communities, such as the absence of voting rights in national elections. The 
institution of EU-citizenship is, therefore, both partial and nationally inflected. 
This European democratic bond of collectivity relies on partaking in a national 
demos. The partiality and national inflection of the democratic bond is also 
institutionalised in the direct election of the European Parliament. The role of 
the EP is limited in some areas compared to national arrangements, such as 
the lack of a right of initiative. Furthermore, the election of these 
representatives takes place in the national polities. Representatives in this 
‘supranational’ institution are not elected in pan-European elections, rather 
national elections are held in accordance with national traditions. They are, for 
instance, held on different days using national electoral systems. As Richard 
Bellamy observes, the organisation of the EP follows a demoicratic logic of 
representation, not a democratic one (Bellamy 2013). These two democratic 
institutions, therefore, effectively institutionalise democratic bonds between 
national demoi rather than giving rise to equivalent relationships at the 
European level. The lack of a public sphere makes these institutional 
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relationships partial compared to their national counterparts, and inflects them 
along national lines.  
For argument sake, I shall assume that supranational citizenship and 
representatives elected by a pan-European electorate are in place at the 
European level. Even if this were the case, which it is clearly not, the civic-
democratic system at the European level remains partial and deeply nationally 
inflected, because the public spheres remain part of the national political 
orders. The public sphere is the crucial institution for democratic will-formation 
as it enables the key democratic processes of accountability and tracking the 
popular will in modern enlarged polities (e.g. Dewey 1954 [1927]; Fossum 
2005; Habermas 1992b). Democratic will-formation remains organised within 
Europe’s national polities. This observation is closely associated with the 
analysis of deep diversity, and more importantly, the lack of a European 
socio-cultural normative system. Important is that the European polity lacks 
the infrastructure to create the preconditions that enabled the emergence of 
even a transnational public sphere at the European level, as was the case, for 
instance, in the early modern American republic (Martin 2005). The lack of a 
common language is one important reason.5 Unlike the success of economic 
and political integration, a transnational public sphere has yet to emerge at 
the European level (Bellamy 2013: 506). The supranational elite have, 
however, tried to forge a symbolic order, but to no or extremely limited avail 
(Bellamy 2013: 506; Middelaar 2009). The alleged transnational links between 
public spheres (Risse 2010) at best ensure similar topics of debate. The lack 
of a public sphere prevents the occurrence of democratic processes of will-
formation at the European level. As a result, democratic will-formation by 
deliberative means in the European polity remains heavily inflected towards 
the nation. Individuals partake first and foremost in national civic-democratic 
orders, not only because citizens remain part of deliberative will-formation 
processes within their national polities, but also because these processes are 
complemented with nationally ensured rights and liberties, and elected 
representation in national parliaments. As such, individuals only fully share 
democratic procedural bonds at the national level. EU-citizenship and the 
democratisation of European institutions do create procedural relationships 
between citizens as part of their national demoi. I propose to refer to this 
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second ‘European’ bond of collectivity as the demoicratic bond, which creates 
peaceful means of conflict resolution through, for instance, compromise rather 
than the construction of a shared democratic will at the European level. I 
suggest, therefore, that bonds between individual citizens transform them into 
a demos at the national level and, in addition, form a demoicratic bond 
between these peoples at the European level.  
In line with Sangiovanni’s analysis (2008: 147), a political order results 
in the institutionalization of networks of relationships. As we saw in chapter 
six, the sovereign state played an important role in creating relationships 
between citizens. Europe’s two-tier integrated political order does not only 
institutionalize mechanisms to manage interdependencies through 
technocratic and democratic means, it also gives rise to transnational 
relationships based upon shared interests and democratic procedures, which 
nonetheless do not destroy the deep diversity of the Union. This interpretation 
of the institutional bonds of collectivity resonates clearly with the demoicratic 
literature on the EU. These theorists agree that EU-citizens remain primarily 
part of people at the national level. As said, they argue that the demoicratic 
Union offers the political means to achieve common goals (Bellamy 2013) 
and/or should manage interdependencies between European countries 
(Nicolaïdis 2013: 351). My argument offers a further argument to perceive of 
the EU as demoicracy based upon a realist interpretation of the institutional 
bonds of collectivity at the European level. To clarify, interdependencies also 
exist between other countries. The US, Canada, and Mexico share certain 
commercial interests, and hence enacted North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA). The lack of political order prevents a realist case for a 
demoicracy, because these countries continue to keep their territorial ‘hard 
shell’ in place, at least at the institutional level. My interpretation of the 
commercial and demoicratic bonds between persistent national peoples 
offers, I believe, the most convincing interpretation of existing institutional 
relations. Other demoicrats could rely upon this realist interpretation of these 
relationships to further bolster their case. 
Before moving on to the reconceptualization of popular sovereignty, 
some commentators might argue that this interpretation privileges certain 
facts over others. My response is, to some extent, to bite the bullet. Indeed, 
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this analysis does not incorporate every detail of the complexity of social 
reality. The task of interpretation requires some aggregation and 
generalisation from empirical reality because political practices are not 
necessarily coherent. The interpretation, however, hopefully offers a plausible 
and coherent account of the institutional relationships within the European 
polity as a whole. Any holistic interpretation should remain open to criticism to 
improve it (Bevir 1999), however, in line with Donald Davidson’s principle of 
interpretive charity, an interpretation’s success should be judged against its 
ability to offer a coherent and convincing account of reality (Sangiovanni 
2008: fn 28). To make this claim, I compare my account to the three 
prominent alternatives in the debate: technocratic, federalist, and nationalist 
claims (e.g. Horeth 1999). Technocrats argue that EU-citizens share similar 
(economic) interests. The diverse national experiences of EU-rule however, 
as happened during the euro crisis, undermine this conception of the bonds of 
collectivity. The crisis illustrated the persistent heterogeneity of Europe’s 
welfare economies exemplifying the peoples’ divergent (economic) interests. 
Moreover, the technocrats do not address democratic relationships at the 
European level, which aim to prevent technocratic domination and the deficit 
of legitimacy. Democratic federalists propose that citizens share democratic 
values which ground procedures. This account is, on the one hand, too 
universalistic, because the United States of America, Australia, and other non-
European democratic countries broadly share the same democratic values as 
expressed in EU-treaties. On the other hand, democratic institutions remain 
nationally organised, especially those associated with deliberative will-
formation, and therefore reflect distinct national understandings of legitimate 
democratic rule. Finally, nationalists argue that the relevant bonds between 
citizens exist exclusively at the national level (and some even at the European 
level (Siedentop 2000)). Their case aligns most closely with my conception. 
But these nationalist conceptions offer no convincing account of institutional 
relationships at the European level. Most citizens express a belief in some 
European interests, such as economic cooperation and even defence 
coordination (Díez Medrano 2010; Thomassen and Schmitt 2004). I want to 
suggest, by comparison, that my two-tier conception of Europe’s bonds of 
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collectivity meets Davidson’s principle of charity better than these prominent 
counterparts.  
In addition, this particular interpretation can lay the foundation for a 
conceptual structure able to govern legitimation stories of popular sovereignty 
that can make sense to citizens in contemporary Europe. Legitimation stories 
should make political reality intelligible. As argued, the willing suspension of 
disbelief requires practical resonance. The political fiction of the people 
therefore requires that an interpretation plausibly make sense of institutional 
relationships between citizens. European citizens are aware of their bonds 
with other peoples, but also their much stronger national communities of faith. 
The denial of this community of faith, as we saw in the previous chapter, can 
result in resentment. Yet, in the main, European citizens evaluate integration 
as a positive development (Bellamy 2006: 248). They now require a story of 
popular sovereignty which makes sense of the EU’s legitimacy within this two-
tier political order. The above interpretation of the institutional bonds offers a 
coherent account in which the national peoples remain the only source of 
authority within the European polity, thereby avoiding competing claims of 
different peoples as sources of authority, as encountered in other theories 
(Glencross 2012). Based upon this realist interpretation, I shall outline a 
conception of popular sovereignty to structure legitimation stories that can 
realistically guide political agents’ appraisal of the Union. 
 
IV - A demoicratic conception of popular sovereignty 
In this section, I offer a novel conception of popular sovereignty, which could 
plausibly make sense of the EU’s legitimacy. According to this alternative 
conceptual structure, multiple peoples as constituent powers create a two-tier 
political order -- the constituted power. As such it constitutes a significant 
departure from the contemporary concept of popular sovereignty. Power 
structures, as genealogists often observe, shaped the concept of popular 
sovereignty at the level of its conceptual structure. The historically shaped 
conception of popular sovereignty became closely wedded to de facto state 
sovereignty (and shaped by it). The contemporary unitary conceptual 
structure of this concept is of a single constituent power that authorizes a 
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single sovereign-constituted power. Popular sovereignty, I want to suggest, 
refers to the conceptual structure in which the bonds of collectivity should 
inform the appropriate criteria of legitimacy of the political regime (see also 
Sangiovanni 2008; White 2011). Taking this more abstract pre-interpretative 
conceptual structure as my point of departure, I propose a reconceptualisation 
of popular sovereignty in order to appraise the EU’s legitimacy realistically. A 
detailed conception would not only take us too far afield, but would more 
importantly enter into a realm of detailed description at odds with Williams’ 
realist political thought. A detailed description of the correct understanding is 
typical of an idealist enterprise, which Williams explicitly rejects for being 
unable to do justice to the disagreement inherent in ‘the political’. As with any 
political concept, disagreement will exist on its proper conception (Williams 
2005). My proposal is that a demoicratic conceptual restructuring of popular 
sovereignty could make sense of the EU’s legitimacy. This conception can, 
furthermore, make sense of it based upon existing relationships within 
Europe’s two-tier political order. In addition, first-order disagreements on the 
exact criteria of legitimacy remain possible, even were this structure to gain 
widespread support. 
The core assumption which underlies this proposal is that popular 
sovereignty remains one of the few viable ideational resources with which to 
theorize political legitimacy in our historical circumstances. This claim requires 
elaboration because some authors have rejected both its validity and 
desirability (Balibar 2004a; Bohman 2004: 323; Papadopoulos and Tsianos 
2007). James Bohman, for instance, suggests that non-domination should 
overcome popular sovereignty. His argument is that, the demoi should not 
dominate another in a polity, and therefore require deliberative structures at 
the transnational level (Bohman 2004; 2005). This argument seems 
reasonable. My claim is that his appeal to the demoi indicates a continued 
commitment to popular sovereignty. In contrast to Balibar, Bohman implies a 
novel conception of popular sovereignty, though his main focus is the 
application of the ideal principle of deliberation rather than the theorizing of 
demoicracy. The most important reason returns us to the central tenet in 
Williams’ political thought; normative commitments arise from within their 
historical circumstances. In chapter two, I proposed a stylized, but historically 
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grounded account of how popular sovereignty arose, in an increasingly 
disenchanted political space, to replace the divine right of kings. This 
disenchanted cosmology was an essential aspect of modernity, and continues 
to frame (post)modern contemporary politics in Europe (e.g. Lassman 2014; 
Willke 2009). Furthermore, another consensus exists on legitimate politics in 
the European polity. Whatever its form, shape, or level, the European political 
order has to be democratic. Just as European empires relied upon 
Christianity, bereft of such metaphysical principles, modern democracies 
require a popular sovereign to ground authority (Bickerton 2011: 666-668). 
The people remain the most likely foundation of legitimate authority for a 
legitimate democratic European polity. These historical circumstances inform 
this attempt to reconceptualise popular sovereignty rather than to abandon it 
completely. 
The demoicratic conception of popular sovereignty conceptually 
structures legitimation stories as those of multiple constituent powers that 
authorize a two-tier political order -- the constituent power. It might be helpful 
to explain this conception of popular sovereignty through the use of the 
thought experiment of a foundational moment (see also Cheneval 2007). This 
move constitutes a Humean thought experiment because it recognizes that 
force results in the construction of centers of power, and thus in institutional 
bonds between denizens.6 Still it clarifies the crucial analytical point of the 
‘simultaneous creation’ of the constituted power. Starting however at the level 
of the constituent power, individuals are first and foremost part of particular 
peoples. The latter, however, are not completely separate institutional entities, 
because they share institutional bonds between each other as collectives. So 
far I have offered a more abstracted account of the previous interpretation of 
institutional bonds. The next part describes the kind of political order -- the 
constituted power -- these peoples would construct in recognition of such 
bonds. Now following the classic logic of popular sovereignty, the people as 
constituent power create the constituted power. In this foundational moment, 
the peoples would simultaneously create two distinct decision-making centers 
within one political order. The peoples authorize both the national decision-
maker and the transnational center. This two-tiered order reflects the peoples’ 
bonds of collectivity. The first-tier should govern the particularities of national 
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peoples, whilst the second-tier should govern transnational bonds between 
polities peacefully. The peoples’ decision-maker and the transnational one are 
part of the same political order, which itself is the product of the peoples’ will. 
The essential point is that this order forms a single constituted power without 
either tier having authoritative superiority, or what some might call sovereignty 
(e.g. Malcolm 1991). The real ‘casualty’ of this conception of popular 
sovereignty is any decision-maker attempting to claim absolute sovereignty. 
As argued in the previous chapter, the political fiction of sovereignty has 
become highly implausible. Therefore, this ‘conceptual’ causality is actually a 
virtue for the conception’s likelihood to act as a heuristic tool for political 
agents, as I address in more detail below.   
This conception of popular sovereignty replaces the statist one, which 
to some extent has become subsumed. These centers are each other’s 
normative equal as they are both part of the same constituted power created 
in this foundational moment. To clarify, in European circumstances, states are 
therefore considered to be normatively on par with the EU-regime. According 
to this conception, first-order disagreements on the political authority of either 
level should have to make sense in relation to one another, rather than trying 
to privilege one over another. Particular historical circumstances will decide 
the justificatory strength of particular claims to authority. Decision-makers’ 
regimes are essentially normative equals within the demoicratic political order. 
The peoples in a demoicracy pursue their common interests peacefully 
through the second tier of the constituted power. The qualification of peace is 
necessary because, unlike mere intergovernmental regimes, the 
dependencies do not create zero-sum benefits. Meaningful disagreements 
can exist on shared interests and the way to pursue them. In addition, deep 
diversity results in the differentiated impact of homogeneous decisions, further 
complicating the pursuit of such interests through transnational rule. A 
democratic second tier aims to ensure the peaceful co-existence of these 
distinct peoples by channeling conflicts through common institutions. This 
emphasis on the peaceful pursuit of interdependencies and interests gives 
these people a democratic character. On this demoicratic conception of 
popular sovereignty, a plausible account of the will of the polity’s popular 
sovereigns should inform the criteria of the transnational order’s legitimacy. 
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The demoicratic conception, however, does limit the scope of the 
transnational power. The move from Union to concord would be illegitimate 
change in the organization of power, because the popular sovereigns want a 
demoicratic political order. This conception of popular sovereignty can 
therefore make sense of the regime’s legitimacy within its historical 
circumstances at the normative level.  
Having fleshed out my proposal for a demoicratic conception of popular 
sovereignty, I appraise this conception’s ability to act as heuristic tool in 
making sense of the EU’s legitimacy, because it offers a plausible political 
fiction to associate to popular sovereignty. This demoicratic conception of 
popular sovereignty relies on the political fiction of the people as beneficiaries, 
demos, and nation at the national level exclusively. This fiction continues to 
find practical resonance in the persistent, national-level institutionalization of 
the intertwined judicial-economic, civic-democratic, and socio-cultural 
systems. The conception can, consequently, continue to rely upon this three-
fold fiction of the people. Most significantly, as said, this conception of popular 
sovereignty arguably, and somewhat paradoxically, jettisons the political 
fiction of sovereignty. The fiction is not rejected as a function of the peoples’ 
right of authorization, but the conception implicitly jettisons the ‘de facto’ 
sovereignty of the state or any other political order. The peoples would not 
authorize a sovereign political order because it would be unlikely to govern 
their transnational ties peacefully. As a result, this conception does not rely 
upon the aspects of the political fiction which are no longer present in 
Europe’s two-tier political order. In recognition of certain interdependencies, 
these peoples no longer want a Hobbesian state order but a two-tier political 
order.7 The EU governs their commercial and demoicratic interests: prosperity 
and peace. These interests can provide a justification for the peoples to come 
together. Recalcitrant states can, in addition, be condemned if they are 
unwilling to abide by common decisions. Thus, a member could not only leave 
the Union, it could also become excluded, based on this conception. Finally, 
demoicratic popular sovereignty fits the historical cosmology and 
commitments within the European polity. Majone’s technocratic non-
majoritarian democratic arrangements, for instance, have been identified as 
conceptually stretching democracy beyond recognition (Everson 2005).8 
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Contemporary citizens do not accept technocratic domination, hence it cannot 
offer a durable solution to the EU’s democratic deficit. Demoicratic popular 
sovereignty can make sense of the EU’s legitimacy in democratic terms. The 
delineation of appropriate criteria, however, should not resolve around what 
binds EU-citizens, but what binds European peoples. The transnational bonds 
of the pursuit of commercial interests, and the demoicratic interest in peaceful 
determination of those and other interests, can inform realistic legitimation 
stories for the Union.  
To further flesh out the novelty of this conception of demoicratic 
popular sovereignty, I contrast this constituent power to other prominent 
sources of legitimacy for the EU in the demoicratic literature: (i) a (weak) 
European demos, (ii) individual citizens, and (iii) the states. To anticipate a 
source of objections to my proposal, the demoicratic conception of popular 
sovereignty is a conceptual structure for making sense of the EU’s legitimacy 
in a two-tier order, at the conceptual level. In the following, I quite often reject 
conceptual suggestions from other demoicrats as ways to make sense of the 
appropriate criteria of legitimacy. As will nonetheless become apparent in the 
next section, I embrace most of their proposals to generate legitimacy at the 
institutional level. This initial clarification can (hopefully) prevent some 
possible confusion in the following discussion. Starting with a European 
demos, some theorists argue that the people can provide legitimacy. In his 
defence of popular sovereignty in the Europe polity, Andrew Glencross 
convincingly argues that a democratic economy of representative claims could 
constitute a democratic legitimation procedure. Decision-makers can appeal 
to a European people in addition to national peoples. Democratic norms of 
accountability and transparency should govern this competition of claims. The 
ambiguity on the popular sovereign in the European polity thus offers a 
constructive source of democratic legitimacy (Glencross 2012). One important 
issue is the implausibility of a European demos. The core issue is that claims 
to even a weak demos thesis find grounding neither in citizens’ beliefs, nor in 
any institutions. Such a legitimation story might be desirable, but it lacks any 
practical resonance to govern citizens’ behaviour. It therefore makes no 
realistic sense of citizens’ position in the European political order. The 
demands on citizens’ willing suspension of disbelief are too high in the current 
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circumstances of deep diversity. At the normative level, this proposal is 
incompatible with demoicratic popular sovereignty because the latter refutes 
the existence of a European demos. The legitimacy of the transnational order 
should not derive from appeals to an overarching people. The appropriate 
criteria of legitimacy should derive from the bonds between peoples. In the 
European context, these claims find resonance in the commercial and 
demoicratic bond. Yet appeals to a European people lack a similar practical 
resonance which can provide a similar degree of plausibility, hence it is a 
problematic source to theorise EU legitimacy from a realist perspective. 
Secondly, the individual citizens of the Union have been identified as a 
possible source of legitimacy for the EU-regime. The legitimacy of the Union 
should derive, in part, from its normative recognition of citizens as legitimate 
transnational agents with inalienable rights and liberties. Cheneval, for 
instance, argues that principles of legitimacy should derive from an original 
position behind the veil of ignore, with both representatives of the peoples and 
citizens determining principles of legitimacy (Cheneval 2008). In a similar 
vein, Nicolaïdis argues that legitimate EU-rule should recognise and protect 
individual citizens’ rights to mobilise at the European level (Nicolaïdis 2013). 
At a strictly ontological level, individual citizens are arguably the most 
creditable source of legitimacy for any political order. Williams’ argument on 
human rights tends to rely on individuals being the raw material of politics 
(Williams 2005: 62-74). The normative position of citizens has been 
recognised in multiple international treaties, declarations of human rights, and 
national bill of rights. Political reality, however, is not merely a product of facts, 
fictions also govern the behaviour of individuals in the political realm. In the 
European context, the recognition of citizens results indirectly in the 
assumption of a European demos. The reason is that citizens are placed in 
direct relationship to the EU-regime. This claim, however, does not plausibly 
make sense at an institutional level because it does not take seriously the 
transnational character of the bonds. Alternatively, it results in an incoherent 
account in which citizens as individuals compete with themselves, but then, as 
part of a collective peoples, act as the source of authority within the polity. In 
attempts to make sense of the EU’s legitimacy at the transnational level, 
individual citizens should not have an authoritative position in the political 
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order. The demoicratic conception of popular sovereignty, therefore, does not 
recognise individual citizens as a source from which to theorise principles of 
legitimacy for the transnational order. That being said, this conceptual 
conclusion does not necessarily result in a rejection of EU-citizens as 
politically significant at the transitional level. But their significance derives 
these from the transnational European bonds of collectivity. Commercial 
interests, for instance, might warrant the freedom of movement and 
transnational property rights. Furthermore, their enforcement might result in 
the creation of transnational rights within national judicial orders. Citizens 
would thus gain the status of right-bearers within the overarching order. The 
transnational recognition of the individual follows from a conceptual argument 
on transnational bonds, rather than on the direct status of the individual in the 
order. Conceptually, individual citizens should not delineate appropriate 
criteria of legitimacy for the second tier of the political order.  
Thirdly and finally to clarify why my proposal does not collapse into 
intergovernmentalism, I shall distinguish peoples from the states. States are a 
prominent candidate to legitimate the ‘EU as a demoicracy’. Richard Bellamy 
emphasises that, as part of the solution, an ethos of non-domination should 
govern supranational negotiations between the state representatives (Bellamy 
2013; Bellamy and Weale 2015). This non-ideal proposal clearly has 
institutional merits. My demoicratic conception of popular sovereignty, 
however, departs company from this position in two ways at the conceptual 
level. Firstly, it denies any normative superiority of the state, because these 
constituted powers are as much a product of the peoples’ normative authority 
as is the transnational part of the constituted power. The demoicratic 
conception would function as a more plausible alternative to this conceptual 
structure. The European peoples’ wills authorize a transnational regime to 
govern interests and dependencies rather than merely achieving zero-sum 
benefits (see also Lord 2011). Secondly, Bellamy continues to rely on the 
people’s sovereignty in a more empirical sense. State representatives are 
therefore deemed to be authoritative agents. This indirect legitimation by 
state-representatives suggests an embellished form of intergovernmentalism 
rather taking seriously the integrated nature of the EU-system of multi-level 
governance. The demoicratic conception explicitly rejects the political fiction of 
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state sovereignty within its conceptual structure. The peoples are the popular 
sovereign, however they do not engage in a process of delegation via the 
states pace Bellamy, but in a process of co-creation. To clarify again, as with 
individual citizens, this conceptual structure does not deny either the states’ 
role or that of its representatives in initial integration processes, or in the 
institutions for shaping second order legislation, and even possibly in 
constitutional processes. States, however, are not a source of legitimacy for 
the Union at the conceptual level. Their authoritative position derives from 
them being the representatives of the deep diversity between peoples, rather 
than because they are the bearers of sovereignty in the ‘anarchic’ realm of 
international politics. Legitimation stories should, therefore, follow a different 
conceptual structure when making sense of the EU’s legitimacy. The 
conceptual structure departs company from applied accounts of institutional 
legitimacy. Moving from the conceptual structure to institutional proposals, this 
structure can guide political agents in making sense of EU legitimacy. The 
demoicratic conception of popular sovereignty can contribute to overcoming 
the EU’s democratic deficit by making sense of the democratic legitimacy of 
the EU-level, following this markedly different logic. 
 
V - From democratic deficit to demoicratic legitimacy 
The theorem at the heart of this thesis, as with many other contributions to the 
normative literature on the EU, has been the ‘democratic deficit’. In this final 
section, I shall return to this real world challenge. The prominent legitimation 
stories, as reflected in the academic debate, propose three criteria of 
legitimacy as appropriate for the Union. The genealogical enterprise 
reconstructed the three distinct conceptions of popular sovereignty which 
underpin these criteria. Historically, they came together to make sense of the 
hard shell of the modern sovereign state. Within Europe, each state’s 
historical circumstances would result in distinct constellations of these criteria 
and understandings thereof. This statist conception does not make sense of 
citizens’ -- the ruled -- (and for that matter, decision-makers’ -- the rulers) 
place in the transformed European polity in any of these particular national 
interpretations. The contemporary conception of popular sovereignty, 
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however, remains the frame for first-order disagreements. Janie Pélabay, 
Justine Lacroix et al. (2010) offer convincing evidence that this is even the 
case in public discourses contributed by elites (see also Beetz 2015), and 
evidence suggests a similar understanding among the broader European 
public (Díez Medrano 2010). It cannot guide appraisals of the EU’s legitimacy 
-- democratic or otherwise. In line with the aim of Williams’ realist project (e.g. 
Hall Forthcoming), I suggest that the demoicratic conception of popular 
sovereignty, grounded in existing institutional bonds of collectivity, can provide 
a realistic conception with which to guide political practices of making sense 
of the EU’s legitimacy. This conception, however, need not lose its critical 
potential due to its plausibility. In the following reflection, I argue that the 
demoicratic conception can theorise a move beyond the democratic deficit by 
focussing upon democratic representation at the EU level. In line with most 
modern democratic analyses, representation remains the institutional 
mechanism through which to generate democratic legitimacy in enlarged 
polities. I will not, however, address its exact relationship to the national level 
because such arguments are part of the political debate. The aim of this 
section is to illustrate that demoicratic popular sovereignty creates a cogent 
perspective on the EU’s democratic legitimacy. A demoicratic conception can 
make sense of these structures as legitimating the EU. The argument 
illustrates that, unlike the statist conceptual structure, this demoicratic one can 
govern political agents’ ability to make sense of the EU’s legitimacy without 
requiring an extensive reconfiguration of power, and without digressing into a 
dogmatic defence of the status quo. This political conception could, as a 
result, realistically contribute to overcoming the EU’s democratic deficit. 
The analysis starts with Europe’s most prominent democratic 
institutions, the EP and the Councils, both of which can be made sense of as 
representative vessels of the demoi’s will. The EP can plausibly act as a 
source of demoicratic legitimacy, because citizens elect their representatives 
through nationally organised elections. This democratic chamber enables 
peoples’ national representatives to discuss their shared commercial interests 
and peacefully come to make decisions. The European commercial interest 
can justify the subsequent organisation of the peoples into party-federations, 
because the demoi have some overlapping ideals concerning the course of 
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the Union. As Richard Bellamy (2013: 510) also observes, the EP can thus 
act as a source of demoicratic legitimacy for the EU. In addition, the Council 
or rather Councils of the Union consists of the ministers of a particular policy 
area.9 State representatives make decisions in order to pursue shared 
interests through Europe’s network of infranational bureaucracies. Most 
decisions have to adhere to the recently introduced double qualified majority 
decision-making procedure (which requires the consensus of a majority of 
countries and of the EU’s overall population). This rule generates demoicratic 
legitimacy by balancing the effectiveness of transnational interests at the 
European level with sufficient respect for particularity at the national one. In 
the Councils, state-representatives can also function as representatives of the 
European demoi in decision-making processes. Made sense of as such, these 
statist agents could generate demoicratic legitimacy. Finally, from a 
separation of powers perspective, the simultaneous presence of the EP and 
the intergovernmental Councils in the decision-making procedure generates 
demoicratic legitimacy within a democratic system of representation. The EP 
represents national positions on the transnational bonds, whilst Council 
represents deep diversity within the polity. The demoicratic conception of 
popular sovereignty can thus make sense of these two core institutions as 
offering democratic legitimacy to the European tier of governance. 
The third prominent governmental institution of the Union is the 
Commission. It is often dismissed as a bureaucratic institution which, 
therefore, fails to generate democratic legitimacy of any kind, but such an 
interpretation does not fully reflect the institutional reality. Firstly, the 
Commission consists of indirect representatives of the member states. The 
heads of state and government recommend them for their competence. To 
some extent, this places them on par with the average cabinet of ministers in 
many of Europe’s national arrangements, rather than merely being conceived 
as elite civil servants. And unlike the spoils systems of democratic 
appointment, the collective transnational parliament has to explicitly approve 
appointments. Similar arrangements exist in national polities, whether 
implicitly (the Netherlands) or explicitly by vote of confidence (Germany). Yet 
(coalition) governments are often supported by parliamentarian majorities, 
hence this expression of trust is somewhat a rubber stamp rather than a 
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meaningful transferral of democratic legitimation. The lack of direct 
relationship between, on the one hand, the Commission and the Council of 
the European Union and, on the other hand, the EP makes this procedure 
more of a meaningful act of recognition than what occurs in most European 
polities. The national demoi legitimate these governors to pursue commercial 
interests and manage other interdependencies peacefully. Some might object 
however that the Lisbon treaty determines that Commissioners should 
“promote the general interest of the Union” rather than their national interests 
(Council 2010: article 17). This treaty article seems to invoke a federal statist 
interpretation of the representative function of the commission. A completely 
technocratic body, isolated from external political influence, pace technocratic 
ideals, would be highly undesirable. In attaining democratic legitimacy, The 
ministerial appointment interpretation therefore accords particularly well with 
the commercial bond of European peoples. The Commission should govern 
with some degree of autonomy so as to remain effective in international 
negotiations and relatively impartial in the application of decisions within the 
Union. Still, it remains part of a system of checks and balances performed by 
the Councils and the EP at the European level. A demoicratic conception of 
popular sovereignty can thus also make sense of the Commission as a source 
of democratic legitimacy for the EU.  
The demoicratic conception of popular sovereignty offers a largely 
positive interpretation of the EU’s legitimacy. Up to this point, the demoicratic 
conception did not propose any institutional changes, but it did provide a more 
constructive frame through which to make the EU-regime intelligible as a 
political order, and to make sense of its legitimacy within its historical 
circumstances. Yet this might make it seem a mere defence of the status quo, 
simply utilising a different conceptual story. Demoicratic popular sovereignty, 
however, also generates a critical perspective on the current institutional 
organisation. European political integration is, at present, a process which is 
governed by the masters of the treaties: the heads of state and government in 
the Council of the European Union. This intergovernmental institution decides 
on both the direction and institutional regime of the Union. From a demoicratic 
perspective, their lack of direct democratic credentials is problematic because 
the rulers of the peoples decide upon the creation of new rulers for the 
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subjects. In this regard, Jonathan White forcefully argues that many European 
measures have not been the product of democratic procedures, but rather the 
exercise of unchecked decisions by a European elite (both intergovernmental 
and supranational). He concludes that the lack of a clear popular sovereign 
contributes to the perpetuation of emergency politics (White 2015). From a 
demoicratic perspective, the question becomes how to include the demoi in 
the constitutional process of European integration? In line with other 
demoicrats, this demoicratic conception of popular sovereignty points toward 
a greater role for national parliaments in transnational decision-making. This 
institution is demoicratic because, firstly, it remains firmly grounded in the 
national polity, unlike the EP and Commission. Secondly, it reflects the 
plurality of the demoi to a much greater degree than state representatives do. 
The emphasis on the role of national parliaments has been a topic in both 
political and academic debates on the democratic deficit (e.g. Auel 2007; 
Cooper 2005; Glencross 2014). The yellow card procedure has been the 
institutional result of these debates. This innovation institutionalises the 
principle of subsidiarity in the Union, which Ian Cooper describes as the virtual 
third chamber of the Union (Cooper 2005). This virtual chamber generates 
further demoicratic legitimacy for the EU because it means direct 
representation of the European peoples. National parliaments gain influence 
on the second order process, which indirectly influences the unwritten 
Kompetenzen Katalog of the Union (that is the division of powers among 
levels of governments in a Union or federation). This institution is certainly a 
demoicratic improvement, even if it is the result of intergovernmental pro-
European politicians attempting to overcome the democratic deficit (Beetz 
2015). Despite being a demoicratic improvement, this ex-post accountability 
function does not offer the degree of ownership implied by the demoicratic 
conception of popular sovereignty. 
A demoicratic conception of popular sovereignty strongly suggests a 
demoi with a pronounced institutional role in the formation of the Treaties 
governing the EU. A constitutional process in which citizens participate as 
equals in the creation of common principles is an elusive prospect in 
modernity’s enlarged polities. The modern model of representative 
government nonetheless suggests that representatives could partake in the 
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name of associational interests (Kalyvas 2005). In Europe’s national polities, 
constitutions can change through multiple majorities of the representatives of 
the demos; the parliament or parliaments. The government cannot change the 
constitution without multiple, often qualified, parliamentary majorities and/or 
referenda. In the European context, a more demoicratic solution would 
institutionalise a (non-virtual) parliament of national parliaments to draft 
proposals for treaties. The Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union 
Affairs of Parliaments of the European Union (COSAC) would be well suited 
for this role. This conference is a better representation of Europe’s peoples 
than the governments. Yet it has no constitutional role in the formation of the 
treaties. This proposal finds resonance among other demoicrats (Bellamy 
2013: 509; Neyer 2014). The national parliaments are a more suitable source 
of democratic legitimacy than the heads of state of governments in a 
demoicracy because the former better represent the diversity present in 
Europe’s particularistic polities. To make a historical comparison, American 
states did not send a single representative to Philadelphia, where, by 
comparison those were rather elitist affairs with a limited degree of internal 
pluralism within the states (Rossi 2010a: 37-38). Returning to the European 
context, integrating a greater number of checks and balances in this 
constitutional process, compared to national equivalents, would further do 
justice to the thinness of the bonds of collectivity between the peoples. 
Treaties might, as a consequence, require acceptance by the Council of the 
European Union, popular ratification through referenda, or maybe both. On 
the referenda, these should remain organised along national lines which 
remain compatible with the demoicratic vision. In both cases, this influence 
should probably remain an ex-post veto. The primary responsibility of drafting 
however should lie with (the true representatives of) the constituent power of 
Europe’s demoicracy: the national parliaments in their collectivity. The 
inclusion of national parliaments should transfer greater democratic legitimacy 
because the peoples’ will would become more prominently reflected in the 
second tier of their political order. Furthermore, the institutionalisation of a 
constitutional procedure could contribute to preventing further integration 
through rather authoritarian emergency politics. One particular episode of this 
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kind of politics has been broadly discussed already and often mentioned in 
this thesis, namely, the 2008 financial crisis and its aftermath.  
The final reflection analyses the central institutions of the Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) in the context of the euro crisis. Many demoicrats 
express critical views on the EMU.10 The demoicratic conception of popular 
sovereignty results in a similar critique of its legitimacy. Lacking clear 
consensus about the finalité politique, many European institutions were 
primarily designed in pursuit of particular policy goals (Bartolini 2005: 194-
199). One of the most ambitious and recently most controversial policies has 
been the creation of a monetary union. The 2008 global financial and related 
economic crisis, however, had severe consequences for the democracies of 
the Union. The responses to the series of intermediate and severe crises 
have been eclectic to some extent. Nevertheless, a pattern toward executive 
federalism has been identified (Crum 2013: 621-623). To quote Ben Crum at 
length,  
 
This tendency is aptly called ‘federal’ to the extent that it involves the 
deepening of common frameworks for financial and economic policy-making 
and the strengthening of European surveillance. Typically, even if central 
policy co-ordination is reinforced, much of that co-ordination allows for a 
certain level of diversity, and actually acknowledges it to be ineradicable. … 
At the same time, the tendency is clearly towards a form of executive-
dominated federalism. The overall policy frameworks and the surveillance 
procedures remain under control of the national governments. This has three 
important implications. First, it means that these processes operate beyond 
effective parliamentary scrutiny. […] The second implication of the key role of 
executives is that this mode of decision-making basically evolves according to 
the logic of international power rather than that it is subject to procedural 
principle. […] The third implication of the continued primacy of national 
governments in EMU is the prominent role attained by objectified guidelines 
and technocratic procedures in the governing process. As the national 
governments cannot themselves execute the actual supervision of each 
other’s financial and economic policies, they delegate these tasks to 
technocratic authorities – most notably the European Commission and the 
ECB (Crum 2013: 621-622).11  
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This pattern arguably constitutes a continuation of earlier less democratic 
patterns of integration (e.g. Bartolini 2005; White 2015).  
Leaving aside empirical considerations for immediate responses to the 
specific crisis, the internal unification of monetary policy transgresses the 
boundaries of the demoicratic conception of popular sovereignty by imposing 
a process of unification rather than coordination. As Ben Crum concludes, 
“Ultimately, the tendency towards executive federalism can be expected to 
lead to states being bound to ever more detailed policy contracts that hollow 
out their political autonomy in financial and economic matters” (Crum 2013: 
623). The automatic penalties for national authorities with ‘indefensible’ 
budget deficits in the Stability and Growth Pact has been characterised as a 
‘straitjacket’ between mistrusting member states, rather than being conceived 
as a macroeconomic policy to further common economic interests (Bartolini 
2005: 198). The design of the ECB further exemplifies the problematic nature 
of this tendency from a demoicratic perspective on popular sovereignty. It can 
best characterized as ‘technocratic’ and ‘federal’. The ECB’s autonomy is 
unprecedented, even compared to pre-existing national arrangements 
(Bartolini 2005: 196; see also Streeck 2014). This design aimed to ensure 
insulation from direct political control and, more importantly, popular 
pressures. Furthermore, its autonomous decisions are directly applicable to 
the entire Eurozone, its ‘federal’ decisions therefore govern across an 
economically heterogeneous polity. The ECB, as part of the troika, can 
directly intervene in national democracies (Bellamy and Castiglione 2013: 
217). This institutional structure, designed to pursue of a common monetary 
policy, conflicts with the demoicratic conception of popular sovereignty. The 
euro crisis illustrates the impact of the peoples of the Union and the lack of 
democratic popular accountability of these monetary institutions to them. This 
supranational institution has competences to govern without consideration for 
particularity across the European polity but it does so without being held to 
account to the representatives peoples in their plurality: the national 
parliaments. It no longer represents a transnational commercial bond between 
sovereign demoi, but is now a centralised hierarchical institution in a 
transnational polity. The logic of such an institution is the presumption of a 
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single people. Moreover, it is a technocratic rather than a democratic 
institution due to the lack of democratic representation in them. For these 
reasons, it does not generate any demoicratic legitimacy.  
The demoicratic conception of popular sovereignty cannot make sense 
of the EMU-regime’s legitimacy in its current executive federal form. My 
interpretation of the transnational bonds recognises that commercial 
relationships justify transnational governance. The deep diversity in the polity 
warrants recognition within decision-making procedures. The national demoi 
thus have an interest in external unity, but they nevertheless require internal 
flexibility (see also Nicolaïdis 2013: 359). Crum’s analysis indicates that 
implementation often uses flexible implementation through national 
bureaucracies. Still, some centralised decisions cannot be accommodated 
within Europe’s polity characterised by deep diversity. Maybe Ben Crum’s 
hope for democratic innovation proves right (Crum 2013: 625-628). The 
historical track record, however, and lack of constitutional structures to keep 
elites’ emergency powers in check suggest a more pessimistic picture about 
this prospect. The lack of democratic legitimacy in this powerful and 
autonomous set of executive institutions is deeply problematic. Leaving aside 
feasibility, if deemed necessary for the Union’s commercial interests, their 
democratisation would require a substantial amount of institutional alteration 
to align with a demoicratic conception of popular sovereignty. It alternatively 
remains a constant source of democratic delegitimation and popular 
resentment, which, at least according to Crum, could become the source of 
(legitimate) democratic resistance to the European integration (Crum 2013: 
630). From this perspective, therefore, the demoicratic conception of popular 
sovereignty cannot accommodate every kind of political institution. As the 
above analysis shows, this conception of popular sovereignty challenges the 
status quo, whilst offering a more plausible heuristic tool for political agents 
Finally, this conceptual structure nonetheless remains open to 
accommodating disagreements on relevant conceptions, even at a more 
normative level. Many republican demoicrats lament the enforced internal 
conditionality. One problem is that the logic of the international domain, 
namely power, takes over from the democratic procedural equality between 
intergovernmental agents (Crum 2013). Strong member states enforce their 
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will upon weaker ones. In the case of the Eurozone crisis, the wealthy 
Northern countries enforce their logic of austerity upon the Southern 
countries, broadly speaking (Streeck 2014). Bellamy’s more state-oriented 
proposals reject this state of affairs by basing himself on an ethos of non-
domination (e.g. Bellamy 2013; Bellamy and Castiglione 2013; Bellamy and 
Weale 2015). Alternatively, Nicolaïdis appeals to mutual transnational 
recognition (e.g. Nicolaïdis 2013; Nicolaïdis and Young 2014; Pélabay, 
Lacroix et al. 2010), which is arguably an equally attractive alternative, or a 
complementary, albeit more demanding ethos. Yet a liberal ethos of tolerance 
could also govern transnational relations, and be less demanding in 
comparison to republican non-domination or the Hegelian ideal of recognition. 
This openness is a merit from a realist perspective. To return to Williams, a 
political value should be able to sustain a political order whilst enabling the 
expression social disagreement. The demoicratic conception of popular 
sovereignty enables disagreement on a myriad of issues. How to define our 
commercial interests? How European should states behave toward another? 
How many checks and balances are necessary at the European level? And 
what competences should remain organised nationally? These issues 
constitute important political issues that I have purposefully left open in this 
account. In a demoicratic polity, citizens (through their representatives) should 
decide on such issues. My realist project attempted to show reasons for the 
unfruitfulness of the conceptual structure of the current debate. In this final 
chapter, I proposed a conception of demoicratic popular sovereignty based on 
already institutionalised European bonds of collectivity that could govern 
these first-order debates on the democratic deficit in a more fruitful manner. 
This hopefully demonstrated that Williams’ political realist thought offers an 
insightful and constructive lens through which to make sense of the EU’s 
democratic deficit. 
 
VI - Conclusion: Realistic hope for a democratic future 
The first quote of the epigraph is from an encounter between representatives 
of a Tsimshian tribe and those of the U.S. government. The former asked the 
latter: “If this is your land, where are your stories?” The indigenous tribe 
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challenged the Western colonizers by effectively asking for their legitimation 
stories. European integration has resulted in a similar dynamic. Europe’s 
democratic homo nationalis do not necessarily dismiss European integration 
out of hand. A majority believe that the European project is a positive 
development (Bellamy 2006: 248), citizens express sincere concerns about 
the EU’s democratic legitimacy. This thesis’ philosophical inquiry into the 
contemporary conception popular sovereignty which governs this debate goes 
some way to illuminating this tension between an acceptance of European 
integration as a desirable development, and an inability to make sense of the 
EU’s democratic credentials. Reliance on the multi-faceted conception of 
popular sovereignty results in an inability to make sense of the EU’s 
legitimacy. The realist perspective clearly draws out the importance of the 
practical resonance of political fictions and their desirability in intelligibly 
making sense of a legitimate political order. A realistic legitimation story, 
therefore, takes seriously the historical circumstances in which a concept did 
and should operate (Hall Forthcoming; Sangiovanni 2008; Williams 2005). 
The pessimism associated with political realism (Hall Forthcoming: 3-4) does 
not imply the dismissal of hope in favour of fear. Realistic hope does not result 
in curtailing all hope for political change all together, rather it limits the 
distance between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ (Sleat 2013). Hope requires a degree of 
realism to temper disappointment and the subsequent resentment of politics 
(Sleat 2013). From this perspective, the messianic visions of re-establishing 
sovereignty in Europe (Nicolaïdis 2013; Weiler 2012) are not merely utopian 
within Europe’s current balance of power, but dystopian sources of 
resentment. Demoicractic popular sovereignty fosters a realistic hope for the 
attainment of a legitimate democratic politics in Europe because it takes into 
account historical circumstances. Instead of an unlikely and hence unstable 
equilibrium, a demoicratic conception of popular sovereignty can govern 
plausible legitimation stories toward a shared democratic future. Practical 
political realities, such as the competition for power and the grip statist 
sovereignty exerts on the political imagination, might hinder this demoicratic 
vision and make it seem an unrealistic prospect. Yet political realism is not 
about dogmatically defending the status quo. Hope has its place in this 
tradition. Political imaginations change, and thus, so can the political status 
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quo. On that note, with in mind the EU’s persistent legitimacy crisis, I want to 





                                            
1
 Quoted in (Bobbitt 2002: 715). 
2
 Some discussion can exist on Immanuel Kant’s position in these matters, though this would 
take us too far afield. In short, a disjunction seems to exist between Kant’s theoretical 
republican argument and practical politics favouring enlightened monarchs. 
3
 See also (Cheneval 2007). 
4
 Multiculturalism has arguably made this true for all Western European polities to greater or 
lesser extent (see Bohman 2003). 
5
 The pre-existing memories against which European peoples make sense of the Union also 
limits the emergence of a meaningful public sphere (Lacroix and Nicolaïdis 2010b). This lack 
might be a matter of time (Malcolm 1991). This, however, would take us into the realm of 
peoples’ beliefs rather than the institutionalisation of relationships between EU-citizens. 
6
 In the European case, Bellamy points toward intergovernmental agreements as the 
empirical source of European integration which cumulated in the emergence of the EU 
(Bellamy 2013: 504). Others propose a less quaint narrative of continuous usage of 
emergency powers (Crum 2013; White 2015). The current EU-regime is clearly the product of 
legal intergovernmental, and some supranational, force.  
7
 Francis Cheneval offers a Hobbessian account of these interdependencies which results in 
a multilateral order in contemporary circumstances (Cheneval 2007). See, for a contrary 
argument, Glyn Morgan’s Hobbesian justification for a European superstate (Morgan 2005a; 
2005b). 
8
 On a side note, the democratic credentials of these non-majoritarian governance practices 
are also unfavourably appraised within national arrangements (Klijn and Skelcher 2007). 
9
 The Council of the European Union and the Council for Common Foreign and Security 
Policy are exceptions to the norm because they include supranational representatives. This 
European representative might, however, strengthen these Councils’ demoicratic legitimacy, 
because they combine individuals, who represent overarching commercial interests and the 
democratic interest in peace, as well as representatives of the constituent powers. 
10
 Taking a republican intergovernmental perspective, Richard Bellamy comes to the 
conclusion that the monetary union resulted in normatively undesirable consequences 
(Bellamy 2013). In a similar vein, Kalypso Nicolaïdis observes that the financial crisis has 
strengthened perception of a crisis of demoicracy in Europe (Nicolaïdis 2013: 351). 
11
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